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ABSTRACT
The people of Mobile, Alabama, supported the seces­
sion of their state from the Union in January 1861, and 
thousands of her able-bodied men served in the Confederate 
army from 1861 to 1865. Recognizing the city's strategic 
importance as a port and major railroad center connecting 
the eastern and western sections of the new nation, the 
Confederate government moved quickly to provide adequate 
defenses for Mobile. Confederate soldiers occupied and 
began to strengthen Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines, which 
guarded the main channels leading into Mobile Bay. The 
Confederate Navy Department converted several steamers 
into gunboats and began construction of four ironclads, 
all designed to support the land defenses of Mobile.
As the war progressed, Union land and naval forces 
moved into the Gulf of Mexico, and the Confederate 
authorities realized that Mobile required more defensive 
works than the two forts at the mouth of the bay. 
Engineers, using slave labor, designed and constructed 
earthern forts along the bay shore near the city and on
vi
various islands at the mouths of the rivers which emp­
tied into the bay. They intended all of these batteries 
to protect the water approaches to Mobile in the event of 
an enemy naval force running past Fort Morgan and Fort 
Gaines. To protect the city from a land attack, the 
engineers erected a series of earthen redoubts con­
nected by infantry entrenchments around Mobile. By war's 
end, three separate lines of forts and trenches sur­
rounded the city. Mobile undoubtedly possessed fortifi­
cations as extensive and strong as almost any city in the 
Confederacy.
Confederate President Jefferson Davis personally 
chose for assignment as commanding general at Mobile men 
whom he knew had the qualifications needed to push the 
construction of all of these defensive works and whom he 
could rely on to conduct a successful defense against an 
enemy attack. Confederate brigades, regiments, and 
artillery batteries moved in and out of the city through­
out the war. Although the garrison at times shrank in 
size to levels which alarmed its commanders, the Confed­
erate military authorities in Richmond made a commitment 
to see that enough men manned the fortifications to put 
up a stiff resistance to an actual enemy attack. The 
War Department also always made sure that the territorial 
command to which Mobile belonged, whether a department or 
a district, had the defense of the city as its objective.
The Union high command did not seriously contemplate 
an attack against the Mobile defenses until relatively 
late in the war. While strategic objectives in other 
areas caused the Union military authorities to delay a 
move against Mobile, the strength of the defenses around 
the city played a part in the decision. A naval demon­
stration against an earthen fort at Grant's Pass in 
February 1864 resulted in little damage to that work. 
Admiral David G. Farragut successfully led a squadron of 
monitors and wooden gunboats past Fort Morgan and Fort 
Gaines in August 1864 and captured the lower bay 
defenses. The commitment of land forces elsewhere pre­
vented the Union navy from proceeding at that time in a 
campaign against Mobile itself. Such a campaign finally 
got under way in March 1865, but it had defensive works 
on the eastern shore as its primary objective. After 
brief sieges, these Confederate fortifications fell.
Faced by overwhelming numbers, Mobile's commander evacu­
ated the city on April 12, 1865, and the city's govern­
mental authorities surrendered Mobile to the enemy that 
same day.
CHAPTER I
"...A SEAPORT SUSCEPTIBLE OF IMPREGNABLE DEFENSE..."
Mobile on the eve of the Civil War was the leading 
city of Alabama and one of the most important cities in 
the South. It was also an old town, the French, under 
Pierre LeMoyne, Sieur d'Iberville, having established a 
settlement there in 1711. From then until 1814, when it 
fell to General Andrew Jackson, Mobile belonged succes­
sively to the French, British, and Spanish governments. 
When the Americans took possession, the population num­
bered a mere handful, but it grew steadily and stood at 
29,258 persons in 1860.^ One observer described the 
city in 1861:
...With a population of thirty thousand the 
city contains many pleasant residences, em­
bowered in shade trees, and surrounded by 
generous grounds. It is rendered attrac­
tive by its tall pines, live oak, and Pride- 
of-China trees....
Joseph Wheeler, "Alabama," Confederate Military 
History, ed. by Clement A. Evans, 12 vols. (Atlanta: 
Confederate Publishing Co., 1899), VII, 7-12; Bureau of 
the Census, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, 
Population (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1864), 9.
2
Albert D. Richardson, The Secret Service, the 
Field, the Dungeon, and the Escape (Hartford, Conn.: 
American Publishing Co., 1865), 95.
1
2Located on a sandy plain near the northwest corner of
Mobile Bay, the city enjoyed excellent drainage and had
no problems with mud. The inhabitants found this sand
difficult to cross, however, so they established over
the years a system of oyster-shell roads. These roads
became a favorite carriage route and were well-known
3
throughout the Gulf South.
Partly because of the various countries which had 
owned the area and partly due to her status as a major 
port, Mobile boasted a significant number of foreign born 
persons in her population. The 1860 census recorded 
7,733 foreigners in the city, one-fourth of the total
4
population and 37 percent of the white population. A 
visitor to Mobile felt that her society was "more cosmo­
politan than that of any city in the South, save per-
5haps, New Orleans." When British correspondent William 
Howard Russell made a brief inspection of the city in 
May 1861, he wrote in his diary some interesting
3
William Rix, Incidents of Life in a Southern City 
During the War (privately printed, 1865), [1]; Fitz­
gerald Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, 
ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Urbana: University of Illi-
nois Press, 1958), 201.
4
Eighth Census, Population, 10.
5Thomas Cooper DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals; 
An Inside View of Life in the Southern Confederacy, from 
Birth to Death TNew York: Collier Books, 1962 reprint),
72.
observations on this aspect of Mobile's society. One of
the first things he noticed upon his arrival was "a
fringe of tall warehouses, and shops alongside [the
wharf], over which were names indicating Scotch, Irish,
English, many Spanish, German, Italian, and French
owners." Later Russell found the market "crowded with
Negroes, mulattoes, quadroons, and mestizos of all sorts
Spanish, Italian, and French, speaking their own tongues
or a quaint lingua franca, and dressed in very striking
7
and pretty costumes."
Two colleges operated in or near Mobile in 1860: 
the Medical College of Alabama and Spring Hill College. 
The former was a branch of the University of Alabama,
O
the latter a private school run by the Jesuit order.
Mobile had seven public schools and several private
academies, all of which had reputations for their fine
9
educational standing. With five hospitals, the city 
could provide excellent care for its sick. The Protest- 
and Orphas Asylum, the Catholic Orphan Asylum, the
^William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, 
ed. by Fletcher Pratt (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
106.
^Ibid., 108.
0
Sister Esther Marie Goodrow, Mobile During the 
Civil War (Mobile: Historic Mobile Preservation
Society, 1950), 11.
9
Ibid.
4Female Benevolent Society, the Samaritan Society, and 
the "Can1t-Get-Away-Club" constituted the city's chari­
table institutions. Twenty-four Christian places of 
worship and two Jewish synagogues ministered to the 
spiritual needs of the populace. Mobile also had one of 
the finest fire departments in the South, consisting of 
eight engine companies and one hook-and-ladder company.
Mobile was a prosperous city primarily because of 
its status as a center for trade and commerce. As a 
port, Mobile stood second only to New Orleans in the 
South. More than 330 vessels cleared and over 200 ves­
sels entered the port in 1860. The value of articles 
exported totalled $38,670,183. Foreign imports amounted 
to $1,050,310."^ Much of Mobile's trade moved up and 
down the rivers which converged on the city, primarily
Ibid., 11-12; "Mobile— Its Past and Presnt," 
DeBow's Review, XXVIII (1860) , 310-11. The "Can't-Get- 
Away-Club" was the most famous of the city's charitable 
organizations. Formed in 1839, it had as its goal the 
aiding of victims of yellow fever epidemics. The name 
derrived from the fact that the original members were 
citizens who could not get away from the city during the 
1839 epidemic. Frances Annette Isbell, "A Social and 
Economic History of Mobile, 1865-1875" (unpublished 
master's thesis, University of Alabama, 1951), 75;
Mobile Press Register, Oct. 17, 1948.
"^Robert L. Robinson, "Mobile in the 1850s: A
Social, Cultural and Economic History" (unpublished 
master's thesis, University of Alabama, 1955), 66; U. S. 
Treasury Department, Commerce and Navigation of the 
United States, 1860 (Washington, D. C.: Geo. W. Bowman,
Printer, 1860), 350, 522, 556, 560.
5the Tombigbee and Alabama river systems. Alabama is
said to have had "more navigable river miles than any
state in the nation," and most flowed into Mobile Bay.
Alabama produced more cotton than any other Southern
state except Mississippi by 1860, and the majority of
these bales were sold in Mobile. In exchange for this
cotton coming down the rivers, Mobile's merchants sent
to the planters and farmers of the interior such goods
12as pork, corn, flour, and whiskey.
Mobile was never a center of Southern radicalism
during the antebellum period. Her commercial ties with
the North and her fairly large population of foreigners
seemed to argue for continued ties with the North. In
the presidential election of November 1860, Mobile
County voters cast 1,823 votes for Stephen A. Douglas;
1,629 for John Bell; and 1,541 for John C. Breckinridge:
a better than two-to-one majority against the secession- 
13ist candidate. Apparently the election of Abraham 
Lincoln pushed Mobilians toward the secessionist camp.
12Weymouth T. Jordan, "Ante-Bellum Mobile: Ala­
bama's Agricultural Emporium," Alabama Review, I (1948), 
180-81; Agriculture of the United States in 1860; Com­
piled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864) ,
xciv; Robinson, "Mobile in the 1850s," 66-67.
13Clarence P. Denman, The Secession Movement in 
Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama State Department of
Archives and History, 1933), 120.
6On December 7, 1860, the city's leading newspaper 
stated: "The rapid progress of events within the last
few weeks leaves little ground for hope that the Union 
can be preserved upon any basis, just, equitable, and 
satisfactory to the Southern people." This article 
expressed the hope that the separation would be 
peaceful.^
Mayor Jones M. Withers of Mobile issued a procla­
mation on December 8 in which he stated: "We are in the
midst of a revolution, and are invoking the sovereignty
15of our State against wrong and oppression." Two days 
earlier Governor Andrew B. Moore had issued a call, in 
accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly, 
for an election of delegates on the twenty-fourth to a 
state convention to consider the course Alabama would 
follow. In meetings at Temperance Hall, the secession­
ists nominated their delegates, and the cooperationists
16met at Odd Fellows Hall to select their slate. The 
news of the secession of South Carolina reached Mobile 
late on December 20 and, "though not unexpected, caused
14Mobile Daily Advertiser, Dec. 7, 1860.
15Ibid., Dec. 9, 1860.
^Wheeler, "Alabama," 34; Mobile Daily Advertiser, 
Dec. 4, 19, 1860; William L. Barney, The Secessionist 
Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), 253-54.
7considerable excitement, and a salute of 100 guns was
v 17fxred...xn honor of the event." Coming as xt did just 
prior to the election of delegates in Alabama, the seces­
sion of South Carolina undoubtedly affected the vote in 
Mobile.
Clarence P. Denman, in studying the secession of
Alabama, wrote: "The returns [of the state convention
delegates election] from Mobile County came as quite a
surprise to those who regarded the cooperationist party
18as the successor of the Bell and Douglas parties;..." 
Those returns showed 2,297 votes cast for the secession­
ists and 1,229 for the cooperationists: a majority of
191,068 for the former. In analyzxng these results,
Denman concludes:
...The cooperationists of the county had advo­
cated a method of withdrawing so closely akin 
to straight-out secession that they should 
have received the votes of all those not 
strongly in favor of separate state action; 
therefore, the large majority for the straight- 
outs indicates that the people of Mobile County 
were in harmony with the interior of the 
state.
17Mobxle Daily Advertiser, Dec. 21, 1860.
18Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 120.
19Ibxd.; Leavy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama 
From 1850 Through 1860 (Wetumpka, Ala.: Wetumpka Print-
xng Co., 1935), 194; Barney, The Secessionist Impulse, 
253.
20Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 120.
8The Alabama convention began its meetings in Mont­
gomery on January 7, 1861. Four days later the dele­
gates voted sixty-three to thirty-nine to take the state 
out of the Union. Business establishments in Mobile had 
closed down awaiting the decision of the convention. 
During the afternoon of the eleventh, the news of seces­
sion reached the city. Widespread celebrations broke 
out in Mobile. The militia fired one hundred guns in 
salute, and bands struck up joyful tunes. All of 
Mobile's military companies turned out to parade through 
the streets. That night the citizens lit lamps and 
candles in homes and businesses and tar barrels along 
Government Street so that the revelry might continue.
A huge fireworks display in Bienville Square highlighted
the night celebration. A large element of the populace
21obviously supported secession.
The city's newspapers picked up the popular 
enthusiasm. The leading daily, anticipating the forma­
tion of a Southern nation, recommended that Mobile be 
established as the capital of the Confederacy. The 
article expressed the view that the Confederacy would 
expand in time to Mexico and the West Indies. If this
21New Orleans Daily Picayune, Jan. 13, 1861; Cald­
well Delaney, The Story of Mobile (Mobile: Gill Print­
ing Co., 1953), 111; Goodrow, Mobile During the Civil 
War, 16.
9occurred, the reasons for placing the center of govern­
ment at Mobile would be obvious:
...Mobile is, to a degree, the convenient cen­
ter of the present and the geographical center 
of the future, is a seaport susceptible of 
impregnable defence, is healthful, and in every 
respect eligible for the honor of being ^  
elected the capital city of the South....
Should Mobile not be chosen, the Daily Advertiser article
stated that Montgomery would be the next logical choice.
Before the secession convention met in Montgomery,
Governor Moore had begun seizing federal installations
and property near Mobile. On January 3 he called out six
Mobile companies of the First Alabama State Troops for
this purpose. Two companies moved by steamer on January
4 to seize Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines at the mouth of
Mobile Bay, while four companies moved at the same time
against the Mount Vernon Arsenal, thirty miles north of
Mobile. Ordnance Sergeant S. Patterson turned over all
of the property under his supervision at Fort Morgan to
Colonel John B. Todd. Not until January 18, however,
did Colonel Todd take formal possession of Fort Gaines
from Lieutenant C. B. Reese of the United States Corps
of Engineers. Both forts were still in an unfinished
state, and United States engineer troops had worked to
^ Mobile Daily Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1861.
10
strengthen them. The property seized included some 5,000
shot and shell.^
Captain Jesse L. Reno, commanding at Mount Vernon
Arsenal, reported that he surrendered his post after
being surprised and overwhelmed by the Mobile soldiers.
He had only seventeen men under his command and could
not have resisted. The arsenal's stores included
twenty thousand stands of arms, fifteen hundred barrels
24of powder, a few cannon, and other munitions. In 
reporting the seizure of all this property to President 
James Buchanan, Governor Moore explained that he had 
acted in self-defense, as he had information that the 
Federals intended to reinforce the forts and place a
23Ordnance Sergeant S. Patterson to the Adjutant 
General, Jan. 5, 1861, in U. S. War Department, War of 
the Rebellion; Official Records of the Union and Confed­
erate Armies, 128 parts in 70 vols. (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 1, Vol. I, 
327, hereinafter cited as O.R., all references are to 
Series 1 unless otherwise noted; Governor A. B. Moore to 
President James Buchanan, Jan. 4 [?], 1861, ibid.,
327-28; Lieutenant C. B. Reese to General J. G. Totten, 
Jan. 19, 1861, ibid., 329-30; Thomas A. Smith, "Mobili­
zation of the Army in Alabama, 1859-1865" (unpublished 
master's thesis, Auburn University, 1953), 13; Lee F. 
Irwin Memoirs, Irwin Collection, City of Mobile Museum 
Department; "Report of the Engineer Bureau, Nov. 30, 
1861," Report of the Secretary of War, Sen. Exec. Doc. 1, 
37th Cong., 2nd Session, Vol. II, 103; J. Thomas Scharf, 
History of the Confederate States Navy (New York;
Rogers & Sherwood, 1887), 21.
24Captain Jesse L. Reno to Captain William Mayna- 
dier, Jan. 4, 1861, O.R. , I, 327; Montgomery Weekly 
Post, Jan. 9, 1861; Irwin Memoirs.
11
strong guard at the arsenal. He hoped, he said, to
avoid bloodshed and hostilities. Moore closed his letter
by stating:
An inventory of the property in the forts 
and arsenal has been ordered, and the strict­
est care will be taken to prevent the injury 
or destruction of it while peaceable relations 
continue to subsist, as I trust they will.
The forts and arsenal will be held by my order 
only for the precautionary purpose for which 
they were taken,...
After the seizure of the forts, Mobile's citizens 
continued to form military companies, and the newspapers 
urged them to begin thinking about the possibility of 
war, At least one paper suggested that the city's fire 
companies follow an example set in Charleston and organ­
ize themselves for military duty. This would not be 
difficult to do since the companies were already 
enlisted, were accustomed to obeying orders, and could 
adapt quickly to drill. These companies would act pri­
marily as a home guard, maintaining their present 
uniforms. The paper expected that no more than one-
third of the men would be used for duty outside the city
2 6at one time. The firemen took these suggestions to 
^Moore to Buchanan, Jan. 4 [?], 1861, O.R., I,
328.
2 6Mobile Daily Advertiser, Jan. 9, 1861.
12
heart and did organize for home defense. A Fire Brigade
27formed and used the engine houses as armories.
Governor Moore acted quickly after Alabama seceded 
to provide for the defense of Mobile. On his own 
authority he gave permission to his assistant quarter­
master, Colonel Duff C. Green, to make a draft of 
$10,000 against the Executive Department. The money 
would be used to strengthen the forts below the city.
At the time neither the General Assembly nor the seces­
sion convention had appropriated funds for that purpose. 
Green wrote to Moore that the people of Mobile intended 
to raise $100,000 for the same purpose. This money 
could later be reimbursed by the State. Moore wrote 
that "Mobile must be defended at whatever cost," but he
urged his military subordinates to use public monies
28economically and efficiently.
The four Mobile companies which had seized Fort 
Morgan remained there under Colonel Todd to garrison and 
strengthen the post. In a short time, however, new com­
panies from the city and companies from the interior and 
Mississippi would take turns of duty at Morgan. A tug 
boat steamed back and forth from Mobile to keep the men
27Ibid., Jan. 22, 1861.
28Moore to Colonel Duff C. Green, Jan. 12, 1861, 
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 5.
13
supplied with fresh food and other goods. As the force
in Morgan grew in size, the men boarded up some of the
casemates and converted them into barracks rooms. The
officers drilled the men and gave some artillery
instruction. The men's health remained good, and their
spirits were high. They usually took twenty-four to
forty-eight hours to adjust to the new military 
29routine.
Planters in the interior of Alabama offered the 
services of some of their slaves to help construct 
defenses. At one time the engineers employed as many as 
150 laborers at Fort Morgan. On another occasion the 
authorities expected some 400 slaves to arrive in the 
city. The volunteers and laborers cleaned all of the 
cisterns in the fort so that fresh rain water could be 
put in them. With the carriages available, the men 
mounted all of the artillery pieces they could. They 
also used sandbags to sod the ramparts facing the ship 
channel. In time the rest of the fort would receive the 
same treatment, but for the time being, the men cut 
grass sod for the outer faces. After the men dug 
trenches at the base of the scarp, water filled the
29Mobile Daily Advertiser, Jan. 13, 17, 1861; New 
York Herald, Jan. 14, 1861; Daily Picayune, Jan. 24, 
1861; W. H. Fowler to William M. Brooks, Jan. 15, 1861, 
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 8.
14
trenches from the soil and added a little to the defen­
sive posture of the fort.^ Much more work needed to be 
done, however, to ready Morgan for an attack.
Throughout the remainder of January and much of
February 1861, military companies from Mobile and else-
31where shuffled in and out of Fort Morgan. Some of
Mobile's volunteers went to Pensacola, Florida, to help
garrison that town. As all of these military companies
moved through Mobile, the businessmen of the city did
what they could to help the men. The owners of the
Battle House Hotel made rooms available at moderate
rates and gave the soldiers as much attention as possible
despite boarders who objected to the hotel being used as 
32a barracks. Citizens continued to rejoice as news of 
the secession of other Southern states arrived. When 
Louisiana left the Union, the soldiers fired an artillery 
salute, but there had been too much previous celebrating 
for the city to be illuminated again. One newspaper 
stated: "The rejoicing on the part of our people is,
however, just as deep, sincere and pervading as if the
3flDaily Picayune, Jan. 24, 1861.
^^Mobile Daily Advertiser, Feb. 7, 22, 24, 28, 1861. 
32Ibid., Jan. 24, 1861; Pensacola Tri-Weekly 
Gazette, Jan. 24, 1861, quoted in ibid., Jan. 27, 1861.
15
demonstrations were of the most extensive and noisy 
33character."
The new Confederate government became involved in 
the defense Of Mobile almost immediately after its 
formation. Secretary of War Leroy Pope Walker tele­
graphed Colonel John H. Forney at Barrancas Barracks, 
Florida, on February 26 and asked if any columbiads 
(large siege artillery pieces) could be spared from 
Fort McRae to be used in Fort Morgan. When Forney 
replied that two such guns could be spared, Walker
informed him to make the transfer "without delay, so as
34not to excite suspicion and report." Forney reported
on March 4 that two eight-inch columbiads, with complete
carriages, chasis, equipment, and implements, had been
35sent to Morgan that day. Several days later, on 
March 7, the military authorities at Mobile received by 
rail two ten-inch columbiads from the Tredegar Iron 
Works in Richmond, Virginia. These guns also had Morgan
33Ibid., Jan. 27, 1861.
34Leroy P. Walker to Colonel John H. Forney, Feb.
26, 1861, Telegrams Sent by the Confederate Secretary of 
War, 1861-1865, Chap. IX, Vol. 33, p. 2, RG 109, National 
Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C.; Walker 
to Forney, Feb. 28, 1861, ibid., 4.
33Forney to Walker, Mar. 4, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 23.
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as their destination. Their mile and a half range made
3 6these columbiads the most powerful guns at the fort.
On March 18, 1861, the Confederate War Department
assumed supervision of Fort Morgan by assigning Colonel
William J. Hardee to command of the post. Hardee,
author of the standard text on infantry tactics, would
have the services of two artillery officers to help 
37train the men. Nine and a half companies, about 800
men, comprised the garrison. Hardee found that the
officers and men alike lacked discipline and had had
little instruction. He began a program but could do
little by himself. On March 28 he wrote to Secretary
Walker to request officers capable of conducting both
infantry and artillery instruction, warning that if such
instructors were not provided the Alabama volunteers
would in battle "disgrace themselves and the Confed- 
3 8eracy." A visitor to the fort reported shortly
^ Mobile Daily Advertiser, Mar. 8, 1861; Mobile 
Daily Tribune, Mar. 8, 1861.
37Special Order No. 4, War Department, Adjutant 
General's Office, Mar. 18, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 27; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the
Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1959), 124.
38Major General Jeremiah Clemens to Secretary of 
War, Apr. 4, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 35; Colonel 
William J. Hardee to Walker, Mar. 28, 1861, ibid.,
30-31.
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afterwards, however, that Hardee seemed to have put the
39place "in thorough repair and readiness."
As Hardee's force at Fort Morgan grew, crowded con­
ditions compelled him to move most of the men outside 
the fort into tents. He did this for fear that yellow
fever or some other epidemic sickness might strike in the
close quarters. The troops still faced problems in their 
new situation, however. The only tents available were 
small, and the men had to remain out in the hot sun much 
of the time. Hardee had ordered the sand hills leveled 
and the few trees around cut down for defensive reasons. 
This action resulted in what an observer called "a huge, 
unbroken waste of sand, nearly as white as snow and 
intensely hot."^ By this time most of the south Ala­
bama companies had been relieved by units from the 
northern part of the state. These men were not accus­
tomed to such exposure. The observer mentioned above
recommended that the government provide larger tents
equipped with flies to allow the sea breeze to blow 
41through.
39DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitols, 73.
40John T. Morgan to Walker, Apr. 4, 1861, O.R.,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 48.
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Mobile's defenses suffered other problems at this 
time. Some people thought Fort Morgan capable of repel­
ling an attack by enemy vessels but not a land assault. 
More serious than this weakness, however, the approaches 
to Mobile from Mississippi Sound through Grant's Pass 
stood completely unprotected. The closest work to the 
pass, Fort Gaines, had no garrison and could not have 
prevented vessels of light draft from using the approach 
anyway. Some of the citizens in Mobile expressed under­
standable concern. Robert H. Smith, Mobile's represen­
tative in the Confederate Congress, suggested that
Hardee's command be extended to include Fort Gaines,
42Grant's Pass, and all other approaches to Mobile.
About this same time, Major General Jeremiah Cle­
mens of the Alabama militia suggested a further measure 
for the defense of Mobile. He recommended that guns 
from Fort Morgan be placed in defensive works on Dauphin
Island and Sand Island at the mouth of the bay and at
43Spanish River and Choctaw Point near the city. The 
Confederate authorities responded quickly to these 
requests. Major Danville Leadbetter, a noted engineer 
officer, received orders to inspect the defenses and make
^Robert H. Smith to Jefferson Davis, Apr. 13, 1861, 
ibid., 45-46.
43General Samuel Cooper to Hardee, Apr. 17, 1861, 
ibid., 52.
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a full report. General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant General
of the Confederacy, authorized Hardee to transfer guns to
the points suggested by Clemens, saying that the guns
would be replaced by others from the arsenal at Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. Finally, Cooper extended Hardee's
command to include Fort Gaines, Grant's Pass, and all
approaches to Mobile. Hardee would also have the ser-
44vices of the revenue cutter Lewis Cass.
In Mobile itself the war spirit rose to a fever
pitch. This was especially true following the fall of
Fort Sumter to Confederate forces. The news reached the
city by telegraph and spread quickly. Bells rang,
artillery salutes echoed over the bay, and the citizens
45turned out into the streets to celebrate. Five days 
later word of the secession of Virginia reached Mobile. 
This created even more excitement among the people. As 
one newspaper put it, the tidings "rose from the lips of
44John Tyler, Jr. to Percy Walker, Apr. 16, 1861, 
Letters Sent by the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861- 
1865, Chap. IX, Vol. 1, p. 196, RG 109, National 
Archives; Cooper to Danville Leadbetter, Mar. 19, 1861, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent by the Confederate Adjutant 
and Inspector General, 1861-1865, Chap. I, Vol. 35, p. 8, 
RG 109, National Archives; Cooper to Hardee, Apr. 17,
1861 (two communications), O.R., LII, Pt. 2, pp. 52, 53; 
Hardee to Walker, Apr. 21, 1861, ibid., 60; Walker to 
Hardee, Apr. 22, 1861, ibid., 61; Walker to Captain J. J. 
Morrison, Apr. 22, 1861, ibid.; Morrison to Walker,
Apr. 22, 1861, ibid.
45 .Richardson, The Secret Service, 97-98.
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the few who had first caught the news" and "was taken up
46and re-echoed by the voices of hundreds and thousands."
There were speeches, the clanging of bells, artillery
salutes, and fireworks. Most proprietors closed their
stores. That night the people burned lights and candles
in every window. Crowds gathered for a two-and-one-half
hour fireworks display, and the celebration continued
47until after eleven o'clock.
All of this excitement led to an increased mili- 
tantcy among the city's male population. Several visitors 
in Mobile commented on the phenomenon. A correspondent 
of the New York Tribune noted: "Hand-bills, headed 'Sol­
diers wanted,' and 'Ho! for volunteers,' met the eye at
every corner; uniforms and arms abounded, and the voice
48of the bugle was heard m  the streets." Captain 
Raphael Semmes, who passed through the city about this 
time, recalled later that "the young merchants had drop­
ped their daybooks and ledgers, and were forming, and
49drilling companies, by night and day,..." Thomas C. 
Mobile Daily Advertiser, Apr. 20, 1861.
47Ibid.; Rix, Incidents of Life, [5].
48Richardson, The Secret Service, 95.
4 9Admiral Raphael Semmes, Memoirs of Service Afloat 
During the War Between the States (Baltimore: Kelly,
Piet, & Co., 1869), 95.
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DeLeon reported that "the mechanics, the stevedores and 
men of every class" followed the example of the upper 
classes in volunteering.^
The Confederate War Department detailed First 
Lieutenant Edward Ingraham for recruiting duty at Mobile 
and ordered him to report there immediately. His 
recruits would receive orders for Fort Morgan after 
enlistment. Under his instructions, Ingraham was to 
issue to the volunteers the following clothing items:
"one blue shirt (to be made into a blouse), three under­
shirts, two pairs of overalls, two pairs of drawers, two
pairs of stockings, one pair of booties, one blanket, one
51 .leather stock." While DeLeon exaggerated in commenting
that more than two regiments were recruited, it may well
have seemed, as Semmes put it, that the city "was thronged
with young men in military costume, and all seemed going
52'as merrily as a marnage-ball. 1 "
On April 16 President Jefferson Davis issued a call 
for volunteers, and four Mobile companies— -the Mobile 
Cadets, Gulf City Guards, Mobile Rifles, and Washington
50DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals, 72.
51General Order No. 6, Adjutant and Inspector Gen­
eral's Office, Apr. 22, 1861, O.R., 4, I, 229.
52DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals, 72; Semmes, 
Memoirs of Service Afloat, 95.
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Light Infantry-'Offered their services to Governor 
Moore. He accepted the offer and notified the companies 
on April 23 to move to Montgomery for formation into a 
regiment. Crowds of people filled the streets, balcon­
ies, wharves, and boats in the harbor to watch the young 
soldiers march off to war. Late in the afternoon the 
first two companies paraded through the streets to the 
wharf. Rather than the bright uniforms they had worn in
the past, the men now "were clad in a stout, serviceable
53gray, specially selected for a rough campaign."
The men enjoyed a brief halt at the wharf to rest.
One of the soldiers recalled later:
...then came the last leave-taking of mothers, 
sisters, sweethearts, wives; the hand-shakings 
of friends and companions, the blessings of 
old men, the final exhortation of father tp^ 
son, the sobs and tears of agonized women.
Then the two companies boarded the steamer St. Nicholas
for the journey up river to Montgomery. As the vessel
pulled out into the stream, church and ships' bells
rang, an artillery unit fired a salute, and the crowds
cheered and waved farewell. The Gulf city's first war
volunteers were on their way to the conflict which would
53Irwin Memoirs; Mobile Daily Advertiser, Apr. 24, 
1861; Henry Hotze, Three Months in the Confederate Army, 
ed. by Richard B. Harwell (University, Ala.: University
of Alabama Press, 1952), 13.
54Hotze, Three Months in the Confederate Army, 13.
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claim many of their lives; "the city of Mobile had lost
55the elite of her youth."
During succeeding months this scene of departing 
troops reoccurred many times in Mobile. The men went by 
boat and train. They wore a variety of uniforms and car­
ried a variety of flags. One of the most colorful com­
panies was the Emerald Guards, the members all being 
firemen and predominently natives of Ireland. When they 
left Mobile, the Emerald Guards wore uniforms of dark 
green. An observer described the flag these men bore as 
having a harp in the center "encircled with a wreath of 
shamrock and the words 'Erin-go-Braghand the words 
"Faugh-a-ballagh!" (Irish for "clear the way") below
C f .
that. Other foreign companies from Mobile joined the
Confederate service, units with nicknames like the
Scotch Guards, Gardes Lafayette, French Guards, and Ger- 
57man Fusiliers. Mobile's home guard units contained 
numerous foreigners as well, even though these men may
"^*Ibid.; Mobile Daily Advertiser, Apr. 24, 1861.
C  C
Kate Cumming, Kate; The Journal of a Confederate 
Nurse, ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Baton Rouge! Louisiana 
State University Press, 1959), 53.
57Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940),
96-98.
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have volunteered only to escape being conscripted into
, . 58regular servxce.
There are no figures on how many men Mobile fur­
nished to the Confederate armies. By July 1861 some
2,000 men had gone into service, but many of these had
59enlisted for only one year. Mobile County's white male 
population between the ages of 15 and 40 in 1860 was 
8,053. If the white males between 40 and 50 are added 
to this figure, the total number of men liable to mili­
tary service during the war was approximately 9,682.88 
Some sixty companies from Mobile County served in the 
regular Confederate Army, and men from the county made up 
part of at least five other companies.8'*' Assuming a 
strength of from 75 to 100 men per company, Mobile 
County's contribution to the regular army would have 
been between 4,500 and 6,000 men at the least. The men 
in home guard, militia, or reserve units may have 
raised total enlistments by as many as 1,000 men.
In the months following the firing on Fort Sumter, 
the Confederates continued to strengthen Fort Morgan.
58Ibid., 98-99.
59Mobile Advertiser and Register, July 17, 1861.
60Eighth Census, Population, 2.
61Willis Brewer, Alabama: Her History, Resources,
War Record and Public Men, From 1540 to 1872 (Montgom­
ery: Barrett & Brown, 1872) , 589-705.
Troops occupied and built up the defenses of Fort Gaines 
as well. Grant's Pass became the site of a small earthern 
fortification. These works guarding the entrances to 
Mobile Bay were not the only obstacles to enemy vessels. 
Confederate engineers drove pilings and floated torpe­
does to block all but a narrow channel left open for 
blockade runners. To protect the water approaches to the 
city itself, the Confederates erected earthworks on vari­
ous islands and peninsulas and placed floating batteries 
to support these forts. Again the engineers used pilings 
and torpedoes near the bay batteries, as they were 
called, and the combination of forts and obstructions 
here made it virtually impossible for enemy vessels to 
reach Mobile itself if they passed the forts at the bay 
entrances.
The Confederate defenses of Mobile did not neglect 
the land approaches to the city either. In the spring of 
1862, engineer officer Captain Charles F. Liernur 
designed and supervised the beginning of construction of 
a line of earthworks surrounding the city. Brigadier 
General Danville Leadbetter began erecting a second line 
of fortifications closer to Mobile in 1863. This line 
consisted of strong forts flanked by redoubts, all con­
nected by rifle pits. Then in 1864 engineers under the 
direction of Lieutenant Colonel Victor von Sheliha com­
menced a third and even stronger series of forts and
26
entrenchments between the other two. Even though engi­
neers and laborers worked on these defenses up until the 
time the city surrendered in 1865, the enemy considered 
them so formidable that Union forces did not attempt to 
assault them.
With the land fortifications and bay batteries 
effectively protecting Mobile from direct enemy approach, 
the enemy could get at the city in only one way: by
water from the north. If a hostile force could make its 
way through the rivers near the northeastern shore of 
Mobile Bay, it could move circuitously and either 
approach Mobile from its exposed side or isolate the 
city from above. The Confederates attempted to impede 
movement in this area as well, although their efforts 
did not progress in earnest until the last months of the 
war. They built several forts or batteries to protect 
the rivers and a series of fortifications and rifle pits 
on the eastern shore to cover the flanks of these water 
batteries. This area, too, had torpedoes and pilings 
in the water to render it even more hazardous for ves­
sels to approach.
In addition to all of the defensive preparations 
outlined above, the Confederates had a small naval force 
stationed in the bay. The squadron began modestly with 
two vessels which had been converted into gunboats. 
Eventually the squadron numbered eight warships: the
27
ironclad Tennessee, ironclad ram Nashville, armored
floating batteries Tuscaloosa and Huntsville, armored
ram Baltic, and lightly armored gunboats Selma, Gaines,
6 2and Morgan. While only one of these vessels was 
actually very strong (the Tennessee), the presence of a 
naval squadron of unknown capabilities undoubtedly was a 
factor in deterring an attack on Mobile Bay by the Union 
navy. Mobile's overall defenses were thus among the 
strongest in the Confederacy and resulted in the city 
being "the last important place in the Confederacy which 
was captured.
62Confederate naval forces and operations are 
thoroughly covered in two publications by William N. 
Still, Jr.— "The Confederate States Navy at Mobile, 1861 
to August, 1864," Alabama Historical Quarterly, XXX 
(1968) , 127-44, and Iron Afloat; The Story of the Con­
federate Armorclads (Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1971), 187-212, 223-26— so this paper will not 
treat the naval aspect of the defense of Mobile in 
great detail except as it relates to active operations 
in Mobile Bay or nearby streams.
63C. C. Andrews, History of the Campaign of Mobile 
(New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 10.
CHAPTER II
"...A HERCULEAN TASK WITH MOST INADEQUATE MEANS..."
On the same day that Mobile's war volunteers left 
for Montgomery, Major Danville Leadbetter sent a report 
of his inspection of the city's defenses to Colonel Har­
dee at Fort Morgan. Leadbetter also made several recom­
mendations for strengthening the defenses. He suggested 
that a floating battery commanded by a naval officer 
would suffice to protect Grant's Pass. Most of Lead- 
better 's concern focused on Fort Gaines and the main ship 
channel between Gaines and Fort Morgan. Naturally, he 
urged that heavy guns be placed in Gaines, but he recog­
nized that they would not be able to defend effectively 
the bay entrance. This area was three and a quarter 
miles wide, and no cannons in the forts could completely 
cover the middle of the area. Leadbetter recommended 
that a floating battery of strong timber covered with 
iron bars should be placed in the center of the channel. 
This, with the guns of the two forts, should prove suf­
ficient to prevent enemy vessels from entering.'*'
■^Leadbetter to Hardee, Apr. 23, 1861, O.R. , LII,
Pt. 2, p. 65.
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At this early stage of the war, the Confederate
command gave no thought to defensive works near Mobile
itself. Leadbetter wrote Hardee that if the bay
entrances were properly protected, the only way the city
could be approached was by a force marching overland from
somewhere on Mississippi Sound. According to Leadbetter,
a landing on the coast could not be prevented. The
answer to such a movement would be strong defense by "the
stout hearts and strong arms of the military forces which
2
can be concentrated at the city." Leadbetter felt that
the urgency of the situation required that he begin work
on his recommendations "without waiting for formal 
3
authority." Hardee forwarded Leadbetter's report to
Montgomery and told the Secretary of War that he had
ordered Leadbetter to work on the defenses at Fort 
4
Gaines.
Many of the leading citizens of Mobile were very 
concerned about the safety of their city, and they began 
contacting the Confederate War Department concerning 
their fears. The concensus seemed to be that the city 
was defenseless and likely to be attacked by Northern
2Ibid., 65-66.
3Ibid., 66.
4
Hardee to Secretary of War, Apr. 23, 1861, ibid.,
6 6 .
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forces. A three-man committee appointed by the citizens 
of Mobile travelled to Montgomery to present personally 
a request to Leroy P. Walker for arms and ammunition. 
These men also protested an order directing the only 
field artillery unit in Mobile to move to Pensacola.
Colin J. McRae, Mobile's representative in the Provi­
sional Confederate Congress, urged Walker to do some­
thing to calm the fears of the city. He suggested in 
particular that cannon in Fort Morgan be mounted in
batteries at Choctaw Point, Grant's Pass, and the eastern
5
end of Dauphin Island. The Confederate government 
reacted favorably to these requests but did so slowly.
Although Mobilians showed apprehension, their ardor 
for the Confederate cause and their militantcy had not 
diminished. The noted British journalist William Howard 
Russell visited Mobile about this time and found the 
people supporting what he called "the most ultra- 
Secessionist doctrines" and determined "to repel the 
'Lincolnite mercenaries' to the last."^ Russell recorded 
in his diary that there was a great deal of marching,
5
John Forsyth, T. J. Butler, and L. W. Lawler to 
Walker, May 4, 1861, ibid., 85; Robert H. Smith to Wal­
ker, May 5, 1861, ibid., 86; Colin J. McRae to Walker,
May 6, 1861, ibid., 87.
g
William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, 
ed. by Fletcher Pratt (New York: Harper & Row, 1965),
107-108.
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drilling, and drum-beating going on. Every steeple and
spire in the city seemed to have a Confederate flag atop
it. When he checked into the Battle House Hotel, he
discovered that a vigilance committee had headquarters
there and scrutinized all visitors. Russell concluded:
...It was fortunate they did not find traces 
of Lincolnism about us, as it appeared by the 
papers they were busy deporting 'Abolition­
ists' after certain preliminary processes 
supposed to
'Give them a rise, and open thei^ eyes 
'To a sense of their situation.'
Russell visited Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines while at
Mobile, and his impressions present a telling portrait of
the weaknesses of these works. He described Gaines as
"a shell of masonry" and noted that the small garrison
had only a few small cannons set up on the beach and the
sand hills nearby to defend the fort. Morgan seemed
only slightly stronger, the Confederates having mounted
there a number of guns of varying calibers. Russell
was impressed with the men of the garrison, the Second
Alabama Infantry Regiment, and the unit's commander,
Colonel Henry Maury. Yet the fort had grave weaknesses.
Russell felt that in a heavy bombardment Morgan would
suffer great damage and that the magazines were vulnerable
7Ibid., 107.
8Ibid., 109-110. Fort Morgan had, in fact, a total 
of 107 guns mounted at this time. Major Josiah Gorgas to 
 , Apr. 20, 1861, O.R., 4, I, 227.
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to enemy fire. Recalling his observations of Fort Sum­
ter after its fall, he recommended that the wooden
9
buildings and barracks be destroyed to avoid fires.
Mobile soon received new attention to its defenses. 
On May 27, 1861, the Confederate government assigned 
southern Alabama to Department No. 1, commanded by Major 
General David E. Twiggs, whose headquarters were in New 
Orleans.^ The day before, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin 
Gardner had assumed command of Fort Gaines after receiv­
ing orders to report to Hardee on May 7. Gardner con­
ducted an inspection of his new post and sent a report 
to Hardee. The recommendations and plans for improving 
Gaines' situation adopted by Leadbetter received endorse­
ment from Gardner. He felt that as soon as the work was 
completed and some heavy guns mounted, the fort would be 
"in a tolerably fair state for defense."'^ Gardner 
requested at least two companies to reinforce his small 
garrison. When Hardee forwarded Gardner's report to 
Montgomery, he stated that he had no men to send Gardner
9
Russell, My; Diary North and South, 111.
^Para II, Special Order No. 61, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, May 27, 1861, O.R., LIII,
690.
^Compiled Service Record of Franklin Gardner, RG 
109, National Archives? Gardner to Lieutenant C. P.
Ball, May 30, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 110.
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and asked that the government order additional companies
12to Fort Gaines.
Governor Moore and his staff, accompanied by a 
large group of men and women from Mobile, conducted an 
inspection tour of the lower bay defenses on June 11, 
1861. Hardee acted as guide, and the entourage stopped 
first at Grant's Pass. The eighty-man garrison of Fort 
Grant received the governor in a formal line of inspec­
tion. A newspaper correspondent expressed the impression 
that the troops made: "The men looked healthy, in trim
order as to apparel and discipline, and showed that they
13were commanded by officers who knew their dity." After 
a quick lunch aboard the steamer, Moore's party spent 
about an hour at Fort Gaines. They then went across to 
Fort Morgan, and a portion of the garrison there led them 
into the fort with the band playing and flags flying.
From the ramparts of Morgan, the visitors observed the 
Federal warship Niagara and witnessed the firing of a 
columbiad. The garrison next conducted battalion drill 
on the parade ground behind the fort. Although the men's 
performance seemed a little ragged, the correspondent
12Hardee to General Samuel Cooper, May 30, 1861,
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 110.
13Advertiser and Register, June 1 2 ,  1 8 6 1 .
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felt that with two more months of training "they will
pass muster with any troops."'*'4
Several days later the command arrangements at
Mobile changed. The Confederate War Department ordered
Hardee to go to Memphis, Tennessee, on June 17, 1861.
There he received a promotion to brigadier general and an
15assignment to command troops in northern Arkansas. In
ordering Hardee to Memphis, Cooper informed him that
Gardner would succeed him in command. Two days later,
Colonel Henry Maury telegraphed Cooper asking if Gardner's
assignment was a mistake since he outranked Gardner.
Cooper replied by ordering Maury to assume command at
Fort Morgan and Gardner to retain his command at Fort 
16Gaines. The loss of Hardee did not help Mobile's 
defensive situation. Maury, although described by
14Ibid.
15Cooper to Hardee, June 17, 1861, Letters and Tele­
grams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 
35, p. 198; Advertiser and Register, June 20, 1861;
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray; Lives of the Confed­
erate Commanders (BatonRouge; Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1959), 124.
16Maury to Cooper, June 19, 1861, Telegrams Received 
by the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861-1865, RG 109, 
National Archives; Cooper to Hardee or "officer command­
ing Fort Morgan," June 20, 1861, Letters and Telegrams 
Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 35, 
p. 205.
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17Russell as "an ingenious and clever officer." was at
best an average commander. Later in the war he was
arrested and tried for drunkenness. Available evidence
indicates that after receiving command at Fort Morgan,
Maury did not exercise responsibility for the rest of the
18bay defenses as Hardee had before him.
Toward the end of June 1861, Mayor John Forsyth and 
some of the city's governmental leaders succeeded in 
gathering a large number of artillery pieces and small 
arms for the use of the Mobile militia. Five hundred 
muskets came from the state authorities and an additional 
500 muskets from the Confederate government. The Confed­
erate authorities also informed Forsyth that as many as 
600 more muskets would be available if needed. Plenty of 
powder and musket balls existed to supply these and other 
weapons in the city. In addition to these muskets, 
Forsyth obtained between 25 and 30 artillery pieces, most 
of them smoothbores but some being rifled guns. The 
mounting of the artillery proceeded slowly, but the
authorities believed that half of the cannon would be on
19carriages and ready for action by early July.
■^Russell, My; Diary North and South, 111.
18Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 200.
19Advertiser and Register, June 30, 1861.
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A meeting of most of the prominent citizens of
Mobile resulted in a number of resolutions supporting the
efforts of Forsyth and other civil authorities of the
city. On June 29 a committee of five men presented the
resolutions to the meeting at Odd Fellows Hall. These
men recognized that the city government might have to
"take the responsibility of exercising unusual powers"
and pledged themselves to support "all such measures as
they may deem proper and necessary for the efficient
20defense of Mobile." One resolution created a Committee 
of Safety to assist the civil authorities. Another reso­
lution authorized the city fathers to use the Harbor 
Improvement Fund or any other funds, to levy taxes, and 
to accept contributions for defense of Mobile. The citi­
zens hoped the Confederate government would repay all 
expenditures but expressed willingness to have the city 
bear the burden. Forsyth, the Aldermen, and the Common 
Council received authority to hire or purchase transpor­
tation, laborers, tools, and equipment and to construct 
necessary fortifications. Those men attending the meet­
ing promised to use their influence to gain the support
of the entire city population for the measures they had 
21adopted.
20Ibid., July 2, 1861.
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Mobile's militia units spent short periods of time 
in camps of instruction to improve their training and 
discipline should they be called upon for active duty.
One of these camps, located at Bayou La Batre on the 
coast southeast of the city, bore the name Camp Garnett. 
Camp Moore, named for Alabama's governor, stood nearer 
Mobile. The First Alabama State Volunteers of the Fire 
Brigade established the camp about one mile from the city 
on the north side of the road to Spring Hill. One of the 
soldiers at Camp Moore reported that they were drilled by 
companies during the afternoon. A problem with the camp 
which this soldier recognized was its proximity to 
Mobile:
...After drill, all want to go home. It is 
difficult for a man to realize the necessity 
of sleeping on hard boards in a tent, when 
his home, family, and a comfortable bed, are 
within a few minutes walk; therefore, it is 
but natural that he should want to 'go home,' 
and enjoy his domestic comforts, or go and 
see his sweetheart. !
Commanders of Mobile would experience this problem and
similar ones with troops stationed close to home as the
war years passed.
77 Ibid., July 4, Aug. 9, 20, 1861; Special Order 
No. 16, Headquarters Army of Alabama, Adjutant General's 
Office, Aug. 5, 1861, quoted in ibid., Aug. 7, 1861; 
Orders No. 8, Headquarters 1st Regiment, Alabama State 
Volunteers, Fire Brigade, Aug. 5, 1861, quoted in ibid., 
Aug. 6, 1861.
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Government authorities received information on 
Mobile's situation in early August 1861. Major Leadbet- 
ter reported on August 4 to Congressman Robert H. Smith 
about the status of Mobile's defenses and made recommen­
dations for improving them. Fort Morgan, garrisoned by 
ten companies of the 2nd Alabama, seemed to be in good 
shape. Approximately seventy cannons were mounted in the 
fort, but few of them were heavy guns. Leadbetter did 
not think the fort would survive a regular siege. Fort 
Gaines remained weak. Five companies of state artillery 
comprised the garrison, but these men had only ten ser­
viceable guns, all 32-pounders. Many more guns would 
have to be mounted before the fort would be in decent 
shape. One company of state artillery manned the three 
32-pounders whichT guarded Grant's Pass. Here, too, heav­
ier guns seemed needed. No defenses existed to prevent
an enemy force from landing on Mississippi Sound and
23marching right into Mobile.
Most of Leadbetter's recommendations dealt with the 
works guarding the bay entrances. To protect Fort Morgan
^Leadbetter to Smith, Aug. 4, 1861, O.R., LII,
Pt. 2, pp. 125-26; "Statement of posts and troops in 
Department No. 1, C.S.A.," July 12, 1861, U. S. Navy 
Department, War of the Rebellion; Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Navies, 30 vols. (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing OfTTce, 1894-1922), Series 1,
Vol. XVI, 582, hereinafter cited as O.R.N., all refer­
ences are to Series 1 unless otherwise noted.
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from approach by land,, he suggested extensive earthworks 
on the peninsula east of the fort to keep an enemy force 
far enough away that it could not reach the fort with 
long-range cannon fire. Even at this early stage of the 
war, Leadbetter anticipated the use of ironclad steamers 
by the United States against the forts. He recommended a 
heavy chain supported by rafts as a means of blocking the 
main ship channel near Fort Morgan. For the channel near 
Fort Gaines, he felt crib-work obstructions would suffice. 
Delayed by these obstacles, any enemy ironclads could 
then be destroyed or crippled by the fire of columbiads 
in the forts. Leadbetter suggested the construction of 
fourteen batteries connected by rifle pits in a semi­
circular line around the city to protect Mobile's land 
approaches. To cover the water approaches to the city, 
he favored strong batteries at Choctaw Point and the 
mouth of Spanish River. The cost of all of these defen­
sive works would be tremendous, but Leadbetter concluded:
...we must, if necessary, spend our all in this 
business, certainly hundreds of millions, and 
I know of no point more worthy the application 
of a half of one million than Mobile Bay.
Congressman Smith passed Leadbetter's report on to
the War Department, where it received immediate
attention. Secretary Walker ordered sixteen 10-inch
24Leadbetter to Smith, Aug. 4, 1861, O.R., LII, 
Pt. 2, pp. 125-26.
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columbiads sent to Mobile as soon as the Ordnance Bureau
could have them ready. He also wrote to Governor Henry
T. Clark of North Carolina requesting that he send thirty
32-pounder guns to Mobile. Walker authorized the rifling
of the 32-pounder smoothbores already at Mobile and their
placement in the best positions to repel an attack. He
asked Leadbetter to prepare cost estimates for each
defensive site at Mobile. Finally, Walker wrote to
Governor Moore and asked him to accept for active duty
six companies which would go to Fort Gaines to strengthen 
25its garrison.
About this time Leadbetter received orders to go to
Richmond to assume command of the Engineer Bureau. The
War Department ordered Captain Samuel H. Lockett to
2 6Mobile to succeed Leadbetter as engineer officer. 
Leadbetter addressed a long letter to Lockett to inform 
him of what he had recommended for the Mobile defenses 
and to make suggestions for possible action. In the let­
ter, Leadbetter elaborated on his ideas for defensive 
works surrounding Mobile. He thought the line should be
^Walker to Leadbetter, Aug. 15, 1861, ibid., 130; 
Walker to Clark, Aug. 16, 1861, ibid., 131; Walker to 
Moore, Aug. 15, 1861, ibid., 130.
2 g
Cooper to Major General Braxton Bragg, Aug. 27, 
1861, ibid., 133; Para V, Special Order No. 136, Adjutant 
and Inspector General's Office, Aug. 28, 1861, ibid.; 
Compiled Service Record of Samuel H. Lockett.
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located approximately two and a fourth miles out from the 
courthouse, which stood near the riverfront. The 
redoubts would be placed about one mile apart and would 
all mount heavy guns. Redans with smaller guns would be 
built between the redoubts. The whole line would be con­
nected with entrenchments suitable for field guns and 
infantry weapons. Leadbetter expressed some doubt about 
his ideas for obstructions in the ship channels and asked
for Lockett's thoughts. In closing, Leadbetter estimated
27that the proposed defenses would cost about $500,000.
Mobile's civic authorities realized the deficiencies
in the city's defenses and expressed willingness to spend
the money in the city treasury to remedy the weaknesses.
They proposed a voluntary tax to raise $50,000 "for the
2 8purpose of placing the city in a posture of defense."
The proposal met such opposition from the people that 
the government dropped it before it could be voted on.
The Advertiser and Register ran an editorial entitled 
"Look to Our Homes" to call attention to the city's weak 
defensive state. This editorial emphasized the need for 
large, long-range guns which would be expensive to buy. 
Richmond and Montgomery could not furnish the necessary
^Leadbetter to Lockett, Aug. 22, 1861, O.R., LII, 
Pt. 2, pp. 131-33.
28Advertiser and Register, Aug. 29, 1861.
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artillery, so Mobile might have to purchase some guns
herself. The paper issued this warning: "The time may
soon come when those who smothered this appeal to the
patriotism of the citizens of Mobile will discover that
they have been 'penny wise and pound foolish1 in mounting
that favorite hobby of demagogues— resistance to 
29taxation." On the following day, the Advertiser and
Register renewed the appeal to the people to put up
$50,000 for "Home Defence," but there is no evidence of
30a favorable response.
Much of the correspondence between Mobile and Rich­
mond during the next month or so dealt with the defense 
of the city and attempts to obtain and mount the artil­
lery necessary to strengthen the forts and batteries 
guarding the water approaches to the city. Leadbetter 
talked over and over again of the thirty guns requisi­
tioned from the governor of North Carolina, all the time
31expecting them to be forthcoming. Governor Clark, how­
ever, had advised Richmond when the requisition reached
30Ibid., Aug. 30, 1861.
3"^Leadbetter to Lockett, Sept. 2, 1861, O.R. , VI,
726-27; Leadbetter to Lockett, Sept. 4, 1861, ibid.,
727-28; Leadbetter to H. B. Warren, Sept. 11, 1861, 
ibid., 728-29; Brigadier General Jones M. Withers to 
Walker, Sept. 11, 1861, ibid., 729; Walker to Stephen R. 
Mallory, Sept. 12, 1861,~TbTd.; Leadbetter to Withers, 
Sept. 19, 1861, ibid., 740.
him that he had no spare guns but that the navy y a r d  a t
Norfolk, Virginia, had some. Efforts by the Mobile
authorities to secure guns from the navy yard failed. B y
early October, Leadbetter finally admitted defeat. He
wrote Lockett:
...From present appearances I would not recom­
mend you to rely on getting any more heavy 
guns or carriages from this quarter. The 
demands from all directions are urgent, and 
the Secretary says he cannot give what he h a s  
not got.
The acute need for cannons at Fort Gaines, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  
is reflected in a report by one of the units s t a t i o n e d  
there:
The company has two 6 pounder Field 
Pieces one a U. S. Brass Gun patent 1845, t h e  
other an Iron 4 pounder Gun boared [sic] t o  
a 6 Pounder captured from the British^at F o r t  
Boyer [sic] in 1814 and made in 1777.
As previously mentioned, at this time no o n e  com ­
mander had charge of the overall defense of M o b i l e .  T he  
area belonged to Twiggs' Department No. 1, but t h a t  g e n ­
eral concentrated all of his attention on New O r le a n s .
On September 3, 1861, Congressman Smith recommended t o  
Secretary Walker that Brigadier General Jones M. W it h e r s , ,
Clark to Walker, Aug. 20, 1861, ibid., L I I . P t .  2., 
p. 131; Withers to Walker, Sept. 11, 1861, ibid., V I ,  7 1 9 ; 
Leadbetter to Lockett, Oct. 7, 1861, ibid., "7'SO.
33Roll for Aug. 31-Oct. 31, 1861, Record o f  E v e n ts  
Cards, Company A, 1st Battalion Alabama Artillery, Com­
piled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who S e rv e d  
in Organizations from Alabama, RG 109, National A r c h i v e s .
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a former mayor of Mobile, be assigned to command the 
city's defenses. The War Department responded by creat­
ing the District of Alabama and assigned Withers to head
34the new district. Although he had graduated from West
point and had served in the Creek and Mexican wars,
Withers' chief qualification for this command seems to
have been his familiarity with the city. News of his
assignment leaked out and reached Mobile before the War
Department issued formal orders. Some people in the
city expressed dissatisfaction with and opposition to the
assignment. Mayor Forsyth and others spoke out in favor
of Withers, however, and he seems to have entered his
35command without major opposition from the citizens.
Toward the end of September the Confederates began 
constructing the earthworks around Mobile which Leadbet­
ter had proposed. The city's Council of Defense issued
34Smith to Walker, Sept. 3, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt.
2, p. 137; Para XVIII, Special Order No. 151, Adjutant 
and Inspector General's Office, Sept. 12, 1861, ibid., 
VI, 738; Cooper to Withers, Sept. 5, 1861, Letters and 
Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, 
Vol. 36, p. 65; Advertiser and Register, Sept. 13, 1861. 
The district consisted of the entire state of Alabama 
plus the portion of coastal Mississippi east of the 
Pascagoula River.
35Smith to Walker, Sept. 12, 1861 (with endorsement 
by Jefferson Davis), Telegrams Received, Secretary of 
War; Forsyth to Walker, Sept. 16, 1861, O.R., VI, 738.
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an appeal to the citizens to furnish one thousand of 
their slaves as laborers to help white volunteer workmen 
and Confederate engineers do the work. Although the own­
ers would receive no remuneration, the Council did offer 
to provide rations for the slaves. The Council requested 
that the slave owners provide their chattels with spades, 
shovels, and picks, and whites had to furnish their own 
tools. Both the owners and white volunteers received 
assurances that the laborers would work in separate 
parties based on their race. As the construction got 
under way, the Council of Defense again asked any whites
"who wish work" to report to the race track at the edge
3 6of town where the workers were being organized.
When the War Department ordered Withers to Mobile, 
it approved requisitions for three new infantry regime its 
to serve at the city. This news preceded Withers to Ala­
bama, and the state .authorities initiated steps to muster 
in several Mobile regiments. Withers learned of this 
action when he stopped at Montgomery on his way south.
He protested immediately against using organizations of 
city men. Withers renewed his protest several days later 
with these words:
3 6Leadbetter to Secretary of War, Sept. 23, 1861, 
O.R., VI, 743; Advertiser and Register, Sept. 14, 28, 
T861.
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...The expectation is to play soldier at home, 
not to neglect their private interests, nor 
endure fatigue, exposure, or discipline. Such 
material is most costly and least serviceable 
to Government, and I desire to be responsible 
for none of it.
After expressing his desire to have regiments from north
Alabama, Withers eventually got two such units, but he
3 8had to accept two Mobile regiments also.
As one of his first acts as commander at Mobile,
Withers issued the first of a series of orders regulating
the movement of vessels in and around Mobile Bay. The
first of these orders required fishermen, oystermen, and
other boat owners to obtain permits in order to move
their vessels in the waters under the jurisdiction of the
District of Alabama. Those applying for permits were
obliged to be "well endorsed by true and reliable 
39citizens." Later Withers issued orders that no vessels 
of any type could pass by the forts at the mouth of the
37Endorsement by Walker, Sept. 12, 1861, on Leadbet­
ter to Withers, Sept. 11, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 175; 
Advertiser and Register, Sept. 20, 1861; Withers to 
Cooper, Sept. 27, 1861, O.R., VI, 747; Withers to 
[Cooper], Sept. 30, 1861, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 156.
38Withers to [Cooper], Sept. 30, 1861, O.R., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 156; Withers to [Cooper], Oct. 15, 1861, ibid., 
173-74; Cooper to Withers, Oct. 6, 1861, ibid., 175"; 
Advertiser and Register, Oct. 13, 1861; Special Order 
No. — , Headquarters Department of Alabama, Oct. 12,
1861, quoted in ibid.
39General Order No. 3, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama, Sept. 30, 1861, quoted in Advertiser and Regis­
ter , Oct. 1, 1861.
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bay without permits and that vessels then outside the
4 0forts had to come into the bay. Finally, Major Gen­
eral Braxton Bragg, who later became Withers' depart­
mental commander, ordered the closure of Grant's Pass 
"effectually and unconditionally" to prevent a coastal
trade along Mississippi Sound that was benefitting the 
41enemy.
Mobile's command situation underwent the change 
hinted at above in early October 1861. On the seventh of 
that month, the War Department realigned the command 
structure of the Gulf coast. It extended Bragg's com­
mand at Pensacola to include the entire state of Ala­
bama, designating the new entity as the Department of 
Alabama and West Florida. Bragg established his new 
headquarters on the fourteenth, choosing to stay in
Pensacola. He retained Withers as commander of the Dis-
42t n c t  of Alabama. Withers obviously thought his com­
mand was an independent department and wrote to Richmond 
of the "humiliation and mortification" he felt when he
40Special Order No. 14, Headquarters District of 
Alabama, Oct. 29, 1861, quoted in ibid., Oct. 31, 1861.
41Withers to Major George G. Garner, Dec. 9, 1861, 
O.R., VI, 779; Bragg to Benjamin, Dec. 11, 1861, ibid.
42Para IX, Special Order No. 173, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Oct. 7, 1861, ibid., 751; 
General Orders No. 1, Headquarters Department of Alabama 
and West Florida, Oct. 14, 1861, ibid., 752.
48
learned he had been placed under Bragg's command.
Because of what he called "this sudden manifestation of
change in estimate of my fitness for the position to
which I was then assigned," Withers asked to be relieved 
43of duty. After several visits with Bragg and assur­
ances from Davis that his competentcy was not in question,
44Withers withdrew his request. With the proximity of 
Mobile to Pensacola, this new command situation represent­
ed a logical step in the Confederacy's defensive strategy.
The authorities in Richmond had placed Mobile and 
the rest of Alabama under Bragg, in part, to placate him. 
He had grown tired of his rather stagnant situation at 
Pensacola and desired a more active field, so he could 
prove himself as a commander. In a letter to a friend, 
Bragg stated that President Davis had promised him com­
mand of the Gulf Coast from Pensacola to New Orleans.
When Twiggs made it known that he would retire, Bragg 
expected Davis would "show his sincerity and confer this
43Withers to Cooper, Oct. 15, 1861, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 174.
44Bragg to Davis, Oct. 22, 1861, in the William P. 
Palmer Collection of Braxton Bragg Papers, Western 
Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, hereinafter 
cited as Bragg Papers, Western Reserve; Bragg to Adju­
tant General C.S. Army, Oct. 25, 1861, O.R., VI, 756; 
Withers to Benjamin, Nov. 2, 1861, Letters Received by 
the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861-1865, RG 109, 
National Archives.
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45command on me." Instead, the president gave New
Orleans and Department No. 1 to Major General Mansfield
Lovell, a northerner who had just recently joined the
southern cause. Bragg was naturally upset. In a letter
to Governor Thomas 0. Moore of Louisiana he complained:
"The command at New Orleans was rightly mine. I feel
4 6myself degraded by the action of the government...."
Bragg in a series of letters spoke harshly of Lovell,
saying the "eleventh-hour" convert had been "purchased in
47the open market by the highest bidder." Yet he deter­
mined to make the best of the situation and do a good job 
in his new command.^
Bragg devoted much of his attention to Mobile itself 
after receiving it under his jurisdication. He sent his
45Benjamin to Bragg, Oct. 8, 18 61, Bragg Papers, 
Western Reserve; Bragg to "My dear Doctor," undated, 
ibid.
46Bragg to Thomas 0. Moore, Oct. 31, 1861, in 
Thomas 0. Moore Papers, Louisiana State University 
Department of Archives and Manuscripts.
47Bragg to Ben3amxn, Oct. 30, 1861, O.R., VI, 759; 
Bragg to Moore, Nov. 14, 18 61, Moore Papers; Bragg to 
"My dear Doctor," undated, Bragg Papers, Western 
Reserve. Thomas Bragg, Braxton's brother and the Con­
federate Attorney General, later recorded in his diary 
that Davis had "seemed disposed" to place the Gulf Coast 
under Braxton's command but that Benjamin persuaded 
Davis to give it to Lovell. Entry Jan. 6, 1862, Thomas 
Bragg Diary, 1861-1862, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
48Bragg to Elise Bragg, Oct. 14, 1861, Bragg Papers, 
Western Reserve.
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engineer officer on an inspection tour when he assumed 
command and made a visit himself from October 23 to 27.
At Mobile, Bragg found that Withers had halted construc­
tion of the earthworks on the land side of the city. He 
concurred with Withers' decision and criticized the
"grand scheme for squandering money by digging ditches...
49which would have required 40,000 men to defend them."
Bragg felt that more troops should be ordered to Mobile
to back up the essentially untrained and undisciplined
forces then there. To protect Mobile adequately, Bragg
decided to put his force at Pensacola on the defensive
and to concentrate men and material at Mobile. Perhaps
the best summary of Withers' position at Mobile lies in
Bragg's comment that "he has a hurculean [sic] task with
50most inadequate means."
Bragg found shortcomings connected with both the 
troops and subordinate commanders at Mobile. The men 
suffered from measles, and Bragg felt that their proxim­
ity to the city encouraged a lack of discipline. He 
suggested that their camp be moved to a point fifteen or 
twenty miles from the city. To improve their diet, Bragg
49Bragg to Davis, Oct. 22, 1861, ibid.; Bragg to 
Adjutant General, Oct. 25, 1861, O.R., VI, 755-56.
50Bragg to Davis, Oct. 22, 1861, Bragg Papers, 
Western Reserve; Bragg to Adjutant General, Oct. 25,
1861, O.R., VI, 755-56; Bragg to Adjutant General,
Oct. 28, 1861, ibid., 757.
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ordered that the men's rations of meat would be ten
ounces of bacon or salt pork or sixteen ounces of beef.
He also ordered that "one gill [four fluid ounces] of good
51Louisiana Molasses will be added to the ration." Bragg
complained that the officers commanding Fort Morgan and
Fort Gaines, Maury and Gardner, were "very competent, but
sadly addicted to drinking, and therefore unsafe for
52those exposed positions." Hoping to find abler com­
manders for the forts, he recommended several officers 
for promotion to brigadier general. Gardner received 
orders relieving him of duty on November 14. To replace 
him, the War Department promoted William L. Powell to 
colonel in the Provisional Army and ordered him to
Mobile. Bragg assigned Powell to overall command of
53both forts and Grant's Pass as well.
In late October 18 61, Bragg learned that an enemy 
expedition was on its way to the Gulf. He began looking
"^Bragg to Adjutant General, Oct. 23, 1861, O.R.,
VI, 757; Bragg to Cooper, Oct. 31, 1861, ibid., 761; 
General Order No. 6, Headquarters Department of Alabama 
and West Florida, Oct. 31, 1861, General and Special 
Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida, Oct. 15, 
1861-Feb. 28, 1862, RG 109, National Archives.
52Bragg to Adjutant General, Oct. 28, 1861, O.R.,
VI, 757.
53Ibid.; Compiled Service Record of Franklin Gard­
ner; Benjamin to Davis, Nov. 24, 1861, Letters Received, 
Secretary of War; Benjamin to Bragg, Nov. 24, 1861,
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 219; Bragg to Adjutant General,
Jan. 4, 1862, ibid., VI, 793.
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around for troops to reinforce Mobile and Pensacola.
Brigadier General Leroy P. Walker, who had recently
resigned as Secretary of War, commanded a new brigade at
Huntsville, and Bragg requested that two of his regiments
be ordered south. On arriving, the men would receive
weapons of sick and wounded soldiers on the coast. After
receiving permission to use some of Walker's brigade,
Bragg ordered one regiment to Mobile. He also ordered
two armed regiments at Montgomery to Withers. When
Bragg ordered a second of Walker's regiments to Mobile,
that general wrote to Richmond that he, too, would go to
Mobile. Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin approved
Walker's move. Walker reported to Bragg at Pensacola
54and received formal assignment to Withers' command.
In addition to these infantry units, a newly formed 
artillery company reported to Mobile, where it obtained 
guns and equipment.
54Bragg to Cooper, Oct. 29, 1861, O.R., VI, 758; 
Bragg to Cooper, Oct. 31, 1861, ibid., 761; Benjamin to 
Bragg, Oct. 31, 1861, ibid.; Walker to Benjamin, Nov. 4, 
1861, ibid., 764; Benjamin to Walker, Nov. 5, 1861, 
ibid.; Bragg to Adjutant General, Nov. 5, 18 61, ibid., 
764-65; Benjamin to Walker, Nov. 6, 1861, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 198; Walker to Benjamin, Nov. 6, 1861, ibid., 
VI, 765; Moore to Bragg, Nov. 8, 1861, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, 
pp. 202-203; Benjamin to Walker, Nov. 10, 1861, ibid., 
203; Special Order No. 14, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Dec. 1, 1861, ibid., VI, 772.
55Dr. George Little and James R. Maxwell, A History 
of Lumsden's Battery C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: R. E.
Rhodes Chapter, United Daughters of the Confederacy,
1905) , 5.
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Part of Mobile's value to the Confederacy during 
the war years lay in its railroad connections. Just 
before the firing on Fort Sumter, the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad opened its line to traffic. This road con­
nected Mobile with Columbus, Kentucky. At Corinth it
crossed the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which ran
56east and west. On November 15. 1861, the Mobile and 
Great Northern Railroad began operations, completing 
Mobile's rail system. This latter railroad ran from 
Tensas Landing to Pollard, Alabama, where it joined the 
Alabama and Florida Railroad to provide service to Mont­
gomery to the north and Pensacola to the south. The 
Mobile and Great Northern had been constructed fairly 
quickly. The workers laid the first rails in late March
1861, and the company promised that it would be finished 
57by September.
By early October, however, the work was still 
incomplete. Company president William D. Dunn wrote 
Withers that although grading, bridging, and laying of 
cross ties was complete, half of the rails remained to be 
put down. The company had exhausted its money supply, 
and Dunn requested a loan of $15,000. With this money,
"^Robert C. Black III, Railroads of the Confederacy 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1952), 5.
57Ibid., 75.
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he said, the road should be finished between November 10 
and 15. Dunn hoped Withers would use his influence with 
the government to get the loan approved. Dunn also con­
tacted Congressman McRae to ask for his assistance. The
government approved the loan, and, as promised, the road
58opened on November 15. After the fall of Corinth to 
Union forces, the Mobile and Ohio-Mobile and Great North­
ern systems made Mobile the only rail link between Con­
federate armies in the east and west. The sole problem 
in the system was that men and supplies had to be 
detrained and transported by steamer between Mobile and
Tensas Landing. Even so, this trip could be completed in
59about one and a half to three hours.
One facet of Mobile's defenses received attention 
from Richmond in early December 1861. Secretary of War 
Benjamin wrote to Bragg and inquired if any measures had 
been taken to prevent an enemy force from landing at Pas­
cagoula and marching to Mobile. He feared that now the 
enemy was in the Gulf he would land and march by night to
58Dunn to Withers, Oct. 2, 1861, Letters Received, 
Secretary of War; Dunn to McRae, Oct. 3, 1861, O.R.,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 165; McRae to Davis, Oct. 3, 1861, ibid., 
164-65; Bragg to Benjamin, Nov. 1, 1861, ibid., VI, 762; 
Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 11, 1861, ibid., 766; Dunn to Ben­
jamin, Nov. 16, 1861, ibid., 4, I, 732.
59Circular, Office of Chief of Bureau of Transpor­
tation, Aug. 20, 1864, quoted in Mobile Daily Tribune, 
Aug. 25, 1864.
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surprise the city. Bragg replied that he had cavalry 
pickets on the coast where landings might take place.
The infantry and light artillery not on duty in the forts 
were prepared to concentrate quickly to meet any threat. 
Bragg also expected that reinforcements from Pensacola 
could reach Mobile in ten hours' time. After receiving 
Bragg's letter, Benjamin took steps toward strengthening 
Bragg's hand in the area. The War Department issued 
orders transferring the area of Mississippi between Pas­
cagoula and the Alabama line from Department No. 1 to 
Bragg's department. Bragg then assigned the area to 
Withers' district.^
Controversy between the army and navy at Mobile 
sprang up in late December 1861 and early January 1862. 
Early in December Withers had expressed open contempt 
for the naval force:
...The idea of our caricature gunboats being 
a protection to the coast trade is to me 
simply ridiculous. In truth I should look 
on our Navy Department as an amusing fancy 
sketch but for the waste of money agtjl cor­
ruption for which it is the excuse.
Benjamin to Bragg, Dec. 2, 1861, O.R., VI, 774; 
Bragg to Benjamin, Dec. 11, 1861, ibid., 779; Bragg 
Diary, Dec. 31, 1861; Para XVI, Special Order No. 264, 
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Dec. 12, 1861, 
ibid., 780; General Order No. 18, Headquarters Depart­
ment of Alabama and West Florida, Dec. 20, 1861, ibid., 
785.
^Withers to Garner, Dec. 9, 1861, O.R., VI, 780.
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Bragg, however, carried on the controversy. He reported 
to Richmond that Lieutenant James D. Johnston of the navy 
refused to acknowledge any authority by Withers. An 
incident which occurred several days later brought more 
wrath by Bragg. Federal blockade vessels had run a 
blockade runner ashore and tried to capture her by send­
ing in sailors on small boats. Fort Morgan's guns opened 
fire on the enemy boats, driving them off, and an unarmed 
Confederate steamer finally braved enemy fire to help the 
runner into the bay. Bragg was angry because the gunboat 
Florida had remained at Mobile "unoccupied and indepen­
dent" and the gunboat Alert had been "lying in the harbor 
here utterly useless.
In Richmond Secretary Benjamin took Bragg's com­
plaints to Davis, who agreed that there should be more 
harmony between the services. Benjamin recognized that 
he confronted a delicate problem of authority and advised 
Bragg that he would talk the matter over with Secretary 
of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory. When Benjamin referred 
Bragg's letter to Mallory, he suggested that it might be 
good policy to make small craft in coastal waters subject 
to the orders of the appropriate department commander.
62Bragg to Adjutant General, Dec. 24, 1861, ibid., 
787; Captain Levin M. Powell to Flag Officer W. W.
McKean, Dec. 27, 1861, O.R.N., XVII, 14; Lieutenant 
A. K. Hughes to Powell, Dec. 27, 1861, ibid., 15; Bragg 
to Adjutant General, Dec. 29, 1861, O.R., VI, 790.
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Then he made a telling observation: "...as you cannot
have chose your best officers for such unimportant com­
mands , I think it not improbably that there is ground for
6 3the complaints." Mallory answered Bragg's charges by 
saying that the Florida was in Mobile refitting after a 
recent engagement with enemy vessels and thus too far 
away to have lent aid and that the Alert was only a 
small schooner with one gun. He had confidence in John­
ston and promised that there would be greater cooperation 
in the future.^
Mobile's militia forces remained quite weak toward 
the end of 1861. In a letter to Governor John Gill 
Shorter, Bragg stated:
I find, on enquiry here, that no organi­
zation, equipment, or drill of the militia 
exists. The people are quietly pursuing 
their ordinary daily avocations, attending 
to their private interests, whilst the 
defence of the city is left to the army 
alone. As far as I know or can learn, no 
other threatenedcPoint in the Confederacy 
is thus exempt.
Bragg asked Shorter to use his influence to get the
C. O
Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 5, 1862, O.R., VI, 795; 
Benjamin to Mallory, Jan. 6, 1862, ibid., 796 (emphasis 
added).
64Mallory to Benjamin, Jan. 9, 1862, O.R.N., XVIII,
17.
^Bragg to Shorter, Dec. 24, 1861, quoted in Anne 
Kendrick Walker, "Governor John Gill Shorter: Miscel­
laneous Papers, 1861-1863," Alabama Review, XI (1958), 
214.
59
thousands of able-bodied men in the city to respond to
the possible threat to Mobile. Militia routine in the
city did step up, with company muster and drills occurring
three times each week. In a few weeks Bragg could
report an improved situation:
...With the cheerful and cordial aid of Gov­
ernor Shorter we shall probably get out at 
least 1,000 armed militia— men who have held 
back, but will come out rather than give up 
their army.
On December 27, 1861, Benjamin wrote Bragg about a 
possible change of command. It is possible that Bragg's 
earlier desire for more active service or the hope of 
further smoothing Bragg's feelings about not being given 
command over New Orleans and the Gulf Coast prompted the 
Secretary of War. Whatever the reason, Benjamin stated 
that he and Davis had been looking for someone to go to 
the trans-Mississippi region and take charge of all Con­
federate troops in Missouri and Arkansas. Bragg was 
their choice, and Benjamin asked if he would agree to 
take the assignment. While this letter was on its way, 
Davis received a letter from Mayor R. H. Slough and other
6 6Ibid.; General Order No. 1, Headquarters 1st Bat­
talion, 45th Regiment Alabama Militia, Jan. 16, 1862, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Jan. 18, 1862; Gen­
eral Order No. 1, Headquarters 95th Regiment Alabama 
Militia, Jan. 15, 1862, quoted in ibid.; General Order 
No. 1, Headquarters 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment Alabama 
Militia, Jan. 14, 1862, quoted in ibid.; Bragg to Benja­
min, Jan. 17, 1862, O.R., VI, 810.
60
prominent citizens of Mobile asking that he establish 
Bragg's headquarters in the city. They feared an attack 
and stated: "The presence of General Bragg here would
greatly inspire our troops and people, and would consol­
idate and bring to perfection our military 
organization,.. .
Bragg responded to Benjamin's letter by declining 
the offer tendered. The facts that the troops in the 
trans-Mississippi area were largely unorganized and 
undisciplined and that there seemed little prospect for 
success there influenced his decision. Most of his argu­
ment, however, Bragg centered around his concern for 
Mobile. He pointed out that a large enemy force had 
landed on Ship Island. The people of Mobile expressed 
alarm for the safety of the city. Because of lack of 
military resources and weakness in troop strength, Bragg 
did not feel the city was at all safe. He stated that his 
influence with the people and troops was such that he did
not think "any other could now fill my place to their 
68satisfaction." Benjamin learned of the enemy landing 
before he got Bragg's letter and quickly wrote that Bragg
67Bragg Diary, Jan. 8, 1862; Benjamin to Bragg,
Dec. 27, 1861, O.R., VI, 788-89; Mayor R. H. Slough, 
William B. Hamilton, C. LeBaron, et al, to Davis, Jan. 1, 
1862, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 247.
6ft
Bragg to Benjamin, Jan. 6, 1862, O.R., VI, 797.
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should no longer consider the offered command since his
own seemed threatened. He informed Bragg of the petition
from the citizens of Mobile but left to him the choice of
headquarters location. After receiving Bragg's letter
turning down the offer, Benjamin wrote:
...The people there would have every reason 
to complain of your withdrawal under such 
circumstances, and the dissatisfaction would 
be such as to produce a very bad gfcate of 
feeling as regards their defense.
Although Bragg had shifted Walker's brigade to 
Mobile, he found some morale problems with the unit, most 
of them attributable to its commander. While his men 
remained in a crowded, unhealthy camp some miles from 
Mobile, lacking discipline and instruction, Walker lived 
in the city with his staff and ignored his brigade.
Bragg had absolutely no confidence in Walker and thought 
him unfit for command. He wrote Richmond requesting 
proper generals for his troops. In response, the War 
Department ordered Brigadier General Samuel Jones to 
Pensacola from the Army of the Potomac and nominated 
Colonel John K. Jackson for promotion to brigadier gen­
eral for duty at Mobile. Bragg seemed pleased with these 
moves. He wrote Benjamin that he planned to place Jones 
in command at Pensacola so that he could spend more
69Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 9, 1862, ibid., 803; 
Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 12, 1862, ibid.
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time at Mobile. Even though Walker outranked Jackson, 
Bragg promised to make arrangements to employ both to 
best advantage. The command at Mobile stood on the 
verge of several changes in organization and subordinate 
commanders.70
70Bragg to Adjutant General, Jan. 4, 1862, ibid., 
793; Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 9, 1862, ibid., 802; Bragg 
to Benjamin, Jan. 17, 1862, ibid., 810; Dr. Josiah C. 
Nott to Dr. Samuel H. Stout, Dec. 29, 1861, in Samuel H. 
Stout Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
CHAPTER III
"THE WORK WILL NOT ADMIT OF DELAY..."
On January 27, 1862, Bragg issued orders changing 
the command structure in his department. He placed Brig­
adier General Samuel Jones in charge at Pensacola so that 
he could move departmental headquarters to Mobile. All of 
the troops in and around Mobile received the new designa­
tion the Army of Mobile, to be commanded by Withers. The 
responsibility of the army would be the defense of the 
Gulf Coast between the Pascagoula and Perdido rivers. 
Relieving Walker of command of the infantry brigade at 
Mobile, Bragg ordered him to Montgomery and transferred 
Brigadier General Adley H. Gladden from Pensacola to take 
over the brigade. Bragg expected Gladden to correct the 
demoralization and drunkenness in Walker's brigade 
through discipline and instruction. On February 5 Bragg 
arrived in Mobile and established his headquarters.^-
"^General Order No. 23, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Jan. 27, 1862, O.R., VI,
815-16; Bragg to Adjutant General, Feb. 1, 1862, ibid.r 
Advertiser and Register, Feb. 1, 6, 1862; Bragg to Adju­
tant General, Feb. 8, 1862, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 265;
James S. Deas to ------ , Feb. 6, 1862, in Chestnut-
Miller-Manning Collection, South Carolina Historical 
Society, Charleston.
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Bragg set about almost immediately to improve con­
ditions at Mobile. He wrote Benjamin: "It is difficult
to conceive the state of affairs here and almost as dif-
2
ficult to apply a remedy." Bragg succeeded in getting 
all stores and businesses to close their doors at three 
o'clock in the afternoon. Able-bodied men could then 
spend the remainder of the daylight hours drilling or 
performing other military duties. To aid in the disci­
plining of the regular soldiers in camp, Bragg ordered 
all saloons and drinking establishments in Mobile and 
Baldwin counties closed. This order also forbade sales 
of alcohol "except for medicinal purposes, by regular 
apothecaries, upon the written prescription of 
physicians."^ Owners of supplies of alcohol were 
required to pack and store these supplies where they 
could be inspected. Many of the citizens of Mobile 
approved of these efforts by Bragg, and, according to one
2
Bragg to Benjamin, Feb. 11, 1862, Letters Received, 
Secretary of War.
3Advertiser and Register, Feb. 7, 1862; (London) The 
Index, May 1, 1862; General Order No. 34, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 20, 1862, 
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and 
West Florida, Oct. 15, 1861-Feb. 28, 1862, RG 109, 
National Archives.
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observer, the regulations "worked a great reformation
4
among the soldiers."
About the time Bragg took over immediate supervision 
at Mobile, his forces at that point numbered slightly 
more than 7,000 men present for duty. Most of these 
troops were newly organized, and none had faced enemy 
fire. Some units had only pikes as weapons, and others 
had no arms at all. Bragg ordered the 1st Louisiana 
Regulars from Pensacola, where it had fought in several 
actions, to Mobile and a raw regiment from Mobile to 
Pensacola. He also ordered a company of marines from 
the Florida town to Mobile. These troops he expected to 
serve as examples of discipline for the men of the Army
5
of Mobile. On February 13, the navy launched the gun­
boat Gaines, which was being constructed at Mobile. She 
would soon join the small naval force already in the bay.
4
General Order No. 34, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 20, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida; 
The Index, May 1, 1862.
5
Abstract from Field Return, Department of Alabama 
and West Florida, Feb. 1, 1862, O.R., VI, 819; Deas to
------ , Feb. 6, 1862, Chestnut-MTller-Manning Collection;
Para I, Special Order No. 51, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 11, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida; 
Para II, Special Order No. 52, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 12, 1862, ibid.; Para III, 
Special Order No. 39, Headquarters Army of Pensacola,
Feb. 13, 1862, in A. C. Van Benthuysen Papers, Special 
Collections Division, Tulane University Library.
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It appeared to Bragg that he might need these experienced 
troops and naval assistance soon. He had received 
reports that a large Federal naval expedition was headed 
for the Gulf and feared it might attack Mobile. Bragg 
admitted in a confidential letter that Fort Morgan and 
Fort Gaines could not "prevent their entrance of a dark 
night," and he pushed the construction of water batteries 
near the city.*’
Events in Kentucky and Tennessee soon intruded to
break the relative calm existing at Mobile. Following
the Confederate defeats at Mill Springs and Fort Henry,
the War Department began scouring the lower South for
troops to reinforce General Albert Sidney Johnston's
army. Bragg had to furnish at least four regiments. He
responded by ordering two regiments each from Mobile and
7
Pensacola to Knoxville. Bragg also took the opportunity 
to make some suggestions to the authorities in Richmond 
on the Confederacy's future strategy. His ideas con­
tained some of the earliest, if not the earliest
C.
Advertiser and Register, Feb. 13, 14, 1862; Bragg 
to Brigadier General Samuel Jones, Feb. 12, 1862, O.R., 
VI, 825.
^Benjamin to Bragg, Feb. 8, 1862, O.R., VI, 823; 
Bragg to Jones, Feb. 12, 1862, ibid., 824-25; Bragg to 
Benjamin, Feb. 18, 1862, ibid., 894; Para I, Special 
Order No. 54, Headquarters Department of Alabama and West 
Florida, Feb. 14, 1862, General and Special Orders, 
Department of Alabama and West Florida; Bragg Diary,
Feb. 19, 1862.
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considerations of the place of Mobile in the overall 
strategy of the Southern war effort. According to Bragg, 
all resources should be concentrated so that the enemy
could be attacked in Kentucky. He advocated abandoning
!
all points on the Gulf except Mobile, New Orleans, and 
Pensacola. He did not feel that the loss of the aban­
doned territory would prove significant. From this 
point onward, Bragg continued to support the defense of 
the city because of the strategic significance of its
rail and telegraph links with the eastern and western
8portions of the Confederacy.
The command and troop situation at Mobile soon
changed again. On February 18, 1862, Benjamin sent Bragg
instructions to withdraw his forces from Mobile and
Pensacola and "hasten to the defence of the Tennessee 
g
line." He advised Bragg to abandon Pensacola completely 
but to leave garrisons in the forts in Mobile Bay. 
Benjamin hoped these garrisons would discourage an attack 
on Mobile. The Confederate high command did not agree 
initially with Bragg's advocacy of defending Mobile or 
his idea of its importance. Benjamin told Bragg "the 
risk of its capture must be run by us."^ Bragg did not
®Bragg to Benjamin, Feb. 15, 1862, O.R., VI, 826. 
^Benjamin to Bragg, Feb. 18, 1862, ibid., 828. 
~^Ibid.y Bragg Diary, Feb. 19, 1862.
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receive these instructions until February 27, but he made 
immediate arrangements to comply. He ordered most of his 
infantry and Generals Withers and Gladden to Corinth. 
Colonel John B. Villepigue replaced Withers in command of 
the Army of Mobile. After arranging to turn over the 
department to Jones at Pensacola, Bragg left Mobile for 
Corinth on March 1."^
The departure of Bragg and Withers deprived Mobile 
of two able generals. Withers served capably as a divi­
sion commander in the Army of Tennessee until late sum­
mer 1863, when failing health forced him out of active 
duty. His performance in several battles resulted in
12praise from Bragg and Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk.
Bragg to Benjamin, Feb. 27, 1862, O.R., VI, 834; 
Bragg to Jones, Feb. 27, 1862, ibid., 835; Bragg to 
General G. T. Beauregard, Feb. 27, 1862, ibid., 836;
Para II, Special Order No. 62, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 26, 1862, ibid.; Paras II 
and III, General Order No. 37, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 27, 1862, General Orders, 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Oct. 14, 1861- 
Feb. 28, 1862, RG 109, National Archives; Para I, Gen­
eral Order No. 38, Headquarters Department of Alabama and 
West Florida, Feb. 28, 1862, General and Special Orders, 
Department of Alabama and West Florida; Para — , General 
Order No. 38, Headquarters Department of Alabama and West 
Florida, Feb. 28, 1862, O.R., VI, 836; Bragg to Jones, 
[March 1], 1862, ibid ., 837.
12Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray; Lives of the 
Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1959), 342-43.
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Although his tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee
was an almost continuous record of failures, Bragg's
service at Mobile can hardly be faulted. Bragg had been
a hero in the Mexican War and an outstanding artillery
officer in the old army. His appointment as a general in
the Confederate army had received widespread applause:
...no one doubted Bragg's ability when the 
Civil War began....he was one of the most dis­
tinguished soldiers to join the Confederacy- 
and for a time one of the most impressive.
Davis demonstrated his confidence in Bragg by assigning 
him to command at Pensacola, a site where war might break 
out because the Federals held Fort Pickens. As I stated 
previously, Bragg recognized Mobile's strategic signifi­
cance and pushed the defensive preparations there. He 
won the respect of his men and the people of the city.
His interest in the city's welfare continued until the 
end of the war. The only criticism of his command at 
Mobile might be that his underestimation of the impor­
tance of entrenchments caused him to delay the construc-
14tion of earthworks around the city.
13Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate 
Defeat: Field Command (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), ix, 155-56.
14Ibid., 155, 195, 202-203; Josiah C. Nott to Bragg, 
Nov. 1, 1862, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve; John For­
syth to Bragg, Nov. 3, 1862, ibid.
Bragg had not hesitated in turning over to Jones
the command of the Department of Alabama and West
Florida. A native of Virginia, Jones graduated from
West Point in 1841 and received a commission in the
artillery corps. For seven years he served as an 
instructor at the Military Academy, an assignment which 
included courses in tactics and artillery. Jones' first 
Confederate service came as chief of artillery to Beaure­
gard at First Manassas, and his performance brought him a 
promotion to brigadier general. His experience as an 
artillery officer undoubtedly led Davis and Benjamin to 
choose him to go to Bragg in January 1862. That experi­
ence impressed Bragg, as did his "high character as an 
15officer." Even after only a short time observing Jones 
at Pensacola, Bragg had confidence in his abilities and 
gave him what Bragg felt to be "the most important com­
mand in this army..., and the one on which the general 
[Bragg] considers the safety of our cause depends."^ 
Bragg's new assignment caused the Advertiser and 
Register to declare that his leaving would probably stir 
up the "croakers and panic makers" even though there was
15Warner, Generals in Gray, 166; Mark M. Boatner III, 
The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay Co.,
Inc., 1959), 443; Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 9, 1862, O.R., 
VI, 802; Bragg to Cooper, Feb. 1, 1862, ibid., 820.
1 CL
Garner to Jones, Mar. 28, 1862, O.R., VI, 867.
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17no cause for alarm. Jones had assumed command shortly
after Bragg left, but he kept his headquarters at
Pensacola. Perhaps with the idea of reassuring the
people of Mobile, Bragg on March 4 issued an order at
Jackson, Tennessee, resuming command of the Department of
Alabama and West Florida and adding to his jurisdiction
the troops in northern Mississippi and southwestern
Tennessee. This order apparently never took actual
force, but Jones and other commanders at Mobile continued
to correspond with Bragg and seek his advice or ask 
18instructions. To calm further the fears of Mobilians,
Jones ordered an experienced unit from Pensacola to man
the batteries protecting the upper bay, and he also
19ordered reinforcements to Fort Gaines.
The defenses at Grant's Pass received renewed 
attention from the Confederate engineers. Lockett had
17Advertiser and Register, Mar. 2, 1862.
18General Order No. 39, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Mar. 3, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida; 
Para I, General Order No. 1, Headquarters Second Grand 
Division, Army of the Mississippi Valley, Mar. 4, 1862, 
O.R., VII, 920-21.
19Para I, Special Order No. 65, Headquarters Depart­
ment of Alabama and West Florida, Mar. 4, 1862, General 
and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Flor­
ida; Advertiser and Register, Mar. 2, 1862; Dr. George 
Little and James R. Maxwell, A History of Lumsden1s Bat­
tery, C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: United Daughters of the
Confederacy, 1905), 5.
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staked out gun positions at Cedar Point to help protect
the pass. Villepigue visited Cedar Point and revised
Lockett's plan. Henry B. Warren, a civilian engineer
with responsibility for erecting the battery, found an
infantry company at the point, but the men received
orders to go to Corinth before he could put them to work
mounting guns. Warren did get foundations laid for three
guns but had to await a force of laborers to complete
construction of the battery. By April, Warren had
finished his work, and a company of the 1st Alabama Bat-
20talion Artillery had occupied the earthwork. Warren 
also began driving piles into the waters of the pass.
He had the piles prepared on Dauphin Island and trans­
ported them by steamer to the pass. The men assigned to 
this task drove some 250 piles into the water about a 
quarter of a mile out from Grant's Island. To protect 
the pile driver from enemy vessels, the Confederate com­
mand stationed a steamer nearby where it could pull the
21barge to safety if necessary.
Two new militia regiments entered active service in 
Mobile at this critical juncture in early March 1862—
on
Henry B. Warren to Lockett, Feb. 27, 1862, William 
P. Palmer Collection of Civil War Manuscripts, Western 
Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio; Roll dated 
Apr. 23, 1862, Record of Events Cards, Company D, 1st 
Alabama Battalion Artillery, Compiled Service Records.
^Warren to Lockett, Feb. 27, 1862, Palmer Civil War 
Collection.
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the 2nd Volunteer Regiment, Colonel John H. Higley, and
3rd Volunteer Regiment, Colonel John Forsyth. The two
units joined the 9th Brigade, Alabama Militia, already on
duty in the city. Both were organized specifically for
22the defense of the city and were well armed. Forsyth's
regiment performed provost guard duty in Mobile while
Higley's went into camp at Hall's Mills. On Dog River 
near Mobile, this site became the main camp of instruc­
tion for Alabama militia troops. From time to time regu­
lar Confederate units encamped there also. The men con­
structed wooden houses arranged in regular rows as their 
quarters. A soldier stationed there provided this 
description of the camp:
...Some of the buildings are quite spacious 
and two stories high. Others again are mere 
log huts. The timber for a mile all around
has been cleared away, forming a large and
splendid drill ground, the terror of the 
soldiers.
Bragg soon requested that Jones send Villepigue to 
report to Jackson. In complying with Bragg's telegram, 
Jones felt compelled to go personally to Mobile and
22Advertiser and Register, Mar. 5, 1862; General 
Order No. 1, Headquarters 2nd Regiment Alabama Volunteer 
Militia, Mar. 4, 1862, quoted in ibid.; General Order 
No. 1, Headquarters 3rd Regiment Alabama Volunteer Mili­
tia, Mar. 4, 1862, quoted in ibid.
^ Ibid., Mar. 21, 1862; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluc­
tant Rebel: The Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861-
1865 (Baton Rouqe: Louisiana State University Press,
1961), 126.
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assume command there. He ordered Villepigue to Tennes­
see, and the latter officer turned over command of the 
Army of Mobile to Colonel Powell at Fort Morgan until 
Jones could reach the city. Jones arrived on March 14 
and almost immediately telegraphed Cooper in Richmond 
asking that Davis declare martial law in and around
Mobile. He assured Cooper that "the best citizens
24desire it and have petitioned that it be done."
Secretary of War Benjamin informed Jones on March 23 that
Davis approved his request. The next day Jones proclaimed
martial law in Mobile and Baldwin counties and that part
of Jackson County, Mississippi, east of the Pascagoula
River. His order suspended "the jurisdiction of the
civil courts...so far only as it may conflict with the
25military requirements of the Government."
The command situation at Mobile remained in flux 
during late March 1862. Jones received an order from 
Bragg on March 24 instructing him to turn over command to 
Colonel Powell and to report to him in Tennessee.
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Bragg to Jones, Mar. 11, 1862, O.R., VI, 852;
Jones to Colonel Thomas M. Jones, Mar. 12, 1862, ibid., 
853; Powell to Jones, Mar. 14, 1862, ibid., 856; Jones 
to Bragg, Mar. 15, 1862, ibid.; Jones to Cooper, Mar. 14, 
1862, Letterbook, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
^Benjamin to Jones, Mar. 23, 1862, O.R., VI, 866; 
General Order No. 19, Headquarters Army of Mobile, Mar.
24, 1362, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, pp. 290-91; Daily Tribune, 
Apr. 4, 1862.
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When word of this order got out, Governor Shorter and the 
Mobile Committee of Safety requested Benjamin to allow 
Jones to remain. Benjamin telegraphed back that Jones 
would be ordered to remain but sent no instructions to 
Jones. William M. Dunn, chairman of the Committee of 
Safety, told Jones of this latter telegram, and the gen­
eral determined to stay in Mobile and await official con­
firmation of Dunn's telegram. Several days passed with 
no word from Richmond, so Jones decided to join Bragg. 
Upon leaving, Jones turned over command of the Army of 
Mobile to Brigadier General Thomas J. Butler, commander 
of the 9th Brigade, Alabama Militia. After a day or so 
with Bragg at Corinth, Jones received orders to return to 
Mobile. Bragg may have sent him back so that a competent 
officer would have charge of the department. Jones
resumed command of the department and Army of Mobile on
2 6April 2, but his position remained unsettled.
2 6Jones to Bragg, Mar. 24, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg 
Papers, Western Reserve; Jones to Cooper, Mar. 25, 1862, 
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 290; William M. Dunn to Benjamin, 
Mar. 25, 1862, Telegrams Received, Secretary of War; 
Shorter to Benjamin, Mar. 25, 1862, ibid.; Jones to 
Bragg, Mar. 26, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg Papers, Western 
Reserve; Jones to Major General Mansfield Lovell, Mar.
28, 1862, in Mansfield Lovell Papers, Henry E. Huntington 
Library, San Marino, California; Para I, General Order 
No. 21, Headquarters Army of Mobile, Mar. 29, 1862, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Mar. 30, 1862; Para 
II, Special Order No. 24, Headquarters 2nd Corps, Army of 
Mississippi, Mar. 31, 1862, quoted in Compiled Service 
Record of Samuel Jones; Para I, General Orders No. 40, 
Headquarters Department of Alabama and West Florida,
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While these events occurred, several official acts
transpired which involved Mobile's military situation.
On March 24, 1862, the Confederate Congress appropriated
$1,200,000 to be used in the defense of Mobile Bay and
the Alabama River. This money would go a long way toward
27providing needed defensive construction. General Butler
issued an order requiring the registration of all white
males over eighteen years old living in and around Mobile
who had not already joined Confederate or state military
service. The desire to "determine who may be entitled to
exemption from military service and to fix the status of
2 8all men" prompted the order. Butler also ordered all
government employees not currently enlisted in volunteer
companies to organize themselves into military companies.
These units would be expected to drill whenever possible.
Both of Butler's orders aided in placing the eligible men
of the city on a better footing if they had to be used to 
29defend Mobile.
Apr. 2, 1862, General and Special Orders, Department of 
Alabama and West Florida.
27 "An Act to provide for the further defense of the 
bay of Mobile and the Alabama River," Mar. 24, 1862,
O.R., 4, I, 1020.
28Para II, General Order No. 21, Headquarters Army 
of Mobile, Mar. 29, 1862, quoted in Advertiser and 
Register, Mar. 30, 1862.
29General Order No. 33, Headquarters 9th Brigade 
Alabama Militia, Mar. 28, 1862, quoted in ibid., Mar. 29, 
1862.
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Some confusion still remained in Mobile's command
arrangements. Brigadier General John H. Forney, having
been ordered to the city nine days earlier, arrived in
Mobile on April 11, 1862. The War Department intended
Forney to replace Jones so that the latter could join the
army at Corinth. Forney, however, suffered from a wound
and poor health, and he applied for and received a
fifteen-day leave to recuperate. Under these circum-
30stances Jones felt compelled to remain m  command. The 
situation confronting him did not seem an encouraging 
one. In all, only about 2,400 men were present for duty 
in the Mobile defenses, most of them stationed in Fort 
Morgan and Fort Gaines. Following the battle of Shiloh, 
Jones had sent several units to Corinth and would soon 
send several more. He felt that the forts at the bay 
entrances stood in fairly good shape, and although he did 
not think the enemy would attack, Jones warned that a 
strong assault would capture Mobile. To help defend the 
city, Jones requested that Richmond either send weapons 
to arm several thousand men to be recruited in Alabama
30Cooper to Brigadier General John H. Forney, Apr.
2, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspec­
tor General, Chap. I, Vol. 36, p. 557; Cooper to Forney, 
Apr. 9^  1862, ibid., 566; Para XVI, Special Order No. 75, 
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Apr. 2, 1062, 
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 295; Jones to General Robert E.
Lee, Apr. 12, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg Papers, Western 
Reserve; Jones to Cooper, Apr. 20, 1862, O.R., VI, 880.
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or order troops from Corinth to Mobile. He also asked
31that a general officer be sent to Mobile.
A new military unit from Mobile was offered to the 
Confederate army in April 1862. On the twenty-third,
G. Huggins Cleveland wrote to Secretary of War George W. 
Randolph asking if he succeeded in raising a battalion 
or regiment would the War Department accept it for Con­
federate service. The request would not have sounded 
unusual except that the men Cleveland wished to organize 
were "Creoles," free men of mixed white and black blood. 
They were property-owning slaveholders and, according to
Cleveland, "as true to the South as the pure white 
32race." He also stated that the "Creoles" were anxious 
to go to war and would form a battalion or regiment in a 
few days' time. Congressman Edmund S. Dargan of Mobile 
endorsed Cleveland's application and stated: I know the
character of the population he proposes to enlist, and
^Jones to Cooper, Apr. 15, 1862, O.R., VI, 875-76; 
Para I, Special Order No. 79, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 13, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida; 
Para V, Special Order No. 80, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 14, 1862, ibid.; Jones to 
Cooper, Apr. 20, 1862, O.R., VI, 879-80.
32G. Huggins Cleveland to [George W. Randolph],
Apr. 23, 1862, O.R., 4, I, 1088.
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think they will render as efficient aid as any class we 
33have." The War Department denied Cleveland authority
to raise his unit on the ground that "the law does not
34permit the Department to accept any new corps."
Mobile's "Creoles" did not give up the idea of getting 
into Confederate service, however, and would offer again 
to form military units for active duty.
Forney returned to duty from sick leave and assumed 
command of the Department of Alabama and West Florida on 
April 28, 1862. Forney's main qualification for command 
at Mobile was his experience at Pensacola early in the 
war. Governor Moore appointed him as a special aide with 
the rank of colonel and sent him to the Florida town in 
January 1861 to assist in drilling the Alabama troops 
there. He later received a commission as colonel of the 
1st Regiment of Artillery, Army of Alabama, and in this 
capacity commanded a portion of the troops at Pensacola. 
When Bragg assumed command there in March, he assigned 
Forney to duty as acting inspector general and used him 
to superintend the construction of works and the mounting 
of artillery. In June 1861, Forney left Pensacola to 
take command of an Alabama infantry regiment on its way
33Ibid.; Edmund S. Dargan to Randolph, Apr. 23,
1862, iEIdT, 1087-88.
34
A. T. Bledsoe to Dargan, May 5, 1862, ibid., 1111.
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north to Virginia. He led his unit at First Manassas and
in a skirmish at Dranesville in December and received a
severe wound in the latter action. Both General Joseph
E. Johnston and Brigadier General James E. B. Stuart
recommended Forney for promotion because of his bravery
in the skirmish. Forney was in Alabama recovering from
his wound when he received his promotion and orders to
35report to Mobile.
The situation Forney inherited from Jones was poor
but apparently not discouraging. Mobile's defenses
still remained rather weak. A private in Fort Gaines
confided in a letter to his sister that if a large enemy
force attacked the bay: "my opinion is we will not be
3 6able to hold the fort tho the officers think we can."
On assuming command Forney directed that obstructions be 
placed on Dog River bar to prevent enemy vessels from 
approaching the city if they should get into the bay.
35Forney to Beauregard, Apr. 28, 1862, Letterbook, 
Bragg Papers, Western Reserve; Bragg to Cooper, Mar. 12, 
1862, ibid.; General Order No. 4, Headquarters Troops 
Confederate States near Pensacola, Mar. 18, 1861, quoted 
in Daily Advertiser, Mar. 20, 18 61; Moore to Colonel 
William H. Chase, Jan. 22. 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 13; 
Colonel J. J. Seibels to Forney, Feb. 7, 1861, ibid., 17; 
Brigadier General James E. B. Stuart to Major Thomas A. 
Pratt, Dec. 23, 1861, ibid., V, 493; General Joseph E. 
Johnston to Cooper, Feb. 2, 1862, ibid., 1058; Boatner, 
Civil War Dictionary, 288.
3 6James R. Vickers to Miss Morell Vickers, Apr. 26, 
1862, in Fort Gaines Collection, Mobile Museum 
Department.
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The engineers left a small passage over the bar for
their own naval vessels to use, but the gap could be
closed quickly by sinking a wreck in it. Forney also 
issued the following order:
That all cotton at or near navigable 
waters within this Military Command shall be 
forthwith removed by the owner to some point
in the interior of the country near to which
no approach-can be made by water, or shall 
be burned.
He took this action to discourage an enemy attack on
Mobile. Any cotton not removed promptly the military
38would burn without compensation to the owner.
Following the fall of New Orleans, Forney feared 
that the Federals would attack Mobile next. He evidently 
felt that Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines would be passed by 
the enemy fleet as had been Fort Jackson and Fort St. 
Philip on the Mississippi River. Obviously, if this 
occurred, much more than obstructions over the Dog River 
bar would be necessary to protect the city. Accordingly, 
Forney revived the idea of defensive works near Mobile.
On April 30 he ordered the construction of entrenchments
37Forney to Beauregard, Apr. 28, 1862, Palmer Civil 
War Collection; General Order No. 50, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862, 
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and 
West Florida.
3 8General Order No. 50, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida.
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for light artillery and infantry to surround the city.
The soldiers of the Army of Mobile would furnish the
labor involved, but willing citizens could volunteer
their services. Forney also instructed his men to
strengthen the batteries which covered the Dog River
obstructions and to erect other batteries to bear on the 
39obstructions. Captain Charles F. Liernur, whom Jones
had assigned as chief engineer of the department on April
15, took charge of the construction of all of these
defensive works and received assistance from a number of
40other engineer officers.
The defensive posture of the city did not satisfy a
number of persons besides Forney. One resident wrote
that things were "in a bad state" in the city and that
"many families" had begun moving to the interior of the 
41state. Some of the military men expressed apprehension
39Para VIII, Special Order No. 95, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862, 
ibid.; Aberdeen (Miss.) Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Forney to 
Beauregard, May 8, 1862, Palmer Civil War Collection; 
Forney to Beauregard, May 10, 1862, ibid.
40Para II, Special Order No. 81, Headquarters Depart­
ment of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 15, 1862, General 
and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West 
Florida; Para VIII, Special Order No. 95, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862, 
ibid.
^ T h e  Index, June 12, 1862.
83
about the city also. The troops in Mobile lacked suffi­
cient arms and ammunition. Forney's exact feelings are 
difficult to discern from available evidence, but the 
opinions of Flag Officer Victor M. Randolph on the naval 
force at Mobile seem clear. He did not expect his 
"cockleshell gunboats" to survive an attack on the bay 
and thought the Confederate military would be forced to 
defend the rivers above Mobile. One of Randolph's sub­
ordinates wrote home that the flag officer took his
squadron to the city whenever the enemy appeared off the 
42bay. Although he gave some thought to evacuating the 
city, Forney promised the people that he would defend 
Mobile. He asked them to furnish tools and workers for 
the entrenchments. He also appealled to them to avoid
43"all undue excitement" and to preserve "strict order."
Work on the entrenchments began more slowly than 
Forney had hoped. Units at times worked in shifts, one
42Forney to Randolph, May 5, 1862, Telegrams 
Received, Secretary of War; Flag Officer Victor M. Ran­
dolph to Shorter, May — , 1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 847-48; 
Ed. Harleston Edwards to his mother, May 11, 1862, in 
E. H. Edwards Letters, South Caroliniana Library, Uni­
versity of South Carolina, Columbia.
43Captain Charles F. Liernur to Superintendent, 
Mobile and Spring Hill Railroad, May 4, 1862, in Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Department of Alabama and West 
Florida, Apri1-May 1862, Chap. Ill, Vol. 15, p. 62, RG 
109, National Archives; Orders, Headquarters Department 
of Alabama and West Florida, May 3, 1862, quoted in 
Advertiser and Register, May 6, 1862.
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occupied during the day and another at night. Forney
quickly authorized his officers to impress white and
black laborers alike to speed construction. A private
in the Alabama Cadet Corps wrote his mother:
...the officers send a squad of men in town 
and if they see an idle man on the streets or 
more than one clerk in a store they order 
them to 'Fall in,' and march him down and 
give him^| hoe or shovel and put him to 
work....
At least a partial reason for the lack of progress seems 
to have been that many of the men laboring on the bat­
teries would leave work and go into the city. Liernur 
requested the provost marshal in Mobile to set up a guard 
to prevent the men from leaving. Forney soon issued an
order requiring commanding officers to keep their men at
45work and away from the city.
To facilitate construction of the works, Liernur 
decided to practically strip the forts at the bay 
entrances of engineering property and laborers. He sent
44Para XIII, Special Order No. 98, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 3, 1862, 
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and 
West Florida; Advertiser and Register, May 6, 1862;
Harden P. Cochrane to Sophie Sarah Louisa Perkins 
Cochrane, May 7, 18 62, quoted in Harriet Fitts Ryan 
(arranger), "The Letters of Harden Perkins Cochrane, 
1862-1864," Alabama Review, VII (1954) , 283.
4 5Liernur to Major H. 0. Humphries, May 5, 1862, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Chap. Ill, Vol. 15, p. 63; 
General Order No. 51, Headquarters Department of Alabama 
and West Florida, May 6, 1862, General and Special Orders, 
Department of Alabama and West Florida.
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Captain William R. Neville to bring the "papers, maps,
furniture, building material (not needed for defence and
which can be used by the troops to restore breaches and
damages during action), horses, carts, provisions, tools,
cooking utensils &c" to Mobile. Neville also had orders
to transfer all Negro laborers to the city. Apparently
some of the cannon and ammunition in the forts were to be
moved as well, as Forney mentioned them in Neville's 
46instructions. The owners of the Mobile and Ohio Rail­
road turned over some of their railroad iron to Liernur 
for use in bombproof shelters in some of the bay 
batteries. Again Forney aided Liernur by ordering Cap­
tain Junius A. Law's Company D, 1st Alabama Artillery
Battalion, from the battery at Cedar Point to the city 
47defenses.
The governmental authorities and press of Mobile 
appreciated the efforts of Forney and Liernur.
Recognizing the urgency of the work in progress, the 
Advertiser and Register appealed to the people of the 
city to provide the needed labor which the military could
46Liernur to Captain William R. Neville, May 4,
1862, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Chap. Ill, Vol. 15,
pp. 61-62.
^Liernur to Firnan (?) Hurtel, May 5, 1862, ibid., 
66; Para XII, Special Order No. 103, Headquarters Depart­
ment of Alabama and West Florida, May 8, 1862, General 
and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West 
Florida.
86
not furnish itself. It urged the men to volunteer their
services at Liernur's offices in the customhouse. The
paper closed its editorial with these words: "The work
will not admit of delay, and Gen. Forney will not permit
it to drag when there are idle men in town capable of
48doing service." Adding its praise, the city council
passed a series of resolutions commending Forney and
asking the populace to get involved in the defense of
the city. The town fathers promised to help in every
way they could. Their resolutions expressed their
determination "to stand by the authorities in their
efforts to beat back the invading foe, and to hold the
49city to the last extremity."
Forney's fears of an attack on Mobile had some basis 
in fact. Union interest in capturing the city dated back 
to early 1862. When he received orders to assume command 
of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, Flag Officer 
David G. Farragut also received instructions to capture 
the forts at the bay entrance after he had taken New 
Orleans. At about the same time, Major General George B. 
McClellan told Major General Benjamin F. Butler that 
after his expedition accomplished its objective of
48Advertiser and Register, May 7, 1862.
49 "Joint Resolutions by President Forsyth, Relating 
to the Defence of Mobile," May 14, 1862, quoted in ibid., 
May 15, 1862.
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capturing New Orleans and Baton Rouge he was expected to 
50attack Mobile. Once the Crescent City had actually 
fallen, Farragut began making plans to attack Fort 
Morgan. Butler, however, favored continued operations up 
the Mississippi River against Vicksburg and Memphis. 
Although these latter operations took precedence, Farra­
gut sent Commander David D. Porter's squadron of mortar 
boats and gunboats toward Mobile. Porter planned to 
attack Fort Morgan on May 7, 1862. While he made pre­
parations for the attack, one of his gunboats ran aground 
near the fort, and the Confederate gunners fired about 
ten rounds at her. The gunboat succeeded in getting
51afloat again, but Porter never carried out the attack. 
From this point on, the Union high command gave no more
50Gideon Welles to Flag Officer David G. Farragut, 
Jan. 20, 1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 7-8? Major General George 
B. McClellan to Major General Benjamin F. Butler, Feb.
23, 1862, O.R., VI, 695.
51Farragut to Captain Thaddeus Bailey, Apr. 29,
1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 147; Farragut to Welles, Apr. 29, 
1862, ibid., 148? Butler to Edwin M. Stanton, Apr. 29, 
1862, quoted in Jessie Ames Marshall (ed.), Private and 
Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During 
the Period of the Civil War, 5 vols. (Norwood, Mass.:
The Plimpton Press, 1917), I, 428; Commander David D. 
Porter to Welles, May 10, 1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 478-79; 
Forney to Beauregard, May 8, 1862, Palmer Civil War Col­
lection; David D. Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the 
Civil War (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885), 38-39.
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serious thought to attacking the forts, as the Missis-
52sippi River became the scene of the naval effort.
One result of this feint attack on Mobile was the
evacuation of Pensacola by the Confederates. Colonel
Thomas M. Jones had been removing artillery, ammunition,
and other property from the twon for several months in
anticipation of evacuation of the forts and naval yard.
General Robert E. Lee in Richmond had advised Jones that
if the enemy attacked Mobile he should move his forces to
that city. When Jones received a telegram from one of
Forney's staff officers that shots had been fired on Fort
Morgan, he began withdrawing from Pensacola. He com-
53pleted the evacutaion on the night of May 9. Forney 
maintained Jones' troops near Pollard, Alabama, as an 
"army of observation" to protect the railroad between 
Mobile and Montgomery. He originally assigned Colonel 
J. R. F. Tatnall of the 29th Alabama to command the 
troops. Tatnall's men had instructions to remove the 
railroad iron between Pensacola and Pollard in addition 
to scouting the countryside. In late May Forney
Gustavus V. Fox to Farragut, May 12, 1862, xn 
Robert M. Thompson and Richard Wainwright (eds.), Confi­
dential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, 2 vols. (New 
York: Printed for the Naval History Society, 1918), I,
313.
^Jones to Forney, May 14, 1862, O.R., VI, 660.
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assigned Jones, by then an acting brigadier general, to
54command the troops at Pollard. From May 1862 until 
early 1865, the Confederates stationed troops at Pollard 
to watch the Union forces in Pensacola and help protect 
Mobile from that direction.
The Confederate authorities in Mobile remained con­
cerned about the city's defensive posture. In late May 
1862 Liernur still worked feverishly on the line of 
earthworks surrounding Mobile. He directed only a small 
number of laborers, however, and appealed to the citizens 
to volunteer their "Negro Laborers, Cooks and Waiters,
who can be spared, to work on the entrenchments and per-
55feet the works." Those persons willing to contribute 
would have their names registered with the provost mar­
shal along with the number of laborers furnished. To 
strengthen the armed forces around the city, Forney 
urged the men of Mobile and nearby counties to form 
military companies and arm themselves as best they could. 
These companies would form themselves into regiments, and 
once organized they would drill so as to be prepared for
54Paras V and VI, Special Order No. 107, Head­
quarters Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 12, 
1862, General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama 
and West Florida; Para III, Special Order No. 124, Head­
quarters Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 29, 
1862, ibid.
^ Advertiser and Register, May 25, 1862.
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service when needed. Forney promised to try to supply
56ammunition to those who could not supply themselves.
In early June Forney moved several of his units 
around to have his most experienced men in his most 
strategic defensive works. He transferred the 27th Mis­
sissippi Infantry from Pollard to relieve the 1st Confed­
erate Infantry, then in charge of the bay batteries and 
the shore batteries at the southern end of the line of 
entrenchments. The 1st Confederate Infantry moved to 
Fort Gaines and relieved some ninety-day troops manning 
the guns in that fort. Both the 27th Mississippi and 1st 
Confederate had occupied batteries at Pensacola and had
engaged in several duels with Federal gunners in Fort 
57Pickens. When not drilling or on guard duty, the men 
passed the time bathing in the bay or playing marbles 
under nearby live oaks. The living quarters for the men 
varied. Some slept on cots arranged under large, open,
56Ibid., May 25, 27, 1862.
57Para IV, Special Order No. 122, Headquarters Army 
of Mobile, June 3, 1862, in Special and General Orders, 
Army of Mobile, March-June 1862, RG 109, National 
Archives; Aberdeen Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Paras IV and 
V, Special Order No. 128, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, June 3, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida.
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cotton storage sheds. These men also did their cooking
58next to the sheds.
Liquor still provided a problem for the military 
authorities even though Bragg had attempted to remove the 
supply months before. Forney issued orders prohibiting 
the sale or delivery of intoxicating beverages to offi­
cers or enlisted men in Confederate service on steamboats 
or vessels on the rivers near the city or on any of the 
railroads near the city. This order also forbade sale of 
liquor to civilians who would then allow soldiers to
drink it. Anyone caught violating the order would be
59arrested and have his liquor supplies destroyed. The
men had little or no coffee to drink because of the
blockade of Mobile Bay. Forney eventually had to
restrict the supply of coffee to use by men in the hos-
6 0pitals of the city. This shortage of Coffee was at" 
best only a partial excuse for the excessive use of
C O
Aberdeen Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; James ------ to
mother, May 18, 1862, quoted in Caldwell Delaney, Confed­
erate Mobile: A Pictorial History (Mobile: The Haunted
Book Shop, 1971), 30.
59General Order No. 62, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama and West Florida, June 20, 1862, General and 
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida; 
Advertiser and Register, June 26, 1862.
6 0Para IV, Special Order No. 124, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 29, 1862, 
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and 
West Florida.
9?
liquor at Mobile. The frequent boredom and monotony of 
military life has often driven soldiers in a garrison 
situation to seek relief in alcohol.
At this time the Confederate command began to give 
attention to the defensive situation along the rivers 
which emptied into Mobile Bay at its northeastern corner. 
Part of Forney's plans for the area included something 
new to Mobile— a floating battery. In May 1861, the state 
authorities had seized the ship Danube from her owners.
The Confederates later converted her into a floating bat­
tery mounting four 42-pounder cannons. Forney ordered 
her stationed at the point where the Blakely and Appa- 
lachee rivers diverged so that her guns would command 
the latter river. He also wanted a battery erected on
the western bank of the Blakely River to protect that 
61stream. The Confederates needed to have defensive 
works covering these two rivers. If left unobstructed,
enemy vessels could ascend them and, then make their way
I
through the maze of streams at the head of Mobile Bay to 
approach Mobile from the rear. Eventually the engineers
build another earthwork to help prejvent such an enemy
I
  /
61 fPara III, Special Order No.I 146, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Flqrida, June 23, 1862, 
ibid.; U. S. Navy Department, Civiil War Naval Chronology, 
1861-1865, 6 parts (Washington, D. C.: Government Print­
ing-Office, 1961-1966), Pt. VI, 218.
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move in the area. The Confederates usually referred to
the defenses in this area as the Appalachee Batteries.
In late May and again in late June 1862, the War
Department issued a series of orders attempting to clarify
the command situation in the West and to reorganize the
departments there. Beauregard at Corinth had requested a
clear definition of the boundaries of his Department
No. 2. The War Department responded by placing those
parts of Mississippi and Alabama north of the thirty-
third parallel, east of the Mississippi River, and west
6 2of Alabama's eastern boundary in Beauregard's command. 
After Bragg succeeded Beauregard, Richmond extended the 
eastern boundary of the department "to the line of rail­
road from Chattanooga via Atlanta to West Point, on the
Chattahoochee River, and thence down the Chattahoochee
63and Apalachicola Rivers to the Gulf of Mexico." Four 
days after the War Department issued this last order, 
new Secretary of War George W. Randolph wrote Bragg that 
his department included all of the state of Alabama.
6 2Paras II and III, General Order No. 39, Adjutant 
and Inspector General's Office, May 26, 1862, O.R., XV, 
746.
6 3Para XVI, Special Order No. 146, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, June 25, 1862, ibid., 766.
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This decision placed Mobile in a new command, and the
city's status in this command would receive clarifica
64tion before long.
CA
Randolph to Bragg, June 29, 1862, ibid., 770.
CHAPTER IV
"...IT SHOULD BE DEFENDED FROM STREET TO STREET..."
General Braxton Bragg assumed command of the 
extended Department No. 2, also referred to as the West­
ern Department, on July 2, 1862. He reorganized several 
of the subdivisions of his new department. One of these 
became the District of the Gulf, which consisted of the 
territory between the thirty-second parallel and the Gulf 
from the Pearl River to the Apalachicola River. Forney 
remained at Mobile as commander of the new district.'1'
The District of the Gulf remained the territorial com­
mand responsible for the defense of Mobile from this time 
until the end of the war, although for a brief period the 
War Department upgraded the district to a department.
The district's boundaries changed slightly several times, 
but the protection of Mobile and Mobile Bay stood as top 
priority of the generals in charge of the district. As 
commander of a subdivision of a larger territorial unit, 
Mobile's general-in-chief lacked complete control over 
the troops in his district but could draw supplies freely 
from other areas in the department. District status
^"General Order No. 89, Headquarters Department No.
2, July 2, 1862, O.R., XV, 771; Advertiser and Register, 
July 6, 1862.
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connected with the states of Alabama and Mississippi 
seems to have been the best position for Mobile because 
the area surrounding the city could never furnish enough 
foodstuffs. The War Department would always see that 
Mobile had a sufficient garrison.
A demonstration of Mobile's strategic importance to
the Confederacy occurred shortly after creation of the
District of the Gulf. In what one author calls "the
largest single Confederate troop movement by rail,"
twenty-five thousand men of the Army of the Mississippi
moved in railroad cars from Tupelo, Mississippi, through
2Mobile to Chattanooga, Tennessee. A smaller troop trans­
fer preceded this movement by about a month. Following 
the occupation of Corinth by Union forces, Major General 
Don Carolos Buell's Federal army began operations aimed 
toward Chattanooga. Major General Edmund Kirby Smith, 
whose department included Chattanooga, asked Bragg at 
Tupelo to send troops to help defend the city. Bragg 
responded by ordering Major General John P. McCown's 
division to report to Kirby Smith by rail via Mobile.
The three thousand men of this division left on June 28, 
1862, and their lead elements reached Chattanooga on 
July 3. Transit through Mobile went smoothly, but the
2
Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confed­
eracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1952) , 180.
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men encountered difficulties between Montgomery and
3Chattanooga, thus delaying their arrival slightly.
By late July 18 62 Bragg had decided that he could 
not attack Middle Tennessee from Tupelo as he desired 
and that Kirby Smith could not hold Buell out of 
Chattanooga. Knowing that this city and its railroad 
connections through eastern Tennessee were strategically 
more important than northern Mississippi, Bragg deter­
mined to go to Kirby Smith's aid. On July 21 he ordered 
the infantrymen of the three divisions of the Army of 
the Mississippi to proceed by rail through Mobile to 
Chattanooga. He sent his artillery and wagons overland 
through central Alabama. To get troops to Chattanooga 
quickly, Bragg also ordered available units at Mobile and 
Pollard to start for the city. These latter troops 
departed on July 22, and Bragg's first units left Tupelo 
the next day. The Mobile units reached Chattanooga on 
the twenty-seventh, while the lead units of the Army of
4
the Mississippi did not arrive for several more days.
3
Ibid., 181; Major General Edmund Kirby Smith to 
Bragg, June 27, 1862, O.R., XVI, Pt. 2, p. 709; Paras 
II and III, Special Order No. 96, Headquarters Department 
No. 2, June 27, 1862, ibid., XVII, Pt. 2, p. 626; Smith 
to Davis, July 14, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, p. 727.
^Bragg to Smith, July 22, 1862, O.R., XVI, Pt. 2, 
p. 732; Bragg to Cooper, July 23, 186/T, ibid., XVII, Pt. 
2, p. 656; Special Order No. 4, Headquarters of the 
Forces, July 21, 1862, ibid., 657; Lieutenant Edward 
Cunningham to Brigadier General Carter L. Stevenson,
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If Mobile had not still been in Confederate hands, the 
transfer of Bragg's army from Tupelo in time to save 
Chattanooga would not have been possible. The subse­
quent Confederate campaign into Kentucky would not have
5
been possible either.
Bragg once again expressed his concern for the 
defense of Mobile as he moved his army through the city. 
Even though he ordered infantrymen from Mobile to rein­
force Kirby Smith ahead of the Army of the Mississippi,
g
he planned to leave "a sufficient garrison" at Mobile. 
Four infantry regiments and a light artillery battery 
entrained at Mobile and proceeded to Chattanooga. In 
addition to being closer to Chattanooga than Bragg's 
units, these regiments had more men present for duty than 
Bragg's regiments. The latter had suffered casualties at 
Shiloh and in the skirmishes around Corinth and had lost 
men to disease both at Corinth and Tupelo. To replace 
the units from Mobile, Bragg ordered three Alabama and
July 28, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, p. 739; Aberdeen 
Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Black, Railroads of the Confed­
eracy , 182.
5I am indebted to my colleague Lawrence L. Hewitt, 
who cleared up some misconceptions about Bragg's 
strategy during the summer of 1862 in discussions con­
cerning Hewitt's "Braxton Bragg and the Invasion of 
Kentucky: A Campaign of Maneuver" (unpublished seminar
paper, Louisiana State University, 1975).
^Bragg to Cooper, July 23, 1862, O.R., XVII, Pt. 2, 
p. 656.
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two Louisiana regiments detached from the Army of the 
Mississippi. He also ordered a light battery from Colum­
bus, Mississippi, to Mobile. The two Louisiana units
moved on to duty at Pollard while the Alabama regiments
7
remained at the city where they could recruit.
While engaged in shifting troops from Mobile to
Chattanooga and from Tupelo to Mobile, Bragg was planning
to change commanders at Mobile. Forney apparently wanted
to be relieved so that he could resume duty in the field.
It is well known that Bragg had little confidence in the
major generals and brigadier generals under his command.
Perhaps with these two factors in mind, Bragg ordered
Samuel Jones, now a major general, to relieve Forney in
command of the District of the Gulf. What position
Bragg had in mind for Forney is unknown, but he probably
would have succeeded to command of Jones' division. Word
of this planned change reached Richmond (and possibly
Mobile) before Bragg issued the order. Jefferson Davis
sent the following telegram to him:
The confidence felt in General Forney, 
at Mobile, and the knowledge he has acquired 
as the successor of General Jones, render
7
Aberdeen Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Special Order No.
6, Headquarters Department No. 2, July 23, 1862, O.R., 
XVII, Pt. 2, p. 657; Paras II, III, and V, Special 
Order No. 133, Headquarters Department No. 2, July 26, 
1862, ibid., 659; Kate Cumming, Kate; The Journal of a 
Confederate Nurse, ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 57.
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the propriety of withdrawing him very 
doubtful. Please reconsider your purpose 
in that regard....
In response to this wire, Bragg revoked his order and
9
left Forney in command at Mobile.
The troops left by Bragg at Mobile settled into 
their new duties in a short period of time. Two of the 
regiments— the 17th and 18th Alabama— remained near the 
city. The 18th Regiment established Camp Beulah on the 
Spring Hill Road four miles from Mobile. Forney ordered 
the 17th Alabama into camp on the Bay Shell Road near 
the city. This regiment had charge of the bay batteries. 
The men were unfamiliar with the handling of artillery so 
Forney assigned some of his experienced artillery offi­
cers to instruct the officers and drill the men in their 
new duties.^ The camp of the 17th Alabama was known as 
Camp Forney, and one soldier described it as "beautiful
Bragg to Cooper, July 24, 1862, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 332; Bragg to Cooper, June 29, 1862, ibid., XVII,
Pt. 2, p. 628; Bragg to Randolph, Aug. 9, 1862, ibid.,
673; Para I, Special Orders No. 133, Headquarters Depart­
ment No. 2, July 26, 1862, ibid., 659; Davis to Bragg,
July 26, 1862, ibid.
9
Special Order No. 134, Headquarters Department No. 
2, July 27, 1862, ibid.
■^Roll for Apr. 30-Aug. 31, 1862, Record of Events 
Cards, Company A, 18th Alabama Infantry, Compiled Service 
Records; Roll for Sept. and Oct. 1862, Record of Events 
Cards, Company G, 18th Alabama Infantry, ibid.; "Diary of 
Captain Edward Crenshaw of the Confederate States Army," 
Alabama Historical Quarterly, I (1930) , 438-39.
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and healthy." Some of the officers and men had wooden
houses for their quarters, but most of the regiment lived
in walled tents with plank floors. As winter and cold
weather approached, the soldiers bought stoves to put in
the tents for warmth. Many of the men probably would
have agreed with the diarist who wrote: "I spent decid-
11edly the most pleasant winter of the War, at Mobile."
Two units— the 18th and 19th Louisiana Infantry
regiments— became a part of the force at Pollard after
detaching from Bragg's army. Men of the two units had
mixed reactions to the area around Pollard. A private of
the 19th Louisiana found the camp pleasing with its
nearby springs providing fresh water and a nearby river
12furnishing good fishing. On the other hand, a lieu­
tenant of the 18th Louisiana remembered little to compli­
ment the village on: "There was no evidence of any cul­
tivation of the soil in the vicinity, the general appear­
ance of the country and the inhabitants thereof indicat­
ing that the principal food was composed of Pine top
■^Roll for July 1862-Aug. 1863, Record of Events 
Cards, Field and Staff, 17th Alabama Infantry, Compiled 
Service Records; "Diary of Captain Edward Crenshaw," 438.
12Private John A. Harris to Rebecca Harris, Aug. 11, 
1862, in John Achilles Harris Letters, 1861-1864, Louisi­
ana State University Department of Archives and Manu­
scripts.
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13whiskey and gophers." The Louisianians had not been
at Pollard long when Secretary of War Randolph asked
Forney if he could spare them to be sent to western
Louisiana. Forney protested that detaching the regiments
would seriously reduce his infantry force. Eventually
Randolph and Forney reached a compromise, and Forney gave
14up only the 18th Louisiana.
By October 1862 the Confederate troops stationed in 
Fort Morgan had settled into a regular routine of duties. 
With no signs of an enemy attack, the men's daily life 
remained uneventful. Before breakfast every morning the 
men drilled by company. They held guard mount at eight 
o'clock and then dress parade. Activities during the 
afternoon varied. On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, the 
men of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Alabama Infantry Regiment, 
went through battalion infantry drill. The troops of the 
1st Alabama Artillery Battalion drilled at the guns on 
those afternoons. On Tuesday and Thursday the battalions 
switched, the artillerymen drilling as infantry and the 
infantrymen as artillery. The only duty on Saturday 
was cleaning, and on Sunday the men had company
"^Weekly Thibodaux Sentinel, July 11, 1868.
"^Randolph to Forney, Sept. 1, 1862, O.R., XV, 804; 
Forney to Randolph, Sept. 3, 1862, Telegrams Received, 
Secretary of War; Weekly Thibodaux Sentinel, July 25, 
1868.
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inspections and inspections of kitchens and quarters.
Only about 900 to 1,000 men occupied Fort Morgan, and at 
least some of the officers thought the position a weak 
one. Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Stewart wrote to his 
wife that the fort could not keep enemy ironclads from 
running through into the bay. He felt that only in 
cooperation with the Confederate ironclads under con­
struction at Selma could the fort's garrison achieve any
15success against attack.
In mid-October the Confederates feared that an
attack on Mobile was imminent. Scouts near Pensacola
sent word to Forney that thousands of new Union troops
had landed at the Florida town with the intention of
undertaking a campaign into southeastern Alabama. Forney
quickly sent requests for reinforcements to Richmond and
Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, commanding in
Mississippi. He did not think he had enough men to
defend both Mobile and Pollard. Governor Shorter also
asked Jefferson Davis to send more men to Mobile, saying:
X 6"General Forney is worn down and wants help."
■^Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Stewart to Julia 
Stewart, Oct. 16, 20, 1862, in Charles S. Stewart Let­
ters, 1862-1863, Fort Morgan Museum.
"^Forney to Cooper, Oct. 18, 18 62, O.R./ XV, 833; 
Forney to Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, Oct. 18, 
1862, ibid., 833-34; Shorter to Davis, Oct. 18, 1862, 
ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 377.
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Pemberton sent a brigade to Meridian to be used if the
enemy did advance on Mobile. The War Department promised
Forney that Brigadier General Leadbetter would receive
orders to report to Mobile as chief engineer and that the
Department would send a brigadier general to command some
of Forney's troops. Davis authorized Forney to enroll all
militiamen between the ages of thirty-five and forty for
Confederate service. The fear of attack passed quickly,
17however, and Forney received no troop reinforcements.
This threatened enemy attack caused Forney to push 
the completion of defensive works around the city. He 
asked Mayor Slough to furnish laborers. Slough, in turn, 
urged the citizens to volunteer their services, and he 
announced that white laborers would receive $2.50 a day 
plus rations. Shortly after this plea, Governor Shorter 
issued an appeal for 600 slaves for use in working on the 
Mobile defenses. He called for 100 slaves each from 
Montgomery, Lowndes, Dallas, Marengo, Perry, and Wilcox 
counties. The request for slaves read in part:
The owners will be allowed a dollar a day 
for each slave, to commence from his embarka­
tion on river or railroad; transportation,
■^Pemberton to Forney, Oct. 18, 1862, ibid., XV,
834; Randolph to Shorter, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 378; Cooper to Forney, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid.; 
Cooper to Jones, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, p.
968; Major J. R. Waddy to Forney, Oct. 23, 1862, ibid.,
XV, 842.
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subsistence and medical attendance will be 
furnished. Each slave must be provided with 
either a spade or shovel, axe or pick, cloth-^g 
ing, bedding and provision to last to Mobile.
Any owner who sent twenty-five slaves could select a 
white man to go with them to care for them and help 
supervise their work."^
Shorter estimated that the defenses could be com­
pleted in about sixty days. Newspapers throughout Ala­
bama and in other southern states published the governor's 
appeal. The Montgomery Daily Mail urged the citizens of 
the capital city to give their aid cheerfully "in pro­
moting a move so necessary for the protection and safety
20of our interests and our homes." This paper's editor 
realized how important the defense of Mobile was to the 
rest of the state. The Charleston Mercury also expressed 
its concern for the safety of Mobile but found some 
things in Shorter's call to criticize. In particular, 
the Mercury's editor felt that Shorter was too calm and 
that he was being too slow in getting necessary laborers. 
Why ask for only 600 slaves, stated the paper, when he 
should have requested several thousand to finish the 
work quickly. The Mercury also wondered: "...why in a
1 8Advertiser and Register, Oct. 22, 29, 1862; Mont­
gomery Daily Mail, Oct. 25, 1862. ^
1Q \Montgomery Daily Mail, Oct. 25, 1862.
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vital matter of this sort, there should be any dislike
21to resort immediately to impressment." No information
is available on how many slaves went to Mobile in response
to Shorter's appeal, but Forney apparently did not
receive a large number.
About October 20, 1862, Shorter visited Mobile to
survey the situation there for himself. After this trip
he reported to Davis in a lengthy letter and talked of
the problems he found and the importance of Mobile.
First, he indicated that Forney needed the assistance of
some regular army officers as subordinates. Second,
Shorter found the troops at Mobile to be primarily
"fresh, undisciplined, and unskilled." Third, and most
importantly, the forces in the District of the Gulf seemed
too weak in numbers adequately to protect the territory
for which they had responsibility. In speaking of the
importance of Mobile, Shorter called the city "the only
Gulf port of any importance which is left us and one of
the most important lines of communication in the 
22Confederacy." He then reminded Davis that the fall of 
Mobile and its railroad connections would result in the 
isolation of the Trans-Mississippi Department.
^ Charleston Mercury, Oct. 28, 1862.
^Shorter to Davis, Oct. 22, 1862, O.R., LII, Pt.
2, p. 379.
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In Shorter1s mind there was no such thing as too much
money spent in the defense of the city. He felt that the
Confederacy would not survive long if the city fell to
the enemy. Shorter advocated rather drastic action
should Mobile face capture:
...If Mobile is to fall, I earnestly hope 
that orders will be given that not one stone 
be left upon another. Let the enemy find 
nothing but smoking and smouldering ruins to 
gloat over....
Davis replied to Shorter's letter in a short note.
He agreed with the Alabama governor on Mobile's impor­
tance and the probable consequence of its fall.
However, he stated that the Confederacy did not have any 
troops to spare from other places to send to Mobile.
Davis did not seem to think that the enemy seriously 
threatened Mobile enough to increase its garrison. He 
did say that the War Department was looking for some men 
to send. In the meantime he suggested that conscripts
be used to fill the depleted Alabama units then at 
24Mobile. Some assistance for Forney in the form of sub­
ordinate brigadier generals soon came. Alfred Cumming, 
whom the War Department had already ordered to Mobile, 
assumed command of a brigade of four regiments shortly 
after his arrival. Davis also instructed the War
23Ibid., 380.
2^Davis to Shorter, Oct. 29, 1862, ibid., XV, 848.
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Department to order James E. Slaughter from Jackson, 
Mississippi, to Mobile. Forney assigned Slaughter to 
the command of the Army of Mobile, which then consisted 
of the troops in the city entrenchments and bay batteries, 
including Cumming's brigade. Forney himself received a 
promotion to major general.^
In addition to the possibility of enemy attack and 
the weakness of his own force, Forney faced a couple of 
additional problems in early November 1862. One of these 
concerned the civilian population in Mobile. Apparently 
Forney felt that some of the people were passing informa­
tion to the enemy and asked for the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus in Mobile. Davis acquiesed and 
suspended the writ both in the city and the territory 
within ten miles. He did not object to civilians being
held for offenses but did not want military courts to 
2 6try them. Forney's second problem concerned drunken­
ness among the officers and men of his command.
25History of Company B, 40th Alabama Regiment, Con­
federate States Army, 1862 to 1865 (Anniston, Ala.(?):
The Colonial Press, 1963), 12; Davis to Shorter, Oct. 29, 
1862, O.R., XV, 848; "Organization of troops in the 
District of the Gulf, commanded by Maj. Gen. John H. 
Forney," Oct. 31, 1862, ibid., 850; Cooper to Forney,
Oct. 27, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and 
Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 37, p. 331.
^Cooper to Forney, Oct. 19, 1862, O.R., LII, Pt.
2, p. 378; Cooper to Forney, Nov. 10, 1862, ibid., XV,
859.
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He issued orders prohibiting the sale of liquor in and 
around Mobile and closing all bars and liquor shops. In 
addition to the seizure of liquor supplies of those who 
violated the order, Forney threatened to send guilty
27parties outside the district and forbid them to return.
Some of the people at Mobile did not trust com­
pletely the Confederate military authorities in the city. 
To a few merchants it seemed that certain officers used 
their positions to give preferential treatment to indi­
viduals in the shipment of supplies on the railroads and 
riverboats. Other merchants and boat owners showed 
reluctance to bring fuel and food supplies to the city 
on their vessels for fear that the military would impress 
the boats or articles. As a result of this slowing of 
trade, prices of items such as firewood and corn rose 
sharply. Several persons wrote to Davis and the War 
Department to complain about the state of affairs.
Acting Secretary of War James A. Campbell sent a long 
letter to Forney outlining the complaints which he had 
received. Campbell advised that seizures of private 
property were justified only in cases of extreme neces­
sity and warned against officers using their influence
27General Order No. 84, Headquarters District of the 
Gulf, Nov. 10, 1862, quoted in Advertiser and Register, 
Nov. 11, 1862; General Order No. 85, Headquarters Dis­
trict of the Gulf, Nov. 13, 1862, quoted in Daily 
Tribune, Nov. 13, 1862.
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for personal gain. Before he received Campbell's letter, 
Forney had already published a notice that he and the 
Confederate authorities did not contemplate the seizure 
of any boats or supplies. He did state, however, that 
railroads and steamboats would be expected "to give
2 8preference to the transportation of Government stores."
Mayor Slough initiated a possible solution to the 
problem existing between the military and civilians. In 
early November 18 62 he appointed a Committee of Safety 
for Mobile. The twenty-five-man group included Price 
Williams, Peter Hamilton, Daniel Wheeler, and Dr. G. A. 
Ketchum, all leading citizens of the city. These men 
were to work with the governor and the Confederate 
authorities at Mobile in two areas. They would collect 
information relating to the city's defenses which the 
civilian populace needed to know about. The committee 
also had authority to make plans that would lead to coop­
eration between the civilians and the military if the 
enemy threatened the city. In announcing the formation 
of the committee, Slough reaffirmed that Mobile would be 
defended. He felt that his duty as mayor compelled him 
to let the people know what he expected of them. He 
pointed to the examples of Vicksburg and Richmond where
2 8James A. Campbell to Forney, Nov. 23, 1862, O.R. , 
XV, 874-76; Notice, District of the Gulf, Nov. 13, 1862, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Nov. 16, 1862.
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the people had cooperated with the armies in turning back
enemy attacks and stated that he was sure Mobilians would
"help save to the Confederacy one of the most important
29bases of military operations."
On November 4, 1862, Leadbetter finally arrived in
Mobile. He had received orders to go there in mid-
October but had been delayed by ill health. Even after
reaching the city Leadbetter still suffered from a cold
and jaundice. Despite his sickness, he conducted a ten-
day inspection of the defenses in the district. He did
not find matters to his liking and began looking for
means to strengthen the defenses. In a report to the War
Department, Leadbetter stated that he felt time was of
the essence but that "the means available in anchors and
chains for rafts and in iron for general use is extremely 
30limited." Obstructing the various channels near Fort 
Morgan, Fort Gaines, and the bay batteries stood as his 
first priority. He hoped that the obstructions would
29Advertiser and Register, Nov. 11, 1862.
30Leadbetter to Cooper, Nov. 14, 1862, O.R., XV,
867; Cooper to Jones, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, 
p. 968; Cooper to Leadbetter, Nov. 7, 1862, in Danville 
Leadbetter Papers, Dr. Thomas M. McMillan Collection, 
Mobile Museum Department, hereinafter cited as Leadbetter 
Papers; Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer to Captain George E. 
Walker, Nov. 14, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent by the 
Engineer Bureau of the Confederate War Department, 1861- 
1864, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 51, RG 109, National 
Archives.
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slow enemy vessels so that they would receive a pounding
by artillery fire. Another of Leadbetter's priorities
was to complete the line of defenses around the city.
The entrenchments remained unfinished and weak. As
opportunity presented itself, he intended to strengthen
31works already partially constructed.
The Alabama legislature took several actions rela­
tive to the defense of Mobile during November. On the 
seventeenth it approved two joint resolutions. The first 
stated:
...the city of Mobile shall never be sur­
rendered; that it should be defended from
street to street, from house to house, and 
inch by inch, until, if taken, the victgjj's 
spoils should be alone a heap of ashes.
The second resolution called for an appropriation to help
pay for the evacuation from Mobile of women and children
33and to maintain them in a safe place m  the interior. 
Three days later the legislature passed a bill authoriz­
ing the enrollment of Creoles (free Negroes) between the 
ages of eighteen and fifty in Mobile as part of the 
militia. The mayor would accept interested men, form
them into companies, and appoint white officers to
"^Leadbetter to Cooper, Nov. 14, 1862, O.R., XV,
867.
32 "Joint Resolution in relation to the defense of 
Mobile," Nov. 17, 1862, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 389.
33Ibid.
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command the units. These companies would only be used
to defend Mobile. Thus, the Creoles of Mobile finally
got the opportunity for service which the Confederate
government had denied them. Mayor Slough issued a call
for Creoles to report for enlistment in accordance with
34the legislative act in mid-December. No evidence is 
available to show their response, however.
Leadbetter began working in earnest to upgrade 
Mobile's defenses in late November. He assigned one of 
his engineer officers to the task of placing obstructions 
in the entrances to Mobile Bay. This officer began driv­
ing wooden piles into the sea floor on the twenty-fourth. 
Although the work was difficult, he reported to Leadbet­
ter that he hoped his crew could put in around fifty 
piles a day. Another of Leadbetter's subordinates super­
vised the erection of earthworks on the land face of Fort 
Morgan and the sodding of the fort's walls. Leadbetter 
asked Forney for permission to take up eight miles of the 
railroad between Pollard and Pensacola so that he could 
use the iron in the defensive works around Mobile.
Forney gave his permission but furnished only a guard to
34 "An Act to authorize the enrollment of the 
Creoles of Mobile," Nov. 20, 1862, ibid., 4, II, 197; 
Advertiser and Register, Dec. 18, 1862.
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protect the operation. Leadbetter had to provide the
35necessary labor and transportation.
Although Leadbetter could see some progress, he and 
the Confederate command at Mobile still had to contend 
with shortages of men and material. Leadbetter had to 
request more laborers from the state government because 
previous appeals had not resulted in a sufficient number 
of men coming in. Governor Shorter promised to impress 
slaves and forward them to Mobile as soon as possible. 
Leadbetter also asked Shorter and the Confederate Engi­
neer Bureau for more spades and shovels for the laborers 
to use, but there were none to be had. A shortage of 
artillery pieces also plagued Leadbetter. The Mobile 
Committee of Safety wrote to Shorter asking him to use 
his influence to try to get more cannons from the Confed­
erate authorities in Richmond. Shorter forwarded their 
letter to the Secretary of War, reminding him that he 
(Shorter) had made similar requests for guns several 
times in the past. In closing, the governor stated his 
conviction that if guns arrived he felt certain that they 
would enable the land and naval forces at Mobile to 
defend the city successfully. The Engineer Bureau did
351st Lieutenant John W. Glenn to Leadbetter, Nov. 
24, 1862, Leadbetter Papers; Captain William R. Neville 
to Liernur, Nov. 25, 1862, ibid.; Forney to Leadbetter, 
Nov. 24, 1862, ibid.
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send two heavy guns to the city in response to Shorter's
3 6and Leadbetter's requests.
About this time another change in command occurred
at Mobile. Forney's health apparently began failing in
late October 1862. Dr. Josiah C. Nott and former mayor
John Forsyth wrote to Bragg expressing concern for
Forney and the safety of the city. Forsyth also addressed
a letter to Davis. In Nott's opinion, Forney's would and
the weight of his responsibilities had proven too much
for him. Forney's personal physician and many of the
officers around the commanding general felt that "he is
not in condition for such an important command, & ought
to be relieved from command until his health is 
37restored...." Forsyth intimated that Forney might be 
suffering mental as well as physical problems. The lack 
of proper direction from the top had supposedly thrown 
affairs in and around Mobile into a state of near chaos:
O C.
Shorter to Leadbetter, Nov. 24, 1862, ibid.; 
Shorter to Leadbetter, Nov. 30, 1862, ibid.; Sam Tate to 
Liernur, Dec. 10, 1862, ibid.; Peter Hamilton, et al, to 
Shorter, Dec. 1, 1862, O.R., XV, 889-90; Shorter to 
James A. Seddon, Dec. 5, 1862, ibid., 888; Gilmer to 
Leadbetter, Dec. 10, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, 
Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 119; Endorsement 
of Gilmer on letter from Leadbetter, Dec. 10, 1862, 
ibid., 121; Gilmer to Leadbetter, Dec. 11, 1862, ibid., 
124; Gilmer to Leadbetter, Jan. 5, 1863, ibid., 181.
37Josiah C. Nott to Bragg, Nov. 1, 1862, Bragg 
Papers, Western Reserve; Forsyth to Bragg, Nov. 3, 1862, 
ibid.
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...The town is full of officers & soldiers; 
the rifle guns are rusting in the batteries;
1200 cavalry on both sides of the bay are 
doing nothing....Every thing is wrong & full 
of peril....
Forsyth concluded: "...Mobile is lost if the existing
39administration lasts until the enemy comes."
Bragg began looking for assistance for Forney after 
receiving these reports. Slaughter, too, apparently suf­
fered from some illness and could not provide the support 
Forney needed. In a letter to Cooper, Bragg stated that
for a general assigned to duty at Mobile "acquaintance
40with artillery and engineering is essential." He had 
hoped to order Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan, 
recently exchanged after his capture at Fort Jackson, 
Louisiana, to Mobile, but Duncan was also ill. In mid- 
November, Bragg asked for and received the services of 
Brigadier General William W. Mackall. The latter had 
graduated eighth in his class at West Point and entered 
the artillery corps. Mackall had experience with both 
artillery and engineering as commander of Island No. 10. 
At Mobile, he assumed command of the former Army of 
Mobile, now a division consisting of Slaughter's and
38Forsyth to Bragg, Nov. 3, 1862, ibid.
39Ibid.
^Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 14, 1862, O.R., XX, Pt. 2, 
p. 403; Surgeon A. J. Foard to Bragg, Jan. 31, 1863,
Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
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41Cumming's brigades. Bragg issued an order on December
8 relieving Forney of command of the District of the Gulf,
and the latter relinquished temporary command to Mackall
on the fourteenth. Forney then began a much-needed leave
to recover his health. He had served competently while
at Mobile but his failing physical condition somewhat
restricted his effectiveness in his last days in command
42of the district.
The only events of consequence occurring during 
Mackall's temure as head of the District of the Gulf 
involved Grant's Pass. Leadbetter decided to erect a 
strong earthwork there to protect that vital entrance 
into the bay. The few guns placed there early in the 
war had been removed. To guard the pass, the Confeder­
ate engineers had driven piles in the channel and sta­
tioned one or more of their gunboats there to bar passage
Cooper to Bragg, Nov. 5, 1862, O.R., XX, Pt. 2, 
p. 389; Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 15, 1862, ibid., 403;
Cooper to Bragg, Nov. 16, 1862, ibid., 405; Special 
Order No. — , Headquarters Department No. 2, Nov. 17, 
1862, in Compiled Service Record of William W. Mackall.
42Para II, Special Order No. 57, Headquarters 
Department No. 2, Dec. 8, 1862, in Compiled Service 
Record of John H. Forney; General Order No. 99, Head­
quarters District of the Gulf, Dec. 14, 1862, O.R. ,
XV, 899; Bragg to Davis, Nov. 24, 1862, ibid., XX, Pt. 2, 
p. 423; William W. Mackall, A Son's Recollections of His 
Father (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1930),
174-75.
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43 . . . .by the enemy. Thomas H. Millington, a civilian engi­
neer, took charge of the construction of an earthwork 
designed to mount at least three guns. Millington and 
his men worked rapidly. He began work on a shell bank 
in Grant's Pass on December 7. Leadbetter instructed him 
to transport dirt from Dauphin Island or Mobile Point 
near Fort Morgan to use in the construction. Millington 
found it more expedient to use oyster shells and sand 
from the immediate vicinity, however, and by December 13 
had the battery ready for guns to be mounted. The chief 
of artillery for the District of the Gulf had selected
one 10-inch columbiad, one 8-inch columbiad, and one 32-
44pounder rifled piece as armament for the work.
The Confederates at Fort Gaines had little time to 
rest. They moved artillery pieces in, and Captain J. M. 
Cary's Company C, 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion, trans­
ferred from Fort Morgan to man the guns. On December 14 
two Union sidewheel steamer gunboats sailed to within 
about two miles of the battery to see what the
43Thomas H. Millington to Liernur, Dec. 19, 1862, 
Leadbetter Papers; Commodore Henry H. Bell to Lieutenant 
Commander Pierce Crosby, Oct. 10, 1862, O.R.N., XIX,
296; Bell to Farragut, Oct. 12, 1862, ibid., 297; Bell to 
Lieutenant Commander Homer C. Blake, Dec. 10, 1862, 
ibid., 401.
44Millington to Liernur, Dec. 12, 1862, Leadbetter 
Papers; Millington to Liernur, Dec. 19, 1862, ibid.;
Major Daniel Trueheart to Leadbetter, Nov. 24, 1862, 
ibid.
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Confederates had done. The gunboats stopped and opened
fire on the battery and the Confederate gunboat Selma
stationed nearby. All of the shells from the enemy
vessels fell short of their marks. The Selma replied to
this fire first, but her shots fell short also. Cary's
Alabamians manned their guns and opened on the enemy
gunboats. One of their shells burst before it reached
the vessels, and another passed over them. With this the
two sidewheelers withdrew. Millington and his engineers
continued their work unmolested until its completion on 
45December 17.
45 "Extracts from private diary of Commodore H. H. 
Bell, U. S. Navy, 1862— No. 5," O.R.N., XIX, 734; 
Advertiser and Register, Dec. 16, 1862.
CHAPTER V
"CANNOT GENL. BEAUREGARD SEND ME REINFORCEMENTS!"
Jefferson Davis needed a competent officer to 
replace Forney at Mobile, and he searched for such a man 
during a trip to the West in December 1862. While visit­
ing Bragg's army at Murfreesborough, he received a recom­
mendation from Major General William J. Hardee. The 
latter, whom it will be remembered had been Mobile's 
first commander, suggested Major General Simon B. Buck­
ner, one of Hardee's division commanders. The desire to 
see Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne promoted at 
least partially motivated Hardee's recommendation. Davis 
did select Buckner and directed Bragg to appoint Cleburne 
as a major general to take over Buckner's division.
Bragg issued the pertinent orders on December 14.^
Despite Hardee's maneuvering, Buckner had qualifications
"Liddell's Record and Impressions of the Civil War 
in North America 1860 to 1866," in Moses and St. John R. 
Liddell Family Papers, Louisiana State University Depart­
ment of Archives and Manuscripts; Special Order No. 62, 
Headquarters Department No. 2, Dec. 14, 1862, O.R., XV, 
899-900; Enclosure No. 5„ Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 22,
1862, ibid., XX, Pt. 2, pp. 508-509; Para III, Special 
Order No. 24, Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Dec. 14, 
1862, ibid., 449; Colonel George W. C. Lee to Bragg,
Dec. 13, 1862, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 396; Leonidas Polk 
to wife, Dec. 25, 1862, in Leonidas Polk Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill.
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for command of the District of the Gulf. He had gradu­
ated from West Point, served bravely in the Mexican War, 
and taught tactics at the Military Academy. After 
resigning from the army in 1855, Buckner worked for a 
while as a construction superintendent. In Confederate 
service, he had led a division at Fort Donelson and in
the Kentucky Campaign and had a reputation as "an excel-
2
lent organizer."
Mobile's new commander assumed his duties on Decem­
ber 23, 1862. A Montgomery newspaper, in noting Buck­
ner's arrival, stated: "He is well qualified for the
position, and will inspire the utmost confidence in his
3
ability, and military skill,..." Buckner found only 
about 7,600 men present for duty in his district. He 
soon issued an appeal to the men of Mobile to aid in 
defense of the city. He asked them to come out and either
2
Mark M. Boatner III, Civil War Dictionary (New 
York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), 95-96; Thomas
Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of
Tennessee, 1861-1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni­
versity Press, 1967) , 66.
3
General Order No. 105, Headquarters District of the 
Gulf, Dec. 23, 1862, O.R., XV, 905; Advertiser and 
Register, Dec. 27, 1862; Daily Mail, Dec. 30, 1862. 
Shortly after Buckner's arrival, the District of the Gulf 
was renamed Department of the Gulf but remained under 
Bragg's Department No. 2. Some authorities in Richmond 
apparently never officially recognized the new status. 
Major General Simon B. Buckner to Seddon, May 12, 1863, 
O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 833.
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form new companies or fill up existing units. The troops 
when organized would be placed under competent officers 
for drill and instruction. Buckner intended to use the 
men only in actual defense of the city and only if the 
city seemed in real danger. William Dunn, president of 
the Committee of Safety, urging the populace to respond 
to Buckner's call, said: "...let no resident of Mobile
able to wield an arm refuse to take his place in the 
ranks of its defenders."^
Davis visited Mobile shortly after Buckner took over 
the District of the Gulf. The president arrived by train 
on the afternoon of December 30 and moved into a room at 
the Battle House Hotel. A number of people gathered near 
the hotel with the expectation of hearing him speak. 
However, Davis left soon with Buckner, several other 
generals, and the staff officers of these generals to 
inspect the 17th Alabama Infantry and the fortifications 
they manned on the bay shore. The reviewing party 
visited each battery and inspected the company respon­
sible for each one. After this phase of the proceedings 
had ended, the entire 17th Alabama marched in review.
That night the regiment's band serenaded Davis at the 
Battle House, and he made a short address to the crowd.
4
"Abstract from Report of Troops, District of the 
Gulf," Dec. 20, 1862, O.R., XV, 903; Advertiser and 
Register, Jan. 1, 1863.
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The next day Davis visited Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines 
with Buckner and the new naval commander at Mobile,
Admiral Franklin Buchanan. On January 1, 1863, Davis
5left Mobile to return to Richmond.
No extraordinary events occurred in the Mobile 
defenses between the time Buckner arrived and the end of 
January 1863. The troops assigned to the various bat­
teries and earthworks drilled several times a day as both 
infantry and artillery. Their officers expected them to 
keep their batteries and quarters clean and in good 
order. The engineers needed more shovels for use in 
construction of the fortifications, and Buckner appealed 
to both the Quartermaster General and the Engineer 
Bureau for some to be sent. The Engineer Bureau could 
furnish only about half the number of shovels he 
requested. Many of the laborers available to the Con­
federate engineers were unsatisfactory. One officer 
complained: "The Irishmen sent me by the Bureau is a
lazy set and I return them having only permitted them to
5
Daily Mail, Jan. 4, 1863; Ephraim McD. Anderson, 
Memoirs: Historical and Personal; Including the Cam­
paigns of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade (St. 
Louis: Times Printing Co., 1868) , 257.
r
Order No. 3, Headquarters Batteries Huger and 
Tracy, Dec. 28, 1862, Records of the Department of the 
Gulf, 1861-1865, Louisiana Historical Association Col­
lection, Special Collections Division, Tulane University 
Library; Order No. 9, Headquarters Batteries Huger and 
Tracy, Dec. 28, 1862, ibid.
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7
work but one day." In addition to having to deal with
poor labor, the Confederate officers also had to cope
with problems created by the elements. For example, high
tides and winds eroded away about ten feet of the front
parapet of the Pinto Island Battery. The commander of
the bay batteries recommended the erection of pilings in
8front of the battery to act as a breakwater.
The Confederate command established a series of reg­
ulations concerning Negro laborers on January 26, 1863. 
Leadbetter ordered his superintendents to have overseers 
and laborers at work promptly at seven o'clock every 
morning. The overseers were to keep the men under their 
charge busy at all times so that they would lose no time. 
No overseer could excuse a man from work unless a medi­
cal officer approved his remaining in quarters. The 
superintendents issued all tools to the overseers, who 
would have responsibility for these tools after they 
issued them to the work gangs. If the laborers damaged 
any property, such as flatboats, tools, pile drivers,
7
Buckner to Colonel Abraham C. Myers, Dec. 29, 1862, 
in Compiled Service Record of Simon B. Buckner; Endorse­
ment, Dec. 30, 1862, by Gilmer on Buckner to [Myers?], 
Dec. 29, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer 
Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 168; Gilmer to Leadbetter, 
Jan. 2, 1863, ibid., 173; Glenn to Leadbetter, Jan. 6, 
1863, Leadbetter Papers.
O
Captain William Y. C. Humes to Trueheart, Jan. 16, 
1863, Leadbetter Papers.
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or wagons, the superintendents had to report the damage
to engineer headquarters. Leadbetter's regulations
expressed some concern for the health of the laborers.
He wanted their rations to be as good as possible, and
he ordered an assistant surgeon to check the men daily.
How well all of these regulations would work had yet to
9
receive testing, however.
A minor foray by the Confederates against the Sand 
Island lighthouse occurred on the last day of January 
1863. Sand Island is situated near the main ship chan­
nel into Mobile Bay southwest of Fort Morgan, and a 
lighthouse located on the island helped guide vessels 
into the bay. After the Union navy established the 
blockade off the bay, the blockaders would sometimes use 
the lighthouse to observe movements of the Confederates 
within the bay. To deprive the enemy of this observation 
post, the engineer officer for the lower bay defenses, 
Lieutenant John W. Glenn, led a small group of Confed­
erates from Fort Gaines to the island by boat. Glenn and 
his men set fire to five frame buildings near the 
lighthouse. Lookouts aboard the U.S.S. Pembina detected 
Glenn's activity, and the gunboat fired a few shots at
9General Order No. 3, Engineer Office, Jan. 26, 1863, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Department of the Gulf,
Jan. 1863-April 1864, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, pp. 3-4, RG 
109, National Archives.
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the island. The Confederates withdrew after having 
destroyed only the buildings set afire, but Glenn planned 
to return to destroy the lighthouse later.
The Confederates attempted to conduct another offen­
sive operation in early February 1863. Mobile's naval 
officers had control of this sortie. They hoped to make 
a night attack on the blockading squadron and capture at 
least one of the vessels by boarding. On the night of 
February 5, between sixty and one hundred men from other 
vessels transferred to the Selma for the attack. Armed 
with cutlasses and pistols, they wore white handker­
chiefs around their caps so that they could distinguish 
one another from the enemy during the boarding. The 
Selma left Mobile in a dense fog, weather which should 
have aided the operation. Near Dog River bar, however, 
the gunboat struck a snag or piling and began to sink 
rapidly. The crew got her pumps going and kept her 
afloat until she could be steered into shallow water. 
There the Selma ran aground. Ship carpenters came down 
to patch the hole, and the Confederates used a steam fire 
engine to get the Selma afloat. She then sailed to the
"^Thomas M. Owen, History of Alabama and Dictionary 
of Alabama Biography, 4 vols. (Chicago: The S. J. Clarke
Publishing Co., 1921), II, 1006; Glenn to Leadbetter,
Feb. 1, 1863, Leadbetter Papers; Commodore R. B. Hitch­
cock to Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, Feb. 3, 1863,
O.R.N., XIX, 599.
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dry dock for permanent repairs. One naval officer sum­
marized the operation: "...now we are once more afloat,
not having boarded the blockaders and 'nobody hurt.1" ^
Work to improve the battery at Grant's Pass had con­
tinued since the skirmish there in December. Captain 
Cary's Alabamians replaced the carriage of their 8-inch 
columbiad to make it more serviceable. When they dis­
covered the magazine leaking and covered with too little 
dirt, Lieutenant Glenn's engineers made the necessary 
repairs. To supply the garrison in the event of extended 
operations, the Confederates constructed a casemated 
storeroom for foodstuffs and water tanks to hold about 
3,800 gallons. Cary still had several recommendations 
for further improvements. He asked for a supply of tim­
ber to build a small hospital for his men. To protect 
his men from the weather, he proposed that a building 
be erected as company quarters. Finally, Cary requested 
that the engineers build a wharf on the island to 
facilitate resupply and reinforcement of the garrison.
^Memorandum by Hitchcock, Feb. 24, 1863, O.R.N., 
XIX, 627; T. L. Moore to Cousin Blannie, Mar. 7, 1863, in 
Southall and Bowen Papers, Southern Historical Collec­
tion, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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In time the engineers completed all of the construction
12Cary asked for.
The Confederate engineers had continued to work on 
their defenses nearer Mobile as well as at Grant's Pass 
during January. Buckner had ordered a four-gun battery 
erected on Choctaw Point Spit because the earthern bat­
teries near Choctaw Point could not effectively cover the 
main ship channel to the city or the Dog River bar 
obstructions. As the spit was under water, the engineers 
would have to use crib work filled with dirt as the base 
for the battery. Leadbetter assigned this task to 
Liernur, who began driving piles for the crib work. The 
Confederates carried out minor improvements at the Pinto 
Island and Spanish River batteries. The former mounted 
six guns and covered Choctaw Pass and Spanish River. 
Spanish River Battery contained eight guns, the heaviest 
of which bore on the channel of Spanish River. Leadbet­
ter also strengthened the line of obstructions from 
Choctaw Point to Spanish River. These piles stood in the 
water in eight rows five to ten feet apart. The openings
■^Cary to Colonel William L. Powell, Feb. 6, 1863, 
Leadbetter Papers; Trueheart to Leadbetter (with endorse­
ment by Leadbetter to Glenn), Feb. 2, 1863, ibid.; Glenn 
to Leadbetter, Feb. — , 18 63, ibid.
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left at the Spanish River and Choctaw Pass channels
13would be closed by rafts when necessary.
Leadbetter's engineers also remained busy near the 
eastern shore of the upper bay. They had already com­
pleted Apalachee Battery on the west side of the fork of 
the Apalachee and Blakely rivers and mounted six guns in 
it. Leadbetter expressed dissatisfaction with the loca­
tion and layout of the battery, however. He began erect­
ing a four-gun work at the head of Apalachee Island.
Here the Confederate artillerymen could better cover the 
two rivers than they could from the Apalachee Battery. 
Unfortunately the engineers had no guns readily available 
to place in the new battery. Leadbetter planned to put 
the four 42-pounders then in the ironclad battery Danube 
in the work if no other cannon could be found. He did 
not think the Danube was strong enough to withstand heavy 
enemy fire. In the meantime, he directed stationing of 
the Danube near Apalachee Battery for use if needed. In 
the channels on each side of the new earthwork the Con­
federate engineers put in several lines of pilings to
14obstruct passage.
13Leadbetter to Liernur, Jan. 3, 1863, ibid.;
"Report of operations for the defense of Mobile, Ala., 
for the month of January, 1863," Mar. 11, 1863, O.R. ,
XV, 1010-1011.
1 4
"Report of operations...," Mar. 11, 1863, O.R. ,
XV, 1011.
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The entrenchments around the city occupied much of 
Leadbetter's attention. Work had ceased on the line of 
fortifications begun by Liernur in 1862. By early 1863 
that line was nine miles long. Buckner had come to the 
conclusion that he would not be able to obtain a suffi­
cient number of troops properly to man such extensive 
works. He ordered Leadbetter to build a second line of 
earthworks between Liernur's and Mobile. A shorter line 
would prove easier to man adequately. Leadbetter plan­
ned to begin his work at Choctaw Point and extend the 
fortifications around to the mouth of One Mile Creek. 
There a series of earthworks and a swamp would block any 
enemy advance. In this line Leadbetter hoped to con­
struct square redoubts approximately 600 yards apart 
with trenches for infantrymen between each redoubt. In 
concluding his report of work done on these works Lead- 
better stated:
The line is too near the city to save it 
from bombardment, but such an attack would 
prove a lesser evil than the capture of the 
place. It is hoped that the line j^n be held 
until the place shall be relieved.
Living and health conditions of the Negro labor 
force at Mobile underwent close scrutiny by both engi­
neers and medical officers in early February 1863. Many 
of the workers suffered from illness much of the time,
15Ibid., 1012.
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and rumors circulated that the mortality rate among them
was very high. At least one engineer officer complained
that he could not keep enough laborers to do the work he
1 6had orders to do. Dr. D. E. Smith, the assistant sur­
geon in charge of the Engineer Hospital, conducted an 
investigation into the rations and living quarters of 
the Negroes. He found the food issued anything but suf­
ficient for their good health:
...Upon investigation of their rations I find 
them to consist of Corn Meal, rice, Molasses 
and fresh beef, the latter article often fall­
ing short and according to evidence of over­
seers for as many as five and six days in 
succession the negroes [sic] have lived upon 
Bread and Molasses. The Corn Meal is issued 
in sufficient quantities, but there being no 
lard or fat of any kind issued it makes very 
unpalatable bread. Bacon is issued for one 
day only in every fifteen days |^d salt 
meats are not issued at all,...
To correct these deficiencies, Smith recommended that
the engineer commissaries issue to the workers more
18salted meat and large quantities of fresh vegetables.
Smith also observed problems with the workers' 
quarters. Most of the Negroes stayed in Hitchcock's 
Cotton Press where they were crowded together in
^Glenn to Leadbetter, Feb. 1, 1863, Leadbetter 
Papers.
17Assistant Surgeon D. E. Smith to Surgeon F. A. 
Ross, Feb. 11, 1863, ibid.
18Ibid.
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uncomfortable quarters. The Press stood near the Choctaw 
Point swamps, a traditionally unhealthy area of the city 
because of dampness and mosquitoes. Dr. F. A. Ross, 
Medical Director of the District of the Gulf, had 
appointed three medical officers to attend to the labor­
ers in addition to Dr. Smith at the hospital. According 
to Smith, the primary diseases affecting the Negroes
were typhoid fever, measles, pneumonia, Erysispe.las, and 
19"swamp fever." Ross admitted that the physicians had 
not been able to treat some of the ill Negroes success­
fully but stated that the laborers received the same 
care as the soldiers and that deaths among the laborers 
were fewer than among a similar number of raw troops. 
Although Ross could do little about the food issued, he 
did recommend the erection of barracks for the Negroes 
along the line of earthworks. The Confederates also 
constructed a larger hospital for the laborers who 
worked on Dauphin Island and the other lower bay 
defenses.^
In late February 1863 the Confederates completed 
the destruction of the Sand Island lighthouse. Despite 
the burning of the wooden buildings, the men of the
1 QIbid.; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 17, 1863.
on
Advertiser and Register, Feb. 17, 1863; Glenn to 
Leadbetter, Mar. 3, 1863, Leadbetter Papers.
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blockading squadron continued to land on the island and
use the lighthouse to observe Confederate movements.
Writers in the past have given credit for destroying the
lighthouse to Captain N. J. Ludlow, but Lieutenant Glenn
actually carried out the mission. He and a small party
of men proceeded by boat to Sand Island on the night of
February 22. The next morning the Confederates placed a
total of seventy pounds of powder at various places in
the structure. By three o'clock that afternoon Glenn had
completed his work, and he fired the charges. Then he
and his men returned to Fort Gaines. In his report of
the operation, Glenn described the results of his mines:
...Nothing remains but a narrow shred [?] 
about fifty feet high & from one to five feet 
wide. The first storm we have will blow that 
down....
During February the Confederate engineers continued 
to work at strengthening the Mobile defenses. No great 
endeavor had been required at Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines 
since they seemed practically complete. Leadbetter's men 
took up the iron rails from the road between Fort Morgan 
and Navy Cove because they needed the iron for a floating 
battery under construction at Mobile. They laid wooden 
rails to replace the iron taken up. At Grant's Pass the 
engineers erected a wharf in accordance with Capatin
21Owen, History of Alabama, II, 1006; Glenn to Lead- 
better, Feb. 24, 1863, Leadbetter Papers.
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Cary's earlier request. Leadbetter continued work at the
Choctaw Point Spit battery but felt construction should
be suspended for two reasons. First, he did not think
cannons were available to mount there, and second, he
wanted to use the boats employed there to complete the
new battery on Apalachee Island. A good deal of work
had been done at the latter battery, but earth had to be
brought in by boat because little dirt was available on
the low, swampy island. The engineers placed no further
piles in the channels near this battery during the 
22month.
Leadbetter's men conducted other engineering opera­
tions at the bay batteries and city entrenchments. They 
had practically completed Pinto Island Battery even 
though the tide eroded part of the parapet. At Spanish 
River Battery the engineers did work to reinforce the 
parapet and expand the flanks to contain two additional 
guns. The engineers drove further pilings near these 
batteries to obstruct the channels. To help reinforce 
the earthworks, the Confederates moved a floating battery 
into the area. This battery mounted two 10-inch guns, 
and railroad iron covered her front. The gunboat Selma 
fired some of her guns at the battery to test the iron's
22Leadbetter to Gilmer, Mar. 15, 1863, O.R. , XV, 
1014-1015.
135
strength, and although several shells broke on the hard
23surface, none of the shots hurt the iron. On Leadbet­
ter 's new line of entrenchments, the laborers began 
redoubts on either side of Government Street and worked 
outward from there. They completed each earthwork to the 
point where it seemed defensible, and the laborers then 
moved on to begin a new work. They would add the finish­
ing touches later. Leadbetter placed Colonel P. J.
Pillans in charge of the construction of the city 
24entrenchments.
The rations drawn by the troops at Mobile in early 
1863 contained more varieties of foods than those issued 
to troops in the field. Commissary officers furnished 
the following items most regularly— fresh beef, corn 
meal, rice, molasses, and salt. The troops received one 
pound of beef eight days in ten, one and a quarter pounds 
of corn meal seven days in ten, fifteen pounds of rice 
per hundred rations daily, one gallon of molasses daily, 
and four and a half pounds of salt daily. If molasses
23Ibid.,1015; Humes to Captain L. G. Aldrich, Feb.
20, 1863, Leadbetter Papers; "Report of operations...," 
Mar. 11, 1863, O.R., XV, 1012; Moore to Cousin Blan- 
nie, Mar. 7, 1863, Southall and Bowen Papers; Memorandum 
by Hitchcock, Feb. 24, 1863, O.R.N., XIX, 627; Lieu­
tenant George Gift to ----- , June 13, 1863, quoted in
Harriet Gift Castlen, Hope Bids Me Onward (Savannah, Ga.: 
Chatham Publishing Co., 1945), 128.
^Leadbetter to Colonel P. J. Pillans, Feb. 26, 1863, 
Leadbetter Papers.
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was not available from the commissaries, those officers 
would make up for it by doubling the sugar ration.
Issued less often, but nonetheless available, were bacon, 
flour, potatoes, and vegetables. To supplement rations 
drawn, many of the soldiers planted gardens to raise 
vegetables. These gardens not only provided food but 
also relief from the daily drill routine. At least one 
regiment planted a field with corn and melons in addition 
to its garden. As the war wore on, this abundance of 
foodstuffs did dwindle.^
In order to defend Mobile properly in case of 
attack, Buckner and Leadbetter realized they needed ade­
quate artillery and ammunition. Buckner sent his chief 
of artillery, Major Victor von Sheliha, to Richmond to 
try to get more heavy artillery pieces for Fort Morgan, 
Fort Gaines, and Fort Grant. Leadbetter sent with Von 
Sheliha a letter to Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, chief of 
the Engineer Bureau, and called Gilmer's attention to 
Mobile's needs. He stated: "The liberality accorded in
this behalf to the city of Charleston and the good effect
25General Order No. 130, Headquarters District of 
the Gulf, Mar. 1, 1863, Orders, District of the Gulf, 
1862-1865, RG 109, National Archives; Harris to C. L. 
Hays, Feb. 23, 1863, Harris Letters; Advertiser and 
Register, Mar. 20, 1863.
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2 6of it, will plead in our favor." In a letter to Gen­
eral Cooper, Buckner asked for more ammunition for his 
artillery pieces. He complained that the Ordnance 
Bureau had limited him to 175 rounds per gun. Buckner 
also stated:
The object of the fortifications now in 
progress is to compel the enemy, should he 
appear in large force, to besiege this place, 
and reduce him to the necessity of making 
regular approaches. The works will be need­
less unless a proper supply of ammunition is 
provided. The requisition I send is for not 
exceeding a half-supply for a siege2  ^ It is 
indispensable to a good defence....
Secretary of War Seddon assured Buckner that he would
receive enough ammunition to give him 200 rounds per
gun. The supply bureaus in Richmond had no more than
that at the time, but Seddon said he would keep Buckner
2 8in mind when supplies became more plentiful.
On April 18, 1863, the Confederates once again made 
an offensive move against the enemy. Union blockading 
vessels were accustomed to lying in as close to Mobile 
Point east of Fort Morgan as possible to try to catch 
blockade runners going out or coming in through the
2 6Leadbetter to Gilmer, Apr. 24, 1863, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 162.
27Buckner to Cooper, Mar. 20, 1863, in Simon B. 
Buckner Papers, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California.
^^Seddon to Buckner, Apr. 4, 1863, O.R., XV, 1035-
1036.
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Swash Channel. In this operation, the Confederate troops 
had as their objective discouraging the blockaders from 
coming in so close to land. Major James T. Gee left Fort 
Morgan with two lieutenants and forty-two enlisted men of 
his 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion and two rifled field 
pieces on the night of April 17. The detachment marched 
nine miles along the point until they found a blockader 
lying about one mile from the beach. At daylight the 
Confederates opened fire with their cannons. After being 
struck several times the Union vessel withdrew from 
range. Two other gunboats came up, and all three fired 
at the Confederate position. The Union fire did no dam­
age except to hit and destroy a stack of muskets. After 
two and a half hours the Union vessels sailed off, and
Gee's men returned to Fort Morgan. From this time on the
29blockaders did stay farther out from the land.
During April 1863 Buckner lost several of his gen­
erals and many of his troops. Through the last two weeks 
of March he received repeated requests from Pemberton in 
Mississippi to send one or two cavalry regiments to the 
northern part of that state to aid planters in getting 
their crops out of the region and to combat enemy raids.
29
Roll for Feb. 28-Apr. 30, 1863, Record of Events 
Cards, Company B, 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion, Com­
piled Service Records; Stewart to Julia Stewart, Apr. 21, 
1863, Stewart Letters.
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On March 28 Buckner finally agreed to send the 2nd Ala­
bama Cavalry to Pemberton even though he did not feel he
could spare any troops. The regiment reached Pemberton
30about April 29 with less than half of its men armed.
President Davis telegraphed Buckner on April 7 asking
what troops he could spare for Bragg in Middle Tennessee.
Buckner replied that he could send Cumming's brigade of
about 2,200 men if Pemberton would reinforce Mobile in
case of attack. By April 20 Buckner had sent Cumming's
brigade of three regiments, one additional regiment, two
infantry battalions, and a battery to Tullahoma— in all
about 4,000 men. Buckner thus lost practically all of
his infantry, except for several regiments serving as
31heavy artillery. In addition to the loss of General 
Cumming, who accompanied his brigade to Tennessee, Buck­
ner lost General Mackall, who became Bragg's chief of 
staff. In response to a request for his services by
30Pemberton to Buckner, Mar. 20, 1863, O.R., XXIV, 
Pt. 3, p. 679; Pemberton to Buckner, Mar. 24, 1863, 
ibid., 687; Pemberton to Buckner Mar. 26, 1863, ibid., 
691; Pemberton to Buckner, Mar. 28, 1863, ibid.; Pember­
ton to General Joseph E. Johnston, Apr. 29, 1863, ibid., 
803.
^Davis to Buckner, Apr. 7, 1863, in Dunbar Rowland 
(ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist; His Letters, 
Papers and Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.: Depart­
ment of Archives and History, 1923), V, 469; Buckner to 
Davis, Apr. 8, 1863, O.R., XXIV, Pt. 3, p. 724; Johnston 
to Buckner, Apr. 11, 1863, ibid., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 750; 
"Diary of Captain Edward Crenshaw," 441.
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General Edmund Kirby Smith, the War Department ordered
General Slaughter to Texas, but it quickly revoked the
order rather than deprive Buckner of his last brigadier.
Slaughter retained command of the troops in the imme-
32diate vicinity of Mobile.
The War Department on April 27, 1863, ordered Buck­
ner to turn over command of the District of the Gulf to 
his ranking subordinate and go to Knoxville, Tennessee, 
and assume command of the Department of East Tennessee. 
The reason for this order is not clear, but the War 
Department possibly hoped Buckner would end the confused 
command situation in East Tennessee and work closely 
with Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Major General Dabney H. 
Maury, who had just assumed command at Knoxville,
received orders to await Buckner and then go to Mobile
33to assume Buckner's place. The latter had succeeded 
in improving the condition of the Mobile defenses by
32Para I, Special Order No. 9, Headquarters Depart­
ment No. 2, Apr. 17, 1863, O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 777; 
Para XVI, Special Order No. 96, Adjutant and Inspector 
General's Office, Apr. 20, 1863, ibid., XV, 1048; Para 
XIX, Special Order No. 102, Adjutant and Inspector 
General's Office, Apr. 27, 1863, quoted in Compiled 
Service Record of James E. Slaughter.
33Cooper to Buckner, Apr. 27, 1863, O.R., XV, 
1055-1056; Cooper to Major General Dabney H. Maury,
Apr. 27, 1863, ibid., 1056; Thomas Lawrence Connelly, 
Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971) ,
107.
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his energetic action. Admiral Buchanan, no doubt express­
ing the sentiment of many in Mobile, wrote to Richmond 
asking that Buckner's orders be revoked: "...he has the
confidence of all here...and his absence will cause much
34regret to the whole community." Others in Mobile 
accepted the loss of Buckner and asked Seddon to assign 
Mackall in his place. They felt that Mackall knew their 
situation and wants. Since his arrival at Mobile, these 
citizens had found him "uniformly courteous, and always 
attentive to all his duties— and firm and prompt in their 
discharge.
Before Buckner could leave Mobile, he once again 
received requests to send troops to Mississippi.
Originally Pemberton had asked several of his subordi­
nates to request some cavalry from Buckner to combat a 
Union cavalry force conducting a raid through Mississippi. 
Buckner replied to these requests by saying that he had 
sent all of his available troops to Tennessee. Pemberton 
then went to Davis and the War Department to get their 
assistance. The War Department ordered a cavalry regi­
ment from Montgomery to Pollard and ordered Buckner to
34Buchanan to Mallory, Apr. 28, 1863, Telegrams 
Received, Secretary of War.
35Committee of Safety of Mobile to Seddon, Apr. 30, 
1863, in Compiled Service Record of Mackall; William W. 
Mackall, A Son's Recollections of His Father (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1930), 175.
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send some cavalry from either Pollard or Mobile to
Pemberton. To this Buckner replied that he had very few
men left in his district and practically no cavalry to
spare. He did agree to send the only cavalry battalion
he had left, about 300 men in all. There was a plaintive
note in Buckner's closing remarks: "Cannot Genl. Beaure-
3 6gard send me reinforcements!" The 15th Alabama Cavalry 
Battalion proceeded from Mobile to Meridian, but it
37arrived too late to be used against the enemy raid.
Buckner's last action prior to departing for Knox­
ville was to issue a call for the citizens to organize 
themselves for local defense. He urged them to form 
companies, battalions, and regiments so as to be ready 
if needed to man the defenses. The organization of the 
troops he turned over to General Slaughter. After arriv­
ing in Knoxville, Buckner reported that his appeal "was
3 6Pemberton to Brigadier General John Adams, Apr.
24, 1863, O.R., XXIV, Pt. 3, p. 781; Pemberton to 
Adams, Apr. 25, 1863, ibid., 785; Major General William 
W. Loring to Pemberton, Apr. 25, 1863, ibid., 787; John­
ston to Pemberton, Apr. 27, 1863, ibid., 791; Loring to 
Pemberton, Apr. 27, 1863, ibid., 793; Pemberton to Davis, 
Apr. 28, 1863, ibid., 797; Pemberton to Cooper, Apr. 29, 
1863, ibid., 801; Davis to Pemberton, May 1, 1863, ibid., 
807; Campbell to Colonel James H. Clanton, May 1, 1863, 
ibid., XV, 1069; Cooper to Buckner, May 1, 1863, ibid.; 
Buckner to Cooper, May 2, 1863, ibid., 1070-1071.
"^Buckner to Pemberton, May 2, 1863, ibid., XXIV,
Pt. 3, p. 817; Brigadier General Abraham Buford to 
Pemberton, May 2, 1863, ibid.; Brigadier General Daniel 
Ruggles to Colonel Benjamin S. Ewell, June 22, 1863, 
ibid., 973.
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responded to in a proper spirit, and with a promise of 
3 8fair success." Governor Shorter made a final appeal
on behalf of the citizens of Mobile to Richmond to have
Mackall appointed to replace Buckner. Seddon replied
that the authorities in Richmond had already chosen
Buckner's successor before the receipt of the April 30
letter from the Mobile Committee of Safety or Shorter's
telegram and that the decision would not be changed.
Slaughter assumed temporary command of the District of
the Gulf on May 8, 1863, when Buckner left by rail. The
War Department instructed Slaughter to continue the
organization of local defense troops while he awaited
Maury's arrival. His only other action of consequence as
temporary commander seems to have been to issue an order
39to obstruct completely the channel at Grant's Pass.
O  O
Daily Mail, May 7, 1863; Buckner to Seddon, May 12,
1863, O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 833.
39Shorter to Seddon, May 6, 1863, O.R., XV, 1077; 
Seddon to Shorter, May 7, 1863, ibid.; Buckner to Seddon,
May 9, 1863, Telegrams Received, Secretary of War; Seddon
to Slaughter, May 13, 1863, Telegrams Sent, Secretary of 
War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 36; Leadbetter to Glenn, May 
8, 1863, O.R., XV, 1080.
CHAPTER VI
"...AN INTERESTING AND AGREEABLE COMMAND..."
On May 19, 1863, Major General Dabney H. Maury
assumed command of the District of the Gulf, a position
he would retain until the end of the war.'*' A native of
Virginia, Maury graduated from West Point in 1846 and
fought in the Mexican War. His Confederate service began
as chief of staff to Major General Earl Van Dorn in
Arkansas. Promoted to brigadier general, Maury led a
division of the Army of the West at the battles of Iuka
and Corinth. His division moved to Snyder's Bluff on the
Yazoo River above Vicksburg in late December 1862 and
defended that position against attacks by Union gunboats.
In April 1863 Davis chose Maury to assume command in East
Tennessee, desiring "an efficient officer of rank" for
2that "important command." There is no evidence indicating
■^General Order No. 192, Headquarters Department of 
the Gulf, May 19, 1863, quoted in Daily Tribune, May 23, 
1863.
2Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the Con­
federate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni­
versity Press, 1959), 215; Mark M. Boatner III, Civil War 
Dictionary (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), 519;
Cooper to Pemberton, Apr. 9, 1863, O.R., XXIV, Pt. 3, p. 
729; Pemberton to Maury, Apr. 15, lB63, ibid., 743.
144
145
why Davis so soon switched Maury and Buckner, but he
specifically selected Maury to take over at Mobile and
would not allow any senior major generals to be assigned
to the district. Maury's primary qualification for the
command was his experience in supervising heavy artillery
against gunboats at Snyder's Bluff, but his record in
Arkansas and northern Mississippi had marked him as an 
3
able general.
Former Confederate Congressman Edmund S. Dargan pro­
vided his home as a residence for Maury and his wife when 
they arrived in Mobile. In later years Maury remembered
his tenure at the city as "altogether an interesting and
4
agreeable command." He had not been particularly anxi­
ous to go to Mobile and for a long time did not under­
stand why he had been assigned there. He had hoped for 
an assignment to take over a division in his native 
Virginia. When he received orders for Mobile, however, 
Maury welcomed the prospect of leaving Knoxville. In a 
letter to the Secretary of War he wrote: "...I shall
3
Cooper to Maury, Apr. 29, 1863, Letters and Tele­
grams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 
38, p. 219; Johnston to [Hardee], Aug. 31, 1863, O.R., 
XXX, Pt. 4, p. 573; Johnston to Cooper, Sept. 13, 1863, 
ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 222; Cooper to Johnston, Sept. 16, 
1863, ibid., XXX, Pt. 4, p. 653.
4Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian 
(New York: Scribners, 1894), 190.
146
enter upon its duties with more satisfaction than I find 
5
here...." Maury became very popular with the people of
Mobile and the soldiers under his command. One of
Maury's men remembered him:
...Our commander was Dabney H. Maury, 'every 
inch a soldier, ' but then there were not many 
inches of him. The soldiers called him 'puss 
in boots,' because half of his diminuitive 
person seemed lost in a pair of the immense 
cavalry boots of the day. He was a wise and 
gallant officer....
Shortly after arriving in Mobile, Maury attempted to 
augment his weak garrison. Thousands of refugees from 
New Orleans had arrived in the city to avoid swearing the 
oath of allegiance to the United States government. The 
group of refugees included large numbers of men of mili­
tary age. Maury telegraphed the War Department to seek 
authority to organize eligible men into companies and 
form battalions or a regiment. He inquired whether the 
men should be accepted as conscripts or with the privi­
leges of volunteers. Secretary Seddon replied several 
days later that Maury could organize the New Orleans ref­
ugees into military units but only for temporary service.
5Maury to Seddon, May 7, 1863, O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2,
p. 822.
^Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: 
Personal Experiences of the Late War, ed. by Richard B. 
Harwell (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), 247;
P. D. Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," Southern 
Historical Society Papers, XXXIX (1914), 119.
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The conscript laws demanded that the men remain liable to
being drafted and placed in existing organizations. After
receiving Seddon's instructions, Maury tried to form the
Louisianians into companies, but he had to admit defeat.
The refugees resisted his efforts to form a battalion.
Many of the men did eventually enter Louisiana units
7
stationed at Mobile, however.
In a letter of May 23, 1863, President Davis reas­
sured Governor Shorter about his concern for Mobile and 
explained the government's policy on the defense of the 
area. Davis had recently received letters from Shorter 
and the citizens of Mobile that had expressed concern 
about Mobile's weak condition. He told Shorter that the 
government intended to protect the safety of the city 
because "any misfortune which should befall it would be
o
deeply felt by the Confederacy." In 1862 the authorities 
in Richmond had begun formulating their strategy on 
coastal defense, and by May 1863 had established this 
strategy. Davis explained that due to the enemy's
7
Maury to Seddon, May 22, 1863, Telegrams Received, 
Secretary of War; Seddon to Maury, May 26, 1863, Tele­
grams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 43; 
Maury to Seddon, June 16, 1863, Telegrams Received, 
Secretary of War.
0
Davis to Shorter, May 23, 1863, quoted in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His
Letters, Papers and Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.: 
Department of Archives and History, 1923), V, 494.
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numerical superiority, the Confederates could not leave
large numbers of men in unthreatened coastal garrisons.
All available men had to go to important places under
attack or actually threatened. If the enemy attacked
Mobile, then troops would move there from other areas.
Davis suggested that both state and city officials fully
organize local defense troops to back up the regulars in
9
the event of a sudden assault.
The Confederate engineers continued work on the 
Mobile defenses during May 1863, although they had com­
pleted many of their tasks already. On the forts guard­
ing the bay entrances, they had little work to do. The 
engineers sodded the embankment at Fort Gaines and com­
pleted the wharf at Fort Grant. Leadbetter reported the 
Choctaw Point, Pinto Island, Spanish River and Apalachee 
batteries all complete. He suspended work on the Choctaw 
Spit battery in order to put his full effort on the bat­
tery on Apalachee Island. The latter battery Leadbetter 
expected to complete in June. Despite a severe shortage 
of laborers, the Confederate engineers finished construc­
tion of most of Leadbetter's line of redoubts around the 
city. Fourteen redoubts stood ready to be manned, and 
Leadbetter planned only two more redoubts and several
9
Ibid., 494-95; Samuel R. Bright, Jr., "Confederate 
Coast Defense" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke 
University, 1961), 210-11.
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smaller works between some of the redoubts. His men 
mounted cannon in practically all of the defensive works. 
The only other work of consequence carried out by the 
engineers involved the placing of additional obstructions 
between Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines and near Apalachee 
and Blakely islands near the eastern shore.^
A new weapon in Mobile's defensive arsenal made its 
appearance during May. Maury, having witnessed their 
effectiveness near Vicksburg, ordered the procurement of 
one hundred fifty torpedoes (mines) for placement in the 
waters around and in Mobile Bay. At Grant's Pass the 
engineers put ten or twelve torpedoes in the channel west 
of the battery. Other torpedoes they floated near the 
Spanish River Battery. Leadbetter informed Admiral 
Buchanan that he intended to place torpedoes in two loca­
tions not usually visited by naval or civilian vessels—  
the channels of Apalachee and Blakely rivers below Apa­
lachee Island Battery and the area of Garrow's Bend near 
the city. Leadbetter also warned that he would eventu­
ally put the devices in the channel near Fort Morgan, 
extending from the western edge of the channel toward the 
fort to obstruct three-fourths of the passage. All ves­
sels moving through the area would need to sail close to
"^"Report of operations for the defense of Mobile, 
Ala., for the month of May, 1863," May 31, 1863, O.R., 
XXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 26-27.
150
the wharf at the fort. Leadbetter advised Buchanan:
"This will cause little trouble and may prevent acci­
dents.""^ By war's end, the torpedoes at Mobile would be
12responsible for the sinking of ten enemy vessels.
In early June 1863 Mobile's command designation 
changed again. The War Department formally created the 
Department of the Gulf on June 8. The department con­
sisted of Mobile and the approaches to the city. 
Technically the new department remained under the juris­
diction of General Joseph E. Johnston's Western Depart-
13ment, headquartered in Mississippi. Governor Shorter 
and the Mobile Committee of Safety had urged Richmond to 
make Mobile an independent command and expressed their 
displeasure about its status as a "mere dependency" of 
Bragg's Army of Tennessee. Most of the credit for per­
suading the War Department to take the actual step 
belongs to Buckner. After his arrival at Knoxville, he 
sent Seddon a lengthy letter discussing Mobile's situation
^ Ibid., 27; Leadbetter to Buchanan, May 22, 1863, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, 
pp. 222-23; Buchanan to Lieutenant George W. Harrison,
May 25, 1863, O.R.N., XX, 828.
12Milton F. Perry, Infernal Machines: The Story of
Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 200-201.
■^Para XXII, Special Order No. 136, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, June 8, 1863, O.R./ XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 40.
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and making several suggestions. Buckner recommended 
that the city be separated from Bragg’s command because 
the two had no close relationship. He recounted command 
problems which had occurred during his tenure at Mobile 
and stressed the connection between the defense of Mobile 
and Vicksburg. In concluding, Buckner urged Seddon to
issue orders similar to those which actually appeared on
] 4June 8.
This new arrangement did not, in the long run, prove 
beneficial to the defense of Mobile. Davis had created 
the Confederate departmental system "as a means to organ­
ize and to administer military forces within every inch
15of southern terrain." The departments each had respon­
sibility of defending a certain area or location. Davis 
allowed the departmental commanders wide discretionary 
powers in the defense of their area, and, as stated 
previously, the general exercised virtually complete 
control over the units under him. Only in this regard 
did establishment of the Department of the Gulf work in 
Maury's and Mobile's favor. Davis had hoped that
14Hamilton to Shorter, May 12, 1863, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 471; Buckner to Seddon, May 12, 1863, ibid., 
XXIII, Pt. 2, pp. 833-34.
15Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The 
Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate
Strategy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1973), 88-89.
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departments would supply their own needs for food and 
other supplies. Here the Department of the Gulf suffered 
because the territory within its limits simply could not 
provide a sufficient amount of food for Mobile and its 
army. As will be seen later, Buckner experienced prob­
lems with another department commander in trying to 
obtain supplies, and Maury faced the same situation for 
a time. The creation of a separate department at Mobile 
also made more difficult coordination of the city's 
defense with defense of the areas Mobile needed to be
X 6connected with— the states of Alabama and Mississippi.
Maury renamed eight of the fortifications in his 
department in early June 1863. All of the batteries so 
involved received names of Confederate officers who had 
died in the line of duty. Apalachee Battery became Bat­
tery Tracy, named for Brigadier General Edward D. Tracy 
of Alabama who died in the battle of Port Gibson. The 
battery on Blakely Island, sometimes referred to as 
Gindrat Battery, became Battery Huger, after Lieutenant 
Commander Thomas B. Huger, killed April 25, 1862, on the 
C.S.S. McRae below New Orleans. Pinto Island Battery had 
its name changed to Battery Gladden in memory of 
Brigadier General Adley H. Gladden, who received a mortal 
wound at Shiloh shortly after leaving Mobile. One of the
16Ibid., 88-92.
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floating batteries Maury named for Brigadier General 
Lloyd Tilghman, who died at the battle of Champion's 
Hill. He placed the name of one of the generals killed 
at Elkhorn Tavern on one work— the Light House Battery 
became Battery McCulloch for Ben McCulloch. Spanish 
River Battery was renamed Battery McIntosh to honor Com­
mander Charles F. McIntosh, who died aboard the C.S.S. 
Louisiana near New Orleans. Two relatively new fortifi­
cations on the Alabama River above Mobile also received 
new names. A work at Choctaw Bluff was called Fort 
Stonewall for Stonewall Jackson, and the work at Oven
Bluff was named Fort Sidney Johnston after Albert Sidney
17Johnston who died at the battle of Shiloh.
While Maury contended with the problem of too few 
troops, he also faced an excess of officers in the city. 
These officers had come to Mobile on leave or recruiting 
duty. Maury felt that they were a discredit to the army 
and a bad example to soldiers and civilians alike 
because most seemed to wander the streets with nothing 
to do and seemingly under no one's authority. Maury 
wrote to Joe Johnston saying that the officers there on 
recruiting duty served no purpose, that the enrolling
17General Order No. 207, Headquarters Department of 
the Gulf, June 17, 1863, quoted in Advertiser and Regis­
ter , June 20, 1863; Warner, Generals i n G r a y , 107, 201, 
306, 309; Caldwell Delaney, Confederate Mobile: A Pic­
torial History (Mobile: The Haunted Book Shop, 1571) ,
99-100.
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officer of the department, Major Jules C. Denis, was 
"fully capable of performing all the duty." Maury 
requested permission to order all officers assigned to
18units in Johnston's department back to their commands. 
Some hope existed for partial relief of the troop short­
age at Mobile. Davis had called upon Alabama to muster
7,000 militiamen into Confederate service. The com­
mander of the militia forces of the state ordered the 
enlistment of 500 men in Mobile County. These troops 
would not be available until August at the earliest, 
however.^
Not only did Maury face a shortage of troops, but he 
also found the defenses short of Negro laborers. The 
Engineer Bureau no longer encouraged the use of soldiers 
on fortifications, possibly for fear of the demoralizing 
effects of having them doing the same work as slaves.
Thus Leadbetter could rely only on slave labor and a 
small number of officers and men in engineer service.
The planters of Alabama remained reluctant to send their 
slaves away when they needed them to work the fields.
18Maury to Ewell, June 18, 1863, Letters and Tele­
grams Received, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana, Nov. 1862-April 1865, RG 109, National 
Archives.
19General Order No. 10, Office Adjutant and Inspec­
tor General, Alabama Militia, June 17, 1863, quoted in 
Daily Mail, June 20, 1863.
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At one point Leadbetter had only about 150 slaves working
on the city entrenchments. Maury authorized him to try
to hire laborers for two dollars a day plus subsistence.
Leadbetter had little luck with his efforts to hire men.
When the engineer in charge at Choctaw Bluff asked for
laborers to work there, Leadbetter wrote that he had none
to spare. Toward the end of June 1863 Maury sent some of
his troops into nearby counties to impress slaves. One
of the officers, who came from one of Alabama's hill
counties, enjoyed the impressment work he carried out
near Greenville:
...You can imagine that I have a good deal of 
fun. At first I thought it a very unpleasant 
business to impress Negroes, but the planters 
oppose it so much that my ambition makes 
more a pleasure to take them than not....
The fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, caused Maury
to adopt new measures to improve his defenses. He felt
that the enemy would attack the city now that they had
the Mississippi River in their possession. In a circular
to the citizens of Mobile and surrounding areas, he
20 "Report of operations...," May 31, 1863, O.R. , 
XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 27; Notice by Leadbetter, June 11, 1863, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Department, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 
12, p. 261; Leadbetter to Colonel I. W. Robertson, June 
17, 1863, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Office at 
Mobile, June-July 1863, Chap. Ill, Vol. 10, p. 2, RG 109, 
National Archives; 1st Lieutenant Elisha Orear to Malinda 
Caroline Orear, June 28, 1863, in Eldridge Virgil Weaver 
III Collection, Special Collections Division, Tulane 
University Library.
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called upon the able-bodied men to form local defense 
units and the owners of slaves to send laborers to work 
on the fortifications. Slaughter received the responsi­
bility of organizing, issuing arms to, instructing, and 
making assignments for the new units formed. To Lead- 
better, Maury assigned the task of arranging employment 
for any slaves sent to the city. Leadbetter then took 
several measures to speed up work on the fortifications. 
First, he ordered construction of the city entrenchments 
carried on on Sundays as well as on other days in the 
week. Second, under instructions from Maury, Leadbetter 
closed down construction at Choctaw and Oven bluffs and 
moved all of the laborers and tools from there to Mobile. 
In addition to these actions, Maury revoked the leaves of 
all officers, ordering them back to their units, and 
announced that only sick leaves would be granted in the 
future.^
When the Port Hudson garrison surrendered on July 9, 
1863, Maury became more concerned about a possible attack
21Circular, Headquarters Department of the Gulf,
July 8, 1863, quoted in The Index, Aug. 27, 1863; Para I, 
General Order No. — , Engineer Office, July 13, 1863, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Office, Mobile,
Chap. Ill, Vol. 10, p. 33; Leadbetter to Captain Charles 
de Vaux, July 20, 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, 
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 277; Leadbetter to Robert­
son, July 20, 1863, ibid.; Para I, General Order No. 221, 
Headquarters Department of the Gulf, July 23, 1863, 
quoted in The Index, Aug. 27, 1863.
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on Mobile. He realized few factors existed to prevent 
Banks' Union army from moving against the city. In a 
letter to the War Department, Maury outlined the condi­
tion of his command. The forts at the bay entrances 
appeared defensible to him. Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines 
both had provisions for six months. Seventeen of the 
proposed nineteen redoubts in the city entrenchments were 
ready, and the two remaining would be ready soon. Maury 
anticipated that he would need 20,000 men, plus appro­
priate ordnance supplies for his guns, to withstand a 
siege. The problem imposed by the defensive line was 
that it was so close to the city that if an attack came 
the city would suffer from enemy fire. Because of the 
active trade in Mobile and the city's status as a refugee 
center, Maury estimated that the city contained some
15,000 non-combatants whom he would have to evacuate. In 
response to Maury's letter, Davis instructed the War 
Department to push the collection of supplies for Mobile 
and study the reinforcement of the garrison if an attack
came. He preferred to postpone removing non-combatants
22until an assault seemed certain.
Fears on the part of the Confederate command of an 
attack on Mobile continued through the remainder of July.
22Maury to Cooper, July 16, 1863, with endorsements, 
O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 111-12.
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Cognizant of the situation, Davis warned Johnston that 
the enemy might move from New Orleans against the city. 
Johnston apprised Davis that he had obtained the same 
information from Union prisoners. He also contacted 
Maury to learn the condition of Maury's troops and 
supplies. In responding to Johnston's inquiry, Maury 
stated that his force of 2,500 men was entirely inade­
quate to withstand an attack. He felt he needed 15,000 
men and four additional field batteries. Several days 
later Maury sent a telegram to Richmond saying that he 
expected to receive an attack and needed more men and 
ordnance supplies. Cooper, in the meantime, had received 
information from Johnston that Johnston's scouts had 
learned that the Union command did not intend to move 
immediately against Mobile. He passed this news on to 
Maury and stated that in view of this development no 
troops would be sent to Mobile. Knowing that an assault 
might come in the near future, Seddon advised Maury to
continue to collect supplies and ammunition and to
23strengthen the defenses.
23Cumming, Kate, 121; Davis to Johnston, July 18, 
1863, O.R., XXIV, Pt. 1, p. 208; Johnston to Davis,
July 19, 1863, ibid.; Ewell to Maury, July 19, 1863, 
ibid., Pt. 3, p. 1017; Maury to Johnston, July 20, 1863, 
ibid., 1019; Maury to Cooper, July 23, 1863, ibid.,
XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 120; Cooper to Maury, July 31"^  HT63, 
ibid., 128; Seddon to Maury, Aug. 1, 1863, ibid., 129.
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Union authorities had given some thought to an
attack on Mobile. Major General William T. Sherman,
after capturing Jackson, Mississippi, following the fall
of Vicksburg, suggested to Major General Ulysses S. Grant
an attack on Mobile from New Orleans. When Mobile fell,
he wanted to conduct operations against Selma. Banks
also urged a move to capture Mobile:
The capture of Mobile is of importance 
second only in the history of the war to the 
opening of the Mississippi....Mobile is the 
last stronghold in the West and Southwest.
No pains sljguld be spared to effect its 
reduction.
Perhaps prodded by these missives, Grant telegraphed 
Major General Henry W. Halleck and suggested an attack on 
Mobile from the vicinity of New Orleans. The Union high 
command had other objectives in mind, however. Halleck 
informed Grant that remaining Confederate armies in Mis­
sissippi, Arkansas, and western Louisiana should be 
broken up first. When these things had been accomplished,
the Union command would have enough men to go against
25either Mobile or Texas.
24Major General William T. Sherman to Major General 
Ulysses S. Grant, July 12, 1863, O.R., XXIV, Pt. 2, 
p. 523; Banks to Grant, July 18, 1863, ibid., Pt. 3, 
p. 528.
25Grant to Major General Henry W. Halleck, July 18, 
1863, ibid., 530; Halleck to Grant, July 22, 1863, ibid., 
542.
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Banks continued to press Washington about an attack 
on Mobile. He felt that the capture of Mobile and occu­
pation of much of Texas would practically end the war in 
the Southwest. Halleck told Banks that he saw Texas as a 
more important objective. Abraham Lincoln had urged Hal­
leck to send a force to eastern Texas. Still Banks 
persisted. In several letters he pointed out that his 
intelligence pictured Mobile as weak and not likely to 
receive reinforcements. He suggested that Grant send him 
troops from his army and that the attack start from 
Portersville on Mississippi Sound. Banks anticipated a 
campaign of only thirty days and stated that Grant con­
curred in the operation. Diplomatic considerations 
arising from the French takeover in Mexico were uppermost 
in the minds of the Union high command, however. Halleck 
instructed Banks to forget Mobile for the time being and 
make an immediate move against some point on the Texas
coast. Banks began making plans in accordance with
2 6Halleck's orders soon after receiving them. Again more 
important enemy objectives saved Mobile from an attack.
2^Banks to Halleck, July 23, 1863, ibid., XXVI,
Pt. 1, p. 651; Halleck to Banks, July 24"^  T563, ibid., 
652; Abraham Lincoln to Secretary of War, July 29, 1863, 
ibid., 659; Banks to Halleck, July 30, 1863, ibid., 661- 
62; Banks to Halleck, Aug. 1, 1863, ibid., 666; Halleck 
to Banks, Aug. 6, 1863, ibid., 672; James A. Padgett 
(ed.), "Some Letters of George Stanton Denison, 1854- 
1866: Observations of a Yankee on Conditions in
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By the summer of 1863 the naval squadron at Mobile 
was suffering a shortage of men. Buchanan explained to 
the Navy Department that discharges, desertions, and ill­
ness had reduced his force to the point where he did not 
have enough men to man the guns on all of his vessels. 
Very few volunteers had joined the squadron, the great 
majority of whom had had no experience as seamen. He 
asked Mallory to intervene with the Secretary of War to 
permit the transfer of men from the army to the navy. 
Maury, recognizing the necessity of cooperation with the 
navy, asked the War Department to grant Buchanan's 
requests:
...The naval force here is very important, 
and, as a successful defense of this place 
will depend in great measure upon it, I think 
it appropriate for me to urge upon the 
Department the necessity of aiding the admi­
ral of th^ sf station in procuring men for his 
ships; . ..
Mallory forwarded Buchanan's letter to Davis, who in turn
referred it to Seddon "for attention and such relief as 
2 8can be given." Seddon informed Mallory that the War 
Department would cooperate in the transfer of men.
Louisiana and Texas," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 
XXIII (1940), 77-79.
27Buchanan to Mallory, July 16, 1863, O.R., 4, II, 
663; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 8, 1863, ibid., 1, XXVI, Pt. 
2, pp. 152-53.
2 8Mallory to Davis, July 24, 1863, with endorsement 
by Davis, July 30, 1863, ibid., 4, II, 662-63.
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By mid-1864 several hundred men from the army units in
the Department of the Gulf had received orders to join
29Buchanan's warships.
The navy did not stand alone in trying to obtain
men. Maury remained apprehensive about the safety of
Mobile, as did Johnston. Both men made efforts to get
troop reinforcements for the city. Not only was Mobile's
garrison relatively weak, but Maury by early August 1863
had only one general officer remaining in his department.
After repeated requests by Kirby Smith for his services
in Texas, the War Department ordered Slaughter to the
Trans-Mississippi Department. Slaughter left Mobile for
Havana aboard a blockade runner and eventually got to
30Texas on another blockade runner. Seeking to increase 
his available forces, Maury asked Cooper to return to 
Mobile the infantry brigade which Buckner had sent to 
Bragg in April 1863— if it could be spared. The War 
Department answered that no troops could be sent from 
Tennessee then or in the forseeable future. Johnston
29
Seddon to Mallory, [Aug. — , 1863], ibid., 697.
30Smith to Cooper, June 10, 1863, ibid., 1, XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 43; Smith to Cooper, June 16, 1863, ibid., 56; 
Cooper to Maury, July 7, 1863, Letters and Telegrams 
Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 38, 
p. 324; Cooper to Slaughter, July 17, 1863, ibid., 333; 
"Abstract from returns of the Department of the Gulf," 
Aug. 1, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 130; Brigadier 
General Hamilton P. Bee to Captain Edmund P. Turner,
Sept. 10, 1863, ibid., 219.
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wrote to Governor Shorter to request that he send troops
to Mobile. Shorter replied that he had no volunteers or
militia which he could send to the city. Few volunteers
had responded to Davis' June call, and the governor
reported the militia severely depleted in numbers. There
31appeared to be no chance of reinforcements for Mobile.
About the middle of August 1863 Maury again antici­
pated that the enemy would make an attack against Mobile. 
Information came to him which indicated troop and ship 
concentrations at Ship Island. He succeeded in pushing 
the work on his defensive lines because the planters had 
sent more laborers to the city than earlier in the year. 
Leadbetter ordered his men to strengthen the walls of 
Fort Grant and to place a rifled cannon there to improve 
the fort's firepower. A foundry in Mobile turned out two 
cannons per week, and Maury planned to reopen another 
foundry which had closed. The Confederate command still 
needed a large amount of ammunition for the guns in the 
defenses, but Maury had accumulated food supplies suffi­
cient to subsist 10,000 men for four months. In response 
to information sent to him by Maury about a possible
^Maury to Cooper, Aug. 1, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 130; Colonel H. L. Clay to Maury, Aug. 19, 1863, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector Gen­
eral, Chap. I, Vol. 38, p. 380; Johnston to Shorter,
Aug. 2, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 136; Shorter to 
Johnston, Aug. 4, 1863, ibid., 139.
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attack, Johnston made three of his brigades available to
Maury if needed. He stationed one brigade at Meridian
and the two others at Enterprise— all with easy access
32to Mobile via the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
While expecting an attack, Maury remained confident 
of his ability to defend Mobile successfully. Leadbetter 
had made good progress in strengthening the walls of the 
redoubts surrounding the city. Anticipating that the 
enemy would move by land either from the Pascagoula area 
or Pensacola, Maury felt that relief forces could cut 
the supply lines of the enemy to either place and help 
check any attack. The Confederate command still needed 
long-range cannon at Mobile, and Maury asked Johnston for 
three 20-pounder Parrott guns which he had promised to 
send to the city. Maury did not want to employ one wea­
pon— the land mine— in the defense of Mobile, however.
In early August 18 63, Brigadier General Gabriel J.
Rains, who had designed these anti-personnel devices, 
had arrived in Mobile to confer with Maury about possible 
use of mines. After discussing the matter with Maury but
32Maury to Cooper, Aug. 8, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 153; Leadbetter to Robertson, Aug. 5, 1863,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, 
p. 296; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 13, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 160; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 161; 
Maury to Ewell, Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 163; Johnston to 
Maury, Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 164; Maury to Johnston,
Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 164.
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getting nothing accomplished, Rains proceeded under 
orders from Richmond to Charleston. Maury remained unim­
pressed with Rains' ideas:
General Rains has gone away with his gim- 
cracks; he was not at all practical; every­
thing I received from him was vague and 
visionary.
Despite Maury's expressed confidence, he still 
attempted to get more troops for his garrison. He asked 
Johnston to send one of the brigades designated to go to 
Mobile to the city as soon as possible. He argued that 
the new situation would be healthier and more cheerful 
for the men. Maury did not want any Alabama troops sent 
to him if men from other states stood available. Two of 
his Alabama regiments on duty at Mobile suffered from 
desertions, and Maury blamed this on the influence of the 
men's despondent friends and relatives. He expressed 
particular interest in getting to Mobile men of Louisiana 
units which had served artillery batteries at Snyder's 
Bluff and Vicksburg. Many of these men had served under 
Maury at the former place, and he knew how good they 
were. As soon as the authorities declared these men 
exchanged, Maury wished them ordered to him: "...the
^Maury to Johnston, Aug. 24, 18 63, O.R., XXVI,
Pt. 2, pp. 179-80; Special Order No. 145, Headquarters 
[Department of the West], Aug. 3, 1863, ibid., 136; Para 
XIV, Special Order No. 198, Adjutant and Inspector Gen­
eral's Office, Aug. 20, 1863, ibid., XXVIII, Pt. 2, 
p. 297.
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y e a r of alertness and frequent practice at Vicksburg
34made them very dexterous in sinking ships."
As August 1863 drew to a close, the defensive stance 
of Mobile seemed fairly good. Maury and his command 
still had several shortages in supplies facing them, 
however. Subsistence stores coming into the city did not 
keep pace with supplies issued. Maury asked Johnston to 
allow him to gather more foodstuffs along the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad in Mississippi even though the area stood 
outside his department. He also complained that he still 
did not have enough shells and powder for his artillery 
pieces. To improve the readiness of his field artillery, 
Maury ordered his men to impress horses in and around the 
city to fill out the teams. Johnston ordered Brigadier 
General Samuel B. Maxey's brigade of seven regiments from 
Enterprise to Mobile in response to Maury's request of 
the twenty-fourth. Several of Maxey's regiments encamped 
at Hall's Mills, while the bulk of the brigade went to 
Portersville on the coast. The addition of these troops 
gave Maury approximately 6,400 men to defend the city.
He wrote to Richmond: "With a proper garrison and a
Maury to Johnston, Aug. 24, 1863, ibid., XXVI, 
Pt. 2, p. 179.
proper supply of ammunition I believe Mobile can sue
35cessfully resist any attack of the enemy."
Maury to Cooper, Aug. 28, 1863, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 519; Maury to Johnston, Aug. 31, 1863, ibid., XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 190; Orear to Carrie Orear, Aug. 29, 1863, 
Weaver Collection; Johnston to Hardee, Aug. 31, 1863,
O.R., XXX, Pt. 4, p. 572; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluctant 
ReEel: The Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959),
126; "Abstract from returns of the Department of the 
Gulf,..for August, 1863," O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 191.
CHAPTER VII
"... THE TREES FALLING ALL AROUND..."
Concern for a proper garrison and supporting force 
for Mobile again occupied the minds of Maury and Johnston 
in September 1863. Johnston reported to Richmond on the 
strength of the garrison. His estimate of 10,000 men 
being needed for an adequate defense agreed with that of 
Maury. In addition to the two brigades which he had pre­
viously earmarked to support Mobile, Johnston told Cooper 
that two brigades at Newton, Mississippi, would also go 
to the city if the enemy attacked. These four brigades, 
along with 1,200 to 1,500 local defense troops, would 
give Maury a supporting force of approximately 6,750 men. 
Johnston still did not think this would be enough men to 
combat a large besieging army. Maury asked the War 
Department to order Brigadier General John C. Moore to 
Mobile to command Maxey's brigade, as Maxey had received 
orders to go to the Trans-Mississippi Department. He 
also repeated his request to Johnston to send Louisiana 
artillerists to man his heavy guns. Finally, Maury 
expressed a desire to have the Missouri brigade which 
had served at Vicksburg. In requesting the Louisiana and 
Missouri troops, Maury stated again a conviction of his:
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"I think it very important to have troops belonging to 
distant localities."^
The Mobile defenses appeared in satisfactory shape 
and required very little work during the month of 
September. Leadbetter's engineers enlarged Battery 
Gladden on its left flank so that they could place two 
more cannons in it. To honor the memory of the Missouri 
soldiers killed in the war, Maury ordered the Choctaw 
Point Battery renamed Missouri Battery. Along the line 
of works surrounding Mobile, the engineer laborers toiled 
to thicken the walls of the various redoubts. This work 
became so routine that the overseers and engineers allowed 
the slaves to slack off on their duties. Their actions 
forced Leadbetter to order the engineers to remain at the 
fortifications throughout the work day and to threaten to 
recommend the overseers for conscription if they con­
tinued to neglect their duties. Near Fort Morgan the 
engineers placed more torpedoes in the main ship channel. 
At Grant's Pass Lieutenant Glenn and his men expanded the
■^Johnston to Cooper, Sept. 4, 1863 , O.R. , XXVI, Pt.
2, pp. 201-202; Maury to Cooper, Sept. 5, 1863, Tele­
grams Received, Secretary of War; Maury to Ewell, Sept. 7, 
1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 211; Maury to Hardee, Sept.
24, 1863, Letters and Telegrams Received, Department of 
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana; Ewell to 
Maury, Sept. 30, 1863, in Telegram Book, July 4, 1863- 
May 6, 1864, p. 138, Joseph E. Johnston Papers, Library 
of the College of William and Mary.
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walls of Fort Grant to accommodate six heavy guns and
2
bombproof shelters for barracks and storerooms.
Fort Grant again became the site of an engagement 
with Federal gunboats on September 13, 1863. Company D, 
21st Alabama Infantry, previously stationed at Fort Mor­
gan, had joined the garrison in late August. About 10 
o'clock A.M. the gunboats Genesee, Jackson, and Calhoun 
sailed up toward the earthwork to test its strength and 
opened fire after anchoring. A Confederate gunboat and 
transport stationed near Fort Grant changed their posi­
tions to avoid being struck. The Confederate gunners 
opened up with their own guns in reply to the enemy fire, 
but the range was so great that none of their shots 
struck the vessels. This exchange continued almost with­
out interruption until almost 4 o'clock in the afternoon, 
when the Federal gunboats disengaged and steamed back 
toward Ship Island. Although the gunboats had thrown 
approximately 175 shells at the little fort, only fifteen 
struck the island, and none did any damage. A soldier 
stationed at Fort Grant wrote: "The only loss on our
2"Report of operations for the defense of Mobile, 
Ala., for the month of September, 1863," O.R., XXVI,
Pt. 2, pp. 274-75; Para I, General Orders No. 235, Head­
quarters Department of the Gulf, Sept. 8, 1863, quoted in 
Daily Tribune, Sept. 8, 1863; unsigned report dated 
"Alabama, September 1863," in Jefferson Davis Papers,
Duke University Archives, Durham, North Carolina; Lead- 
better to Pillans, Sept. 1, 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer 
Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 342.
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side was a poor innocent rat that got killed in trying
3to make its escape out of the magazine."
On September 25, 1863, Colonel William Llewellyn 
Powell, commanding the lower bay defenses with head­
quarters at Fort Morgan, died in Mobile after a long 
illness. Powell's death saddened Maury and placed him 
at a loss as to how to replace Powell. He praised 
Powell's ability and efficiency as an officer:
...His loss is irreparable. He had peculiar 
qualifications for the position he occupied 
and was a man o| very rare combinations of 
good traits....
During Powell's illness Maury had allowed the senior
officer at Fort Morgan, Colonel George A. Smith of the
1st Confederate Infantry, to command Powell's brigade
but wanted a permanent replacement. On the same day that
Powell died, Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup, having
received orders earlier in the month to report for active
duty at Mobile, arrived. Maury assigned Shoup to
3
Commander W. H. Macomb to Bell, Sept. 15, 1863, 
O.R.N., XX, 584; Lieutenant Commander George A. Bigelow 
to Macomb, Sept. 13, 1863, ibid., 584-85; "Abstract log 
of the U.S.S. Genesee, Commander Macomb, U.S. Navy, 
commanding," ibid., 585; Roll for July and Aug. 1863, 
Record of Events Cards, Company D, 21st Alabama Infan­
try, Compiled Service Records; "Company D, 21st Ala. 
Regt.," to Editor, Sept. 16, 1863, quoted in Daily 
Tribune, Sept. 19, 1863.
^Maury to Cooper, Sept. 28, 1863, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 532; Maury to [Johnston], Sept. 29, 1863, Letters 
and Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama, Missis­
sippi, and East Louisiana.
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command Powell's brigade because of his experience as an 
artillery officer. Shoup had begun his Confederate ser­
vice as a lieutenant of artillery and had commanded Gen­
eral William J. Hardee's artillery at Shiloh. Maury did 
not, however, intend Shoup's assignment to be permanent
as he felt "the command is hardly equal to his [Shoup's]
5
rank." In October Maury renamed the fort at Grant's 
Pass Fort Powell in memory of its former brigade 
commander.6
The engineers conducted only limited operations in 
the Department of the Gulf during October 1863. A change 
in the position of chief engineer of the department at 
least partially accounted for the slowdown. Leadbetter 
left Mobile to become Bragg's chief engineer and superin­
tend the construction of fortifications on Missionary 
Ridge southeast of Chattanooga. To replace him, the War 
Department ordered to the city Lieutenant Colonel Victor
Maury to Cooper, Dec. 21, 18 63, O.R., XXXI, Pt.
3, pp. 851-52, Para XXII, Special Order No. 212, Adju­
tant and Inspector General's Office, Sept. 7, 1863, 
ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 212; Para VIII, Special Order No. 
43, Headquarters Department of the Gulf, Sept. 25, 1863, 
ibid., XXXI, Pt. 3, p. 852; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in 
Gray; Lives of the Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge; 
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 276; Maury to 
[Johnston], Sept. 29, 1863, Letters and Telegrams 
Received, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East 
Louisiana.
^Para II, Special Order No. 251, Headquarters 
Department of the Gulf, Oct. 28, 1863, quoted in Adver­
tiser and Register, Oct. 30, 1863.
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von Sheliha, a former Prussian army officer and most 
recently Buckner's chief of artillery. Von Sheliha
would remain chief engineer at Mobile for most of the
7
remainder of the war. The engineers, with assistance
from the infantry, began felling all of the trees between
the two lines of earthworks surrounding the city. They
also began cutting down the trees for about one mile out
from the first line of trenches. This tree removal would
provide a clear field of fire for all of the redoubts and
lesser works. One officer participating in this project
wrote his wife:
...it is only when I see all these hands chop­
ping that I fully realize the expression, 'The 
forest disappeared beneath the settlers axe,' 
for I must say it is pheasant to see the trees 
falling all around....
All of the engineering operations at Mobile cost the 
Confederate government a good deal of money. By October 
1863 these expenditures had begun causing some concern in 
Richmond. Leadbetter had estimated in January that he
7
Para I, Special Order No. 38, Headquarters Depart­
ment of Tennessee, Oct. 23, 1863, O.R., XXXI, Pt. 3, 
p. 581; Para VIII, Special Order No. 241, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Oct. 10, 1863, quoted in Com­
piled Service Record of Victor von Sheliha; Para VI, 
Special Order No. 75, Headquarters Department of the 
Gulf, Oct. 20, 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, 
Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 433; Rives to Von Sheliha, Nov. 7, 
1863, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. 
Ill, Vol. 4, p. 89.
q
Orear to Carrie Orear, Oct. 3, 1863, Weaver 
Collection.
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would need $700,000 to complete his work. At that time, 
however, the Engineer Bureau could send him only $50,000 
because Congress had not acted on the Bureau's appro­
priations request. Leadbetter1s expenditures had reached 
$600,000 by June, and yet he had not been able to com­
plete the defenses. For the next few months Leadbetter's 
estimates of funds required averaged $300,000. The 
Treasury Department notified the Engineer Bureau that it 
could place no more than $850,000 per month to the 
Bureau's credit. Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Rives wrote 
Gilmer that because Mobile's appropriation took up more 
than one-third of this total he feared "the remainder 
will scarcely suffice to meet the expenditures necessary
9
in other quarters." In a letter to Leadbetter, Rives 
pointed out that the expenditures at Mobile had already 
greatly exceeded those at Charleston, and he urged "the 
strictest economy in future operations."'*’^  However, the
9
Rives to Leadbetter, Jan. 22, 1863, Letters and 
Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 
231; Gilmer to Leadbetter, June 15, 1863, ibid., Vol. 3, 
p. 104; Rives to Gilmer, Oct. 24, 1863, ibid., Vol. 4, 
p. 46.
■^Rives to Leadbetter, Oct. 16, 1863, ibid., Vol. 4, 
p. 21. These engineering funds paid for such things as 
hire of mechanics, compensation for slave labor, hire of 
wagons and animals, and hire of vessels.
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estimates of funds needed continued to average $300,000 
for the remainder of the year.'*''*'
Maury had to look again for a commander for the 
lower bay forts in early October 1863. Shoup became ill 
and had to reliquish his command. When Maury learned 
that Colonel Edward Higgins had been declared exchanged 
after his capture at Vicksburg, he asked Davis to pro­
mote Higgins to brigadier general and order him to Mobile 
to command both the lower bay and harbor defenses.
Higgins had served as a midshipman in the United States 
Navy prior to the war and had entered Confederate service 
as a captain of artillery. As lieutenant colonel of the 
22nd Louisiana Infantry he had commanded Fort Jackson and 
Fort St. Philip below New Orleans during Farragut’s 
attack on the Crescent City. Later he commanded the 
defenses at Snyder's Bluff, and during the long siege of 
Vicksburg had charge of the river batteries. Maury thus 
thought his service had given him skill in defending 
fortifications against ships. During a visit by Davis to 
Mobile in late October, Maury again requested that the 
president promote Higgins and assign him to Mobile. On 
Maury's recommendation, Davis initiated the necessary
^Estimate of funds required for Engineer Service, 
Mobile, Dec. 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, 
Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 523; Estimate of funds required 
for Engineer Service, Mobile, Jan. 1864, ibid., 534-35.
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orders concerning Higgins. The latter had arrived in
12Mobile and assumed command by late November.
In early November 1863 Maury attempted to get 
approval from the War Department to accept into Confed­
erate service one or more companies of Creoles (free 
Negroes) from Mobile. The department had turned down an 
earlier request by Maury on the reasoning that Negroes 
could not be organized as soldiers. He did not think the 
authorities in Richmond fully recognized the status of 
Mobile's Creoles. In his dispatch, Maury pointed out 
that these people had enjoyed all of the privileges and 
immunities of United States citizens since the cession of 
Mobile to the country. Most of the white people of the 
city did not look upon them as Negroes. Maury intended 
to drill the Creoles as heavy artillerists, and he stated 
that they seemed anxious to enter Confederate service. 
Seddon replied to Maury's request by saying that Negroes 
could serve only as laborers or in support jobs.
Maury to Cooper, Dec. 21, 1863, O.R., XXXI,
Pt. 3, pp. 851-52; Maury to Colonel George W. C. Lee, 
Oct. 8, 1863, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 542; Arthur W. Ber­
geron, Jr., "They Bore Themselves With Distinguished 
Gallantry: The Twenty-Second Louisiana Infantry," Lou­
isiana History, XIII (1972), 253-82; Daily Tribune, Oct. 
25, 1863; Davis to Seddon, Oct. 29, 1863, in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His
Letters, Papers and Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.: 
Department of Archives and History, 1923), VI, 69; 
Special Order No. 30, Headquarters Third Brigade, Nov. 
28, 1863, Orders, District of the Gulf.
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Political considerations dictated Seddon's stand: "Our
position with the North and before the world will not
13allow the employment as armed soldiers of negroes."
Troops once again left Mobile for another theater in 
late November 1863. Bragg at Missionary Ridge had been 
trying since late October to get reinforcements for his 
army. To accommodate Bragg, Davis promised to get two 
brigades from Johnston in Mississippi and suggested that 
Bragg exchange troops with Maury to obtain larger 
regiments. Johnston agreed to send two brigades to 
Bragg for temporary service. One of the brigades he 
chose was that of Brigadier General William A. Quarles, 
fdrmerly Maxey's, then stationed at Mobile. Maury 
expressed willingness to send two of his regiments to 
Bragg if he could get some heavy artillerists to replace 
them. He stated particular interest in having the 1st 
Alabama Infantry, which had manned heavy guns at Port 
Hudson, and the 1st Tennessee Heavy Artillery. Johnston, 
however, advised Maury against giving up any troops to 
Bragg since replacements were probably not available. 
Maury heeded this advice, and only Quarles' brigade 
departed from Mobile's garrison. The remnants of the
13Cooper to Maury, Sept. 28, 1863, Letters and Tele­
grams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 
38, p. 458; Maury to Cooper, Nov. 7, 1863, with endorse­
ment by Seddon, Nov. 24, 1863, O.R., 4, II, 941.
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Tennessee artillery regiment did arrive in Mobile in
December and received assignment to the Apalachee 
14batteries.
Maury made some interesting comments about Mobile in 
a candid letter written in late November 1863. He felt 
that the city was a very pleasant one but that the quiet 
situation caused men stationed there to lose easily their 
soldierly habits. The people of the city acted hospit­
ably but had not really felt the war's impact. Maury 
ventured the opinion that Mobile had been fortified at 
Vicksburg's expense. Heavy guns which could have been 
used at Vicksburg had gone to Mobile where they probably 
would receive little, if any, use. Maury gave two reasons 
for doubting an attack on Mobile. First, he did not 
think Banks' army was in any condition to attack due to 
its repeated defeats in Louisiana and Texas during the 
fall and early winter. Second, Maury expressed confi­
dence that the defenses around the city and harbor could 
hold off any assault. He predicted: "I do not think
^Davis to Bragg, Oct. 23, 1863, O.R., LII, Pt.
2, p. 547; Davis to Bragg, Oct. 29, 1863, ibid., 555;
Ewell to Maury, Nov. 20, 1863, ibid., XXXI, Pt. 3, p.
723; Maury to Ewell, Nov. 21, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, 
p. 431; Johnston to Bragg, Nov. 22, 1863, ibid., XXXI,
Pt. 3, p. 739; Johnston to Maury, Nov. 22, 1863, ibid.; 
Field and Staff Roll for Apr. 30, 1863-May 1, 1864,
Record of Events Cards, 1st Tennessee Heavy Artillery, 
Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who 
Served in Organizations from Tennessee.
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they will attempt Mobile until they have an army of
40,000 men, a large fleet of ironclads and about ninety
15days liesure [sic] for them."
By early December 1863 Von Sheliha found that the 
rations issued to the Negro laborers at Mobile had 
become insufficient. The men received only three-quarters 
of a pound of beef a day, no corn meal, and few other 
victuals. Von Sheliha recognized the necessity for 
larger ration amounts and requested aid from the commis­
sary department. After receiving assurances of increased 
supplies, Von Sheliha issued orders establishing an 
improved schedule of rations which included one pound of 
beef daily, one pound of pumpkins daily, one and a quar­
ter pounds of corn meal daily, ten pounds of rice per 
hundred rations eight days in fifteen, fifteen pounds of 
peas per hundred rations seven days in fifteen, and four 
and a half pounds of salt per hundred rations daily. He 
ordered scales set up in each quarters area to weigh the 
rations. Von Sheliha charged his overseers with seeing 
not only that the slaves receive the proper rations but 
also that the food was prepared properly and distributed 
fairly. If the overseers failed to follow these 
instructions, commissaries had authorization to purchase
■^[Maury] to [Sterling Price], Nov. 29, 1863, in 
James W. Eldridge Collection, Henry E. Huntington 
Library, San Marino, California.
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necessary rations and deduct their price from the over-
, 16 seers' wages.
For several weeks during December 1863, Maury had 
the services of an additional general officer. Brigadier 
General John C. Moore reported for duty at Mobile on the 
tenth. Maury had specifically requested Moore on two 
occasions and wanted to place him in command of Maxey's 
brigade. Instead of ordering Moore to Mobile for that 
purpose, the War Department obtained the promotion of 
Colonel William A. Quarles to take over the brigade. On 
November 23 the Department finally ordered Moore from 
his command in the Army of Tennessee to report to Maury. 
The latter general assigned Moore to command the Eastern 
Division of the Department of the Gulf and the part of 
the department west of Dog River. When the War Depart­
ment realized that both Shoup and Moore had received 
orders to Mobile, Cooper instructed Maury to retain the 
former and send the latter back to the Army of Tennessee
*1 /T
Von Sheliha to Garner, Dec. 4, 1863, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 504; General 
Order No. 2, Engineer Office, Department of Mobile [sic], 
Dec. 9, 1863, quoted in FitzGerald Ross, Cities and Camps 
of the Confederate States, ed. by Richard B. Harwell 
TlJrbana! University of Illinois Press, 1958), 162.
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despite Maury's request to keep Moore and send Shoup to
■ 17 Mississippi.
Rumors of a planned attack on Mobile again reached 
the city in December. Maury repeated his request to 
Johnston to send him the artillerists who had become 
prisoners at Port Hudson and Vicksburg as soon as they 
received their exchange. He needed these experienced 
soldiers to garrison his batteries rather than the infan­
trymen who then served the guns. If these regiments got 
orders for Mobile, Maury felt that their absentees would 
return and that new recruits would fill their ranks. 
Besides this concern over the lack of veteran troops, 
Maury also expressed concern that he did not have suffi­
cient food and ordnance supplies to withstand a siege.
He admitted in a letter to Cooper that he expected the 
enemy fleet to run successfully past Fort Morgan and Fort 
Gaines if an attack came. He expressed much the same 
feeling to Beauregard at Charleston but said he would do 
his best to obstruct the channel. Maury asked Beauregard
17Para II, Special Order No. 117, Headquarters 
Department of the Gulf, Dec. 10, 1863, O.R., XXXI, Pt.
3, p. 852; Maury to Cooper, Sept. 9, 1863, ibid.;
Maury to Cooper, Dec. 31, 1863, ibid., 851-52; Para 
XXXIII, Special Order No. 278, Adjutant and Inspector 
General's Office, Nov. 23, 1863, ibid., 741; Maury to 
Cooper, Dec. 19, 1863, ibid., 848; Cooper to Maury, Dec. 
19, 1863, ibid.; Maury to Cooper, Dec. 20, 1863, ibid., 
849; Cooper to Maury, Dec. 23, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, 
p. 527.
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to come to Mobile to help in the defense of the city if 
the situation at Charleston permitted him to get away.
He recognized the success Beauregard had had in South 
Carolina and wished to use his knowledge in the defense 
of Mobile.'*'®
In anticipation of the feared attack, Von Sheliha 
pressed the work being done on Mobile's defensive works. 
The troops cutting down trees around the city redoubts 
completed this task and chopped the timber into firewood. 
Von Sheliha had enough Negro laborers coming in from the 
plantations that the small number of soldiers working on 
the defenses could return to their commands, but he hoped 
to get even more slaves. He knew that he had to keep 
construction going to make the defenses absolutely 
complete. Like Maury, Von Sheliha realized that the 
masonry forts alone could not prevent an enemy fleet with 
ironclads from entering the bay. After consultations 
with Maury, Gilmer, Buchanan, and Beauregard, Von Sheliha 
decided to construct an earthwork battery on the west 
bank of the main ship channel between Port Morgan and 
Fort Gaines. He also planned to obstruct the channel 
further with torpedoes, ropes, and sunken timbers. 
Continued construction on Fort Powell rendered that bay
1 ft
Maury to Cooper, Dec. 11, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 499; Maury to Ewell, Dec. 12, 1863, ibid., 500-501; 
Maury to Beauregard, Dec. 17, 1863, ibid., 510-11.
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entrance secure. Closer to the city, Von Sheliha's men 
reconstructed and expanded four bay batteries— McIntosh, 
Gladden, Huger, and Tracy. The line of city entrench­
ments appeared closer to completion, but it did not sat­
isfy Von Sheliha because of its proximity to the city.
He began construction of a third line of fortifications 
between the two existing lines. This new line would 
include nine large redoubts, according to Von Sheliha's
plans. By late December, only Redoubt A and Redoubt B ,
19which flanked Stone Street Road, were m  progress.
Von Sheliha and his engineers faced some criticism 
and complaints despite the good work they did on Mobile's 
defenses. Planters in the interior of Alabama voiced 
most of the complaints, which centered around the use and 
treatment of slave laborers. In a letter to Governor 
Thomas H. Watts, Von Sheliha answered the criticisms.
The planters alledged first that the engineers kept the 
slaves in Mobile beyond the sixty-day period for which 
they had been impressed. Von Sheliha pointed out that 
he retained no Negroes longer than sixty days and that, 
in fact, he had counted the days spent in travel to and
1 Q
Von Sheliha to T. H. Watts, Dec. 13, 1863, ibid., 
501-503; Orear to Carrie Orear, Dec. 1, 1863, Weaver Col­
lection; Para VI, Special Order No. 121, Headquarters 
Department of the Gulf, Dec. 14, 1863, LHA Collection; 
Rives to Von Sheliha, Dec. 18, 1863, Letters and Tele­
grams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 242.
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from Mobile as a part of the impressment period. The 
second complaint stated that the slaves received mis­
treatment while in the city. Although he admitted that 
some abuses still existed, Von Sheliha referred Watts to 
orders issued setting standards for the feeding of the 
Negroes. He also said that the cotton presses used as 
barracks had been improved and that workers made shoes 
and clothing for the slaves to wear. In closing, Von 
Sheliha hinted at a plan to replace the impressment sys­
tem with a permanent engineering corps of Negro labor­
ers, a plan which, if successful, would eliminate further
20criticisms of the engineers.
This idea of a corps of Negro engineers received 
more extensive treatment in a letter Von Sheliha wrote to 
Senator Clement C. Clay of Alabama. Von Sheliha outlined 
briefly the disadvantages of the impressment system.
When the slaves were sent to Mobile, they left the plan­
tations without necessary clothing and shoes. Many 
Negroes received discharges quickly because they were 
unfit for the duties required of them, while others 
received discharges due to illness. The engineers then 
had to instruct the laborers who remained in the compli­
cated tasks of military engineering. This period of
20Von Sheliha to Watts, Dec. 13, 1863, O.R., XXVI, 
Pt. 2, pp. 503-504.
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teaching took so much time that the slaves spent very 
little of the sixty-day impressment period on productive 
labor on the earthworks. Even during training and actual 
work, the process of acclimatization often reduced the 
amount of effective work the slaves could perform. In 
addition to the disadvantages mentioned, the impressment 
system cost a lot of money. The government paid not only 
for the transportation, hire, and support of the laborers 
but for the hire of agents and clerks to maintain the 
system. To these costs, the authorities might have to 
add compensation to planters for their slaves who died 
while at Mobile.
The advantages to be gained by the organization of
an engineer-laborer corps were four in number, according
to Von Sheliha. First, such an organization would enable
chief engineers to carry out all of their plans
successfully. For example, Von Sheliha estimated that if
he had a proper standing labor force he could complete
the work at Mobile so that it would "not only stand a
most minute criticism" but that it would "stand any 
22siege." Second, an engineer corps would work more
21Von Sheliha to Senator Clement C. Clay, Dec. 29, 
1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 12, pp. 525-26.
22Ibid.; Von Sheliha to Watts, Dec. 13, 1863, O.R.,
XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 503.
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efficiently than impressed laborers. Third, the 
government would save a considerable amount of money. 
Fourth, the creation of a labor corps would eliminate the 
shortcomings and hatred of the impressment system. Von 
Sheliha suggested also that his idea extend to hospital 
nurses and teamsters. This would free many men who could
bear arms from what he called "an inactive, unsoldierlike
23 .service." Von Sheliha's plan showed merit, and it is
perhaps unfortunate that the Confederate authorities did
not follow up on it.
Maury found himself faced with dissatisfaction 
among a part of the troops of his command in late Decem­
ber 1863. Some of the men of the 57th and 61st Alabama 
Infantry regiments at Pollard contemplated laying down 
their weapons and going home, hoping to bring the end of 
the war closer. Predominently conscripts from the poor 
counties of northern Alabama, these men felt little 
affinity with the Confederate cause. They had set 
Christmas Day as the date for the mutiny. The regi­
mental field officers learned of the plot, however, and 
by personal persuasion prevented any mutiny. Maury 
began looking into the situation as soon as he learned
^"^Von Sheliha to Clay, Dec. 29, 1863, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, pp. 525-26. 
John Forsyth supported a proposal similar to Von She- 
liha's in an editorial. Advertiser and Register,
Nov. 13, 1863.
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of it and ordered Brigadier General James H. Clanton,
commanding at Pollard, to investigate matters thoroughly
and make a full report. In his own report to the War
Department, Maury recommended that these two units and
his other Alabama regiments be sent to other theaters in
exchange for weakened but veteran units. He thought
active service away from their homes and alongside
seasoned troops would eliminate the mutinous feelings of
24these Alabama soldiers.
The feelings of discontent among Clanton's brigade 
broke out into overt action in early January 1864.
Sixty men of the 57th Alabama mutinied on January 5 
while on picket duty. One of their officers arrested all 
of the men, and Clanton sent them to Mobile for trial. 
Clanton ferreted out the ringleaders of the plot and 
succeeded in quieting the situation. Maury remained 
concerned about the morale of Clanton's troops and 
repeated his request to have them transferred. He also 
asked the War Department to transfer Clanton. Joe John­
ston seconded Maury's recommendations. Seddon and Davis 
approved Maury's request and ordered Clanton to duty
24Maury to Seddon, Dec. 28, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt.
2, pp. 548-49; Brigadier General James H. Clanton to 
Maury, Dec. 26, 1863, ibid., 549; Colonel William G. 
Swanson to Clanton, Dec^ 26, 1863, ibid., 549-50; Major 
C. J. L. Cunningham to Captain R. S. Abercrombie, Dec.
26, 1863, ibid., 550.
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in northern Alabama. The 57th Alabama received orders 
to report to Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk's army in 
Mississippi, while the 61st Alabama moved to Virginia. 
Clanton subsequently performed adequate service, and the
two infantry regiments served creditably until the end
* 4-u 25of the war.
In early January 1864 information reached both
Mobile and Richmond that the enemy planned to attack the
Gulf city. Maury contacted Polk and Johnston to ask for
reinforcements. Polk immediately ordered two artillery
units to Mobile and requested that Johnston return to him
some of the brigades sent to the Army of Tennessee in
November 1863. Johnston did not want to give up any men
and referred the matter to Davis. The latter ordered two
brigades— Baldwin's and Quarles'— back to Polk for use in
2 6protecting Mobile. Maury also contacted Polk about
Maury to Seddon, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid., 551-52; 
Clanton to Garner, Jan. 6, 1864, ibid., 552; Clanton to 
Garner, Jan. 7, 1864 (three items), ibid., 553; Johnston 
to Davis, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt. 2, pp. 543-44; 
Cooper to Johnston, Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 555; Johnston 
to Cooper, Jan. 15, 1864, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 553;
Polk to Colonel Thomas M. Jack, Jan. 28, 1864, ibid., 
XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 629; Paras XV and XVI, Special Order 
No. 32, Headquarters [Department of Alabama, Mississippi, 
and East Louisiana], Feb. 1, 1864, ibid., 651; "Organi­
zation of troops in the Department of Alabama, Missis­
sippi, and East Louisiana," Mar. 10, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, 
p. 604; Brewer, Alabama, 668-69, 673.
2 fi
Davis to Maury, Jan. 9, 1864, in Rowland (ed.), 
Jefferson Davis, VI, 147; Polk to Maury, Jan. 10, 1864, 
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 542; Polk to Davis, Jan. 10,
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obtaining supplies for his troops. Approximately three
hundred cannons of various sizes stood in the Mobile
defenses, but none of them had more than 250 rounds per
gun. While Maury had 130,000 pounds of salt meat and 400
beef cattle available, he desired to obtain more pork.
He hoped to save as much of his current reserves as
possible and bring in the pork when a siege seemed 
27imminent.
As Maury began to receive troop reinforcements for
his garrison, he endeavored to persuade the city's non-
combatants to leave Mobile. Even with the urging of
Mobile's newspapers, the people did not depart in large
numbers. Maury correctly realized that the enemy would
have actually to begin operations against the city itself
28before the civilians would leave. The first
1864, ibid.; Polk to Johnston, Jan. 10, 1864, ibid.; 
Johnston to Davis, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid., 543-44; Maury 
to Polk, Jan. 12, 1864, ibid., 549-50; Para I, Special 
Order No. 13, Headquarters Department of Alabama, Mis­
sissippi, and East Louisiana, Jan. 13, 1864, ibid., 553; 
Davis to Johnston, Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 554; Cooper to 
Johnston, Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 554-55; Seddon to Maury, 
Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 557.
27Maury to Polk, Jan. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
2, pp. 552-53; "Statement of the number, caliber, and 
position of the guns in the Department of the Gulf, Jan­
uary 11, 1864," ibid., 547-48.
28Maury to Polk, Jan. 12, 1864, ibid., 549; Maury to 
Polk, Jan. 16, 1864, ibid., 565-66; Advertiser and Regis­
ter, Jan. 17, 1864.
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reinforcements to reach Mobile were the men of Brigadier 
General Francis M. Cockrell's Missouri brigade. The 1st 
Louisiana Heavy Artillery Regiment followed them shortly 
afterwards. These two units received assignments to the 
redoubts and entrenchments of the city works. Both units 
impressed Maury and the civilian population by their 
soldierly appearance and discipline demonstrated in a 
military review held soon after their arrival. The bri­
gades of Baldwin and Quarles reached Mobile from Dalton, 
Georgia, in late January and moved into camp at Dog River
Factory. With the addition of all of these troops, Maury
29had approximately 12,000 men to defend Mobile.
Von Sheliha continued to push his engineers in their 
work to improve Mobile's defenses. He proposed to estab­
lish two ironclad floating batteries to obstruct the main 
ship channel into the bay rather than attempt to con­
struct an earthwork battery as he had planned earlier.
To secure the floating batteries on the western edge of 
the channel, Von Sheliha hoped to anchor them to flats 
which he would sink next to the channel. He had his
29Diary of Lieutenant William T. Mumford, Jan. 16, 
1864, in William T. Mumford Collection, Mobile 
Museum Department; Daily Tribune, Jan. 19, 1864; Polk to 
Maury, Jan. 22, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 601;
William Pitt Chambers, "My Journal: The Story of a Sol­
dier's Life Told by Himself," Publications of the Mis­
sissippi Historical Society, Centenary Series, V (1925), 
298; "Abstract from return of the Department of the 
Gulf,..." Jan. 20, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 582.
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engineers place floating rope obstructions in the channel 
while he worked on his plans, and he submitted his new 
proposal and other plans for the Mobile defenses to the 
chief of the Confederate Engineer Bureau, General Jeremy 
Gilmer. The latter did not think Von Sheliha would 
succeed in establishing his floating batteries and cited 
the unstable sand bottoms, strong currents, and unmanage­
ability of the structure as difficulties Von Sheliha 
might not overcome. Although Gilmer did not strongly 
object to the effort, he urged Von Sheliha to proceed 
cautiously and test his floating batteries thoroughly.
As to the new line of redoubts Von Sheliha had begun 
around the city, Gilmer suggested that the Prussian 
erect the redoubts quickly and perfect them as time 
permitted.
A final change in Mobile's command status began tak­
ing shape in late January 1864. The War Department cre­
ated the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East 
Louisiana on the twenty-eighth of that month to include 
all of the areas named in its title. Both Maury and 
Polk, the department commander, assumed that the order 
did not affect the status of Maury's command. Maury con­
tinued to use the title "department" on all of his
■^Gilmer to Von Sheliha, Jan. 19, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 577; Von Sheliha to Buchanan, Jan. 15, 
1864, ibid., 560-61.
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reports and returns, and on February 7 Polk issued orders
defining the boundaries of the "Department" of the 
31Gulf. The War Department informed Maury that his com­
mand now comprised a district in Polk's department and
incorrectly stated: "There is no order constituting such
32a department [meaning the Gulf]." Even though the War 
Department had included Mobile and its environs in sev­
eral descriptions of Johnston's massive Western Depart­
ment while he held command, Johnston still referred to 
the area around Mobile as a department. This uncertain 
situation finally reached resolution on April 6, 1364, 
when the War Department formally revoked the orders cre­
ating the Department of the Gulf and designated Maury's
command as the District of the Gulf. This appellation
33remained m  effect until the end of the Civil War.
31Para II, Special Order No. 23, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Jan. 28, 1864, ibid., 627; 
"Abstract from return of the Department of the Gulf,..." 
Jan. 20, 1864, ibid., 582; Para I, Special Order No. 38, 
Headquarters [Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana], Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., 692.
^ H. L. Clay to Maury, Mar. 5, 1864, ibid., 586.
33Para III, Special Order No. 275, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Nov. 24, 1862, ibid., XXXI, 
Pt. 4, p. 511; Cooper to Johnston, Aug. 12, 1863, ibid., 
512; Maury to Ewell, Nov. 4, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, 
p. 390; Ewell to Maury, Nov. 10, 1863, ibid., 678; Para 
XXIV, Special Order No. 81, Adjutant and Inspector Gen­
eral's Office, Apr. 6, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 752; 
Cooper to Buckner, Feb. 20, 1863, Letters and Telegrams 
Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 38,
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Despite the confusion caused by the War Department's 
January 28 order, it placed Mobile in its proper context 
within the strategy for the defense of the western 
Confederacy.
p. 92; Ewell to Garner, Nov. 3, 1863, Telegraph Book, 
July 4, 1863-May 6, 1864, p. 174, Johnston Papers.
CHAPTER VIII 
"...THE PARIS OF THE CONFEDERACY..."
Despite the extensive military preparations and 
troop movements going on around them, the people of Mobile 
attempted to maintain the lifestyle they had enjoyed 
before the war. To a great extent they seemed successful. 
Many observers concluded that the war did not really 
touch Mobile to any extent. One resident remembered 
after the conflict: "Mobile was called the Paris of the 
Confederacy, New Orleans having fallen so early in the 
fray, and gay indeed it was."'*' Dances, parties, band 
concerts, and parades continued unabated. Although many 
soldiers and citizens enjoyed the social life they found 
at Mobile, other people criticized the "hideous reputa­
tion" the city had. A newspaper correspondent assigned 
to Mobile wrote:
...I must say the country is likely to con­
trast the hard fighting and hard living of her 
brave soldiers in Tennessee, Virginia, and 
elsewhere, with these holiday doing at 
Mobile. Making obstreperous mirth over more 
than two hundred thousand newly made graves of 
our kindred and friends, and in the hearing of
"*■ [Mary E. Brooks?], "War Memoirs," typescript in 
Irwin Collection, Mobile Museum Department.
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the poor sick fellows who crowd our hospitals 
in thousands, is not at all to my taste....
In response to the criticism, Mobilians answered: "But
while we worked and prayed for those who were actually
doing battle for our cause, we felt that it was only
right to make bright the lives of the soldiers and sail-
3ors stationed here, or on leave."
This bright social life continued down to the last 
days of the war, but on occasion the citizens demon­
strated that they did feel the impact of the war. Kate 
Cumming recorded in her diary in January 1865 that the 
city seemed as festive as it had ever been. In the 
midst of the final siege of Mobile, a local soldier wrote 
to his girlfriend: "Our city is not at all changed in
4
appearance...." A graphic portrayal of the effect the 
war had on the community occurred in late 1862. There 
existed in Mobile a mystic krewe, called the Cowbellions,
2
Caldwell Delaney, The Story of Mobile (Mobile:
Gill Printing Co., 1933), 115-16; Robert Tarleton to
------, undated, in Sallie L. Tarleton Letters in
possession of Mrs. Grace DuValle, Mobile, Ala., herein­
after cited as Tarleton Letters; H. E. Sterkx, Partners 
in Rebellion: Alabama Women in the Civil War (Ruther­
ford, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
1970), 162; Montgomery Daily Mail, Feb. 18, 1863.
3
"War Memories."
4
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 118-19; 
Ciomming, Kate, 248; Tarleton to Sallie Lightfoot, Apr.
2, 1865, quoted in William N. Still, Jr., "The Civil War 
Letters of Robert Tarleton," Alabama Historical Quar­
terly, XXXII (1970), 78.
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which paraded through the city every New Year's Eve„
Young men comprised most of the membership of the 
society, and they normally exhibited a great deal of 
cheerfulness and color. On the occasion in question, 
however, the mood was anything but cheerful. The few 
remaining members dressed in black, and they played the 
music of a dirge. They carried a transparent banner on 
which they had written the words "In Memory of Our 
Departed Associates." Everyone who witnessed the spec­
tacle was deeply affected and realized that "Mobile has
5
had her share of sorrow."
As can be imagined, soldiers and sailors found 
Mobile a very pleasant duty station or site for leave. A 
Missourian remembered: "...a man could come nearer get­
ting the worth of Confederate money there, than any other
g
place in the department." When members of Kentucky's 
famed Orphan Brigade passed through the city, they used 
a ruse to try to get around an order confining them to 
their camp and to obtain a meal of Mobile's noted 
ysters. The men found themselves face to face with 
their brigade commander as they entered the Battle House.
5 .Ephraim McD. Anderson, Memoirs: Historical and
Personal: Including the Campaigns of the First Missouri
Brigade (St. Louis: Times Printing Co., 1868), 257-58;
Daily Mail, Jan. 4, 1863.
g
Anderson, Memoirs, 255.
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To their excuse that they were looking for stragglers,
Colonel R. P. Trabue observed: "'...you are looking for
7
straggling oysters. I know what you are up to.'" Some
soldiers got carried away by the city's atmosphere. One
group of officers are said to have taken up quarters in
the Battle House and "trained...on a diet of whiskey,
8music, and women." Many young officers and enlisted 
men, including Brigaider General Thomas H. Taylor, mar­
ried Mobile girls. On one day alone ten officers got
9
married.
The people of Mobile tried to aid the soldiers and 
sailors in ways other than providing social entertainment. 
In May 1861 Adelaide de Vendel Chaudron and Ellen S.
Walker organized the Mobile Military Aid Society. This 
group of women began by making uniforms for soldiers 
in service. Later they supplied clothing and food to the 
families of men who were away at war. Eventually they 
provided assistance to needy soldiers passing through.
7
A. D. Kirwan (ed.), Johnny Green of the Orphan 
Brigade: The Journal of a Confederate Soldier (Lexing-
ton: The Universityof Kentucky Press, 1956), 48-49.
8John P. Dyer, From Shiloh to San Juan: The Life of
"Fightin' Joe" Wheeler (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1961), 25.
9
Moore to Cousin Blannie, Mar. 7, 1863, Southall and 
Bowen Papers; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 20, 1864; 
FitzGerald RosiT, Cities and Camps of the Confederate 
States, ed. by Richard B. Harwell Turbanal University 
of Illinois Press, 1958), 202.
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The Society originally did their work free of charge, 
but in time they had to accept government funds and 
private donations to support their efforts. Other 
ladies picked lint and made bandages for the wounded in 
nearby hospitals. Even in the final days prior to the 
fall of Mobile, her women were putting together boxes of 
provisions for the soldiers fighting in the trenches 
across the bay. The post chaplain, Reverend P. B. Mil­
ler, established the Soldiers' Library on Water Street, 
equipping it at his own expense and keeping it open 
throughout the war. In the library soldiers could find 
"a large assortment of reading matter, books, pamphlets, 
magazines and news papers, all conveniently arranged, and 
seats and tables for writing."'*'^
This charity the citizens also extended to needy 
persons living in the city. The Military Aid Society in 
1862 began providing food and clothes for the families of 
men away in service besides meeting their responsibili­
ties toward the soldiers themselves. Another group, the 
Female Benevolent Society, provided food, clothing, and 
quarters for soldiers' widows and their children.
^Sterkx, Partners in Rebellion, 98, 104; Kate Cum- 
ming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, ed. by
Richard B. Harwell (Baton Rouge! Louisiana State Uni­
versity Press, 1959) , 55; Thad Hold (ed.) , Miss Waring1s 
Journal: 1863 and 1865 (Chicago: The Wyvern Press, 1964) ,
ll, 12; Chambers, "My Journal," 301-302.
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A third group of women made it their duty to contribute 
clothing to needy children of soldiers.^ In order to 
assure that poor people of Mobile got needed food, a com­
mittee of the city's leading men established the Free 
Market in December 1861. The association collected sup­
plies not only from Mobile County but from planters in 
the interior as well. The railroad and steamship compan­
ies provided free transportation for supplies coming from 
these planters. When the Free Market first opened, 
approximately 800 people got food there. By early 1863 
slightly more than 2,500 people were taking advantage of 
the market. Even though supplies became more expensive
and in shorter supply as the war wore on, the Free Market
12continued to serve the poor until Mobile's surrender.
Life in Mobile remained relatively normal in other 
ways besides its lively social life. The city government 
continued as usual except that the mayor and aldermen 
took on added responsibilities such as assisting the Free 
Market and aiding the thousands of refugees who crowded 
into the city. Throughout the war the courts in Mobile, 
such as the Confederate District Court for the Southern 
Division of Alabama, held regular sessions and scheduled
"^Sterkx, Partners in Rebellion, 104.
12Advertiser and Register, Jan. 18, 1862, Mar. 26,
1863.
200
a number of special terms. All of the city's churches 
remained open, and their ministers, like the civil offi­
cials, assumed extra duties in visiting the wounded and 
the families of soldiers away at war and in conducting 
numerous funerals. Mobile's public schools operated 
until the end of the war through liberal contributions 
by her citizens. The shortage of schoolbooks due to the 
war received relief when Adelaide de Vendel Chaudron 
authored a set of readers and spelling books. S. H. 
Goetzel and Company of the city printed these books.
In many instances the firm used wallpaper for parts of
13the books because regular paper was in short supply.
The city authorities made every effort to keep 
Mobile as clean as possible throughout the war. Early in 
the conflict they ordered the razing of dilapidated build­
ings so that new construction could take place. In 
August 1862 Mayor Slough appointed a committee with mem­
bers in every ward to supervise the city's sanitary 
condition. The city council had passed an "Ordinance to 
Secure Public Health" which allowed the committee to
13Peter J. Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags 
(Mobile: Gill Printing Co., 1913JT 302-306; Minute Book,
Confederate District Court, Southern Division of Ala­
bama, Apr. 18, 18 61-Jan. 13, 1865, Federal Records Center, 
East Point, Georgia; Delaney, The Story of Mobile, 119; 
Advertiser and Register, Feb. 5, 1862; Cumming, Kate,
249.
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investigate anything that might endanger the people's 
health. This ordinance also required all property owners 
or occupants to keep their areas clean. The authorities 
did not always strictly enforce the ordinance. In Feb­
ruary 18 65 citizens reported to the city fathers that 
hogs running loose in the streets had damaged the side­
walks and other property. All stock owners received 
instructions to lock up their animals, and an Inspector 
of Animals supervised the enforcement of stock 
regulations. One woman whose hog the inspector had
seized had to pay $5.00 for an affidavit and $20.00 in
14pound fees to get her animal back.
The people of Mobile exhibited a great deal of tol­
erance toward those among them who held divergent politi­
cal opinions. A Northern-born Union man who lived in the
city throughout the war wrote later that few acts of
15oppression occurred during the conflict. One of the 
few incidents of tension transpired in October 1862.
Three cases of attempted arson occurred at that time. 
Fortunately the fire department extinguished all of the 
blazes before they did great damage, but the incidents 
made apparent the need for vigilance. In an editorial,
14Advertiser and Register, May 7, Sept. 5, 1862,
Feb. 5, 1865.
15William Rix, Incidents of Life in a Southern City 
During the War (Mobile: Iberville Historical Society
Papers, 1865), [5].
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the Advertiser and Register attempted to identify the
guilty parties:
...The majority of them are probably negroes, 
debauched by association with the viler strata 
of the white population, but there must be 
white men actively engaged in the ijigfarious 
schemes which are in operation,...
To aid the city police in patrolling the city, Slough 
organized groups of citizens to guard against further 
mischief. For the most part, the city authorities pre­
vented any similar occurrances.^
Although a detailed analysis of the effect of the 
war on slavery in Mobile is beyond the scope of this 
study, a few comments on the institution seem appropriate. 
By 1860 the percentage of slaves in the Mobile population 
had declined to just over twenty-five percent. Slave 
women outnumbered slave men. A majority of the "heads of 
families" in the city owned slaves but most owned only a 
small number of Negroes who performed domestic duties. 
Businesses or corporations owned the larger slaveholdings 
of the city. This, slavery in Mobile seemed a relatively 
benign institution with more contact between whites and 
blacks than occurred in the country. Certainly the white
^ Advertiser and Register, Oct. 25, 29, 1862. 
17Ibid., Oct. 29, 1862.
18populace did not seem hostile toward the slaves. A 
cursory examination of the Mobile newspapers reveals 
little evidence that slavery in the city changed signif­
icantly during the war. Certainly no one protested or 
expressed fears about the large numbers of slave laborers 
in the city working on the fortifications. Unrest among 
or crimes committed by slaves does not appear to have 
increased noticeably. A few violent crimes against 
whites and incidents such as the incendiarism mentioned 
above did occur but were exceptions to the norm. The
real changes in white-black relations came after the war, 
19not during it.
Throughout most of the war, the civilian population 
of Mobile evaded large outbreaks of disease such as had 
happened before 1860. The efforts at keeping the city 
clean undoubtedly contributed to holding down disease.
A smallpox epidemic threatened to erupt in late March 
1864, however. When the authorities discovered the
18Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities; The 
South, 1820-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1964) , 18, 20, 21, 22-23, 24; Eighth Census of the United 
States, 1860, Population (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office^ 1864) , 8-10; Isbell, "A Social and 
Economic History of Mobile," 134-35.
19Jane [Covington?] to Mrs. ----- Young, Jan. 5,
1864, in William R. Hansford Papers, 1861-1865, Duke 
University Library; Isbell, "A Social and Economic His­
tory of Mobile," 134-35.
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prevalency of the disease, it was confined primarily to 
Negroes in the city. The Advertiser and Register urged 
its readers to seek vaccination. Mr. O. Kratz, Superin­
tendent of Vaccination, opened an office on Jackson 
Street to innoculate any persons who presented them­
selves to him. He gave vaccinations between the hours of 
9:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. without charge. Several days 
after the opening of this office, the Advertiser and Reg­
ister renewed its appeal to the people to take advantage
of the free vaccinations. The editorial stated that
20smallpox appeared "very prevalent." Apparently
Mobile's citizens heeded the newspaper's advice, because
in mid-April it reported that the smallpox "is rapidly
disappearing, and that the alarm which prevailed a few
21weeks ago has subsided."
Both civilians and soldiers found good hospital 
facilities to treat diseases and wounds. The five hos­
pitals in operation when the war began continued to serve 
throughout the war. In the course of the conflict, as 
the number of sick and wounded began to grow, the Confed­
erate authorities constructed or transformed older 
buildings into at least seven new hospitals for soldiers 
and sailors. The United States Marine Hospital opened on
20
Advertiser and Register, Mar. 25, 29, 1864. 
21Ibid., Apr. 13, 1864.
205
November 3, 1861, under the name Ross Hospital after 
appropriation by Confederate authorities. This facility, 
one of the finest hospitals in the South, could accommo­
date 250 patients. In November 1863 the city authorities 
turned over the City Hospital to the Confederate govern­
ment to serve as a military hospital. The military set 
aside part of the building, now called Cantey Hospital, 
for civilians. The Sisters of Charity supervised the 
wards of the hospital and acted in such capacities as 
druggists and stewards. The three remaining pre-war
22hospitals in Mobile remained for use of civilians only.
In July 1862 the medical director at Mobile estab­
lished a convalescent hospital at Spring Hill near the 
city. Between 70 and 100 soldiers could receive care at 
the facility. One soldier reported that the food at 
Spring Hill consisted primarily of "poor beef, corn meal,
coffee, grits, sour bread, small piece of bacon twict
23[sic] a week, also some pudding...." This soldier 
did have one complaint about his quarters:
22W. J. Donald (ed.), "Alabama Confederate Hospit­
als," Alabama Review, XV (1962), 275-77; Mobile Army 
Argus and Crisis, Jan. 7, 1865; Cumming, Kate, 255-56.
23Para III, Special Order No. 153, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama and West Florida, July 1, 1862, 
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and 
West Florida; Abram M. Glazener to wife, Apr. 27, 1863, 
in Glazener Papers, Civil War Times Illustrated Collec­
tion, United States Military History Institute,
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...There is one thing I have got acquainted 
with since I have bin [sic] here that is 
lice....It is a hard matter to keep clean of 
them unless you shift your clothes twist 
[sic] a week. They are in the bed clothes.
You are ||rtain [sic] to katch [sic] 
them....
The blockade and the needs of other hospitals limited the 
supply of medicine available for the Spring Hill and 
other facilities at Mobile, but the doctors had access to 
some medical supplies. In many cases doctors and citi­
zens used home remedies more often than they would have 
in normal times.
As stated, the military increased the number of hos­
pitals at Mobile as the war progressed. On May 14, 1863, 
a hotel on Royal Street became the S . P . Moore Hospital. 
The Soldiers Rest Hospital opened on July 18, 1863, and 
one year later the medical authorities converted it into 
a hospital for officers only. Several days after the 
opening of this latter facility, the Nott Hospital began 
receiving patients. Mobile's medical staff converted the 
Kennedy House Hotel into the Heustis Hospital October 18,
1864. On November 23, 1864, the Mansion House Hotel 
became Nidelet Hospital, the last medical facility
Carlisle Barracks, Pa., hereinafter cited as Glazener 
Papers.
24Glazener to R. M. Shuford, May 24, 1863, Glazener
Papers.
^Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags, 303-304.
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established by the military in Mobile. Both of the for­
mer hotels required extensive cleaning and renovation but
2 6became excellent hospitals. I have mentioned the hos­
pital constructed for Negro laborers working on Mobile's 
fortifications. In December 1864 an inspector made the 
following report on this facility:
...I have never seen any place in which Neg­
roes are congregated which presented the 
degree of cleanliness and neatness comparable 
with this establishment. The wards, out 
buildings, kitchen, bathroom, even the yard 
was policg^ as well as it was possible to 
do it... .
The charity of the women of Mobile is again apparent 
in the aid they gave to the patients in the military 
hospitals. In 1862 a group of women formed the Ladies' 
Supply Society. They had as their goal the furnishing of 
food to the soldiers and sailors in Ross Hospital. Some 
of the members of this society took on additional duties 
such as cleaning floors, acting as practical nurses, and 
making beds. Dr. Josiah C. Nott, Medical Director of the 
Department of the Gulf, praised the society for its many 
good works. Another organization, the Soldiers' Friend 
Society, performed services at Moore Hospital similar to
2 6Army Argus and Crisis, Jan. 7, 1865; Donald (ed.), 
"Alabama Confederate Hospitals," 275-76; Cumming, Kate, 
255.
27Donald (ed.), "Alabama Confederate Hospitals,"
277.
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those performed by the Ladies' Supply Society at Ross 
Hospital. One Mobile lady used her own money to estab­
lish and equip a convalescent hospital on the grounds of 
her home. Not only did she set up this facility, but she
also spent many hours personally tending to the sick and 
2 8wounded.
The war had a tremendous impact on Mobile's economy. 
Normal economic activities were interrupted and curtailed, 
prices rose drastically, and supply shortages existed.
All three of these problems were interrelated and worked 
to make life difficult for all segments of the city's 
population. As a port city, Mobile's economy was based 
on her merchant community. The blockade, the diversion 
of goods to the armies, and the use of river steamers and 
railroads by the military all reduced the trade the mer­
chants had enjoyed prior to 1860. From time to time 
exhausted stocks or exhorbitantly priced existing sup­
plies forced stores to close. About the only time the 
merchants could do a booming business came following the 
arrival of a blockade runner bearing luxury food and 
clothing items. Naturally the situation worsened as the 
war progressed and as blockade running came to an end.
2 8Selma Morning Reporter, Feb. 24, 1863; Advertiser 
and Register, Oct. 11, 1863; William P. Fidler, Augusta 
Evans Wilson, 1835-1900; A Biography (University, Ala.: 
University of Alabama Press, 1951), 91.
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Mobile never fully recovered from the effects of the war
and never again acted as an important port as she had
29done before 1860.
Adapting to the situation as well as possible,
Mobile's civilians.found substitutes for items in short
supply. Homespun replaced finer fabrics in women's
clothes. Many people dyed old clothes to make them
appear new. Referring to the clothing situation, one
Mobilian wrote:
...All the rag-bags have been emptied, and 
dresses turned and cut into all kinds of 
shapes. Any and every thing is the fashion; 
nothing is lost. The old scraps of worsted 
and flannel are carefully unraveled, carded, 
and spun, for making capes and nubies. The 
fact is, it is a kind of disgrace to have 
plenty of clothes. If any one has on a new 
silk or calico dress, kid gloves, or any 
thing that is foreign, they have^to give an 
account of how they came by it.
Both women and men wore hats made from palmetto. Some
men sported suits made of a mixture of cotton and coe
hair, a combination said to have been waterproof. From
time to time wood became scarce, and the military
impressed existing supplies. When lighting oil and
29Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags, 306-307; W. W. 
Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States (London: 
Richard Bentley, 1863), 110; Mumford Diary, Aug. 13,
1864; Isbell, "A Social and Economic History of Mobile," 
passim.
■^Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags, 306; Cumming, 
Kate, 189, 248-49.
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candles became hard to acquire, many people burned pitch
31pine knots to provide illumination.
Prices for all goods rose in Mobile as they did 
elsewhere in the Confederacy due to shortages and the 
decreasing value of Confederate currency. Speculators 
often took advantage of the situation to buy large quan­
tities of supplies and sell them at exorbitant prices.
In March 1862 a group of citizens asked General Samuel 
Jones to establish a tariff of prices to keep the specu­
lators from asking too much for the goods they had for 
sale. Jones promptly established the tariff they had 
recommended and prohibited large sales of foodstuffs to 
one individual or company. At first the Advertiser and 
Register protested Jones1 order as being unfair to the 
majority of honest merchants of the city, but, when the
general apprised the paper of the intent of the order, it
32came out m  full support of his action.
31Mumford Diary, Jan. 13, 1864; Gumming, Kate, 88, 
249; Mobile The Home Journal, May 27, Sept. 23, 1864.
32Jacob Faser to Louisa Mentzmger Faser, Nov. 10, 
1861, quoted in "Letters of Jacob Faser, Confederate 
Armorer," Alabama Historical Quarterly, III (1941) , 197; 
W. A. Smith, William H. Ross, and B. Tardy (?) to Jones, 
Mar. 24, 1862, in General Samuel Jones Papers, 1861-1865, 
RG 109, National Archives; General Order No. 20, Head­
quarters Army of Mobile, Mar. 24, 1862, Special and Gen­
eral Orders, Army of Mobile; Daily Tribune, Apr. 4, 1862; 
Jones to Shorter, Mar. 25, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg 
Papers, Western Reserve; Advertiser and Register, Jan.
18, Mar. 26, 30, 1862.
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Once the crisis which had precipitated Jones' order 
had passed, the price tariff was abandoned. Later in the 
war the Alabama state government regulated prices of food­
stuffs through a commission. Actually none of these 
efforts succeeded because prices continued to go up for 
most items. A currency bill passed by the Confederate 
Congress in February 1864 with the intention of increas­
ing the value of currency had the effect of raising
33prices alarmingly in Mobile. Several examples will 
sufficiently demonstrate the rise in prices. Molasses 
sold for twenty-eight cents a gallon early in the war but 
had gone up to seven dollars a gallon by the fall of
1863. Valued at fifty cents a pound in November 1861, 
butter increased in value to five dollars a pound by June
1864. Perhaps the greatest rise occurred in the price of
flour, which went from forty-five dollars a barrel in
October 1862 to four hundred dollars a barrel in January 
341865. Under these circumstances, it is not difficult 
3 3Maury to Seddon, Feb. 2, 1864, Telegrams Received, 
Secretary of War; Seddon to Maury, Feb. 5, 1864, Tele­
grams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 154;
E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 
1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1950), 160; Lieutenant James P. Butler to Aunt, Mar. 21, 
1864, in Thomas Butler Family Papers, Louisiana State 
University Department of Archives and Manuscripts.
34Faser to Louisa, Nov. 10, 1861, quoted in "Letters 
of Jacob Fase," 197; Richard Spencer to Mrs. A. R. Hol­
combe, Sept. 19, 18 63, June 2, 1864, quoted in Mrs. Sar­
gent Pitcher, Jr. (ed.), "Spencer-Holcombe Letters
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to understand why many people in Mobile found it impos­
sible to furnish their families with needed food items 
even when those items were readily available.
Food shortages in Mobile during the Civil War are 
more easily understood by looking at the city's antebel­
lum food supply. The relatively large population of the 
city and county meant that the surrounding countryside 
could not supply the needs of the people. No large food 
surpluses existed in the interior of the state for trans­
port to Mobile. About the only item that did reach the 
city from the interior in significant amounts was corn. 
Mobile's major food imports--pork, wheat and flour, corn, 
beef, and whiskey— came through New Orleans. The coastal 
trade route from the Crescent City became so well 
developed that western produce entered Mobile very 
easily. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the Fed­
eral blockade cut off this coastal trade in the summer of 
1861. This forced Mobile to look to Alabama and Missis­
sippi for her food supplies, but the plantations and 
farms of these states could not furnish pork, beef, corn, 
and wheat in quantities sufficient to meet the city's 
average annual consumption of those items. That the
Written in the 1860s," Louisiana Genealogical Register, 
XIX (Mar. 1972), 45, 46; Corsan, Two Months in the Con­
federate States, 115; Mumford Diary, Jan. 19, 1864; 
Daily Tribune, Oct. 23, 1864; Advertiser and Register, 
Jan. 29, 1865.
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population of Mobile ate as well as they did is a tribute
35to the merchants, planters, and farmers of Alabama.
The people of Mobile did not always find necessary 
supplies available. One of the more severe crises 
occurred in the winter of 1862 and early spring of 1863. 
On December 12, 1862, General Pemberton issued an order 
prohibiting the transportation of corn and fodder out of 
Mississippi. The necessity of supplying his army and the 
activities of speculators brought about this order. 
Because Mobile had drawn much of its corn from the coun­
ties of northern Mississippi via the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad, the city stood to suffer as a result of the 
order. The Advertiser and Register quickly asked that 
Pemberton or higher authorities modify or rescind the 
order. At the same time Mayor Slough and the president 
of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad sent protests to
35Sam Bowers Hilliard, Hog Meat and Hoecake: Food
Supply in the Old South, 1840-1860 (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1972), 107-108, 200, 208, 209. 
Professor Hilliard estimates average annual consumption 
of the four major food items in the diet of antebellum 
Southerners as follows: pork, 150 pounds; beef, 25 to
30 pounds; corn, 13 bushels; and wheat, 2 bushels. Ibid., 
105, 130, 157, 230. A survey of fragmentary import sta­
tistics for Mobile found in extant newspapers reveals 
that not enough of the four named foods reached the city 
to meet Hilliard's estimates for consumption, especially 
in view of the needs of the military and the increased 
population because of refugees.
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Pemberton, General Johnston, and the War Department hoping
3 6to open the flow of supplies to the city.
Both the War Department and Buckner at Mobile refer­
red the protests to Johnston, who was away in Tennessee 
and preferred not to interfere in such a distant 
situation. He suggested to Mayor Slough and Governor 
Shorter that Mobile look to southern Alabama for her sup­
plies in the future. In view of Johnston's inactivity,
Secretary of War Seddon suggested that Pemberton and
37Buckner try to work out the problem together.
Pemberton continued to insist, however, that Mobile get 
her supplies by way of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers. 
His intransigence prompted Buckner to issue orders for­
bidding the shipment of supplies and provisions from his 
department. He also authorized his chief of subsistence 
to impress cattle and other stores held by speculators.
Vicksburg Daily Whig, Jan. 10, 18 63; Milton Brown 
to Buckner, Jan. 9, 1863, O.R., XV, 937; Johnston to 
Shorter, Feb. 8, 1863, ibid., 971; Campbell to Pemberton, 
Feb. 10, 1863, Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap.
IX, Vol. 34, p. 457; Campbell to Major L. Mims, Feb. 11, 
1863, ibid., 458.
37Buckner to [Johnston], Jan. 12, 1863, with endorse­
ments by Johnston, Jan. 17, 1863, and Pemberton, Jan. 18, 
1863, O.R., XV, 938; Johnston to Shorter, Feb. 8, 1863, 
ibid., 971; Seddon to Johnston, Feb. 14, 1863, ibid.,
XXIV, Pt. 3, p. 625; Seddon to Colonel W. M. Wadley,
Mar. 23, 1863, Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap.
IX, Vol. 35, p. 1.
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At the same time, Buckner attempted to reassure the public
as to his intentions:
It is not the policy of the Commanding 
General to make seizures of private property, 
or to prevent shipments from one portion of 
the District to another. Supplies evidently 
intended for private consumption will not be 
interferred with while in transitu within 
this District.
The people of Mobile really suffered the brunt of
this conflict between military authorities, although
some evidence exists that they found certain items in
39plentiful supply. To help subsist the populace, the 
city's military commanders relaxed restrictions on fish­
ing around Mobile Bay. Fishermen and oystermen normally 
could not go outside the confines of the bay, but Gen­
eral Mackall issued an order allowing them to go up to 
three miles west of Grant's Pass in search of their 
catches. All boats taking advantage of the order had to 
register with the army and comply with any regulations
3 8Pemberton to Seddon, Feb. — , 1863, quoted in 
Seddon to Johnston, Feb. 14, 1863, O.R., XXIV, Pt. 3, 
p. 625; Special Order No. 343 (?), District of the Gulf, 
Feb. 14, 1863, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb.
19, 1863; Major Samuel K. Hays to Captain W. H. Jemison, 
Feb. 20, 1863, O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 693; Special 
Order No. 11, Office of Chief Quartermaster, Feb. 27, 
1863, ibid.; General Order No. 129, District of the Gulf, 
Mar. 15, 1863, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Mar.
20, 1863.
39Daily Tribune, Mar. 23, 1863, quoted in Montgomery 
Daily Mail, Mar. 29, 1863; Vicksburg Daily Whig, Mar. 31, 
1863.
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established by the naval commander at Mobile. In response 
to his request, Buckner received permission from the War 
Department to sell excess military supplies at cost to 
the needy in times of scarcity. At least a few enter­
prising citizens found ways to get around Pemberton's 
order. One man bought a quantity of bacon in Mississippi 
and devised an ingenious method of transporting it to 
Mobile without having it confiscated. He bought a six- 
foot pine box similar to those used to transport the 
bodies of soldiers to their families. Filling the "cof­
fin" with the bacon, he marked the box "John Shoat, 32nd 
Alabama Regiment, Mobile, Ala." A Montgomery newspaper
reported: "The shoat, or shoats, came to hand without
40trouble, and m  good order."
Perhaps the most noted response to the supply dif­
ficulties came in the formation of the Mobile Supply 
Association. A group of 74 prominent and wealthy gentle­
men joined together to organize the association and used 
their own money to finance it. The association had as 
its goal the purchase of supplies and the sale of them at 
cost to people in the city. By selling goods at cost 
these men could keep prices of all goods down to a
40Order No. 1, Mackall's Division, Feb. 21, 1863, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 25, 1863; Buck­
ner to Cooper, Mar. 20, 1863, Buckner Papers; Montgomery 
Daily Advertiser, Mar. 8, 1863.
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reasonable level. The Advertiser and Register urged 
other patriotic citizens to join the association so that 
its capital would increase and its operations could 
expand. At first the agents of the association worked 
only along the Alabama and Tombigbee river systems in 
collecting supplies. Association Secretary T. A. Hamilton 
appealled to Johnston to permit the purchase of corn in 
Mississippi and its shipment on the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad. Johnston approved the shipment of supplies for 
both the Supply Association and the Free Market. Eventu­
ally the organization had agents in many parts of the Con-
41federacy procuring necessities for Mobile's people.
The supply shortage came to a head in late March and 
early April 1863. The inability of the military command­
ers to settle the matter, newspaper editorials complain­
ing of the situation, and reports of signs reading "Bread 
or Peace" stuck on street corners in Mobile all prompted
41Advertiser and Register, Dec. 18, 1862; Daniel 
McNeill to Editors, Dec. 19, 1862, quoted in ibid., Dec. 
20, 1862; T. A. Hamilton to Johnston, Feb. 19, 1863, 
Letters and Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana; Campbell to Slough, Nov. 
3, 1863, Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 
35, p. 124; Campbell to Johnston, Nov. 3, 1863, ibid.,
125; Johnston to Campbell, Nov. 6, 1863, Johnston Papers; 
Johnston to Slough, Nov. 6, 1863, ibid.; Cumming, Kate, 
190; Peter Joseph Hamilton, A Little Boy in Confederate 
Mobile (Mobile: Colonial Mobile Book Shop, 1947), 12-13.
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42Seddon to act. He approved a plan which Colonel Lucius
B. Northup, Commissary General and head of the Subsis­
tence Department, had put forth. Northup's plan called 
for the creation of Chief Commissaries in each state to 
supervise the collection, storage, and distribution of 
supplies. In informing Buckner of his decision, Seddon 
wrote:
...The course which under the circumstances I 
sought to adopt is what appears to me under 
any but very exceptional conditions the more 
regular and judicious. It is to confine each 
Commander, to subsidiary operations in obtain­
ing supplies, to his own Department and to 
require of the Commissary General through the 
Bureau officers and agents to be active in 
all, collecting supplies, accumulating at 
Depots and preparing to distribute and meet 
requisitions from the various Armies accord­
ing to their respective needs....
Northup's plan, the activities of the Mobile Supply Asso­
ciation, and improved crop harvests in Alabama eased 
Mobile's supply difficulties considerably.
The "bread riot" of September 4, 1863, vividly 
demonstrated that some of the people of Mobile continued
42 "Alabama," The American Annual Cyclopedia and 
Register of Important Events of the Year 1863 (New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1865), III, 6; Vicksburg Daily Whig, 
Mar. 24, 1863; Dargan to [Seddon], Mar. 29, 1863, O.R.r 
LII, Pt. 2, p. 448.
43Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply (Durham,
N. C.: Duke University Press, 1969) , 84; Seddon to Buck­
ner, Apr. 4, 1863, Letters Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. 
IX, Vol. 10, pp. 391-92.
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to suffer from shortages of food and other supplies. On 
the morning of that day, several hundred poor women, 
armed with hatchets, hammers, brooms, and axes, gathered 
on the Spring Hill Road. Carrying banners reading "Bread 
or Blood" and "Bread and Peace," they marched two-by-two 
down Dauphin Street into the city. Thousands of specta­
tors watched as the women broke into stores, took out 
food and clothing, and distributed their loot amongst 
their number. Available sources indicate that Jews owned 
most of the stores broken into, indicating a prejudice 
against that class, and that most of the onlookers sym­
pathized with the plight of these women. Maury called 
out the 17th Alabama Regiment to put down the riot, but 
the men of that unit refused to take action. The failure 
of the military to stop the women left the whole matter 
in the hands of the civil authorities. Mayor Slough made 
a speech promising to meet the needs of the rioters if 
they would disperse. A witness related the results of 
his effort:
...[the speech] had the desired effect of dis­
banding the Amazonian phalanx and sending the 
women to their houses, well satisfied with the 
result of their foray....
44New Orleans Times, Sept. 21, 1863; Colonel Samuel
E. Hunter to Stella Bradley Taylor Hunter, Sept. 4, 1863, 
in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers, Louisiana State Univer­
sity Department of Archives and Manuscripts; Orear to 
Carrie Orear, Sept. 5, 1863, Weaver Collection; Rix, 
Incidents of Life, [9].
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Slough quickly followed up on his promise to the
"bread rioters." On the same day that the riot occurred,
the mayor addressed an appeal to the citizens of Mobile
to come to the aid of the needy women:
...Their own wants and those of their child­
ren are calculated to touch the hardest and 
least sympathetic heart. Let us then, my 
fellow citizens, see that these worthy 
objects of charity are placed above the reach 
of absolute destitution....
Slough asked the people to contribute monetary subscrip­
tions to be used to purchase food and clothing for those 
needing assistance. To collect the money and distribute 
the supplies, he appointed a fourteen-man Special Relief 
Committee. The committee then appointed a special agent 
to purchase goods from city factories for delivery to the 
poor. They also solicited contributions of money or 
material suitable for clothing. Selecting other citizens 
to form the Citizens' Relief Association and to aid in 
its activities, the Special Relief Committee surveyed the 
various wards of the city to locate poor families and 
determine their needs. In the following months, the com­
mittee succeeded in alieviating most of the distressing
46conditions afflicting Mobile's poor.
45Advertiser and Register, Sept. 5, 1863.
46Ibid., Sept. 14, 1863.
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Supply shortages continued until the end of the war, 
but nothing like the two crises just described occurred 
again. Scarcities of meat existed during various 
periods, while at other times vegetables and other items 
became hard to obtain. A scarcity of money or interrup­
tions in the normal transportation system usually created 
these temporary shortages. In January 1865, for 
instance, the military impressed most of the river 
steamers to transport its supplies, thus making it dif­
ficult to bring in goods intended for the citizens of 
Mobile. When the Federal fleet occupied the bay, its 
presence deprived Mobile of one of its luxury foods—  
oysters. Oystermen could bring in a few of the shellfish 
from the upper regions of the bay, but high prices kept 
these few delicacies out of the hands of most people.
The enemy occupation of the bay also resulted in almost 
completely cutting off coffee imports. These shortages 
affected morale as well as stomachs:
...some who did not touch it [coffee] before 
the war, talk gravely about its loss as if 
their very existence depended upon it, a n d ^  
indeed they are quite melancholy about it.
Mumford Diary, Feb. 16, 1864; Daily Tribune, June 
5, 1864; Advertiser and Register, Jan” 29, 1865; Cumming, 
Kate, 248.
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CHAPTER IX 
"...PROFITS EQUAL THEIR RISK..."
Although Mobile occupied a strategic position in the 
Confederacy because of her railroad connections, her pri­
mary strategic importance lay in her status as a major 
port for blockade runners. New Orleans outranked Mobile 
as a port early in the war, as she had before the war, 
but the fall of the Crescent City in April 1862 made 
Mobile the leading port on the Gulf. The vessels which 
ran the blockade in and out of Mobile took their cargoes 
to and from Havana, Cuba, the best base for this trade in 
the Gulf. The trip between Mobile and Havana took about 
three days if the runner encountered no problems. Taking 
out of Mobile primarily loads of cotton, the runners 
exchanged their cargoes for both military supplies and 
items for consumption by the civilian populace of the 
Gulf South. Running the blockade was very dangerous, but 
attempts to get by the blockading squadron increased as 
the war progressed. In speaking of the men who engaged 
in the trade, one author has written:
...Some of the blockade runners were patriots 
who wished to aid the Confederacy, but many 
were in the business only for iponey, and they 
made profits equal their risk.
"''Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign
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Blockade runners did not find Mobile an easy port 
to enter and leave. For one thing, access to the bay 
was limited and difficult. Three entrances to the bay 
which vessels might use existed. One of these was a 
westward approach near Dauphin Island known as the Peli­
can Channel, but its shallow draft precluded its use.
A second entrance, known as the Swash Channel, followed 
the shoreline from the east toward Fort Morgan. Although 
less than twelve feet deep at low tide, the runners used
it a great deal because once they had gotten into it, the
blockading fleet found it difficult to cut the runner out
from the fleet's normal station. The Main Channel
extended from near Fort Morgan five miles southward. At
%
the lower end of this channel stood a bar with twenty-one 
feet of water over it. Blockading vessels could station 
themselves at these three entrances and cover them very 
easily. Confederate field artillery could keep the 
blockaders far enough away from the Swash Channel to keep 
it open most of the time, but the Confederates could do 
nothing to protect the other channels. By stationing 
vessels near the bar in the Main Channel, the Federals 
could maintain the blockade "more effectually and by a
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1959), 251-52; Francis B. C. 
Bradlee, "Blockade Running During the Civil War," Essex 
Institute Historical Collections, LX (1924) , 167; Delaney, 
The Story of Mobile, 113-14.
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smaller force than at almost any other place of trade on 
the coast.
The shallow waters in and around Mobile Bay also 
created difficulties for blockade runners. In the bay 
itself the two anchorages used by vessels had little 
depth. Only twelve feet of water covered the anchorage 
near the city and eighteen to twenty feet that near Fort 
Morgan. This lack of deep water limited the blockade 
running fleet to light-draft sailing vessels for the most 
part during the early years of the war. These schooners 
and sloops had to depend on a fair wind to go in and out 
of the bay. Those steamers which did engage in the trade 
needed both fair wind and high tides for success. 
Naturally many of the sailing vessels and steamers pre­
sented no match for the much faster Federal blockaders.
By late 1863, however, new, light-draft, British-built 
steamers with engines designed for high speeds dominated 
the blockade runners. These British steamers made fre­
quent successful trips through the blockade. A con­
temporary observer noted that one of the vessels appeared
"in her voyages, almost as regular as a mail-packet in
3time of peace."
2James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), 132-34.
^Ibid., 132; Marcus W. Price, "Ships that Tested the 
Blockade of the Gulf Ports, 1861-1865," American Neptune,
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In presidential proclamations of April 19 and 27, 
1861, Abraham Lincoln established a blockade of the ports 
of the Confederacy from Texas to Virginia. The first 
Federal ship to appear off Mobile Bay was the steam fri­
gate Niagara. She arrived in the area during the first 
week of May 1861. Her patrol area consisted of the 
entire coast between Pensacola and the mouth of the 
Mississippi River, so she did not always stand off Mobile 
Bay during the month of May. The U.S.S. Powhatan assumed 
the duties of blockading Mobile Bay on May 26. When she 
arrived near the Main Channel, her crew observed a wel­
coming signal on the flagstaff of Fort Morgan. The Con­
federate garrison had raised the United States flag, 
union down, on the flagstaff under the Confederate flag. 
To the editors of the Daily Advertiser, the incident 
seemed a "Joke on Lincoln," but the arrival of the Pow­
hatan marked the permanent establishment of the blockade 
4
of Mobile.
XI (1951), 263; Lieutenant Colonel Stewart to Julia 
Stewart, Apr. 21, 1863, Stewart Letters; Victor Von 
Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence (London: E. & F.
N, Spon, 1868), 103.
4
James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1769-1897, 10 vols. 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1896-
1899), VI, 14-15; Gideon Welles to Captain William W.
McKean, May 4, 1861, O.R.N., IV, 155; ------ Zantzinger
to Leroy P. Walker, May 8 , 1861, ibid., XVI, 820;
Abstract log of the U.S.S. Powhatan, Apr. 5-June 3, 1861, 
ibid., IV, 208; McKean to Welles, May 27, 1861, ibid.,
182; Daily Advertiser, May 28, 1861.
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The Federals gave all of the ships then at Mobile 
approximately a month to leave the port with their car­
goes before a rigid blockade became effective. Between 
May 4 and 27, thirteen vessels cleared the harbor, most 
of them British ships bound for Liverpool. These vessels 
carried on them 28,182 bales of cotton weighing 
13,507,240 pounds and 7,555 barrels of turpentine and 
resin. As the "last day of grace" neared, the Acting 
British Consul at Mobile, James Magee, arranged with the 
commander of the Powhatan to allow a tugboat to pull to 
sea the two remaining British ships. Having secured this 
authority, Magee contracted with the captain of the steam 
tug Baltic to tow out the two vessels. These ships 
sailed out from the bay on May 31, both having been 
boarded by the commander of the Niagara, which had 
relieved the Powhatan three days previously. From May 31 
onward any vessel attempting to enter or leave Mobile Bay
would be subject to seizure and the confiscation of her
. . 5cargo by Federal authorities.
5
Lord Lyons to James Magee, May 8 , 1861, quoted m  
J. Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy 
(New York: Rogers and Sherwood, 1887) , 437-38; Record
Book of Exports of Domestic Produce in Confederate Ves­
sels and Foreign Vessels, 1861-1875, passim, RG 36, 
National Archives; Magee to Officer Commanding U. S. 
Squadron off Mobile, May 27, 1861, O.R.N., IV, 185; 
Lieutenant David D. Porter to Magee, May 27, 1861, ibid.; 
William Rix, Incidents of Life in a Southern City During 
the War (Mobile: IbervTTle Historical Society Papers,
1865), [6-7], McKean to Welles, June 4, 1861, O.R.N., IV, 
196; Abstract log of the U.S.S. Niagara, May 5-June 7, 
1861, ibid., 206.
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From early June 1861 until the end of the year, lit­
tle activity took place in and out of Mobile except for 
some coastal trade with New Orleans. Even this coastal
g
trade had ended by June 24. The Confederate government 
had not yet arranged to receive supplies from Europe, so 
no English or other foreign ships attempted to enter Con­
federate ports during much of 1861. In fact, the first
blockade runner to arrive in the Confederacy reached
7Savannah, Georgia, m  September. Besides this general 
lack of blockade running, the paucity of potential cargo 
for export contributed to the inactivity at Mobile. 
Receipts of cotton from the interior fell off dramati­
cally once the war started. The blockade represented one 
reason for the low cotton imports. Of greater importance, 
cotton factors in Mobile urged planters not to ship any 
cotton to the city. The Advertiser and Register, sup­
porting the factors, asserted that the blockade prevented 
it from being shipped and that stockpiles of cotton would
g
Captain Thomas 0. Selfridge to Flag Officer William 
Mervine, Aug. 31, 1861, O.R.N., XVI, 647; Price, "Ships 
that Tested the Blockade of the Gulf Ports," 267-69.
7
Frank E. Vandiver (ed.), Confederate Blockade Run­
ning Through Bermuda, 1861-1865 (Austin; The University 
of Texas Press, 1947), xxv.
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prove "a strong temptation to the enemy to organize land
O
and naval armaments for attacking" Mobile.
With the start of the new year (1862) blockade run­
ners began attempting to sneak in and out of Mobile Bay. 
Most of these vessels successfully eluded the few block- 
aders stationed near the bay. A few, however, were not 
so fortunate. On January 20 the Andrieta tried to get 
into Mobile, but the U.S.S. R. R. Cuyler sighted her.
The captain of the Andrieta raised the British colors, 
ran his ship ashore east of Fort Morgan, and ordered his 
men to abandon her. Federal boarding parties reached the 
Andrieta and secured ropes to her. Shortly afterwards 
Captain William Cottrill's company of mounted scouts 
reached the beach and opened a heavy fire on the Fed- 
erals, driving them away from the beached vessel. The 
enemy boarders had done their job, however, and with the 
rise in the tide hauled the ship off as a prize. The 
British consul at Mobile attempted fruitlessly to per­
suade the commander of the Federal squadron that the
9
Andrieta had not intended to run the blockade.
O
"Weekly Receipts of Cotton at Mobile" as reported 
in the Advertiser and Register, June-September 1861; 
ibid., Aug. 30, 1861.
9
Bragg to Cooper, Dec. 31, 1861, Telegrams Received, 
Secretary of War; Colonel William L. Powell to Captain 
D. E. Huger, Jan. 21, 1862, O.R., VI, 498-99; Lieutenant 
Francis Winslow to McKean, Jan. 23, 1862, O.R.N., XVII, 
59-60; Magee to Commander U. S. Fleet off Mobile,
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Official Confederate policy on blockade running out 
of Mobile began taking shape in the spring of 1862.
Three or four businessmen at Mobile approached General 
Sam Jones and his successor in command at Mobile, General 
Butler, about taking cotton to Havana so that they could 
use it to purchase military supplies for the Confederacy. 
Both Jones and Butler expressed reluctance to grant them 
permission. Jones did allow a few small cargoes to go 
out, but under restrictions "requiring that the parties 
interested, the Captain and Crew, shall be loyal and 
indentified [sic] in interest with the Confederate 
States and that the return cargoes shall as far as prac­
ticable be composed of munitions of war."^ The Confed­
erate Navy Department signed contracts with two or three 
individuals to supply munitions to the government after 
taking cotton out of Mobile. Secretary of War Randolph 
encouraged Jones to allow blockade running on the grounds 
that it was "good policy to exchange produce for arms and
Jan. 23, 1862, ibid., 62; Captain L. M. Powell to 
Magee, Jan. 24, 1862, ibid., 63; Scharf, History of the 
Confederate States Navy, 536.
^Butler to Bragg, Mar. 29, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg 
Papers, Western Reserve; Butler to Bragg, Mar. 31, 1862, 
ibid.; Jones to Randolph, Apr. 4, 1862, Telegrams 
Received, Secretary of War; Jones to Cooper, Apr. 5, 
1862, Letterbook, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
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munitions of war" even though "the practice is liable to
great abuse and should not be allowed indiscriminately.""^ 
The dash of the Confederate raider Florida into the
bay provided one of the most dramatic incidents of the 
blockade of Mobile. She had only recently entered the 
Confederate service when her captain, John Newland Maf- 
fitt, ran her into the bay on the afternoon of September 
4, 1862. Maffitt intended sailing his ship from Havana 
to Mobile so that he could enlist a full crew and procure 
complete equipment to fire her guns. Both he and his 
undersized crew suffered from an attack of yellow fever. 
When the Florida received her cannons from the British 
at Nassau, she had not gotten the rammers, sights, 
sponges, and other items necessary to work the guns. In 
order to get by the four Union blockaders guarding the 
entrances to the harbor, Maffitt decided to fly the Brit­
ish colors and depend on the Florida's resemblance to a
British warship to deceive the enemy. It seemed a des-
12perate gamble but one Maffitt had to take.
"^Randolph to Jones, Mar. 26, 1862, Letters Sent, 
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 6 , p. 217; Randolph to 
Jones, Apr. 4, 1862, Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War, 
Chap. IX, Vol. 34, p. 171; Randolph to Jones, Apr. 14, 
1862, Letters Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 6 , 
pp. 329-30.
12Extracts from the journal of Lieutenant J. N. 
Maffitt, May 4-December 31, 1862, O.R.N., I, 766; Edward 
Boykin, Sea Devil of the Confederacy (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls Co., 1959), 109, 116-22.
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Three Union blockaders guarded the main ship chan­
nel into Mobile Bay. As the Florida approached, Com­
mander George H. Preble of the ten-gun, steam sloop 
Oneida remained unaware that Maffitt's cruiser was any­
where in his vicinity. After successfully bluffing his 
way past the two other enemy vessels, Maffitt steamed 
directly for the Oneida. As the Florida began to steam 
past the latter ship, Preble fired a shot across her bow. 
He then ordered a full broadside when the Florida did not 
slow down. Soon the two other Federal gunboats opened 
fire on the Florida. Maffitt's ruse had paid off, 
however. His vessel ran successfully past her enemies, 
and her superior speed kept her ahead of her pursuers. 
Despite her lead, however, a hail of shell and shrapnel 
struck the Florida. The chase lasted for two hours. 
Maffitt, so ill that he had to be lashed to the rail, 
finally took his battered vessel under the guns of Fort 
Morgan, where he received a greeting of a twenty-one gun 
salute and the cheers of the garrison. Preble received 
no cheers. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles relieved 
him of command and dismissed him from the service. The 
Navy Department later restored his rank and returned him
232
to duty, but not until 1872 did a court of inquiry clear
13Preble of blame for the escape of the Florida.
After entering the bay, the Florida remained in 
quarantine for two weeks. She then steamed up to the 
city to undergo repairs. Maffitt began to recruit his 
new crew and to equip his vessel fully for service. By 
early January 1863 Maffitt and the Florida appeared ready 
to go to sea. The weather did not favor the Florida's 
exit until January 15. On that day a gale began blowing 
from the north. The Florida started out about 2:30 on 
the morning of the sixteenth. Seven Federal warships 
waited for her to come out. Under the cover of a heavy 
mist, the Florida succeeded in passing five of the enemy 
vessels before they discovered her. When Maffitt real­
ized that they had seen his ship, he ordered all sails 
raised. The gale winds drove her forward at fourteen 
knots. Only one Federal vessel possessed speed enough 
to try to catch the Florida, and she chased the Confed­
erate cruiser for three hours, when the Federals lost 
sight of their prey and returned to the blockading 
squadron. Maffitt once again had eluded the enemy and
13Commander George H. Preble to Farragut, Oct. 10, 
1862, O.R.N., I, 436-40; [Susan G. Perkins (arranger 
& ed.)T, Letters of Capt. Geo. Hamilton Perkins, U.S.N. 
(Concord, N. H.: Ira C. Evans, 1886), 102-103; Boykin,
Sea Devil of the Confederacy, 122-31; Extracts from test­
imony taken before a court of inquiry held April 20,
1872, O.R.N., I, 460-68.
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embarked on a notable career of destroying enemy
commerce. After the war, Admiral David D. Porter wrote
of the entire incident:
...His [Maffitt's] being permitted to escape 
into Mobile Bay, and then out again, was the 
greatest example of blundering committed 
throughout the war....
The success of the Florida in running the blockade
at Mobile graphically demonstrates the inefficiency of
the blockade there during 1862. An Englishman who
visited the city in the fall of that year reported:
...The people of Mobile seem to drive a 
thriving trade with Havannah by running the 
blockade— their swift, well-handled steamej§3 
going in and out just when they please....
Even some of the blockaders recognized the weakness of
their efforts to guard the bay. A frustrated sailor
aboard the steamer Susquehanna implied in a letter to a
northern newspaper that many blockade runners were being
allowed to escape and stated: "If there be a case for
judicial and executive investigation it is here at this
14Extracts from the journal of Maffitt, O.R.N., I, 
767-69; Extracts from the journal of Lieut. John N. 
Maffitt, Jan. 13-Apr. 30, 1863, ibid., II, 667-68; 
Commander George F. Emmons to Commodore R. B. Hitchcock, 
Mar. 12, 1863, ibid., 30-31; Boykin, Sea Devil of the 
Confederacy, 132-40; David D. Porter, The Naval History 
of the Civil War (New York: The Sherman Publishing Co.,
1883T7 627 t
15W. W. Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1863) , *114-15.
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post of the Gulf squadron, and it should be inquired 
1 6into." Although no conspiracy existed, it is easy to
understand this Federal's feelings. Available reports on
arrivals and departures from Mobile during the year 1862
show that eighty-three percent of all attempts to run the
17blockade succeeded. The situation at Mobile typified 
the blockade elsewhere along the Southern coast. In his 
study of blockade running, Frank L. Owsley concluded: 
"...for the first year and a half the blockade was noth­
ing more than the plundering of neutral commerce en route 
to the Confederacy under the cover of a nominal 
blockade.
Opposition to running the blockade began to surface 
in Mobile in early 1863. Because of the potential pro­
fits in blockade running, owners of various types of 
vessels prepared to take their ships out with loads of 
cotton. The Committee of Safety wrote to Governor Shorter 
to express their concern about owners of six river and bay
16New York Herald, Feb. 26, 1863.
17Information on the various arrivals and departures 
can be found in Record Book of Exports..., 1861-1875;
Entry of Merchandise, Mobile, 1861-1865, RG 36, National 
Archives; Abstracts of Import Duties, Mobile, 1861-1865,
RG 36, National Archives; Bureau of Customs Cargo Mani­
fests, Mobile, 1861-1865, RG 36, National Archives;
O.R.N., XVII, XVIII, XIX, passim; Price, "Ships That 
Tested the Blockade...," American Neptune, XII (1952), 
52-59.
18Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 232.
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steamers fitting out their vessels to run the blockade. 
These citizens felt that the vessels were essential to 
the transportation of supplies to the city from the 
interior and possibly to furnish engines and machinery 
for the construction of gunboats. If captured, the loss 
of these ships would prove a severe blow to the city and 
state. The committee asked Shorter to use his influence 
in Richmond to prevent these ships from going out.
Shorter did forward the committee's letter to Secretary 
of War Seddon and added his protest to theirs. Seddon 
replied that the Confederate government could not inter­
fere with "such legal use of the river steam-boats as the
19owners deem judicious." In answer to Shorter's 
expressed and the committee's veiled opposition to 
exporting cotton, Seddon stated that the Confederate Con­
gress had sanctioned blockade running and that the War
20Department agreed with that policy.
One Mobilian complained that the value of goods 
exported through the blockade far exceeded that of goods 
imported and that ships coming in brought too few
1 9Peter Hamilton to Shorter, Mar. 25, 1863, O.R., 4, 
II, 462; Shorter to Buckner, Mar. 28, 1863, ibid., ¥62- 
63; Shorter to Seddon, Mar. 28, 1863, ibid., 461; Seddon
to Shorter, Apr. 7, 1863, ibid., 472-73; Gift to ------ ,
June 10, 1863, quoted in Harriet Gift Castlen, Hope Bids 
Me Onward (Savannah, Ga.; Chatham Publishing Co., 1945) , 
T25.
9 0
Seddon to Shorter, Apr. 7, 1863, O.R., 4, II,
472-73.
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munitions and staple goods. Using statistics from the 
Customhouse, John E. Murrell informed the War Department 
that from May 1862 to April 1863 cotton worth $1,823,000 
had gone out of Mobile while the value of imported goods 
stood at only $208,168. This represented a balance of 
$1,614,832 against the Confederacy. Murrell, who had 
participated in blockade running himself, expressed 
special concern that runners brought too much liquor into 
Mobile. He suggested that the blockade trade, as then 
conducted, end or be regulated to benefit the war effort. 
To this end he recommended that the government order 
half of the space on all outgoing vessels reserved for 
government cotton and the same space on returning ships 
for government supplies. Finally, Murrell urged that the 
government exclude or severely limit importation of 
liquor. The authorities did not then want to enact the 
policies suggested by Murrell, but in March 1864 they did 
establish several blockade-running regulations similar to 
Murrell's recommendations. These new regulations derived
from a plan submitted by Murrell's friend Colin J.
21McRae of Mobile.
The Confederate government did begin taking steps to 
insure a more reliable flow of needed supplies. In early
21John E. Murrell to Colonel William L. Powell, Apr. 
30, 1863, Letters Received, Secretary of War; Vandiver 
(ed.), Confederate Blockade Running, xxxv-xxxvi.
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April 1863 Secretary of War Seddon authorized General 
Buckner to seize the iron, side-wheel steamer Alabama to 
run the blockade for the government. Once Buckner 
impressed the vessel, Seddon expected him to charter her 
to a party owning munitions in Havana to bring these sup­
plies back to Mobile. Seddon advised that if, on the 
return trip, additional room remained on the Alabama, 
the parties involved might include food supplies in her 
cargo. The government already successfully employed 
blockade runners at Wilmington, North Carolina. Seddon 
stated that running the Alabama directly under government 
control would prove more successful and economical than 
if she remained under private control because "the Govern­
ment can command more reliable Officers, the best pilots
22and secure facilities." The Alabama became a success­
ful blockade runner, making at least five trips during 
the summer of 1863.
Buckner's successor at Mobile, General Maury, 
attempted to continue and even strengthen Buckner's 
policy on blockade running. He contracted at least two 
other steamers, the Fanny and the Crescent, to bring in 
goods for the Confederate armies. The War Department 
authorized Maury to make similar arrangements with as
22Seddon to Buckner, Apr. 3, 1863, Letters Sent, 
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 10, pp. 390-91.
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23many shipowners as possible. Maury's efforts did not
always succeed, however. Some shipping firms did not
honor contracts signed by them, and Maury urged the War
Department to annul the contracts. He also reported:
...I believe that the people concerned in run­
ning the blockade will run their ships on 
Government account only on compulsion or in 
consideration of extraordinary benefits from 
the Government, and it is probable that owners 
will sell their ships in Havana, and that 
future vg^ages will be made under a foreign 
flag....
The solution to this problem, as Maury saw it, was for
the government to have its agents in Havana buy suitable
25boats and "take the business into its own hands."
Both the Alabama and the Fanny ran out of luck on 
September 12, 1863. On that day three Federal gunboats 
chased the Fanny as she tried to enter Mobile Bay. She 
attempted to escape into Pascagoula Bay, but her crew set 
her afire to prevent her capture and thus destroyed her 
cargo. The Alabama, too, attempted to get into the bay, 
but Federal blockaders discovered and chased her.
23Seddon to Maury, June 8 , 1863, Telegrams Sent, 
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 49; Maury to 
Seddon, June 13, 1863, Telegrams Received, Secretary of 
War; Maury to Seddon, June 24, 1863, ibid.; Maury to 
Cooper, July 16, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 112-13; 
Seddon to Maury, July 24, 1863, ibid., 121.
24Maury to Cooper, Sept. 28, 1863, O.R., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 531; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 28, 1863, ibid., 
518.
^Maury to Cooper, Aug. 28, 1863, ibid., 518.
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They finally captured her near the Chandeleur Islands and
took her to New Orleans. Maury informed Joe Johnston
that blockade running seemed temporarily at an end at
Mobile because of the loss of these two vessels: "They
may be regarded as the last of the blockade runners, as
2 6they were the best of them." Indeed, blockade running 
at Mobile practically came to an end for the year. 
Slightly more than one hundred violations of the blockade 
occurred from January to September but less than twenty
27after the capture and destruction of these two runners.
During 1864, British side-wheel steamers dominated
and revived the blockade running business at Mobile. The
most prominent of these were the Denbigh, Donegal, and
Mary. A description of the Denbigh fits almost any of
these vessels which their builders had specifically
designed to run the blockade:
...She was a side-wheeler, schooner-rigged....
She was built of iron, and had a marked draft
Macomb to Bell, Sept. 13, 1863, O.R.N., XX, 583; 
Bell to Welles, Sept. 15, 1863, ibid., 584; Maury to 
Cooper, Sept. 28, 1863, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 531;
Maury to Johnston, Sept. 20,' 1863, ibid. , XXVI, Pt. 2, 
p. 244; Maury to [Johnston], Sept. 29, 1863, Letters and 
Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, 
and East Louisiana.
27Record Book of Exports..., 1861-1875, passim; 
Entry of Merchandise, Mobile, 1861-1865; Abstracts of 
Import Duties, Mobile, 1861-1865; Bureau of Customs 
Cargo Manifests, Mobile, 1861-1865; Owsley, King Cotton 
Diplomacy, 252-53.
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of seven feet, fore and aft. She had artifi­
cial quarter galleries, an elliptic stern, and 
a straight stem. Boats painted white swung 
from iron davits on her port quarter and 
abreast of her mainmast. A house with a bin­
nacle on top was athwartships, between her 
paddle boxes. Her funnel was painted black, 
and there was a bright, copper steampipe at 
the after part of it. She had side houses and 
a hurricane deck, with her foremast through 
it. Her masts were bright. Mastheads, tops, 
caps, crosstrees,^bowsprit, and gaff were 
painted white....
Only the presence of large numbers of Federal warships
off Mobile Bay in February and March 1864 and the capture
of the forts at the bay entrances in August 1864 slowed
and eventually ended the highly successful trade of these
steamers.
The British steamers did not always enjoy easy trips 
in and out of the bay. On the night of January 31, 1864, 
the Denbigh ran aground in the Swash Channel east of Fort 
Morgan while attempting to get out. Her crew, aided by 
troops from the fort, threw off the cotton with which she 
was loaded. The blockading fleet discovered the Den­
bigh's plight and opened fire on her. One shot hit the 
wheelhouse but did no damage. Artillery fire from Fort 
Morgan drove off the attackers. Several days later, the 
steamer Dick Keys succeeded in getting the Denbigh off
28Thomas H. Dudley to William H. Seward, Oct. 20, 
1863, quoted in Price, "Ships that Tested the Blockade.. 
.," American Neptune, XI (1951), 271.
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29and towed her into the bay. The Virgin ran aground in 
the Swash Channel on July 9, 1864, trying to get into the 
bay. During the daylight hours of the tenth and the 
eleventh, the blockaders fired at the Virgin but did not 
hit her. Confederate soldiers boarded the stranded 
vessel to protect her against enemy cutting-out expedi­
tions, and finally they got the Virgin off and brought
30her into the bay.
Another blockade runner did not enjoy the fortune of 
the Denbigh and Virgin. The Ivanhoe ran aground in the 
Swash Channel on the night of July 1 during her first 
attempt to evade the blockade. Two companies moved out 
of Fort Morgan to protect her and to remove her cargo.
Six or seven Federal gunboats opened fire on the Ivanhoe 
after sunrise. The enemy fleet continued to shell the 
steamer for several days, on each occasion the gunners 
in Fort Morgan returning their fire. Although Confeder­
ate shells struck several vessels, none damaged the
29R. M. Thompson and R. Wainwright (eds.), Confi­
dential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, 2 vols.
(New York! Printed for the Naval History Society, 1918- 
1919), I, 344; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 4, Mar. 24, 
1864.
^^Ellsworth H. Hults, "Aboard the Galena at Mobile," 
Civil War Times Illustrated, X (April 1971) , 19; Tarleton 
to Lightfoot, July 10, 12, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), 
"The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 69-70, 72; 
Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 21, 1864, Tarleton Letters; 
Daily Tribune, July 13, 1864.
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Federals very seriously. On the night of July 5 an expe­
dition of four launches boarded the Ivanhoe and set her 
afire. Confederate soldiers on the beach opened up a 
strong rifle fire when they discovered the flames. The 
raid destroyed both the bow and stern of the blockade 
runner but not her mid-section. Eventually, Confederate 
engineers succeeded in getting the Ivanhoe1s machinery
out of her, but the passage of Farragut's fleet into the
31bay ended plans to refloat her.
The last steamer to run the blockade at Mobile, the 
Denbigh, went out on the night of July 27, 1864. When 
Farragut's fleet concentrated off Mobile Bay prior to 
running past the forts, it became impractical for vessels 
still at Mobile to get out. Maury gave some thought, 
however, to allowing one steamer to attempt to run out 
after the Federals had gotten into the bay. The War 
Department gave its permission for the Heroine to make 
the attempt if she could do so safely, but conditions did 
not permit her to get out. Three other vessels— the
"^Hults, "Aboard the Galena," 17-19; Farragut to 
Welles, July 6 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 355; Sergeant 
William J. Byrnes to Captain John T. Purves, July 5,
1864, in John T. Purves Papers, Special Collections 
Division, Tulane University Library; Tarleton to Light­
foot, July 5, 7, 10, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The 
Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 63-64, 6 6-6 8 ;
Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p.
693; Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 21, 1864, Tarleton 
Letters.
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Virgin, Red Gauntlet, and Mary— became entrapped at Mobile 
besides the Heroine. Maury ordered the seizure of all 
four for use by the military. The steamers served as 
dispatch and transport boats and did good work during the 
siege of Spanish Fort and Blakely. When the army evac­
uated Mobile, the blockade runners carried men and sup­
plies up the inland rivers of Alabama. The Confederate
naval commander surrendered them with his other vessels
32at the end of the war.
Blockade running had proven a highly successful and
profitable business at Mobile and other Southern ports.
Professor Frank Vandiver has concluded that running the
blockade "was perhaps the most successful, large-scale
33campaign attempted by the South," He argues that the 
supplies which came into the Confederacy through the 
blockade enabled her to wage war longer than she could
Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 28, 1864, Tarleton 
Letters; Seddon to Maury, July 20, 1864, Telegrams Sent, 
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 246; Maury to 
Seddon, Aug. 4, 1864, Telegrams Received, Secretary of 
War; Seddon to Maury, Aug. 5, 1864, Telegrams Sent, Sec­
retary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, pp. 224-25; Maury to 
Seddon, Aug. 14, 1864, with endorsement by Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas L. Bayne, Aug. 16, 1864, Telegrams 
Received, Secretary of War; John Scott to G. A. Trenholm, 
Aug. 17, 1864, ibid.; Jeanie Mort Walker, Life of Capt. 
Joseph Fry, the Cuban Martyr (Hartford, Conn.: The J. B.
Burr Publishing Co., 1675),176-78; Bradlee, "Blockade 
Running," 155; Scharf, History of the Confederate States 
Navy, 595, 598.
33Vandiver (ed.), Confederate Blockade Running, xli.
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have done without them and that, given time, blockade
running would have eventually eliminated supply
shortages. Mobile certainly played an important role in
the business. Attempted violations of the blockade at
Mobile numbered between 208 and 220. Slightly more than
eighty percent of these attempts succeeded. The number
of attempts was exceeded only at Wilmington, Charleston,
and New Orleans, and the percentage of successful
attempts stood as high or perhaps slightly higher at
34Mobile than at the other three ports.
34Ibid.; Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 259-60. The 
figures quoted were compiled by the author from most of 
the sources cited in this chapter.
CHAPTER X
"THE DAMAGE TO THE FORT WAS VERY TRIFLING."
Mobile figured in Union plans for the early months 
of 1864, but only in an indirect way. The real Union 
offensive operation in Mississippi and Alabama during the 
months of January, February, and March was a raid by 
Major General William T. Sherman's army from Vicksburg to 
Meridian, Mississippi. No one in the Union high command 
suggested that their forces attack Mobile. Major General 
Nathaniel P . Banks' troops would have been the men to 
have made such an attack, but they had been preparing 
since early January for a campaign up Red River to 
Shreveport, Louisiana.'*' Sherman anticipated that when he 
reached Merdian the Confederates would think he would 
then turn south against Mobile. He did not have enough 
men to attempt an attack on the Gulf city and recommended 
that upon their return to Vicksburg his troops go up Red 
River to cooperate with Banks. Sherman thought the Red 
River campaign would be a short, decisive stroke that
■^Sherman to Banks, Jan. 16, 1864, O.R. , XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 114; Halleck to Banks, Jan. 4, 1864, ibid., 
XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 15; Halleck to Banks, Jan. 11, 1864, 
ibid., 55-56; Banks to Sherman, Jan. 25, 1864, ibid.,
145.
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"would be the death blow to our enemies of the Southwest"
2
and free troops for a later attack on Mobile.
To attract attention away from his foray toward 
Meridian and to keep the Confederates from shifting large 
numbers of troops against him, Sherman requested that 
Banks conduct a demonstration or feint attack against 
Fort Powell. Such a move would reinforce the idea that 
the Federals would make an attack on Mobile. Sherman 
asked Banks to have naval vessels keep up the mock assault 
for about a week so that he could make the most of his 
stay in Meridian in tearing up the Mobile and Ohio Rail­
road in that vicinity. Banks discussed Sherman's request 
with Farragut at New Orleans and urged his cooperation. 
Farragut eagerly agreed, probably hoping that the army
would send him some troops for a full-fledged attack on
3
the forts at the entrance to Mobile Bay. He ordered six 
mortar boats at Pensacola readied for the attack on Fort 
Powell in cooperation with gunboats already in Missis- 
issippi Sound. Farragut informed the Navy Department of 
his intentions: "I shall therefore amuse myself in that
2
Sherman to Banks, Jan. 16, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt.
2, p. 114; Sherman to Halleck, Jan. 29, 1864, ibid., 260.
3
Sherman to Banks, Jan. 16, 1864, ibid., 114; Banks 
to Halleck, Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 266; 
Farragut to Welles, Feb. 7, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 90;
Halleck to Grant, Feb. 16, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, 
p. 402.
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way for the next month, unless the ironclads should 
..4come out,. ..
On the eve of Sherman's Meridian expedition, Maury 
did not seem concerned about an attack on Mobile. He 
reported on January 31 and February 2 that he had not 
procured hard evidence of preparations for a land attack. 
Rumors and some more conclusive facts reached Maury that 
Farragut might try to run his fleet past the outer line 
of forts but did not have the vessels necessary for a 
successful assault on the bay batteries. Maury continued 
to have his engineers work to improve Mobile's defenses. 
Thousands of slaves impressed throughout the state aug­
mented the work force in the city. Ordnance stores 
arrived a bit too slowly to satisfy Maury, but he real­
ized that given the South's limited resources he got all 
that could be spared for his command. All of the troops 
at Mobile appeared to be in good condition and their 
morale was high. To strengthen his outer line, Maury 
hoped for success in constructing a battery in the chan­
nel between Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines. He wrote the
^Farragut to Banks, Feb. 11, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 91; 
Farragut to Fox, Feb. 8 , 1864, in R. M. Thompson and R. 
Wainwright (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of Gustavas 
Vasa Fox, 2 vols. (New York: Printed for the Naval His-
tory Society, 1918-1919), I, 343; Farragut to Commander 
Alex. Gibson, Feb. 8 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 91; Farragut to 
Acting Volunteer Lieutenant D. C. Woods, Feb. 12, 1864, 
ibid., 93; Farragut to Welles, Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., 90.
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War Department: "This, with obstructions, torpedoes, and
the admiral's fleet, ought to make the passage difficult
5
to wooden ships."
The various defensive works around the city impressed 
an Englishman who visited Mobile about this .time and 
inspected them. Of the new line of redoubts being thrown 
up by Von Sheliha's engineers, FitzGerald Ross wrote that 
they "were perfect models of strength and judicious
g
arrangement." Each of the redoubts was constructed of 
sand and had parapets twenty-five feet wide. Turf fas­
tened to the sand by Cherokee Rose shrubs covered the 
revetment, or embankment, in front of each redoubt. The 
prickly nature of the shrubs would prove an additional 
obstacle to any enemy troops trying to storm the 
fortifications. Ross stated that when Von Sheliha's line 
of earthworks reached completion and all improvements
completed on the bay batteries Mobile would be "one of
7
the most strongly fortified places in the world."
5Maury to Polk, Jan. 31, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
2, p. 640; Polk to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Jack,
Jan. 28, 1864, ibid., 629; Polk to Watts, Jan. 28, 1864, 
ibid., 629-30; Polk to Major J. C. Denis, Jan. 28, 1864, 
Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 236 1/4, p. 21, RG 109, 
National Archives; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 2, 1864, O.R., 
XXXII, Pt. 2, pp. 655-56.
^FitzGerald Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confeder­
ate States, ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1958), 195.
^Ibid.
249
Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines did not please Ross, however, 
because experience at Fort Sumter had shown that modern 
artillery could level the old brick forts, making them 
dangerous places for men to be stationed. According to 
Ross, both the army and navy commanders at Mobile acknow­
ledged that these forts could not stop an enemy fleet
0
from passing them.
Sherman's Union army left Vicksburg February 13 in 
its march toward Meridian. The troops captured Jackson 
February 5 and crossed Pearl River two days later.
Polk's Confederates opposing Sherman lacked enough 
numerical strength to make a stand and fell back in front 
of the Federal advance. Polk requested that Maury send
• -S'
him two brigades from Mobile if he could spare them and 
promised to return them if the enemy attacked Mobile.
The brigades of Quarles, Cockrell, and Baldwin left the 
city on February 7 to join Polk. In return for these 
forces, Polk ordered the recently organized 22nd Louisi­
ana Consolidated Infantry and three companies of the 1st 
Alabama Infantry to Maury. The men of both units had 
experience as heavy artillerists, and Maury had requested
9
them earlier. The latter general also relieved Shoup of 
8Ibid., 196-97.
9
Sherman to Brigadier General John A. Rawlins, Mar. 
7, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 175; Polk to Davis,
Feb. 9, 1864, ibid., 335; Polk to Maury, Feb. 2, 1864,
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his duties at Mobile and ordered him to Polk temporarily 
as a brigade commander. To protect his eastern division 
against a possible Federal raid from Pensacola, Maury 
sent Brigadier General James Cantey's brigade to 
Pollard. ^
The troops from Mobile had barely begun arriving at 
Meridian when Polk decided to order them back. In addi­
tion to the three brigades mentioned above, Polk sent two 
other brigades and the men in a camp for exchanged pri­
soners at Enterprise to Maury. The movements of the 
enemy prompted this action. Sherman reached Morton on 
February 8 and began marching toward Meridian the next 
day. Fearing that Sherman's force comprised part of a 
combined attack by land and sea on Mobile, Polk wished to 
strengthen its garrison, which numbered about 2,500 men. 
He had visited Mobile several days before and expressed
ibid., Pt. 2, p. 655; Para IX, Special Orders No. 36, 
Headquarters [Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana], Feb. 5, 1864, ibid., 681; Maury to 
Cooper, Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., 692; Chambers, "My Journal," 
299; Para III, Special Order No. 34, Headquarters Depart­
ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Feb. 3, 
1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 663; Daniel P. Smith,
Company K, First Alabama Regiment, or Three Years in the 
Confederate Service (Prattville, Ala.: Published by the
Survivors, 1885), 90.
■^Para I, Special Order No. 37, Headquarters Depart­
ment of the Gulf, Feb. 6 , 1864, cited in Compiled Service
Record of Francis A. Shoup; Bob ------  to Hunter, Feb. 5,
1864, Hunter-Taylor Papers; Orear to Carrie Orear, Feb.
6 , 1864, Weaver Collection.
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confidence that the defenses looked complete enough to 
resist an assault. Supplies at the city appeared suffi­
cient to sustain a large garrison for six months, but Polk 
promised Maury to try to send him additional meat and 
corn. In reporting his actions to Richmond, Polk urged 
Davis to supply Maury's requisitions for heavy artillery 
ammunition. Polk encouraged Maury to ask the non- 
combatants in the city to leave.^
Maury followed up quickly on Polk's request. He 
informed the people through the newspapers that Mobile 
might be attacked and asked everyone who could not parti­
cipate in the defense of the city to leave for the 
interior. An editorial in the Advertiser and Register 
ventured the opinion that Sherman was unlikely to move 
against the city, yet recommended that women, children, 
and other non-combatants leave so as not to be "in the
way— an obstacle to the General commanding, and a draw-
12back to the success of the defence." Several days later, 
Maury, in a letter to Mayor Slough, made the observation 
that few people had left Mobile and urged him to use his
■^Polk to Lieutenant Colonel F. F. Sevier, Feb. 8 , 
1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 695; Polk to Forney, Feb.
9, 1864, ibid., 700; Polk to Maury, Feb. 9, 1864, ibid., 
701; Chambers, "My Journal," 301; Maury to Cooper, Feb.
9, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 701; Advertiser and 
Register, Feb. 5, 1864; Polk to Davis, Feb. 9, 1864,
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 335.
12Advertiser and Register, Feb. 11, 1864.
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authority to make them go. He offered to furnish trans­
portation for the people. Slough complied with Maury's 
request by appealing to the patriotism of the populace 
and pointing out that if they left more food would be 
available for the soldiers defending Mobile. Governor 
Watts added his voice to those of Maury and Slough and 
made arrangements with planters and townsmen of the 
interior to house the refugees. Hundreds of people 
finally left the city, and many of them found a welcome
in Montgomery, where a number of their fellow townsmen
13had gone earlier.
Confederate authorities in Richmond did not ignore 
the possible threat to Mobile. In particular, Davis 
seemed anxious that Sherman's column be stopped before it 
could reach the Gulf. He urged Joe Johnston at Dalton to 
send troops to Polk to attack the Federals. The capture 
of Mobile would not only mean the loss of its port and 
rail facilities but also that the enemy would have a good 
base for operations into the interior of Alabama.
Johnston replied to the president's entreaties by saying 
that his army was too weak to aid Polk and hold the 
approaches to Atlanta at the same time. He then suggested
1 3Ibid., Feb. 16, 1864; Mumford Diary, Feb. 15,
1864; Chambers, "My Journal," 302; Mary Elizabeth Massey, 
Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1964), 87.
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that Polk assemble all of his cavalry and use it to
14harass Sherman's line of march. Seddon telegraphed
Beauregard at Charleston and asked if he could go and
assume command of the defenses at Mobile. The Creole
general replied that Charleston remained threatened and
that he did not think it proper for him to take over at
Mobile at such a late hour because he did not know the
situation there. Beauregard offered only to inspect the
defenses and confer with Maury. The War Department then
ordered Gabriel Rains back to Mobile from Charleston to
15work once more with subterranean shells.
By February 13, Maury had learned of Farragut's plan­
ned attack on Grant's Pass, though he apparently did not 
know the attack was only a feint. He asked the War 
Department for 6,000 more men to hold the lines in the 
event of a siege. While he felt that he had a sufficient 
supply of commissary stores, Maury requested more ordnance 
for his heavy artillery. In response to Maury's request
■^Johnston to Davis, Feb. 11, 1864, O.R., XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 716; Johnston to Davis, Feb. 11, 1864, John­
ston Papers; Ewell to Maury, Feb. 12, 1864, O.R., XXXII, 
Pt. 2, p. 726; Davis to Johnston, Feb. 13, l!i"6¥, ibid.,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 619; Johnston to Davis, Feb. 16, 1864, 
ibid., XXXII, Pt. 2, pp. 751-52.
■^Seddon to Beauregard, Feb. 14, 1864, O.R., XXXV,
Pt. 1, p. 605; Beauregard to Seddon, Feb. 14, 1864, 
ibid.; Para XVII, Special Order No. 38, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Feb. 15, 1864, ibid., XXXII, 
Pt. 2, p. 738.
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for experienced engineers, the Engineer Bureau made appli-
16cation for several officers to Seddon. Maury's report
to Seddon on the condition of his outer line did not sound
optimistic. He found Fort Powell weak and difficult to
strengthen properly. A determined enemy assault would
probably get through Grant's Pass. According to Maury,
the defensive posture near the main channel did not seem
very much better:
...The line between Forts Morgan and Gaines is 
also very liable from the same causes to be 
forced. The channel is too wide and deep to 
defend or obstruct effectually. The battery 
to have been placed in the channel is not yet 
quite ready, nor has the admiral yet been able 
to move the Tennessee into the lower bay. The 
enemy will probably, therefore, be able to 
occupy the lower bay with his fleet of war 
ships,j^nd will do so preliminary to the 
siege.
Various preparations for the threatened attack occur­
red in the city. Colonel Charles A. Fuller, Post Comman­
dant, ordered all saloons and drinking establishments 
closed to try to keep soldiers of the garrison as sober 
as possible. Mayor Slough issued a civil order which
Maury to Cooper, Feb. 13, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt. 
2, p. 734; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 15, 1864, ibid., 739; 
Maury to Cooper, Feb. 14, 1864, ibid., 736; Rives to 
Seddon, Feb. 15, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi­
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 428.
17Lieutenant Colonel William E. Burnett to Judge 
D. G. Burnett, Mar. 7, 1864, quoted in New York Daily 
Tribune, Apr. 18, 1864; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 15, 1864, 
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 739.
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echoed Fuller's directive. General Cantey, commander of
the troops in and around the city, required all men in
Mobile who could bear arms to enroll for defense of the
city. He would force all who did not obey his order to
leave Mobile immediately. Efforts to procure enough food
to supply the garrison continued. Polk contributed a
quantity of bacon from Mississippi: "...it is not well
cured & it may be well to issue the joints at once & to
18have the balance packed carefully in a cool place." To
supplement the food coming in from normal sources, Captain
V. M. Byrnes, Post Commissary, asked that citizens leaving
Mobile and unable to take subsistence stores with them
turn these supplies over to his office for use by the
military. Persons who responded to Byrne's request
would receive receipts and orders which commissaries in
the interior would honor for an amount of stores equal
19those turned m  at Mobile.
On the morning of February 16, 1864, the anticipated 
attack on Fort Powell began. Six mortar schooners and
18Special Order No. 6 , Commandant Post, Feb. 10,
1864, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 11, 1864; 
Order, Mayor's Office, Feb. 10, 1864, quoted in ibid.; 
General Order No. 22, Headquarters Cantey's Brigade, Feb. 
15, 1864, quoted in Daily Tribune, Mar. 8 , 1864; Polk to 
Maury, Feb. 16, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Depart­
ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap.
II, Vol. 8 3/4, p. 45, RG 109, National Archives.
19Notice, Office Post Commissary, Feb. 16, 1864, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 16, 1864.
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four gunboats opened fire on the fort at about nine
o'clock that morning. The Confederates manning the guns
in Powell replied infrequently to the enemy bombardment.
None of their shells struck the Federal vessels. Most of
the shells hurled at the fort also fell short of their
mark. A Confederate officer wrote later to his girl-
20friend: "The damage to the Fort was very trifling."
At least five Federal shells exploded in the officers'
quarters and completely destroyed them. Two men in the
fort, one of them Lieutenant Colonel James M. Williams,
commanding the post, received wounds during the attack.
A shell fragment knocked Williams down and stunned him.
He barely escaped being killed according to a newspaper
report: "The shell grazed the front of his army and body,
entirely tearing away the sleeve and breast of his 
21coat." At least one Confederate concluded from the
9 n
"Abstract log of the U.S.S. Octorara,..." Feb. 16, 
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 98; "Abstract log of the U.S.S. 
Calhoun,..." Feb. 16, 1864, ibid., 99-100; "Abstract log 
of the U.S.S. J. P. Jackson,..." Feb. 16, 1864, ibid., 
101-102; Lieutenant C. E. Ross to Garner, Feb. 16, 1864, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 17, 1864; Colonel 
George A. Smith to Garner, Feb. 16, 1864, quoted in 
ibid., Feb. 18, 1864; Maury to Cooper, Feb. 16, 1864,
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 401; Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb.
22, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.) , "The Civil War Letters 
of Robert Tarleton," 52.
21Smith to Garner, Feb. 16, 1864, quoted m  Adver­
tiser and Register, Feb. 18, 1864; Tarleton to Light­
foot, Feb. 22, 1864 , quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil 
War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 52; Advertiser and 
Register, Feb. 20, 1864.
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results of the bombardment that naval fire alone would
22not reduce the fort.
Heavy winds from the north prevented the Federal 
vessels from renewing their attack for a week. Maury 
used the lull to continue his defensive preparations. He 
requested additional artillery shells, powder, and rifle 
ammunition from the War Department. To inquiries from 
Beauregard, Maury and Von Sheliha both replied that the 
engineers had placed a heavy sand glacis, or cover, around 
the walls of Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines to protect the 
masonry from the fire of rifled cannons. Maury continued 
to collect food supplies from Polk to provide subsis­
tence in the event of a siege. To assist Von Sheliha in 
the construction of fortifications near the city and in 
the strengthening of the outer defensive line, Maury 
requested the War Department to assign Major General 
Jeremy F. Gilmer, Chief of the Engineer Bureau, to Mobile 
temporarily. Finally, to guard against a possible land­
ing on the coast, Maury organized a force of sharpshoot­
ers from his infantry brigades and sent them with the
^Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb. 22, 1864, quoted in 
Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 
53.
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15th Confederate Cavalry and two field pieces to Bayou 
23LaBatre.
The Confederate high command and Maury divided their 
attention between defense of the city and Sherman's move­
ments in Mississippi. Seddon advised Maury to concen­
trate his efforts against Sherman in the field rather 
than preparing to defend Mobile itself. The Federals had 
reached Meridian on February 14 and sent detachments 
south along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Enterprise. 
Maury apparently agreed with Seddon's strategy because he 
registered no protest cincl or dered Cantey's brigade up the 
railroad to prevent any further southward movement by the 
enemy. Polk granted one of Maury's requests and sent the 
1st Alabama Infantry to Mobile. This unit took charge of 
the heavy artillery in seven redoubts on the city's outer 
line of defenses. Polk also promised to send the 1st
Maury to Cooper, Feb. 16, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 
1, p. 401; Beauregard to Maury, Feb. 16, 1864, ibid.,
Pt. 2, p. 754; Rives to Von Sheliha, Feb. 17m 1864, Let­
ters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 4, p. 434; Rives to Beauregard, Feb. 18, 1864, 
ibid., 437; Rives to Beauregard, Feb. 22, 1864, ibid., 
445; Para IV, Special Order No. 43, Headquarters Depart­
ment of the Gulf, Feb. 17, 1864, quoted in Advertiser 
and Register, Feb. 18, 1864; Polk to Maury, Feb. 17,
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 8 3/4, 
p. 47; Polk to Seddon, Feb. 18, 1864, O.R., XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 763; Cooper to Beauregard, Feb. 18, 1864, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector Gen­
eral, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 81; Chambers, "My Journal," 
304-306.
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Mississippi Artillery to Mobile as soon as he could do
so. Von Sheliha had gathered additional entrenching
tools from Montgomery and put them to use with the force
of slave laborers then coming in from the interior. By
February 20, Maury had almost 9,300 men under his command
ready for the defense of the city. Although not a large
army, this force was probably sufficient considering the
24enemy forces threatening Mobile.
Farragut's mortar schooners and gunboats renewed 
their attack on Fort Powell on February 23 and continued 
their bombardment the two days following. On the twenty- 
third, the Federal gunners fired slightly more than 300 
shells at the fort but caused no damage and no 
casualties. During the attack on the following day, the 
Federal vessels threw nearly 375 shells toward Fort 
Powell. Again, few of the shells struck the target, and 
those that did had no serious effects. The Confederate 
artillerymen in Fort Powell initiated the action of Feb­
ruary 25 by firing on the Federal squadron. Despite the
24Seddon to Maury, Feb. 17, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
2, p. 755; Maury to Polk, Feb. 19, 1864, ibid., 769; 
Smith, Company K, 90-91; Edward Young McMorries, History 
the First Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry C.S.A. 
"{Montgomery: The Brown Printing Co., 1904), 72; Jack to
Forney, Feb. 19, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 771;
Rives to Gilmer, Feb. 20, 1864, Letters and Telegrams 
Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 433; 
"Abstract from return of the army in the Department of 
the Gulf,...February 20, 1864,..." O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, 
p. 785.
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470 shells fired in reply by the enemy, the fort sus­
tained less damage than it had the previous day. The
25garrison lost one man killed and two wounded, however.
A frustrated Union naval officer wrote to a comrade about
these fruitless attacks:
We are hammering away at the fort here, 
which minds us about as much as if we did not 
fire— that is, the fort— for the men skedad­
dle as soon as the fire is at all brisk, 
although they will keep up anything like a 
fair fight, as they did with me for two hours 
yesterday in the Orvetta, and until the 25 
others commenced action, when they retired.
Heavy northerly winds, low tides, and bad weather
prevented Farragut's vessels from renewing their attack
on Fort Powell until February 29, but on that day they
carried out the fiercest bombardment the fort had to
sustain. They fired some 567 shells that day, but the
attack again had negligible results:
...only 20 [shells] struck the island and 3, 
the bombproof, killing or wounding no one and 
damaging the Fort so slightly that ten men in
25Gee to Major D. W. Flowerree, Feb. 23, 1864, 
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 24, 1864; Lieu­
tenant Colonel James M. Williams to Flowerree, Feb. 23, 
1864, quoted in ibid.; Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb. 25, 
1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of 
Robert Tarleton," 54; Maury to Cooper, Feb. 25, 1864, 
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 401; Advertiser and Register, 
Feb. 26, 1864; Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb. 26, 1864, 
Tarleton Letters; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 27, 1864, O.R./ 
LII, Pt. 2, p. 631; Colonel J. C. Ives to Davis,
Feb. 20, 1864, ibid.
2 6Captain Percival Drayton to Jenkins, Feb. 24, 
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 95.
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ten minutes rg^tored it to its former 
condition....
The Confederate gunners fired slightly more effectively 
than before. Despite the bursting of one of their can­
nons, the men kept up a steady barrage. Five shells 
struck one of the mortar schooners, forcing her out of 
the action. The commander of the Confederate ram Baltic 
wrote to a friend about the engagement:
...I saw some beautiful line shots made...dur­
ing the bombardment, and am satisfied at least 
one of the mortar schooners would have been 
sunk if sailors had been handling it [a can­
non] , but unfortunately those who were2$ork- 
ing it knew not how to sight a gun....
Finally at sunset Farragut ordered his ships to break off
the engagement. The fort's flag remained flying as the
29Federal vessels sailed westward.
The bombardment of the twenty-ninth convinced Farra­
gut that further attacks on Fort Powell would yield no 
better results. He also realized that he could do noth­
ing to result in capture of the Confederate forts guarding
Farragut to Welles, Feb. 28, 1864, ibid., 96;
Maury to Seddon, Feb. 27, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p.
631; Advertiser and Register, Mar. 2, 1864; Tarleton to 
Lightloot, Mar. 2, 1§64, quoted in Still (ed.) , "The 
Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 55.
O  O
Farragut to Welles, Mar. 1, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 97; 
Maury to Seddon, Feb. 29, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 
402; Williams to Garner, Mar. 7, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 881; 
Simms to Jones, Mar. 5, 1864, ibid., 880.
29Farragut to Welles, Mar. 1, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
97.
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the entrances to Mobile Bay. High winds and low tides
had prevented the Federal vessels from getting any
closer than two miles to the fort. Several ships ran
aground during the two week demonstration and had to be
towed off. The low water also made it almost impossible
for small boats to land an assault force against the
fort. Buchanan's small squadron of gunboats had assumed
a position in rear of Fort Powell where they could take
the garrison off or reinforce it. The ironclad Tennessee
could not get over Dog River Bar, but Farragut mistook
Baltic or another vessel for the Tennessee. Thinking
the ironclad ready for action, Farragut did not feel he
could run into the bay without monitors or ironclads of
his own. Lacking troops to cut off the land approaches
to the Confederate forts, the Union admiral decided he
could not attack Mobile Bay successfully and chose to
30end his demonstration.
Fort Powell had come through this baptism of fire 
very well, although particular facets of its defense had 
not satisfied the Confederate command. In each attack 
the Confederate guns had been silenced because the weight
30Farragut to Fox, Feb. 28, 1864, quoted m  Thomp­
son and Wainwright (eds.), Confidential Correspondence 
of Gustavus Vasa Fox, I, 34 5; Farragut to Welles, Feb.
28, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 96-97; Farragut to Welles, Mar.
1, 1864, ibid., 97; Farragut to Jenkins, Mar. 1, 1864, 
ibid., 98; Farragut to Banks, Mar. 2, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 12.
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of metal thrown against the fort had made it impossible 
for the artillerymen to remain at their stations. The 
Confederate engineers could not strengthen the earth and 
sand parapets and traverses so that the men could remain 
safely at their guns. None of the torpedoes placed in 
the waters west of Grant's Pass exploded even though the 
Federal vessels struck many of them. Later the engi­
neers discovered that marine worms had formed clusters 
on the tops of the torpedoes and prevented the firing 
mechanisms from working. Despite these disappointments, 
the Confederate military authorities remained pleased 
with the defense of the fort. The garrison had lost only 
one man killed and five wounded. None of the nearly 
2,000 shells fired at the fort did any damage which the 
men could not repair overnight:
...not a single gun had been dismounted, not 
a single traverse had been seriously damaged, 
nor had the parapet and the bomb-proof lost 
any of their strength, all damage done by the 
exploding shells being at once repaired b y ^  
throwing sand-bags in the open craters....
Major General Gilmer arrived in Mobile on February
24, 1864, to serve on temporary duty under Maury. He had
helped design many of the defensive works at Charleston,
31Maury to Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, 
p. 402; Victor von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence 
(London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1868), 36, 38, 229.
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32so his experience could prove very useful. With Maury
and Buchanan, Gilmer visited Fort Powell and Fort Gaines
during the bombardment of the former place. Later he
reviewed the troops manning the city works and made a
thorough inspection of the land defenses. He found the
various forts and redoubts strong though incomplete.
Gilmer requested the War Department to order more engi-
33neers to Mobile to expedite completion of the works.
To strengthen the position at Grant's Pass, he ordered 
the construction of small earthwork batteries at Cedar 
Point and Little Dauphin Island. These works would pre­
vent the Federals from erecting land batteries there to 
use against Fort Powell. The battery at Cedar Point Gil­
mer wanted built around the cedar trees located there to 
help conceal it. By the time Gilmer left on March 9, he 
expressed confidence that with a show of naval force to
32Para XXI, Special Order No. 44, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Feb. 23, 1864 , O.R. ,
XXXV, Pt. 1, p. 640; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 24, 
1864.
33Maury to Cooper, Feb. 25, 1864, O.R., XXXII,
Pt. 1, p. 401; Ross, Cities and Camps, 196-98; Adver­
tiser and Register, Feb. 26, 1864; Mumford Diary, Feb. 
25', 1864; Rives to Seddon, Feb. 26, 1864, Letters and 
Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 
473; Rives to Gilmer, Feb. 26, 1864, ibid., 474; Rives 
to Gilmer, Mar. 2, 1864, ibid., 482; Rives to Maury, 
Mar. 3, 1864, ibid., 485.
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back it up, the outer line of defenses at Mobile could
34prevent the Federal fleet from entering the bay.
Another new general, Brigadier General Richard L.
Page, reported for duty at Mobile about this time to
replace Higgins. The latter, whom Maury had assigned to
command the outer defenses, became ill in early February
and had to be relieved of command. Maury requested that
Seddon promote Colonel Henry Maury of the 15th Confeder-
35ate Cavalry and assign him m  Higgins' place. Davis 
instead chose Page as Higgins' replacement and ordered 
him to proceed to Fort Morgan. At the time, Page held 
the rank of captain in the Confederate Navy, so Davis 
arranged his appointment as brigadier general. There is 
no evidence explaining Davis' choice of Page, but the 
new general's background seemed to qualify him for the 
position. A native of Virginia, Page had served in the 
United States Navy from 1824 to 1861. He resigned his 
commission when Virginia seceded and helped construct 
defenses on the James and Nansemond rivers. Later Page 
commanded shore batteries near Norfolk. When he received 
Davis' order, he held command of the ordnance and
34Ives to Davis, Feb. 29, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 631; Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Mar. 2, 1864, ibid., 
XXXII, Pt. 3, pp. 577-78; Gilmer to Seddon, Mar. 9, 1864, 
ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 637.
35Advertiser and Register, Feb. 18, 1864; Maury to
Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 403.
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construction depot at Charlotte, North Carolina, a post
3 6he had ably filled for two years. Page reached Fort 
Morgan March 12 and quickly made a favorable impression 
on the officers and men of the garrison:
We are very well pleased with our new 
general, although he hasn't found out the dif­
ference between a fort and a ship yet. He is 
a tall erect old fellow with the air of a man 
who has seen service and been accustomed to 
exercise command. A great disciplinarian, but 
very quiet and gentlemanly with it all. He is 
vastly preferred to his predecessor the iras­
cible Higgins.
The land threat to Mobile ended when Sherman's army
began its withdrawal from Meridian February 20 and crossed
3 8the Pearl River February 24. The duties of the Confed­
erate troops around the city became more routine.
Battalion and regimental drills helped improve the
Davis to Captain Richard L. Page, Mar. 3, 1864, 
quoted in Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Consti­
tutionalist : His Letters, Papers and Speeches, 10 vols.
(Jackson, Miss.: Department of Archives and History,
1923), VI, 197; Davis to Maury, Mar. 3, 1864, ibid.; 
Davis to Maury, Mar. 5, 1864, ibid., 199; Cooper to 
Maury, Mar. 7, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adju­
tant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 100; 
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confed­
erate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1959) , 227; John T. Scharf, History of the 
Confederate States Navy (2nd edition; Albany, N. Y.: 
Joseph McDonough, 1894), 143, 553-54, n.l.
"^Tarleton to Lightfoot, Mar. 11, 28, 1864, Tarle- 
ton Letters.
"^Sherman to Rawlins, Mar. 7, 1864, O.R., XXXII,
Pt. 1, p . 176.
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discipline and instruction of the men. At times the vari­
ous brigades competed against each other in "match 
drills." Some of the regiments which had manned the 
outer line of the land defenses returned to the city and 
established camps in the several squares. The men of 
these regiments performed guard duty at various govern­
mental or military buildings. One guard detachment at 
the government whiskey depot took advantage of their 
assignment: "...some of the men soon drank enough to
render them boisterous and afterward utterly useless as 
39guards,..." Food prices remained high and rations for 
the soldiers skimpy: "The troops only receive ten
40pounds of meat per month with corn meal and salt." To
try to make up the deficit in food supplies, Maury 
ordered that the men plant vegetable gardens between the 
lines of fortifications. The soldiers worked the gardens 
and then ate the produce.^
39Mumford Diary, Mar. 2, 1864; Circular, Headquar­
ters Shoup's Brigade, Mar. 7, 1864, Records of the 
Department of the Gulf, LHA Collection; Smith, Company K, 
91; Chambers, "My Journal," 307, 308.
40Maury to Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
1, p. 403; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluctant Rebel: The
Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 143.
41
Maury to Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
1, p. 403; Advertiser and Register, Mar. 8 , 1864.
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Maury continued to move his units around as the 
month of March progressed. He sent troops from Mobile to 
relieve regiments which had been stationed along the 
coast to support Fort Powell. Men of the 1st Alabama 
Infantry occupied the battery at Cedar Point and rein­
forced the garrison at Fort Powell. The remainder of 
this regiment and the other units on the coast moved into 
comfortable tent camps in the nearby pine groves. Often 
the men dredged for oysters to supplement their rations. 
One soldier remembered later: "Under such circumstances,
the duty imposed on the regiment was not regarded as 
42onerous." Maury ordered three brigades from the sub­
urbs of the city to the spacious piney woods near Pol­
lard, where Cantey assumed command of them. While in 
transit by boat from Mobile to Tensas Landing, many of 
the men occupied their time by shooting alligators sun­
ning on the river banks. Once in camp near Pollard, the 
soldiers constructed and occupied cabins. They found 
plenty of good water and fuel nearby and settled down to 
picket and drill duty. Most of the troops who remained
42Chambers, "My journal," 307-308; McMornes,
History of the First Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry, 
72; Smith, Company K, 91-92.
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at Mobile moved to the larger forts on Von Sheliha's
43line, where they camped behind the entrenchments.
Work on the various defensive positions continued 
while Maury moved his troops around, and the army and 
navy commanders attempted to maintain vigilance in case 
of another attack. Von Sheliha found too much diffi­
culty in transporting heavy siege artillery to his Little 
Dauphin Island battery and decided to arm the work with 
Parrott guns on field carriages. To give Fort Morgan 
further protection, Von Sheliha began construction of a 
seven-gun water battery at the base of the fort's west­
ern face. The engineers completed three redoubts on the 
new land line near the city and moved guns into them.
All of this engineering work required experienced men to 
carry it out, so the Engineer Bureau persuaded Seddon to 
continue the detail of three civilian engineers who had
worked for the chief engineer at Mobile for several 
44years. Buchanan, meanwhile, kept all of his gunboats
43Advertiser and Register, Mar. 20, 1864; Chambers, 
"My Journal," 308-310; Orear to Carrie Orear and parents, 
Mar. 26, 1864, Weaver Collection; Butler to aunt, Mar.
21, 1864, Butler Family Papers.
44Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Mar. 7, 1864, Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 604; 
Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Mar. 12, 1864, ibid., 610; Von 
Sheliha to Shoup, Mar. 15, 1864, ibid., 612; Rives to 
Seddon, Mar. 26, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi­
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 590; Rives to Von 
Sheliha, Mar. 26, 1864, ibid., 595.
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in the lower bay near Fort Powell, while he attempted to 
get the Tennessee over the Dog River Bar. The poor con­
dition of the ram Baltic caused naval constructor John L. 
Porter to recommend that workmen strip off her iron and 
place it on newer vessels. Buchanan continued to keep 
her in service despite Porter's recommendation and her 
own commander's opinion of her: "...the Baltic is as
rotten as punk, and is about as fit to go to sea as a 
45mud scow...."
^Simms to Jones, Mar. 20, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 884; 
Simms to Jones, Mar. 30, 1864, ibid., 886.
CHAPTER XI 
"...AN ATTACK IS REALLY IMMINENT..."
The spector of an attack on Mobile raised by Farra- 
gut's demonstration in February 1864 caused Von Sheliha 
to press his engineering operations, but a shortage of 
labor hampered him during much of the month of April.
About the twelfth of that month he had 250 men working on 
the city entrenchments. Companies of soldiers sentenced 
to hard labor by courts martial supplemented the slave 
force but still did not constitute enough men to conduct 
the construction at the rate needed. Von Sheliha com­
plained to the Engineer Bureau that although the yearly 
price paid planters for their hands ($360) seemed 
liberal, it probably would not suffice to satisfy the 
planters even if the government furnished clothing, 
quarters and rations. He recommended conscription as 
the only sure way to bring in workers. Colonel George B. 
Hodge, in Mobile on an inspection tour for the War 
Department, echoed Von Sheliha's conclusions.^ By the end
^Von Sheliha to Major E. H. Cummins, Apr. 1, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, 
p. 629; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Apr. 2, 1864, ibid., 631; 
Von Sheliha to Rives, Apr. 2, 1864, ibid.; Von Sheliha to 
RiveS*, Apr. 8 , 1864, ibid., 638; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, 
Apr. 12, 1864, ibid., 640; Colonel George B. Hodge to 
Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 3, pp. 779-80.
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of the month, Von Sheliha reported his labor force had 
increased. He also received permission from the War 
Department to hire 2,000 slaves, and agents moved into 
both Mississippi and Alabama to obtain the needed 
workers. If he could not hire enough laborers, Von 
Sheliha had the War Department's permission also to 
impress slaves.^
Von Sheliha and his engineers conducted their oper­
ations as well as they could. They concentrated most of 
the work done along the lower bay line on Fort Morgan 
and Fort Powell because Von Sheliha believed Fort Gaines 
in satisfactory condition. At Fort Morgan, the engineers 
completed the water battery and had a redoubt east of the 
fort nearly complete. Recognizing the exposed position 
of the parapet guns in Morgan, Von Sheliha ordered the 
erection of traverses between each gun to afford some 
protection for the gunners. The engineers added more 
sandbags to thicken the fort's magazine. They also com­
pleted the western face of Fort Powell, the earthwork 
now being large enough to hold eleven guns. In the main
^Maury to Jack, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 3, 
p. 787; Von Sheliha to Rives, Apr. 2zF, 1864, Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 2;
Von Sheliha to Colonel F. S. Blount, Apr. 23, 1864, 
ibid., 3-4; Von Sheliha to S. H. Linderberger, Apr. 26, 
1864, ibid., 11; Rives to Von Sheliha, Apr. 29, 1864, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, 
Vol. 5, p. 125.
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ship channel, the engineers placed more torpedoes and 
sank the first of a series of timber obstructions. On 
the city entrenchments, Von Sheliha's men laid gun plat­
forms in four redoubts, continued strengthening of three 
others, and began construction of a new redan. Hodge 
had high praise for the fortifications:
...They evince a scientific proficiency in 
engineering unsurpassed, if equalled, by any­
thing on this continent, and are themselves 
the most eloquent evidence of the educated 
skill of the_engineer in charge, Lieut. Col.
Von Sheliha.
Maury shifted fresh troops to Fort Gaines to relieve 
the men who had garrisoned the post for many months.
Seven companies of the 1st Alabama Infantry moved from 
Alabama Port to Dauphin Island. This regiment and the 
30th Louisiana Infantry Battalion did duty in the fort on 
alternate days, while two companies of the Alabama regi­
ment manned the guns every night. Although the men of 
the garrison did not have much in the way of amusements 
to occupy their idle hours, they did eat well. Using a 
large seine and the more standard hook and line, the sol­
diers caught a variety of fish, crabs, and oysters.
3
"Monthly report of operations for the defence of 
Mobile, Ala., for the month of April, 1864," May 7, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, 
pp. 30-31; Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Apr. 22, 1864, O.R., 
XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 810; "Ammunition report for Fort 
Powell,...for week ending Saturday, April 23, 1864," 
O.R.N., XXI, 894; Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., 
XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 779.
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In addition to seafood, the men enjoyed vegetables raised 
in a ten acre garden near the fort. The only real excite­
ment on the island during the month of April occurred on 
the sixteenth. A landing party of about 100 men came 
ashore on the western end of the island from the Federal 
fleet. A picket guard quickly drove back the invaders.
On the twentieth, the men at Fort Gaines thought they 
would witness an engagement at Fort Morgan when a Fed­
eral gunboat shelled a party of laborers erecting a
battery near the fort, but the vessel withdrew after
. . 4firing only a few shots.
On April 13, 1864, Colonel Hodge reported to the 
War Department on his inspection tour. He stated that 
he found the troops "well equipped and clad, and evincing 
in the precision of their drill and maneuvers a marked
5
and most creditable efficiency." Their weapons he noted 
as being in excellent shape. Hodge concluded: "The
4 . . .Edward Young McMornes, History of the First Regi­
ment Alabama Volunteer Infantry C.S.A.- (Montgomery: The 
Brown Printing Co., 1904), 72; Roll dated Apr. 30, 1864, 
Field and Staff, Record of Events Cards, 30th Louisiana, 
Compiled Service Records; Daniel Smith, Company K, First 
Alabama Regiment, or Three Years in the Confederate 
Service (Prattville, Ala.: Published by the Survivors,
1885), 92-94.
5
Advertiser and Register, Apr. 5, 1864; Mumford 
Diary, Apr] T~, 1864; Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864,
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 778.
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entire force compares favorably with any of similar num­
bers I have seen in the armies of the Confederacy.
When Hodge began his inspection, Maury had five brigades 
numbering 9,300 men, but soon reductions in the garrison 
totaling 3,100 men occurred. Baldwin's old brigade, now 
under Brigadier General Claudius W. Sears, left Pollard 
on April 11 for Selma, where it once again became part of 
Polk's field army. On the twentieth, Cantey's brigade 
began leaving Pollard on their way to join Johnston's 
army in northern Georgia. The War Department ordered 
this latter transfer so that Johnston might eventually
gather enough men to enable him to assume the offensive
7
into Tennessee.
Hodge had both negative and positive comments about 
the supply departments at Mobile. He wrote critically of
6Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
3, p. 778.
7
Ibid.; Abstract from return of the army of the 
District of the Gulf, Apr. 30, 1864, ibid., 860; Maury to 
Polk, Apr. 11, 1864, ibid., 771; Brigadier General Claud­
ius W. Sears to Jack, Apr. 13, 1864, ibid., 776-77; 
Chambers, "My Journal," 313; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluc­
tant Rebel; The Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861- 
1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1959) , 153-54, 156, 159; Johnston to Maury, Apr. 15,
1864, Telegram Book, p. 278, Johnston Papers; Johnston 
to Bragg, Apr. 17, 1864, ibid.; Cooper to Maury, Apr. 18, 
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector 
General, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 223; Orear to Carrie Orear, 
Apr. 22, 1864, Weaver Collection; Colonel J. F. Conoley 
to Mackall, Apr. 24, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 816; 
Ewell to Johnston, Apr. 29, 1F64, ibid., 839-42.
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the quartermaster situation. The officer in charge of 
these supplies did not answer to Maury but had responsi­
bility only to the Quartermaster General in Richmond, a 
situation which existed almost everywhere in the 
Confederacy. Thus any time the army in Mobile requested 
quartermaster supplies, the requisition had to go all the 
way to Richmond to receive approval. Hodge echoed a com­
plaint Maury had made to Polk to have the situation 
8changed. The commissariat seemed in much better shape. 
Hodge found enough food supplies in Maury's warehouses 
to feed the garrison for six months. On April 1 the 
rations issued to the men had been increased. One sol­
dier commented later that the meat ration went up from 
1 1/4 pounds to 1 1/2 pounds a day and bacon from 1/3 
pound to 1/2 pound a day. At least one subordinate com­
mander had established a fishery to add variety to his 
men's diets. All of the foodstuffs Hodge found to be of
9
"excellent quality."
The onset of the Atlanta campaign in May resulted in 
further inroads in the strength of the Mobile garrison.
®Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
3, pp. 779-80; Maury to Polk, Apr. 11, 1864, ibid.,
772.
9
Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, ibid., 779-80; 
Mumford Diary, Apr. 1, 1864; Smith, Company K, 92; Lieu­
tenant Samuel A. Verdery to Captain Edward Durrive,
Apr. 14, 1864, Records of the Department of the Gulf,
LHA Collection.
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On the first, Johnston requested that Reynold's brigade 
at Pollard be ordered to join the Army of Tennessee.
Maury complied with the request by sending the brigade 
plus an Alabama battery to Dalton. To replace Reynold's 
brigade at Pollard, Maury brought the 1st Alabama Infan­
try to Mobile from Fort Gaines and forwarded the regiment 
on to Pollard. There the 1st Alabama had to perform the 
guard and picket duty several regiments had done.
Shortly after these troop movements, Polk ordered Maury 
to send two regiments to Selma. Maury ordered not only 
these regiments but two field batteries as well.^
Toward the end of May, Johnston needed more men to rein­
force his hard-pressed army. The War Department ordered 
Quarles' Tennessee brigade from Mobile to northern 
Georgia. In addition to the Tennessee regiments, Quarles 
took with him the 30th Louisiana Battalion at Fort Gaines 
and the 1st Alabama. Maury sent the 22nd Louisiana Con­
solidated Infantry from the city works to Pollard to
Johnston to Bragg, May 1, 1864, O.R., XXXVIII,
Pt. 4, p. 654; Maury to Polk, May 5, 1864, ibid., 6 6 8 ; 
Smith, Company K, 94; Polk to Maury, May 4, 1864, Letters 
and Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, 
and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 8 3/4, p. 235; Para 
XII, Special Order No. 126, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, May 5, 1864, 
O.R., XXXVIII, Pt. 4, p. 6 6 8 ; Para VII, Special Order 
No. 126, Headquarters District of the Gulf, May 5, 1864, 
Orders, District of the Gulf; Para VII, Special Order No. 
141, Headquarters District of the Gulf, May 20, 1864, 
ibid.
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replace the Alabama regiment. Not only did all of these
soldiers go to Georgia, but Maury also ordered all spare
horses and mules to Johnston.^ The departure of these
troops reduced Maury's force by approximately 2,000 men
and left him with an army of slightly more than 4,300
men. The absence of an enemy threat to the city meant
that the loss of nearly one-third his garrison had little
12real impact on Maury's situation, however.
Maury established an artillery school in May for the 
officers and men of regiments remaining in the District 
of the Gulf. In April he had proposed to the War Depart­
ment the establishment of a military academy to train 
promising privates to become officers for Confederate
armies in the Southwest, but the law did not permit such 
13a school. The artillery school opened on May 20 with 
details of officers and men from all of the regiments
Para XX, Special Order No. 118, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, May 21, 1864, O.R., XXXXVIII, 
Pt. 4, p. 732; Bragg to Johnston, May 21, 1864, ibid., 
LII, Pt. 2, p. 671; Hunter to Stella, May 24, 1864, 
Hunter-Taylor Papers; Smith, Company K, 95; Roll for 
May and June 1864, Field and Staff, Record of Events 
Cards, 22nd Louisiana Consolidated Infantry, Compiled 
Service Records; Mumford Diary, May 19, 1864.
12Abstract of return of the army of the District of 
the Gulf, Apr. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 860; 
Abstract of return of the army of the District of the 
Gulf, June 30, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 677.
13Maury to Cooper, Apr. 23, 1864, ibid., 4, III,
317-18.
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in attendance. Maury hoped the school would provide 
needed instruction to officers and men who had never 
handled heavy artillery and also act as a refresher course 
for those who had. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Beltzhoover 
of the 1st Louisiana Heavy Artillery commanded the school 
and taught the officers. Three subordinate officers 
instructed the non-commissioned officers and enlisted 
men. Many of the officers resented having to attend the 
school, especially since they had manned artillery bat­
teries throughout the war. Besides the lengthy studies 
and recitations conducted by Beltzhoover and his instruc­
tors, the course included artillery and infantry drill as 
well. Some students did not find the meals served at the 
school very nurishing:
...Breakfast, rye coffee and corn bread (of 
unsifted meal); dinner, corn bread and boiled 
bacon, except on three days out of ten, when 
molasses was issued in lieu of bacon; supper, 
corn bread and rice boiled in the pot liquor 
left at noon....
The school continued its sessions until June 27, when it
closed under the false expectation of reopening later at 
15Fort Gaines. Although no evaluation of the school's
^Mumford Diary, May 10, 13, 20, 25, 30, 1864; Tar­
leton to Lightfoot, May 20, 27, 1864, Tarleton Letters; 
Smith, Company K, 94-95.
15Mumford Diary, June 17, 27, 1864.
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results exist, it must have benefitted most of the offi­
cers and men who attended.
A shortage of competent engineer troops and laborers 
continued to plague Von Sheliha during May. He still had 
officers out in Mississippi and other areas of Alabama 
trying to hire slaves. An unexpected source of laborers 
came in the form of a small group of Negro troops cap­
tured by Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest at Fort 
Pillow, Tennessee. The War Department authorized the use
of these runaway slaves on the fortifications provided
1
their owners received remuneration. Von Sheliha com­
plained to the Engineer Bureau that enrolling officers 
had conscripted many of his mechanics and other skilled 
white laborers. The Bureau intervened with the War 
Department to get the enrolling officers to "interfere 
as little as possible with the mechanics, experts &c...
necessary to the prosecution of the operations" of Von
17Sheliha at Mobile. One company of engineer troops had 
already formed under Captain Leverette Hutchinson in
■^Special Order No. 7, Engineer Office, District of 
the Gulf, May 10, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, 
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 39; Polk to Maury, May 7, 
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 8 3/4, 
p. 270; Maury to Cooper, May 20, 1864, O.R., 2, VII, 155; 
Cooper to Maury, May 21, 1864, ibid., 156.
^Rives to Von Sheliha, May 21, 1864, Letters and 
Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, 
p. 205.
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the District of the Gulf. The War Department authorized
a second company but refused to permit Von Sheliha to
organize a third. The department did allow him to recruit
Captain Jules V. Gallimard's company of sappers and miners
so that it could render efficient engineer service and
suggested he call upon engineer companies organized in
the army of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
18East Louisiana when needed.
Admiral Buchanan attempted to conduct a sortie 
against the Federal blockading fleet in late May. His 
ironclad ram, the Tennessee, finally got across Dog 
River Bar on May 18. A potentially formidable vessel 
with her six Brooke rifled guns, heavy ram, and four 
inches of iron plating, the Tennessee was, however, slow 
and had exposed tiller chains. Davis and the Navy 
Department had pressured Buchanan to raise the blockade 
even though he wished to wait until completion of the 
ironclad Nashville. Accompanied by the Baltic, Gaines, 
Morgan, and Selma, Buchanan took the Tennessee down the 
bay to an anchorage near Fort Morgan. On the first 
night chosen for the attack, bad weather hampered the 
squadron's movements and prevented an offensive. The 
Tennessee ran aground the next night. By the time she
18Rives to Captain Leverette Hutchinson, May 28,
1864, ibid., 270; Rives to Von Sheliha, May 21, 1864, 
ibid., 205.
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floated off, Buchanan had decided to cancel the attack
because he considered Farragut's fleet too strong.
Farragut had expected the Confederates to come out for
some time and had reinforced the blockading fleet until
it numbered a dozen vessels. Although the results of
Buchanan's foray down the bay were negative, at least one
army officer supported his cancellation of the attack:
...Everyone thinks the admiral acted most 
prudently. I don't think the younger portion^ 
of the gunboats fancied the expedition much.
During much of the month of June 1864 several Con­
federate officers feared an attack on Mobile. Maury 
reported that Captain J”ames D. Johnston, commander of the 
Tennessee, expected Farragut to run into the bay. He 
also stated that every effort to obstruct effectively 
the main ship channel had failed. General Page at Fort 
Morgan was also apprehensive and had no confidence in any 
of the Confederate warships except the Tennessee. From 
slaves who had escaped from the Federal lines at Pensa­
cola, Page learned that the enemy planned to make an
19 .William N. Still, Jr., Iron Afloat: The Story of
the Confederate Armorclads (Nashville: Vanderbilt Uni­
versity Press, 1971) , 200-203; Abstract log of the C.S.S. 
Tennessee, May 17-26, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 935; Mumford 
Diary, May 19, 24, 25, 1864; Farragut to Welles, May 9, 
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 267; Tarleton to Lightfoot, May 18,
20, 27, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War 
Letters of Robert Tarleton," 59, 61-62; C. Carter 
Smith (ed.), Two Naval Journals: 1864 (Chicago: The
Wyvern Press, 1964) , 2-3.
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attack on June 18. When that day passed without an
assault, he became convinced that the Federal move had
only been postponed. He complained to a friend that he
had only 300 men in the fort, not enough to man all of
the guns, and saw no prospects of any reinforcements.
One of Page's subordinates at Fort Morgan did not share
the general's pessimism and noted that the Federal fleet
did not seem as strong as it had been when the month
began. The officer concluded:
...General Page persists in thinking an attack 
imminent and his mind is so peculiarly consti­
tuted that when once an absurd idea gets into 
it there is no getting it out excepJjQto make 
room for another equally absurd....
The Confederates' fears had some basis in reality 
because the Union high command had such an attack in the 
planning stages. Grant had intended that an assault 
take place in April to coincide with his Virginia cam­
paign and Sherman's northern Georgia campaign. Banks' 
army, which would conduct the attack against Mobile,
suffered delays and defeats in its Red River expedition
21that prevented it from complying with Grant's wishes.
20Maury to Cooper, June 3, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 901; 
Page to Jones, June 26, 1864, ibid., 903-904; Tarleton 
to Lightfoot, June 17, 19, 22, 1864, Tarleton Letters.
21Grant to Banks, Mar. 15, 1864, O.R., XXXIV, Pt.
2, pp. 610-11; Grant to Banks, Mar. 31, T864, ibid., Pt. 
1, p. 11; Grant to Sherman, Apr. 4, 1864, ibid., XXXII, 
Pt. 3, pp. 245-46; Grant to Major General David Hunter,
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Once the Red River campaign ended, Grant and Sherman 
renewed their requests for a Mobile expedition. Sherman 
wanted only a feint to draw Confederate troops away from 
Georgia. Grant, on the other hand, hoped to see the 
city captured so that Federal forces could use it as a 
base from which to supply Sherman's armies after they 
got deep into Georgia. Major General Edward R. S.
Canby, new Union commander in the Gulf region, began 
making preparations and intended to send Brigadier Gen­
eral Andrew J. Smith's troops to make the attack. This 
plan Canby had to abandon when Forrest defeated a Union 
force at Brice's Crossroads, and Smith's men moved to 
Memphis to help fight Forrest. Canby suspended subse­
quent plans when Grant ordered two divisions from Can­
by 's army to protect Washington, D. C., from a threat by 
Confederate Major General Jubal Early's army. This 
second delay meant that the Federals could make no move
against Mobile until some time in July at the very 
22earliest.
Apr. 17, 1864, ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 3, pp. 190-91; Grant to 
Banks, Apr. 17, 1864, ibid., 191-92; Grant to Halleck, 
Apr. 29, 1864 (2 items), ibid., 331; Halleck to Grant, 
Apr. 29, 1864 (2 items), ibid., 331-32.
^Grant to Halleck, June 3, 1864, ibid., Pt. 4, p. 
185; Sherman to Major General Edward R. S. Canby, June 4, 
1864, ibid., 212; Sherman to Brigadier General Andrew J. 
Smith, June 4, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 79; Grant to 
Halleck, June 5, 1864, ibid.; Halleck to Canby, June 6 , 
1864, ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 4, p. 240; Sherman to Major
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The month of June 1864 proved a period of ups and 
downs for Von Sheliha and his engineer operations. Early 
in the month, Colonel S. Crutchfield reported the results 
of an inspection tour to the Ordnance Bureau in Richmond. 
He found most of the ammunition magazines in the bay bat­
teries and city works inadequate for proper storage. In 
almost every case he described the magazines as too 
small, while he said a few were damp or poorly 
ventilated. Toward the middle of the month, the Engineer 
Bureau authorized Von Sheliha to purchase the right to 
cut timber from land near the city works for use as 
lumber and fuel. Under orders from Maury, Von Sheliha 
organized his engineer employees into a battalion for 
local defense, a move which would result in improved 
instruction and discipline. To a request by Von Sheliha 
that it allow him to reorganize Gallimard's company of 
sappers and miners and increase its strength to 100 men, 
the War Department replied in the negative. He could 
only raise the company's strength to a total of 64 men.
On June 25 Von Sheliha wrote to Gilmer asking to be 
relieved from duty:
...His reasons for making this application are
that he receives no assistance whatever and
General Cadwallader C. Washburn, June 14, 1864, ibid., 
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 115; Canby to Halleck, June 18, 1864, 
ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 4, pp. 438-39; Halleck to Canby, June 
24, 1864, ibid., 528; Canby to Farragut, July 1, 1864, 
ibid., XLI, Pt. 2, pp. 3-4; Canby to Washburn, July 2, 
T$64, ibid., 2 1-2 2 .
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yet is expected to accomplish more than any 
Engineer could possibly perform with the inad­
equate means at his disposal.
The War Department turned down Von Sheliha's request,
however, and he remained at his post in Mobile.
By July 1, 1864, Maury had few troops left in his
command. In the entire District of the Gulf, only 4,337
24effectives remained. Page's brigade, which garrisoned 
the three lower bay forts, numbered slightly more than 
1,200 men, some 200 of whom were cavalrymen on picket and 
outpost duty. At Pollard, Colonel Isaac W. Patton had 
his own 22nd Louisiana Infantry, a cavalry regiment, and 
an artillery battery, in all about 1,100 men. This force 
had responsibility for the protection of the railroad to 
Montgomery as well as covering the approaches from Pen­
sacola to Mobile. In early June, Higgins had returned 
to Mobile from sick leave and assumed command of the city 
works and bay batteries, also known as the artillery 
brigade. Under his command he had 1,100 artillerymen
23Colonel S. Crutchfield to Gorgas, June 9, 1864, in 
Daniel Geary Papers, Mobile Public Library; Rives to Von 
Sheliha, June 11, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi­
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, p. 303; Order No. — ,
Engineer Office, June 15, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer 
Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 67; Rives to Von 
Sheliha, June 23, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi­
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, p. 362; Von Sheliha to
Gilmer, June 25, 18 64, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, 
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 71.
24Abstract from return of troops in the District of 
the Gulf, June 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 677.
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and 400 local defense troops. Most of Higgins' men, 
having manned many of the water batteries at Vicksburg, 
had a great deal of proficiency at operating heavy artil­
lery pieces. Their small numbers meant that they had to 
perform a great deal of guard duty in addition to their 
normal routine. Besides having a shortage of troops, 
Higgins also had fewer artillery pieces than his
predecessor. Maury had sent a large number of heavy guns
25and mortars to Atlanta for the works there.
The Mobile garrison suffered fprther reductions in 
strength when the 1st Louisiana Heavy Artillery and 1st 
Mississippi Light Artillery regiments left for Meridian 
on July 6 . These two units acted as infantrymen under 
orders to assist in opposing a Union force marching east­
ward from Vicksburg. In speaking of the departure of the
troops, one officer wrote in his diary: "Mobile is left
2 6almost without a corporal's guard,..." Recognizing 
Mobile's weakened condition, Confederate authorities in 
Richmond sought to find additional troops for the 
garrison. Davis asked Governor Watts to organize state 
reserve units for Mobile, and Cooper ordered Major
25Ibid.; Organization of troops in the District of 
the Gulf, June 30, 1864, ibid., 678; General Order No. 1, 
Headquarters Commandant of Mobile, June 4, 1864, quoted 
in Mobile Evening News, June 10, 1864; Mumford Diary,
June 5, S', July 1, 1864.
^Mumford Diary, July 5, 1864.
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General Jones M. Withers, commander of the Alabama
Reserves, to send available units to the city. By mid-
July, some 40 to 50 companies of reserves had moved to 
27aid Maury. Major General Stephen D. Lee, who had suc­
ceeded Polk in departmental command, briefly considered 
dismounting some of Forrest's cavalry and sending them to 
Mobile, but he realized that such troops would not be 
practical there. Maury, however, remained anxious to 
get his two artillery regiments back because of their” 
experience "in preparing the redoubts, mounting guns,
&c" and wrote Lee: "...I know you will hasten them to me
2 8at the earliest moment at which you can spare them."
Intelligence reports reaching Maury continued to 
indicate that the enemy would soon make an attack on 
Mobile, and he made various efforts to prepare for the 
assault. He did not appear confident of complete suc­
cess: "In view of the large naval preparations of the
enemy we may expect Forts Morgan, Gaines, &c., to be cut
^7Davis to Watts, July 7, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 687; Cooper to Withers, July 8 , 1864, ibid., XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 695; Davis to Withers, July 11, 1864, ibid., 
LII, Pt. 2, p. 691; Withers to Davis, July 12, 1864, 
ibid., 692; Davis to Withers, July 13, 1864, ibid., 693; 
Cooper to Withers, July 14, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 712; Withers to Cooper, July 14, 1864, ibid.; Withers 
to Bragg, July 15, 1864, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 708.
2 8
Lee to Bragg, July 9, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 696; Lee to Bragg, July 10, 1864, ibid., 700; Davis 
to Lee, July 11, 1864, ibid., 702; Maury to Lee, July 11, 
1864, ibid.
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29off, and even reduced." Maury still faced the problem
of too many non-combatants remaining in the city. To
Lee, Maury complained:
...these people are not Virginians; they do 
not desire their city to be defended, and 
unless they see a pretty formidable force 
coming in here they will give m^^mudi 
trouble during my preparations.
While a bit too harsh, Maury's assessment seems to have 
been basically correct. The great majority of the people 
undoubtedly wished to see some sort of defense made but 
not if it meant a bombardment of the city itself. An 
evacuation or bloodless surrender would allow them to 
continue their everyday lives relatively unaffected, and 
most of the population probably felt more concern about 
protecting their homes and livelihoods than occupation 
by the enemy. A few merchants and businessmen undoubt­
edly thought enemy occupation would benefit the city 
economically and looked forward to the day when the Stars 
and Stripes replaced the Stars and Bars.
29Maury to Bragg, July 14, 1864, Braxton Bragg 
Papers, Duke University Archives, Durham, North Carolina, 
hereinafter cited as Bragg Papers, Duke; Maury to Lee, 
July 11, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 703.
■?oMaury to Cooper, July 5, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt.
2, p. 687; Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, ibid., 693; 
Maury to Lee, July 9, 1864, ibid., 697; Maury to Bragg, 
July 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Duke; Maury to Lee, July 11, 
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 703.
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Maury requested several things to help in the 
defense of the city. He asked for the impressment of an 
additional 5,000 slaves to work on the city's land 
entrenchments. He also sent requisitions to the War 
Department for more heavy artillery ammunition. To this 
request, Cooper responded that all of the ordnance stores 
which he had asked for had been sent. Finally, Maury 
suggested that, since his information indicated no Union 
offensive operations in the near future, the Confederate 
forces west of the Mississippi River act to divert Union 
troops collecting to attack Mobile. Davis then sent 
word to General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the 
Trans-Mississippi Department, that he should send
available troops east of the river to defeat any enemy
4-u 31moves there.
The two artillery units which Maury loaned to Lee 
returned to Mobile on July 18, 1864. These regiments had 
served as a reserve infantry force during the battle of 
Tupelo, Mississippi, on July 14 and became free to go 
back to Maury following the retreat of the Union army.
31Von Sheliha to Rives, July 9, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, p. 698; Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, ibid.,
692; Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, ibid., 693; Cooper 
to Maury, July 8 , 1864, ibid., 695; Maury to Cooper,
July 10, 1864, ibid., 701; Maury to Cooper, July 5,
1864, ibid., 687; Lee to Kirby Smith, July 9, 1864, 
ibid., 696; Davis to Lee, July 14, 1864, ibid., 710; Lee 
to Kirby Smith or Major General John G. Walker, July 16, 
1864, ibid., 714.
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Maury sent both units into the various redoubts in the
city works. The men had occupied their stations for only
two days when they again received orders to report back
32to Lee at Meridian. This left only one regular army 
unit in the city— Colonel Maury's 15th Confederate 
Cavalry. General Maury had moved this regiment from 
Pollard to Mobile where it could reinforce Lee, protect 
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, or guard the coast near 
Pascagoula. Detachments of the unit performed provost 
duty in the city in the absence of infantry or artillery 
troops. On July 22 the regiment left Mobile to return to 
Pollard. A Union raiding force had moved toward Pollard 
from Pensacola on the twenty-first, and Colonel Patton 
needed the cavalry unit to help repel the raid. No regu­
lar army units remained in Mobile to defend the city
works. All guard duty had to fall upon the shoulders of
33the local militia.
On July 20, 1864, Confederate troops stationed at 
Fort Morgan witnessed the arrival of the monitor Manhat­
tan to join the Union blockading squadron. The appear­
ance of this monitor, the first of four which would
32Mumford Diary, July 18, 20, 1864; Para IX,
Special Order No. 202, Headquarters District of the Gulf, 
July 20, 1864, Orders, District of the Gulf.
33Maury to Lee, July 11, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 702; Daily Tribune, July 13, 1864; Mumford Diary,
July 22, 1864.
292
eventually join Farragut, seemed a further indication
that the Federals planned an attack. Page responded by
ordering all non-combatants away from Fort Morgan.
Whenever the assault came, believed Maury and some of the
other army officers, one of the weak spots in the
defenses would be Buchanan's squadron. Maury wrote Bragg
that he did not count very heavily on the navy:
"...their ships are inferior to those of the enemy, and
the long period of inaction has not been promotive of
34energy and enterprise." A lieutenant at Fort Morgan
voiced a more severe criticism of the navy in a letter to
his sweetheart:
...I have noticed one peculiarity about our 
naval men here, from Admiral Buchanan down to 
the last midshipman and that is an unlimited 
capacity for getting excited. They fly off 
the handle at the shortest notice and on the 
slightest pretext....
This officer also expressed the opinion that the officers
of the Mobile squadron had caused the confusion he saw
in General Page's mind, thus hindering his ability to
36command the fort.
34Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 21, 1864, quoted m  
Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 
74; Hults, "Aboard the Galena at Mobile," 19; Maury to 
Bragg, July 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Duke.
35Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 26, 1864, quoted m  
Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 
77.
■^Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 10, 26, 1864, ibid., 
69-70, 76-77.
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Von Sheliha pressed his engineering operations so
that the enemy would not find any weaknesses in Mobile's
various defensive positions. A continuing shortage of
laborers and a newly developed shortage of tools made his
work more difficult. At times during July 1864 as few as
fifteen slaves made up the labor force in the city.
Governor Watts responded to Maury's appeal for more
slaves by saying that the planters would only give them
up when troops arrived to take them. Von Sheliha did get
to use 300 slaves impressed from several salt works, but
37these men only remained at Mobile for nine days. Even 
if Von Sheliha had had as many laborers as he desired, 
he admitted that he did not have enough tools to put in 
their hands. He had sent 1,200 entrenching tools to the 
Army of Tennessee, which left him with only 1,500 spades 
and shovels. Von Sheliha preferred not to use the 3,000 
picks at Mobile to break ground, as he found plows much 
better. He tried to get 1,000 shovels from the Quarter­
master Department's stores in Montgomery, but the
^ V o n  Sheliha to Rives, July 11, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, p. 705; Rives to Von Sheliha, July 22, 1864, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, 
Vol. 5, p. 500; "Monthly report of operations for the 
defense of Mobile, Ala., for the month of July, 1864," 
O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 739; Tarleton to Lightfoot,
July 19, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War 
Letters of Robert Tarleton," 74.
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Engineer Bureau responded that the Quartermaster Depart-
38ment could spare only 2 0 0 .
The engineers made fair progress on the bay batter­
ies and city works during July despite the labor and tool 
shortage. Battery McIntosh required no work except 
repair of minor damages caused by heavy rains. Von 
Sheliha's men mounted a fifth gun in Battery Gladden and 
prepared platforms for two more guns expected to arrive 
from Selma. Because of the battery's isolated location, 
Von Sheliha constructed a blacksmith shop there. To pro­
tect Battery Tracy and Battery Huger from an enemy 
approach from Pensacola, Von Sheliha proposed the erec­
tion of defensive works near Blakely. Along the line of 
city entrenchments, the engineers conducted operations on 
six redoubts and three redans. Eight of the redoubts on 
Von Sheliha's new line had guns mounted in them. The 
engineers had not yet begun work on four planned redoubts 
or several of the redans to be located between the larger 
forts. Von Sheliha had wanted to place infantry trenches 
between all of the redoubts and redans but could not do 
much construction of this type. In a mid-month report to
O O
Von Sheliha to Rives, July 11, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, p. 705; Endorsement of Gilmer on telegram from 
Von Sheliha, July 22, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, 
Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, p. 497; Lieutenant 
J. H. Alexander to Von Sheliha, July 28, 1864, ibid.,
528.
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the Engineer Bureau on the condition of the Mobile city 
defenses and bay batteries, Von Sheliha stated that when
he completed his plans, "Mobile will hold out as long as
. . 39our provisions last."
Of more concern to Von Sheliha than the upper bay 
defenses was the condition of the three forts on the 
lower bay line. Only these works would bear the brunt of 
the initial enemy naval attack when it came. Von Sheliha 
assigned Captain Gallimard as engineer in charge of the 
entire lower line. The engineers mounted three guns on 
the east face of Fort Powell to protect that fort from 
attack from the rear if Farragut's fleet passed Fort 
Morgan and Fort Gaines. To strengthen the approaches to 
Powell from Mississippi Sound, the engineers constructed 
a row of chevaux-de-frise made of railroad iron in the 
waters west of the fort. Von Sheliha instructed Galli­
mard to cease work on batteries at Cedar Point and Little 
Dauphin Island because of the shortage of laborers. At 
Fort Gaines, Gallimard's men continued construction of a 
new wharf. The placement of torpedoes in the main ship 
channel continued. By the end of July, 180 torpedoes 
floated in three rows across the channel, but a gap of
39Von Sheliha to Rives, July 11, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, p. 705; "Monthly report of operations...July, 
1864," ibid., 740; Daily Tribune, July 27, 1864.
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226 yards between Fort Morgan's water battery and the
40point at which the torpedoes commenced still remained.
An attack by a Federal gunboat on July 4 had amply 
demonstrated the weakness of Fort Morgan, and Von Sheliha 
determined to try to strengthen the fort as much as 
possible. In the attack three shells hit the fort's 
outer wall, and one struck the west face of the citadel, 
a tall, octagonal, brick structure in the center of the 
fort. Von Sheliha's conclusions drawn from his observa­
tion of the shells' effects seem prophetic:
...From the depth to which these shots pene­
trated, from the size of the opening they pro­
duced, and from the amount of rubbish that 
fell, it is obvious that Fort Morgan, in its 
present condition, cannot withstand a vigor­
ous bombardment. The guns on the west faces, 
if not dismounted by the reverse fire of the 
enemy, will fall with the casemates on which 
they are mounted. The high scarp-wall will 
be breached by curbated shot. The citadel 
will crumble to pieces from the effect of 
either shot or shell, direct or reverse 
fire....
The Unites States Army constructed Fort Morgan in 1833 
when.none of the heavy rifled guns used by Farragut's 
vessels had existed. With cannons like the 100-pounder
40
Von Sheliha to Gallimard, July 10, 1864, O.R., 
XXXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 707-708; "Monthly report of operations 
...July, 1864," ibid., 739; Von Sheliha to Gallimard, 
July 11, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 905; Leonard Rudd to Galli­
mard, July 12, 1864, ibid.; Gallimard to Neville, July 
12, 1864, ibid., 906.
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Parrott, the Federal fleet could stand out of the range
of the heaviest guns in Fort Morgan and pound the fort
42to pieces at will.
In his instructions to Gallimard, Von Sheliha made 
a number of recommendations for improvements on the fort. 
To protect the individual guns and their crews, he sug­
gested the erection of heavy side and rear traverses.
The engineers also had to build traverses around the 
bombproofs and magazines and in front of the main sally­
port. Von Sheliha wanted cribs filled with sand put up 
over all faces of the fort's walls liable to receive 
direct fire from the enemy's fleet. This would prevent 
the walls from being penetrated by shot and broken into 
fragments which would fly through the air like pieces of 
shrapnel and also would prevent the walls from being 
pounded into rubbish and breached. Von Sheliha or one of 
his subordinates suggested that the citadel be cut down 
in height and bombproofed. One officer's opinion of this 
idea may reflect the judgment passed on all of the engi­
neer operations in the fort: "...all are agreed that if
43an attack is really imminent the work is most untimely."
42Ibid.; American State Papers, Military Affairs,
V (22nd Congress, 2nd Session, No. 551), 185; Victor 
Von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence (London: E. &
F. N. Spon, 18S8), 17.
43Von Sheliha to Garner, July 9, 1864, O.R., XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 706; Von Sheliha to Gallimard, July 10, 1864,
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Finally, Von Sheliha wanted the line of earthworks across 
the peninsula east of the fort completed. The engineers 
had already done some work on this line. In his report 
to Maury's chief of staff, Von Sheliha predicted that if 
the work force increased at Fort Morgan, the laborers 
would complete all of the work in fifteen days. The 
slaves did not come in, and most of the critical improve­
ments remained undone when Farragut's fleet ran past the
44fort on August 5.
ibid., 707; Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 19, 1864, 
quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert 
Tarleton," 74.
4 4Von Sheliha to Garner, July 9, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, pp. 706-707; Von Sheliha to Gallimard, July 10, 
1864, ibid., 707; Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 12, 1864, 
quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert 
Tarleton," 71.
CHAPTER XII 
"...A PARCEL OF POOR DEVILS COOPED UP IN 
A PILE OF BRICKS..."
By late July 1864, Union forces along the Gulf coast 
began making final plans for an attack on Mobile Bay. 
Concerned that the Confederates would continue strength­
ening Fort Morgan, Farragut had urged Canby to send him 
some troops so that he could attack the forts before the 
Confederates made them too strong. Even before Canby 
agreed to loan the men, Farragut proceeded with his own 
preparations. He saw his objective only as the reduction 
of Fort Morgan, Fort Gaines, and Fort Powell, thus seal­
ing off blockade running in and out of the bay. In both 
orders and correspondence, Farragut outlined his strategy 
to his subordinates. First, his main attack force—  
fourteen wooden gunboats and four monitors— would run 
through the main ship channel. Once inside the bay, the 
gunboats had as their objective the destruction or dis­
persal of Buchanan's wooden vessels. Farragut intended 
the monitors to attack and capture or sink the ram 
Tennessee. Seven gunboats in the Gulf and five or six 
more in Mississippi Sound would assist and protect the 
landing of Canby's infantry and artillery on Dauphin 
Island. Farragut considered the capture of Fort Gaines
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essential so that he could supply his vessels in the bay 
during further operations. Following the reduction of 
Gaines, the combined Union forces would capture Fort 
Powell and Fort Morgan in turn."*"
Canby designated a force of approximately 1,500 men 
to operate in conjunction with the navy against the Con­
federate forts. He hoped to reinforce this expedition if 
circumstances required it. Major General Gordon Granger 
commanded the Union forces, while Brigadier General
George F. McGinnis held immediate command of the
2 . . infantry. Although precise numbers do not exist, it is
clear that the Confederate troops opposing Granger and 
Farragut numbered slightly less than the Union landing 
force. From his headquarters in Fort Morgan, Page com­
manded the Third Brigade, District of the Gulf, which 
consisted of the garrisons of the three forts. The gar­
rison of Morgan consisted of five companies of the 1st 
Alabama Artillery Battalion, two companies of the 1st 
Tennessee Heavy Artillery, and one company of the 21st
^Canby to Sherman, July 20, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
380; Farragut to Canby, July 25, 1864, ibid., 386; Canby 
to Farragut, July 26, 1864, ibid., 388; General Order No. 
10, U. S. Flagship Hartford, July 12, 1864, ibid., 397- 
98; Farragut to Commodore James S. Palmer, July 18,
1864, ibid., 378.
^Canby to Farragut, July 29, 1864, O.R., XLI, Pt.
2, p. 449; Canby to Granger, July 31, 18(T4, ibid., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, p. 216; Christopher C. Andrews, History of the 
Campaign of Mobile (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 14.
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Alabama Infantry: in all about 500 men. Colonel
Charles D. Anderson, 21st Alabama Infantry, commanded 
Fort Gaines. Six companies of Anderson's regiment and 
two companies of the 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion, 
some 400 men, made up that garrison. At Fort Powell, 
Lieutenant Colonel Williams still held command with a 
force consisting of two companies of the 21st Alabama 
and a portion of Captain James F. Culpeper's South Caro-
3
l m a  Battery: a total force of about 140 men.
At daylight on August 5, 1864, lookouts at Fort 
Morgan saw Farragut's vessels approaching the main ship 
channel. The admiral used the same tactics he employed 
in running the Confederate batteries at Port Hudson: his
vessels steamed up in pairs, lashed together, with the 
more powerful ships on the side facing Fort Morgan. 
Between the gunboats and the fort, the monitors had their 
station, where Farragut hoped they would silence both the 
water battery and parapet guns of the fort. In approach­
ing Fort Morgan, the lead monitor, the Tecumseh, fired a 
few shots to test the range to the fort. Shortly after
3
Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 441; Benjamin B. Cox, "Mobile in the War Between the 
States," Confederate Veteran, XXIV (1916), 212; Maury 
to Seddon, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 428; 
Williams to Garner, Aug. 7, 1864, ibid., 441; Bernard 
A. Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile: From 1814 to the
Present (Mobile: B. H. Richardson, Printer, 1868), 75;
Mobile"Register, Aug. 9, 1908.
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7:00 A.M., when the Union vessels had come within a mile 
of the fort, Page ordered his gunners to open fire. The 
Federal squadron took approximately forty-five minutes 
to pass the fort. Page's men fired 491 shot and shell at 
the enemy from the fourteen heavy and several lighter 
guns which bore on the channel. Heavy smoke from the 
guns on both sides obscured the gunners' vision, and 
their fire had very little effect on the gunboats or 
monitors and caused few casualties. One shell did dis­
able the Oneida when it struck her boiler, but the
Oneida's consort, the Galena, took her into the bay with
4the other vessels.
The Confederates did destroy two Union vessels 
during Farragut's run into the bay. Neither of these 
vessels, however, fell victim to the fire of Fort Mor­
gan's guns. As stated above, Farragut's four monitors 
steamed between the wooden gunboats and the fort with the 
ultimate intention of attacking the Tennessee. The leading
Cox, "Mobile in the War," 212; Hurieosco Austill, 
"Fort Morgan in the Confederacy," Alabama Historical 
Quarterly, VII (1945), 256-57; Diary of First Lieutenant 
James Biddle Wilkinson, Aug. 5, 1864, photostatic copy in 
City of Mobile Museum Department; Farragut to Palmer,
July 18, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 378; Page to Maury, Aug. 6 , 
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 435-36; Endorsement of 
Maury, Sept. 26, 18 64, on Lieutenant F. S. Barrett to 
Lieutenant J. T. E. Andrews, Aug. 20, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 
570; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 4T6-18; 
Lieutenant Charles L. Huntington to Farragut, Aug. 6 , 
1864, ibid., 479.
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monitor, the Tecumseh, proceeded as ordered through the 
gap between the Confederate torpedoes and Fort Morgan.
Her commander, T. A. Craven, directed her into the 
torpedo field so that he could come to grips with the 
Confederate ironclad, but the Tecumseh struck a mine and 
sank almost immediately. Only 21 men of her crew man­
aged to escape before she went down. One historian has 
termed the sinking of the Tecumseh "the most completely
disabling blow struck by torpedoes during the entire
5
war." The side-wheel steamer Philippi became the second 
victim of the Confederates. She attempted to follow the 
main attack force into the bay but struck the shoal on 
the western edge of the channel. The Confederate gunners 
at Morgan directed a heavy, effective fire into her, and 
her commander ordered her abandoned. A party of men from 
the Confederate gunboat Morgan soon boarded the Philippi 
and burned her.^
^Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
417; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 27, 1864, ibid., 489-90; 
Acting Master C. F. Langley and Acting Master Gardner 
Cottrell to Farragut, Aug. 6 , 1864 (with endorsements), 
ibid., 569-70; Milton F. Perry, Infernal Machines; The 
Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare (Baton 
Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1965) , 161.
/•
Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 
505-506; Acting Master James T. Seaver to Farragut, Aug. 
6 , 1864, ibid., 506-507; Commander George W. Harrison to 
Buchanan, Oct. 1, 1864, ibid., 584.
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Buchanan's small squadron added what firepower it 
could to oppose Farragut's vessels as they steamed into 
the bay. The gunners delivered a raking fire into the 
Federal gunboats which the latter could not return.
When the Federal gunboats finally did open on the Confed­
erate squadron, their fire was heavy and accurate. The 
Gaines received several hits below the water line and 
began sinking. Lieutenant John W. Bennett steered his 
ship toward Fort Morgan and, about 500 yards from the 
fort, ran her onto the beach, where he ordered his men to 
abandon her. The commanders of the Morgan and Selma 
attempted to get their gunboats into shallow water after 
they witnessed the disabling of the Gaines. Lieutenant 
Peter U. Murphey took his Selma toward the northeast.
The Union gunboat Metacomet, which had cast off from the 
flagship Hartford, gave chase. After the Metacomet dis­
abled one of his guns and caused a dozen casualties with 
her heavy guns, Murphey surrendered the Selma rather than 
risk sinking and more casualties. Commander George W. 
Harrison managed to get the Morgan safely under the guns 
of Fort Morgan. That night Harrison ran past the Federal 
fleet and reached the safety of the upper bay lines. The 
officers and crew of the Gaines also escaped to Mobile
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during the night in six boats from the Gaines and the 
7Tennessee.
The dispersal of the Confederate wooden gunboats 
left only the Tennessee to face Farragut's squadron. 
Buchanan had attempted to ram the Hartford and Brooklyn 
as they steamed past into the bay, but the ironclad's 
inferior speed prevented her from coming close enough to 
do anything other than fire her guns into the enemy.
Once inside the bay, Farragut's vessels gathered about 
four miles from Fort Morgan and began to anchor.
Buchanan determined to renew the battle and try to sink 
one or more of the enemy gunboats. The latter all raised 
their anchors and joined in the fray. Three gunboats 
rammed the Tennessee but caused little damage, though 
Buchanan suffered a broken leg when an enemy shell 
knocked loose the after port cover and it struck him.
The enemy fire cut the Tennessee's steering chains and 
made it impossible for her crew to change her position. 
When the ram had her smokestack shot away, she filled 
with smoke, and her crew could not answer the increasing 
hail of enemy shells. Commander James D. Johnston
7
Buchanan to Mallory, Aug. 25, 1864, ibid., 576-78; 
Harrison to Buchanan, Oct. 1, 1864, ibid., 583-85; Lieu­
tenant Paul U. Murphey to Buchanan, Aug. 15, 1864, ibid., 
587-88; Lieutenant John W. Bennett to Mallory, Aug. 8 , 
1864, ibid., 588-90; George S. Waterman, "Afloat— Afield—  
Afloat," Confederate Veteran, VII (1899), 16-21.
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finally surrendered the ironclad after an engagement of
about an hour's duration, a fight Farragut called "one of
8the fiercest naval contests on record." Casualties in
the small Confederate squadron numbered 12 killed and 20
wounded. In Fort Morgan, Page lost 1 killed and 3
wounded. On the other hand, Farragut's vessels suffered
52 killed and 170 wounded, not counting the drownings
9
aboard the Tecumseh.
Farragut's squadron got safely into Mobile Bay 
despite all of the efforts made by the Confederates. In 
analyzing the Battle of Mobile Bay in later years, Von 
Sheliha presented this conclusion:
Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 
417-18; John Coddington Kinney, "Farragut at Mobile Bay," 
in Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buell (eds.),
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: 
Century, 1887) , IV, 379-99; Harrie Webster, "An August 
Morning with Farragut at Mobile Bay," in U. S. Navy 
Department, Civil War Naval Chronology, 6 vols. (Washing­
ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961-1966), VI,
85-98; Hults, "Aboard the Galena at Mobile," 29-31;
Susan G. Perkins (ed. & arr.), Letters of Capt. Geo. 
Hamilton Perkins, U.S.N. (Concord, N. H.: Ira C. Evans,
1886), T30-40; Buchanan to Mallory, Aug. 25, 1864,
O.R.N., XXI, 577-78; Johnston to Buchanan, Aug. 13,
1864, ibid., 579-81; James D. Johnston, "The Ram 'Ten­
nessee1 at Mobile Bay," Battles and Leaders, IV, 401- 
404; R. C. Bowles, "The Ship Tennessee," Southern 
Historical Society Papers, XXI (1893) , 291-93; James D. 
Johnston, "The Battle of Mobile Bay," ibid., IX (1881), 
471-76.
9
"Killed and wounded of Confederate fleet,..."
0.R.N., XXI, 578-79; Harrison to Buchanan, Oct. 1,
T8F4, ibid., 585; Bennett to Mallory, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid.,
588; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid., 407; Gee 
to Captain C. H. Smith, Aug. 6 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt.
1, p. 442.
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...The Federal attack would not have suc­
ceeded— nay, it would even have resulted in 
disaster to Admiral Farragut's fleet— had it 
been possible to obstruct the channe^between 
Fort Morgan and the eastern bank....
The shifting sand of the channel bottom combined with the
tidal flow and strong winds over the bay prevented the
Confederate engineers from either placing piles in the
channel or securing a floating battery there. All the
Confederates could do was place torpedoes across the
western portion of the channel. Maury ordered a gap of
400-500 yards left between the easternmost torpedoes and
Fort Morgan so that either Buchanan's squadron or
blockade runners could pass in and out. He felt safe in
this order because of the more than 20 guns which bore on
the channel from Fort Morgan: "No vessel yet built could
pass through that channel in daylight."'*''*'
Farragut and the Federals knew of the existence of
the torpedoes and of the gap left in the channel. In his
orders outlining the plan of attack, Farragut directed
his ships to sail well to the east of the buoy he knew
marked the eastern end of the torpedo field. To protect
■*"^ Victor Von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence 
(London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1^68), 178.
“^ Ibid., 104-105; Waterman, "Afloat— Afield-- 
Afloat," 17; Captain J. W. Whiting to Maury, Oct. 4,
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 433; Von Sheliha to Gil­
mer, Aug. 6 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 559; Endorsement of 
Maury, Sept. 26, 18 64, on Barrett to Andrews, Aug. 20, 
1864, ibid., 570.
308
his wooden vessels as much as possible against the heavy
Confederate fire they had to face, Farragut ordered sheet
chains draped over the ships' sides and sand bags or
12chains placed on deck over the ships' engines. The 
sinking of the Tecumseh caused Farragut to alter his 
plans. He directed his flagship to the head of the line 
and into the torpedo field. By steaming further to the 
west, Farragut avoided having to remain subjected to the 
heavy fire from Fort Morgan. When some of Farragut's 
officers had inspected the torpedo line the night before 
the battle, they found no torpedoes. From this evidence 
Farragut theorized that the mines had floated in the 
water so long that they had become ineffective. Thus he 
was willing to risk going through them. Events proved 
Farragut correct because none of the mines exploded. 
Officers on several gunboats reported after the battle 
that they had heard numerous torpedo primers snapping as 
the vessels passed through the field. Although one Con­
federate torpedo officer felt that few of the Federal 
vessels could have gotten into the bay if the gap had 
not been left in the torpedo line, the evidence of what 
actually occurred when the Federals passed through the 
field supports Von Sheliha's assessment: "...had the gap
1 2General Order No. 10, U. S. Flagship Hartford,
July 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 397-98; General Order No. 11, 
U. S. Flagship Hartford, July 29, 1864, ibid., 398.
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been closed by torpedoes alone, we have our very serious
13doubts if it would have made any material difference."
Buchanan's small squadron had little more success in 
stopping Farragut's ships than did the torpedoes. The 
Confederate tars did their best work and caused the most 
damage to the Federal vessels as the latter passed Fort 
Morgan and thus were unable to return the fire of the Con­
federate gunboats. Farragut reported that most of his 
casualties resulted from shells fired by Buchanan's 
ships. For example, one shell killed 10 and wounded 5 
men aboard the Hartford. Once the Federal squadron got 
into the bay, the unprotected wooden Confederate gunboats 
did not stand a chance of success against the superior 
enemy force. Only luck allowed the Morgan to escape cap­
ture or destruction. The loss of his gunboats left 
Buchanan in a difficult position. His ironclad was one 
of the most powerful ever built, but she lacked speed and 
had lost her smokestack during the passage of the Federal 
fleet. In his mind, Buchanan had two options: to con­
tinue the battle and do as much damage to the enemy as 
possible before retiring under the guns of Fort Morgan or
"^Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 417; 
Barrett to Andrews, Aug. 20, 1864, ibid., 785-86; Kinney, 
"Farragut at Mobile Bay," 390-91; Perry, Infernal 
Machines, 161; Daniel B. Conrad, "Capture of the C. S.
Ram Tennessee in Mobile Bay, August, 1864," Southern 
Historical Society Papers, XIX (1891) , 74; Von Sheliha,
A Treatise on Coast-Defence, 105.
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to sit back and await what he felt would be the inevi­
table destruction of his vessel. His move clearly sur­
prised Farragut and the other Federal commanders. The 
destruction of the Tennessee1s rudder chains foiled 
Buchanan's plans to return to Fort Morgan and resulted in 
the surrender of the ironclad. Buchanan might be criti­
cized for risking his vessel when it could have proven 
more effective as a floating battery at Fort Morgan, but
he was a fighting admiral and pursued the course he
14thought correct.
The evacuation and destruction of Fort Powell by the 
Confederates gave Farragut the route he needed to supply 
his vessels in Mobile Bay. While Farragut's squadron 
ran past Fort Morgan, five Federal gunboats in Missis­
sippi Sound opened fire on Fort Powell. Lieutenant 
Colonel Williams' garrison replied with the four guns 
which faced the Sound. Only five Federal shells struck 
the fort, and none of them did any damage. The Confed­
erates failed to hit any of the enemy gunboats. This 
action lasted about two hours, at the end of which time 
the Federals broke off the engagement. They renewed 
their fire about 11:45 A.M. but ceased firing when they 
received no reply from the fort. In mid-afternoon, the
^Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 
418; Drayton to Farragut, Aug. 6 , 1864, ibid., 425; Con­
rad, "Capture of the Tennessee," 75, 80.
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monitor Chickasaw approached Fort Powell from the east 
and captured the barge Ingomar, which had been used by 
the engineers in working on the fort. Williams ordered 
his men to open on the monitor with a rifled gun on the 
fort's south face. He had two guns on the east face, 
but they were exposed because the engineers had not com­
pleted the parapet. Only one shell struck the monitor, 
knocking away its smokestack. The Federal gunners fired 
25 shells in reply, and their fire had more effect. 
Williams reported the damage his fort sustained:
...A shell entered one of the sally ports, 
which are not traversed in the rear, passe^ 
entirely through the bombproof, and buriedt 
itself in the opposite wall. Fortunately*it 
did not explode. The shells exploding in the 
face of the work displaced the sand so 
rapidly that I was convinced unless the iron­
clad was driven off it would explode my maga­
zine and make the bombproof chambersunten­
able in two days at the furthest....
Williams found himself in a difficult position and
turned to Colonel Anderson at Fort Gaines for advice.
Anderson told him to evacuate his men if he could not
hold the fort. Convinced that he could not defend the
15Perkins to Farragut, Aug. 17, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 
500; Lieutenant Commander J. C. P. de Krafft to Farra­
gut, Aug. 6 , 1864, ibid., 503; Acting Master G. P.
Pomeroy to de Krafft, Aug. 6 , 1864, ibid., 504; "Abstract 
log of the U. S. ironclad Chickasaw,.." Aug. 5, 1864, 
ibid., 786-87; Perkins (ed.), Letters of Capt. Geo. 
Hamilton Perkins, 140-41; John Kent Folmar, "Lt. Col. 
James M. Williams and the Ft. Powell Incident," Alabama 
Review, XVII (1964), 127-29; Williams to Garner, Aug. 7, 
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 441-42.
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work against additional attacks by the Chickasaw, Wil­
liams marched his garrison out of Fort Powell and blew 
up the magazine. Maury, Von Sheliha, and the Mobile 
press criticized Williams' failure to hold Fort Powell, 
and Maury relieved him of command pending an investiga­
tion of his conduct.^ The military tribunal which 
looked into the case acquitted Williams and said that he 
acted correctly in saving his garrison from an indefens­
ible position. Although restored to duty, Williams did
not receive Maury's permission to take command of his
17regiment until December. Fort Powell fell because its 
eastern face had no protection against the fire of the 
Chickasaw or any of the other monitors. After the war, 
Williams expressed his opinion on the reason for the 
weakness of the fort:
"The bay side of Fort Powell had been 
left unprotected while our engineers were 
engaged in many absurd works, and some which 
deserve a worse name— such as the construc­
tion of batteries near Fort Morgan for no
1 6Williams to Garner, Aug. 7, 1864, with endorsement 
by Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 441-42;
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 11, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 164; Adver­
tiser and Register, Aug. 9, 10, 1864; Daily Tribune,
Aug. 7, 1864.
17Maury to Bragg, Sept. 14, 1864 (with endorsements), 
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, pp. 741-42; Williams to Seddon, Sept.
T4, 1864, Letters Received, Secretary of War; Folmar,
"Lt. Col. Williams," 130-34.
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other purpose than the protection of block­
ade runners in the swash channel...."
Available evidence indicates Williams had sufficient sup­
plies and a labor force to enable him to throw up at 
least a temporary parapet so that he could have defended 
the fort for several days. The surrender of Fort Gaines
on August 6 would still have given Farragut a means of
19getting supplies into the bay to his ships, however.
The Confederates began making preparations for the 
defense of Fort Gaines following the landing of Granger's 
Federals late on the afternoon of August 3, 1864. Maury 
was away in Meridian temporarily commanding the Depart­
ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, and 
Higgins acted in his place at Mobile. When Page learned 
that the Federals had landed, he requested reinforcements 
so he could attack the enemy force on Dauphin Island. 
Higgins had no real force to send Page but did order 200 
reserves, local defense troops, and marines from the city 
to Gaines. He also ordered the 22nd Louisiana to proceed
1 ft
Quoted in Folmar, "Lt. Col. Williams," 134.
19Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 11, 1864, Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 164; 
Maury to Seddon, Aug. 9, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, p.
428.
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20from Pollard to Gaines. The initial 200-man reinforce­
ment arrived at Gaines on the fourth. Although subjected 
to the fire of a Federal monitor, the disembarkation con­
cluded successfully. The gunners in Gaines replied 
briefly to the monitor's fire. Unfortunately for the
Confederates, their heaviest gun facing the Federal fleet
21outside the bay became dismounted during this skirmish. 
Page did not have enough men to conduct an attack, but 
Anderson's men burned their outbuildings and prepared 
for siege operations. Due to problems with its transport 
vessel, the 22nd Louisiana did not get away from Tensas 
Landing on schedule and consequently did not get to 
Fort Gaines before Farragut's fleet got into Mobile Bay. 
They did, however, escape becoming prisoners when the 
fort fell.22
20Captain Miles D. McAlester to Brigadier General 
Richard Delafield, Aug. 20, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 410; Maury to Seddon, Aug. 12, T864, ibid., 428;
Maury to Cooper, Sept. 1, 1864, ibid., 429; Higgins to 
Cooper, Aug. 2, 1864, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 715; Mumford 
Diary, Aug. 5, 1864; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 75; 
Roll for July and Aug. 1864, Record of Events Cards, 
Company F, 22nd Louisiana Consolidated Infantry, Com­
piled Service Records.
21Farragut to Commander Thomas H. Stevens, Aug. 4, 
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 403-404; Second Lieutenant M. C. F. 
Denicke to Colonel A. J. Myer, Aug. 4, 1864, ibid., 512; 
Abstract log of the U.S.S. Manhattan, Aug. 4, 1864, 
ibid., 824; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 75; Andrews, 
Campaign of Mobile, 15.
22Maury to Cooper, Sept. 1, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt.
1, p. 429; Granger to Canby, Aug. 5, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
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Granger's men edged in close to Fort Gaines during 
August 4 and by midnight had gotten their light artillery 
within 1,200 yards of the fort. During Farragut's pas­
sage of Fort Morgan, the Federals opened with these guns 
on Fort Gaines. Granger reported that his fire took the 
fort's water battery in reverse and silenced the guns, 
but it is unlikely that the Confederates would have even 
attempted to fire on the enemy fleet because they had no 
guns which could fire that far. Anderson's men did open 
on the Federal batteries but caused no damage. When the 
Tennessee attacked Farragut's fleet, the Confederates
fired a few shots at the Federals with 10-inch columbiads
23that faced in that direction. Anderson signalled Page 
asking what he should do. He stated that his fort would 
offer little protection to his men if fired on from 
Dauphin Island and the enemy fleet. Page advised Ander­
son to do his best and keep up the men's morale. On the 
fourth, Anderson had assured Page that he would resist 
the enemy for as long as possible, and he repeated that
521; Roll for July and Aug. 1864, Co. F, 22nd La., Com­
piled Service Records.
^McAlester to Delafield, Aug. 20, 1864, O.R. , 
XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 410; Granger to Christensen, Aug. 5, 
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 519.
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assurance on the afternoon of the fifth: "'We will emu-
24late our glorious old admiral and do our very best.'"
On the afternoon of August 6 , the monitor Chickasaw
steamed to within several thousand yards of Gaines and
opened fire. Most of the monitor's shells struck the
fort but did not cause any serious damage, but they did
25kill several men who lay sick in the post hospital. 
Anderson again requested guidance from Page, and the lat­
ter sent two of his staff officers, Captains Clifton H. 
Smith and R. T. Thom, to consult with Anderson. These 
officers left Gaines with the impression that Anderson 
would defend the fort to the last. Shortly after the 
captains left, however, Anderson received a letter signed 
by all but two of the officers in the garrison asking him 
to surrender the fort, which they felt would soon be torn 
apart by the enemy's fire, rather than risk further loss 
of life in a hopeless situation. Anderson acceded to his 
officers' wishes and asked Farragut for surrender terms 
early on August 7. Page attempted to learn the purpose 
of the flag of truce and signalled for Anderson to hold
24Page to Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 436.
25Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
414; Abstract log of the U. S. ironclad Chickasaw, Aug.
6 , 1864 , ibid., 787; Page to Maury, Aug."8 , 1864, 0-R*r 
XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 437; Perkins (ed.), Letters of Capt.
Geo. Hamilton Perkins, 142; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 
76-77.
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the fort. Ignoring Page's signals, Anderson visited
Farragut and Granger aboard the Hartford that evening and
agreed to their terms. While he was away, Page visited
Gaines in an attempt to stop the proceedings but had no
success. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the eighth,
Anderson surrendered to the Federal navy. The garrison
numbered 46 officers and 818 enlisted men. Twenty-six
guns, a large supply of ordnance stores, and food sup-
2 6plies for twelve months all fell into Federal hands.
Anderson's surrender of Fort Gaines brought no less
controversy or condemnation than Williams' evacuation of
Fort Powell. Page dubbed the surrender a "deed of dis-
27honor and disgrace to its commander and garrison."
Maury echoed Page's sentiments and said that the men 
should have defended the fort. In a confidential letter 
to Braxton Bragg, Maury stated one theory to explain the 
conduct of both Anderson and Williams:
*? fi
Page to Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 437; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 77-79; Captain 
F. N. Smith, et al, to Colonel Charles D. Anderson, Aug. 
6 , 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, pp. 743-44; Wilkinson Diary, 
Aug. 7, 8 , 1864; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864,
O.R.N., XXI, 414; Anderson to Farragut, Aug. 7, 1864, 
ibid.; Farragut to Anderson, Aug. 7, 1864, ibid., 415; 
Granger to Christensen, Aug. 8 , 1864, i b i d . 574; Page to 
Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid., 561; Maury to Seddon, Aug. 8 , 
1864, ibid., 562.
27Page to Maury, Aug. 8, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 437.
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I think constant croaking and discussion 
of the weakness of that line had greatly pre­
pared the minds of the commanders to give it 
up, and when the tremendous fleet placed 
itself between them and the city*-the Garri­
sons were overwhelmed by dismay.
Officers stationed at Fort Morgan were shocked by the sur
render of Gaines. One lieutenant confided his feelings
to his diary: "Humiliation and sorrow were in our hearts
but indignation soon expelled from our hearts all other 
29feelings...." An officer who had not signed the letter
asking Anderson to surrender later defended the colonel's
actions even though he felt Anderson should have waited
until the Federals demanded a capitulation:
...Col. Anderson may have acted injudiciously 
in yielding to its [the letter by the offi­
cers] request by making the overture to Admi­
ral Farragut, but as we are in honor bound to 
tell the whole truth, we shall here state 
that from the moment that the Federal fleet 
succeeded in running the gauntlet of Fort 
Morgan and the famous Tennessee had sur­
rendered, from that moment the men of Fort 
Gaines lost heart....
With the smaller forts captured, the Federals on 
August 9 turned on Fort Morgan. Granger's infantry, 
which had received reinforcements from New Orleans,
2 8Maury to Seddon, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid., 426; Maury 
to Seddon, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 428; Maury to Bragg,
Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
29 .Austill, "Fort Morgan," 259; Wilkinson Diary, Aug.
8 , 1864.
30Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 77-79.
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landed at Navy Cove and began moving toward the fort.
Page chose not to oppose the landing and turned his 
attention to preparing his position for a stubborn 
defense. Since the passage of Farragut's fleet, the Con­
federate garrison had worked to construct sand traverses 
around all of the guns, quarters, and sally port. Page
telegraphed Jefferson Davis that he planned to hold out
31"to the last extremity." The Confederates burned all 
of the buildings between the fort and Navy Cove and 
cleared the ground as much as possible. On the afternoon 
of the ninth, Farragut and Granger demanded an uncondi­
tional surrender of the fort after the fleet had bom­
barded it for several hours. The enemy fire had done no 
damage and slightly wounded one man. Page replied: "I
am prepared to sacrifice life and will only surrender
32when I have no means of defense." By sundown, the
31Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 17; Farragut to 
Canby, Aug. 9, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 523; Extract from 
journal of Captain John B. Marchand, Aug. 9, 1864, ibid., 
821; Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
pp. 438-39; Richard L. Page, "The Defense of Fort Morgan," 
Battles and Leaders, IV, 409; Austin, "Fort Morgan,"
259; Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 9, 1864; Page to Davis, Aug.
7, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 720.
32page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 439; Page, "Defense of Fort Morgan," *409; Austill,
"Fort Morgan," 259; Wilkinson Diary, Aug, 9, 1864; Page 
to Farragut and Granger, Aug. 9, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
563.
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Federal troops had moved to within two miles of Fort
33Morgan and completed the investment of the place.
Nothing of real consequence occurred at Morgan dur­
ing the next few days. Granger pushed skirmishers and 
sharpshooters to within several hundred yards of the 
fort's walls while his engineers and artillerymen estab­
lished batteries and siege approaches. Within the fort, 
officers joined with the men in working on the traverses. 
Although everyone was tired, morale remained high. The 
men had provided for the siege by driving a number of 
cattle and hogs into the fort to furnish fresh meat. One 
lieutenant wrote in his diary: "My cow and calf were
browsing in the luxuriant grass in the ditch near me,
34happily unconscious of their impending doom." Page 
detailed 160 men as sharpshooters under Major Gee, 1st 
Alabama Artillery Battalion, to meet any attack. From 
time to time these men exchanged shots with the Federal 
sharpshooters. The Tennessee, now manned by Federal 
sailors, and Farragut's three monitors opened fire on the 
fort on August 13 and continued the bombardment sporadi­
cally through the next day. Page's gunners returned the
33Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 17; Austill, "Fort 
Morgan," 259; Wilkinson Diaxy, Aug. 9, 1864.
34Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 17; Page to Maury, 
Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 439; Wilkinson 
Diary, Aug. 10, 1F64; Austill, "Fort Morgan," 260.
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fire but had no effect on the ironclads. When one Con­
federate saw the shells bouncing off her, he pronounced 
the Tennessee impregnable. The accurate Federal fire had 
caused several casualties, and the post adjutant wrote in
his diary: "The casemates are not safe; the shells have
35no respect for them...."
Beginning on August 15, the Federal forces on the 
peninsula kept up a fairly steady fire on Fort Morgan 
with artillery as well as their sharpshooters. One or 
more of Farragut's monitors continued the fire from the 
fleet. The Confederate sharpshooters maintained a spo­
radic return fire but had to lie low because of the heavy 
and accurate shooting of the Federals. Except for 
several brief bombardments of the enemy camp, Page did 
not allow his artillerymen to open on the Federal land or 
naval forces. One of his officers reported that Page 
refused to fire because he did not think the Confederate 
artillery could effectively retard the enemy advance and 
because he feared a heavy bombardment in retaliation.
Many men in the garrison disagreed with Page's policy and 
thought it demoralized the soldiers. Several officers 
stated that the occasional Confederate fire did hamper 
Granger1s advance:
35Austill, "Fort Morgan," 260-61; Wilkinson Diary, 
Aug. 12, 13, 14, 1864.
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...It is a very fine thing to stand off 
cooly, aim the gun as if at target practice,
& fire at a parcel of poor devils cooped up 
in a pile of bricks, when there is no danger 
in the way, but when §gth sides talk Mr Fed 
is rather nervous....
Throughout all of the Federal bombardments, Page moved
about the fort sending officers and men to secure places
37while exposing himself a number of times to enemy fire.
Life became quite dangerous for the men of the Fort
Morgan garrison, and instances of close calls from death
and heroic actions occurred frequently. On one occasion,
a 15-inch shell from a monitor tore into a casemate used
as an office and completely or partially destroyed much
of the furniture. The shell landed at the feet of
several men standing in the office but failed to 
38explode. On another occasion, a 15-inch shell entered
a casemate used as sleeping quarters for forty men and
exploded. The explosion miraculously killed no one and
39wounded only three. Page's Confederates began holding 
prayer meetings every morning at the sally port. Even 
religious services provided no protection because one
"^Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 439; Austill, "Fort Morgan," 261-64"; Wilkinson Diary, 
Aug. 15, 16, 1864.
^Austill, "Fort Morgan," 265.
3 8Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 9, 1864.
39Austill, "Fort Morgan," 261.
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morning a shell fragment struck and killed a soldier on
his way to the meeting. Sentries on the fort's walls
tried to warn their comrades of incoming shells whenever
possible. In one instance, a man had barely called out
to those below him when a Parrott shell tore his head 
40off. Despite the hardships, the men kept up their
morale, and relatively few deserted. An officer summed
up the situation:
...Entirely cut off & with 350 men hemmed in 
by a fleet of Forty vessels besides a large 
land force, confined in a small circle scarce 
large enough to drive a cart in, with a cer­
tainty of captivity & perhaps death before 
us, resistance is heroism & it is our unani­
mous resol^j to sell this Post at a costly 
price— ...
By August 21, Granger had twenty-five cannons and 
sixteen mortars ready to bombard Fort Morgan. Joined by 
all the vessels in Farragut's squadron, the Federal 
artillerymen opened a tremendous fire on the fort. Page 
reported the effect of the hail of shot and shell: "This
fire disabled all the heavy guns save two,..partially 
breached the walls in several places, and cut up the fort 
to such an extent as to make the whole work a mere mass
40Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 15, 16, 1864.
^Austill, "Fort Morgan," 264-65; Wilkinson Diary, 
Aug. 15, 1864.
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42of debris." The bombardment had such force that the
Federal soldiers as far away as Fort Gaines could feel the
43 .concussions. Fearing that his magazine might be hit,
Page ordered most of his powder destroyed. He also 
directed his men to spike all of the fort's artillery.
The enemy shells set fire to the citadel, and the fire 
caused the Federals to increase their barrage, which they 
had reduced considerably as night fell. After consulting 
a number of his officers and seeing his men fight a 
second fire at the citadel, Page decided on the morning 
of the twenty-third to surrender. The ceremonies occur­
red at 2:00 P.M., and a Federal officer recorded this 
description of the Confederate commander:
...Page, in a plain suit of citizen's clothing, 
looked very stiff....From the starched manner 
in which the late lord of Fort Morgan bore him­
self, I could well understand wh^our sailors 
had dubbed him "Ramrod Page."...
42Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 18; Austill, "Fort 
Morgan," 266-67; Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 44 0.
43George H. Gordon, A War Diary of Events in the War 
of the Great Rebellion, 1F61-1865 (Boston: James R.
Osgood & Co., 1882) , 337.
44Page to Maury, Aug. 23, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 571;
Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 440; 
Austill, "Fort Morgan," 267-68; Page to Farragut and 
Granger, Aug. 23, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 537; Granger to 
Page, Aug. 23, 1864, ibid.; Drayton and Brigadier Gen­
eral Richard Arnold to Page, Aug. 23, 1864, ibid., 537-38; 
Page to Drayton and Arnold, Aug. 23, 1864, ibid., 538; 
Gordon, A War Diary, 410.
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Page surrendered Fort Morgan because, as he put it,
45he "had no means left of defense." The enemy's fire,
both from artillery and sharpshooters, and the smoke and
flames from the burning citadel made it impossible for
the Confederates to man their guns or make any kind of
effective reply to the bombardment. With all of the
casemates at least partially breached, the men had little
protection from the Federal shells. After the war, Von
Sheliha wrote: "A bombardment of another twenty-four
hours would have changed the place into a shapeless pile
46of rubbish...." Some 600 men and 46 artillery pieces 
fell into Union hands when the fort's garrison capitu­
lated to them. Page had lost only about three killed and 
sixteen wounded during the siege, but the loss of life 
would have mounted if the enemy bombardment had continued. 
On the eve of the battle of Mobile Bay, Maury had seemed 
disposed to replace Page: "...General Page is too
despondent. He seems to see only the weak points of
47these forts. We need a bouyant man there...."
45Page, "The Defense of Fort Morgan," 410.
46Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 440; Von Sheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence, 19-20.
47Canby to Halleck, Aug. 24, 1864, O.R., XXXIX,
Pt. 1, p. 404; First Lieutenant Charles S. Sargent to 
Banks, Aug. 24, 1864, ibid., 419-20; Daily Tribune, Aug. 
31, 1864; Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 9-18, 1864; Austill,
"Fort Morgan," 259-67; Maury to Davis, Aug. 3, 1864,
O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 716.
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Following the siege of Fort Morgan, however, Maury could
not fault Page's actions:
...From all that is known of the conduct of 
this officer and the garrison under his 
orders, it is believed that they nobly strove 
to redeem the disgrace upon their arms 
inflicted by the hasty and unsoldierlike 
surrender of Fort Powell and Gaines.
The operations in Mobile Bay resulted primarily in
the termination of the blockade running at the port.
Canby did not have a sufficient infantry force for a land
campaign against the city, and Farragut's fleet could do
nothing without land support. Both Sherman and Farragut
expressed opposition to a direct attack on Mobile. The
general preferred to have a Confederate garrison tied up
there than a Union garrison, while the admiral believed
"it would be used by our own people to flood rebeldom
49with all their supplies." It is impossible in the 
absence of accurate importation statistics for the Con­
federacy to assess the exact impact of the cessation of 
the flow of supplies into Mobile, but the Confederate 
war effort must have suffered. The conduct of the Con­
federate army and navy commanders involved in the various
48Maury to Cooper, Sept. 1, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt.
1, p. 430.
49Sherman to Halleck, Aug. 20, 1864, ibid., XXXVIII, 
Pt. 5, p. 610; Canby to Farragut, Aug. 24, 1864, ibid., 
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 299; Farragut to Canby, Sept. 5, 1864, 
ibid., 344.
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actions is also difficult to analyze. Maury probably 
made a correct assessment when he wrote that the com­
manders and officers of the forts had been psychologi­
cally prepared for a surrender by constant talk of the 
weakness of the forts. But Buchanan did what any fight­
ing admiral would have done. He might, however, have 
provided more assistance in defending the forts if he had 
attempted to keep his squadron, particularly the 
Tennessee, under the guns of Fort Morgan. If Fort Powell 
and Fort Gaines had held out longer, they might have 
delayed their capture but only by risking the sacrifice 
of lives.
CHAPTER XIII
"...TIME IS EVERYTHING TO US NOW..."
In anticipation of Farragut's passage of the lower 
bay forts, Maury and his subordinates made hasty prepa­
rations to defend Mobile. The need for experienced 
troops occupied a prominent place in Maury's plans.
Since all of his regular veterans except the 22nd Louisi­
ana had rushed into Fort Gaines in time to be captured 
there, the need was particularly acute. Patton's 22nd 
Louisiana occupied a half dozen works upon its arrival in 
the city. Maury requested of Bragg that he order the 
return of the 1st Louisiana and 1st Mississippi artillery 
regiments to Mobile. The former regiment reached Mobile 
from Montgomery on August 6 and took positions along the 
city line. Bragg directed the 1st Mississippi Artillery 
to move from Atlanta back to the city. En route the 
regiment's train ran into a landslide between Pollard and 
Tensas Landing, and the accident resulted in the killing 
or wounding of 87 men. Instead of keeping the Missis- 
sippians in Mobile, Maury ordered them on picket duty 
below Blakely on the eastern shore. Even the officers 
and crew of the Gaines found themselves assigned to a bay 
battery since their vessel had been destroyed. All of 
these men helped fill gaps the local defense troops and
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convalescents could not cover, but Maury still desired 
further reinforcements: "...Veteran troops should be
sent here as soon as they can be spared elsewhere and 
they should be troops not connected by any ties with 
Mobile.,,;L
Maury appealed to all of the men in Mobile to organ­
ize to defend the city. He ordered Andrew S. Herron and 
Thomas J. Judge, both colonels and judges on the military 
court, to supervise the organization of these men.
Herron had as his responsibility the Louisianians and 
government employees, while Judge had all remaining men. 
Maury asked those men who had arms and ammunition to fur­
nish them and promised that unarmed men would find wea­
pons available. The city papers urged the city's men to 
comply with Maury's request: "All men within the city
capable of bearing arms, are bound, and will be obliged,
2
to shoulder them." Maury ordered city defense troops
Bergeron, "The Twenty-Second Louisiana Consolidated 
Infantry,8' 207; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 3 , 1864 , O.R. , LII, 
Pt. 2, p. 716; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 3, 1864, ibid.; Brig­
adier General Daniel W. Adams to Bragg, Aug. 5, 1864, 
ibid., 719; Mumford Diary, Aug. 5, 6 , 1864; Rolls for 
July and Aug., 1864, Record of Events Cards, 1st Missis­
sippi Light Artillery, Compiled Service Records of Con­
federate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from Mis­
sissippi; Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 21; Maury to 
Bragg, Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
2
‘ General Order No. 96, Headquarters District of the 
Gulf, Aug. 4, 1864, quoted in Advertiser and Register,
Aug. 7, 1864; Daily Tribune, Aug. 6 , 7, 1864.
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which had not gone to Fort Gaines organized into a bat­
talion for permanent guard duty under Lieutenant Colonel 
Stewart W. Cayce. Even the men of the city police 
department formed themselves into a military company and 
elected Mayor Slough as their captain. Governor Watts 
sent available state reserves to Mobile after receiving 
requests from Maury and Davis. These reserves arrived 
in the city very slowly, however. By August 9, Maury
could report only 4,000 troops of all types on duty in
3the District of the Gulf.
Because he was exercising temporary departmental
command, Maury needed a capable subordinate to fill in 
for him at Mobile. He had little confidence in Higgins, 
the only other general officer in the district:
"...while he is well qualified to fight ships, he is pos­
sessed of such an infirmity of temper as sets the whole
community, including the officers under him, against
4
him,— " On August 12, Major General Franklin Gardner
3
Special Order No. 228, Headquarters District of 
the Gulf, Aug. 10, 1864, quoted in Evening News, Aug. 12, 
1864; Para II, Special Order No. 234, Headquarters Pro­
vost Marshal's Office, Aug. 10, 1864, quoted in ibid.; 
Special Order No. 1, Headquarters Post Commandant, Aug. 
11, 1864, quoted in ibid.; Daily Tribune, Aug. 7, 1864; 
Mumford Diary, Aug. 8, 11, 1864; Maury to Davis, Aug. 8, 
1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 721; Maury to Seddon, Aug. 9, 
1864, Ibid.
4
Maury to Bragg, Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg Papers,
Western Reserve.
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arrived in Mobile, and Maury requested of the War Depart­
ment that it allow him to retain Gardner for temporary 
duty. In a letter to Bragg, Maury explained his request:
"...he will be very useful, and has the confidence of the
5
people and Troops." Gardner's previous experience at 
Mobile and his defense of Port Hudson certainly qualified 
him for duty under Maury. The War Department approved 
the latter's request, and on August 17 he assigned Gard-
g
ner to temporary command of the District of the Gulf.
In addition to a temporary district commander, Maury 
wanted two brigade commanders and recommended Colonel 
Henry Maury and Major Bryan M. Thomas, the latter then 
serving in the Alabama State Reserve. Thomas received a 
promotion to brigadier general and orders to report to 
Maury. Instead of promoting Henry Maury, the War Depart­
ment directed Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell to 
Mobile. Liddell had recently crossed the Mississippi
5Para VII, Special Order No. 193, Headquarters 
Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, Aug. 
4, 1864, quoted in Compiled Service Record of Gardner; 
Maury to Cooper, Aug. 12, 1864, Telegrams Received, Sec­
retary of War; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg 
Papers, Western Reserve.
g
Seddon to Maury, Aug. 13, 1864, Telegrams Sent, 
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 228; General 
Order No. — , Headquarters Department of Alabama, Missis­
sippi, and East Louisiana, Aug. 17, 1864, quoted in Com­
piled Service Record of Gardner; Mobile Evening News,
Oct. 8, 1864; Maury to Lieutenant General Richard Taylor, 
Aug. 23, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 795.
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River from western Louisiana, where he had served under
7
Major General Richard Taylor.
Von Sheliha and his engineers concentrated on pre­
paring the eastern shore and bay batteries for a possible 
attack once they knew Farragut had passed the lower bay 
line. Because the bay batteries had received so much 
attention in the past, the Confederates put most of their 
energy into work on the eastern shore. Von Sheliha admit­
ted that the defenses there had been neglected and were 
unreliable. He ordered all gaps in the obstructions in 
the Apalachee and Blakely rivers closed and the obstruc­
tions themselves strengthened. At Battery Huger, Von 
Sheliha mounted five additional heavy guns and thickened 
the fort's walls. He began preparing Battery Tracy for 
new guns also. To support these two works, Von Sheliha 
recommended that the navy move either the Huntsville and 
Tuscaloosa or three blockade runners mounted with heavy
Q
guns into position near the forts. He also initiated
7
Maury to Davis, Aug. 8, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 721; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, 
Western Reserve; Colonel H. L. Clay to Maury, Aug. 8,
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector 
General, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 527; Para XIII, Special 
Order No. 187, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 
Aug. 9, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 767; Davis to 
Maury, Aug. 9, lF64, ibid.; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 17,
1864, ibid., 780.
^Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 6, 1864, O.R., XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 759; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. F, 1864,
ibid., 760; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 10, 1864, ibid.,
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constructing works on the heights east of the two batter­
ies to protect their land approaches. Batteries at 
Blakely would stand too far north to provide effective 
protection alone, so, on the recommendation of Colonel 
John H. Gindrat, Von Sheliha chose the site of an old 
Spanish fort as the position for another permanent work:
...I propose to countersink our guns command­
ing the river, and to protect the battery by 
a bastion line in rear. Time is everything 
to us now, and we have to make the best use 
of the short^respite the enemy seems willing 
to grant....
Maury and Von Sheliha disagreed on the best means of 
defending the direct water approaches to the city. The 
former wished to place two ironclad floating batteries 
near Choctaw Spit to guard the lower line of obstruc­
tions even though these batteries remained uncompleted. 
Von Sheliha thought all of the Confederates' firepower 
should be concentrated at the upper obstructions. He saw 
the Choctaw Spit position as too isolated and weak to 
resist a strong enemy attack. He persuaded Gilmer to
769; "Report of operations for the week ending Sunday, 
August 14, 1864," ibid., 776; Von Sheliha to Gilmer,
Aug. 12, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf,
Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 169; Von Sheliha to Gilmer,
Aug. 13, 1864, ibid., 173.
9Gilmer to Maury, Aug. 6, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 759; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 10, 1864, ibid.,
769; Von Sheliha to Gindrat, Aug. 11, 1864, ibid., 772; 
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 12, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 169; Von 
Sheliha to Gindrat, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 170.
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intercede with Maury in behalf of his ideas, but Maury 
maintained his position, to which the Prussian had to 
a c c e d e . A l o n g  the city works and bay batteries the 
engineers strengthened and put in order all existing 
works. They placed torpedoes in Garrow's Bend and in the 
main channel below the obstructions. The only operations 
of note in this area involved the clearing of land in 
front of the outer city line. Higgins ordered all per­
sons living within one thousand yards of the line to 
evacuate their homes. Then Von Sheliha put nearly 200 
men to work cutting down all of the trees in this zone.
By mid-August, Von Sheliha expressed confidence that the 
works could resist at least any water attack on the
Several things hampered the engineers' efforts to 
prepare the city defenses for an assault. Rainy weather
Garner to Lieutenant Charles C, Simms, Aug. 5, 
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 555-56; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug.
6 , 1864, ibid., 558; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 7, 1864, 
O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 764; "Report of operations...," 
Aug. 14, 1864, ibid., 775; Gilmer to Maury, Aug. 9, 1864, 
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, 
Vol. 5, p. 605; Gilmer to Von Sheliha, Aug. 9, 1864, 
ibid.
11Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 9, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, 
Pt. 2, p. 768; "Report of operations...," Aug. 14, 1864, 
ibid., 775-76; Para V, Special Order No. 226, Headquar­
ters District of the Gulf, Aug. 13, 1864, quoted in Daily 
Tribune, Aug. 14, 1864; Mumford Diary, Aug. 8 , 13, 1864; 
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 12, 1864, Letters Sent, Engi­
neer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 169.
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prevented them from working on certain parts of the city 
line. Von Sheliha's officers had to locate cannons at 
various depots, transport them with carriages and chas­
sis to the forts, and then mount them. The most serious 
problem continued to be a shortage of necessary laborers. 
Von Sheliha's requests for men and attempts to hire the 
services of slaves had failed. He appealed to Governor 
Watts to furnish at least two thousand slaves to work on 
the defenses:
...Forts Powell and Gaines would be in our 
possession yet had my calls and appeals been 
heeded. Mobile will^follow unless planters 
send us laborers....
If the planters would furnish these slaves, Von Sheliha
felt he could make the city's defenses tenable within
twenty days. By mid-month, however, Watts still had not
found the needed laborers. Gilmer advised Maury to
impress Negroes. At Von Sheliha's urging, Maury ordered
all engineer work at Montgomery stopped so that the
slaves and tools there could move to Mobile. Planters in
Clarke, Baldwin, and Monroe counties sent 375 slaves to
the city on August 12 for use by Von Sheliha and his men.
12 "Report of operations...," Aug. 14, 1864, O.R. , 
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 776; Von Sheliha to Watts, Aug. 4, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, 
p. 137; Von Sheliha to Watts, Aug. 13, 1864, ibid.,
175.
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This small contingent still did not meet the engineers' 
needs, however.  ^^
The Confederate authorities made other, less impor­
tant preparations to defend Mobile. Maury had no more 
luck at this time than previously in getting non- 
combatants to leave the city. After the initial alarm 
caused by the passage of the forts, the excitement among 
the civilians subsided quickly, and their morale remained 
high. Higgins finally ordered all soldiers and sailors
who had families in the city to send them to the 
14interior. Maury's inspector of field transportation, 
Captain John T. Purves, attempted to obtain horses and 
mules for field artillery and wagons but found few per­
sons willing to sell their animals. When Purves received 
authorization to impress animals, he experienced further
13 "Report of operations...," Aug. 14, 1864, O.R. , 
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 776; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 6 , 
1864, ibid., 759; Gilmer to Maury, Aug. 6 , 1864, Letters 
and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, 
p. 588; Gilmer to Von Sheliha, Aug. 9, 1864, ibid., 613; 
Daily Tribune, Aug. 12, 1864; Evening News, Aug. 12,
1864; Von Sheliha to Watts, Aug. 4, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 137; Von 
Sheliha to Maury, Aug. 10, 1864, ibid., 161; Maury to 
Watts, Aug. 11, 1864, ibid., 164; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, 
Aug. 13, 1864, ibid., 173.
14Maury to Seddon, Aug. 10, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 
2, p. 768; Daily Tribune, Aug. 7, 1864; General Order 
No. 97, Headquarters District of the Gulf, Aug. 5, 1864, 
quoted in ibid., Aug. 6 , 1864; General Order No. 98, 
Headquarters District of the Gulf, Aug. 13, 1864, quoted 
in ibid., Aug. 14, 1864.
15frustration because he had no cavalrymen to assist him.
Higgins, spurred by the evacuation of Fort Powell and
surrender of Fort Gaines, issued strict orders pertaining
to defense of the forts and batteries around Mobile. He
forbade all commanders from communicating with the enemy
without his authority and required them to hold their
16works "to the last extremity." Finally, Higgins placed
restrictions on boats and vessels plying the waters of
the upper bay. Any boats in transit to the eastern shore
had to report to the naval ships anchored near the
obstructions or to Battery Gladden and could not pass in
front of any of the batteries. Sailing vessels coming
into port from the obstructions had to report to the
17officer of the guard at the navy yard.
Two small military operations briefly interrupted 
the operations conducted by Maury's men. The first of 
these involved an attempt by Maury to relieve Fort 
Morgan. He ordered the 1st Mississippi Artillery, then
15Purves to Major A. M. Paxton, Aug. 5, 1864, m  
Letterbook, Jan.-Oct. 1864, Purves Papers; Purves to 
Lieutenant H. L. D. Lewis, Aug. 7, 1864, ibid.; Purves 
to Paxton, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid.
16Para I, General Order No. 16, Headquarters Hig­
gins' Brigade, Aug. 9, 1864, quoted in Daily Tribune,
Aug. 12, 1864.
17General Order No. 1, Headquarters Defenses of 
Mobile, Aug. 10, 1864, quoted in ibid.; General Order No. 
2, Headquarters Army of Mobile, Aug. 12, 1864, quoted in 
ibid.
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stationed at Tensas Landing, to begin moving down the
eastern shore with the idea of creating a diversion in
the rear of Granger's land forces besieging Fort Morgan.
He hoped to either force the Federals to break off the
land siege or at least delay its progress. On August 13,
1864, Brigadier General Alexander Asboth left Pensacola
with 1,400 Federal infantry, cavalry, and artillery on a
march toward the Perdido River. Maury feared the Federal
move might threaten Blakely and ordered the Mississip-
pians back to a point just south of that place. Asboth's
Federals returned to Pensacola without having crossed the
Perdido. Even so, Maury abandoned any further ideas of
trying to relieve Page's men at Fort Morgan because he
did not have enough men to dispatch there and defend the
18approaches to Mobile at the same time.
On August 15, 1864, Farragut conducted a reconnais­
sance of the obstructions below the bay batteries.
Granger accompanied the admiral, and the two planned to 
study both the land and naval defenses of Mobile. Four 
gunboats, one of them the former Confederate vessel 
Selma, and two monitors moved to within three and a half
18Brigadier General Alexander Asboth to Christensen, 
Aug. 14, 1864, O.R., XXXV, Pt. 1, pp. 426-27; Mumford 
Diary, Aug. 11, 1864; Rolls for July and Aug. 1864,
Record of Events Cards, 1st Mississippi Light Artillery, 
Compiled Service Records; Bragg to Maury, Aug. 26, 1864, 
O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 798; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 27,
1864, ibid., 800.
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miles of the city. At 2 o'clock that afternoon, the 
Federal gunners opened fire on the bay batteries and the 
gunboat Morgan, which was anchored behind the line of 
obstructions. This bombardment continued for two hours 
although the Federals did not put out a heavy fire. The 
Confederate batteries did not reply to the Federals, but 
the crew of the Morgan did send an occasional shell 
toward the enemy. None of the Federal shots did any dam­
age to the Confederate defenses. At sunset Farragut 
ordered his force back down the bay. He had found the 
channel into Mobile completely obstructed. The Confed­
erates had sunk the unfinished ironclad Phoenix in the 
only gap which had remained in the line of piles. In his 
report, to the Navy Department, Farragut reported that 
unless his men could remove these obstructions there 
seemed no possibility of even his light-draft gunboats 
getting close to Mobile. A Vermont native living in 
Mobile witnessed the brief action and pronounced this 
verdict:
...So effective was this water line, protected 
as it was by water batteries, that Farragut's 
fleet might as well have attempted topsail 
through the Green Mountain range....
1 9Farragut to Canby, Aug. 14, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 
528; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 16, 1864, ibid.., 529-30; 
Richmond Sentinel, Aug. 17, 1864, quoted xn Butler to 
Fox, Aug. 17, 1864, ibid., 530; Abstract log of the 
U.S.S. Metacomet, Aug. 15, 1864, ibid., 828; Mumford
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Von Sheliha and his engineers continued their oper­
ations through the end of August. He received some 
opposition in one phase of his work, that of clearing 
the land in front of the city defenses. Various military 
headquarters issued orders preventing the axe parties 
from cutting down some of the trees. He requested that 
subordinate commanders inform him of any further 
exemptions. The engineers built two new batteries on 
the bay shore where they could assist in guarding the 
obstructions. Each of these works contained heavy rifled
guns or columbiads. The former crew of the gunboat
20Gaines assisted m  mounting the guns. Even though 
these fortifications and the other bay batteries appeared 
in good shape for defensive fighting, some of the garri­
sons found themselves in less than an ideal situation.
An officer at Battery McIntosh described his fort:
...The quarters are not very good and very 
much crowded. The water is very bad and
Diary, Aug. 15, 1864; Victor von Scheliha, A Treatise on 
Coast-Defence (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1868), 189-90;
William Rix, Incidents of Life in a Southern City During 
the War (Mobile: Iberville Historical Society Papers,iMsrru?].
20Von Sheliha to Captain John B. Grayson, Aug. 16, 
1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, 
Vol. 16, p. 190; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 17, 1864, 
ibid., 193; Mumford Diary, Aug. 16, 1864; Waterman, 
"Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 449.
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unhealthy. Most of the garrison are suf­
fering from diarrhea....
Von Sheliha did not like the construction or location of 
Battery Huger and Battery Tracy but strengthened their 
walls and placed heavier guns in them. These improve­
ments he felt would enable the works to put up stiff
22resistance to any attack.
The problems which Von Sheliha faced, particularly 
the shortage of slave labor, weighed heavily on him and 
undoubtedly caused him to become somewhat pessimistic.
His letters to Gilmer indicated that he felt that Gover­
nor Watts was helpless to aid him and that Maury could 
not impress the needed labor. In one communication he
wrote: "If not sustained by my Government, I will resign
23unconditionally and immediately." Obviously spurred by 
Von Sheliha's attitude, Maury asked Gilmer to send 
another engineer officer to his district. Because the 
man Maury requested was ill, Gilmer recommended that the 
War Department order Lieutenant Colonel Samuel H.
Lockett to Mobile. Lockett at that time held the
21Mumford Diary, Aug. 27, 1864.
22Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 17, 1864, Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 193;
Von Sheliha to Harrison, Aug. 19, 1864, O.R., XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 782.
23Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 16, 1864, Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 188;
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 17, 1864, ibid., 193.
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position of chief engineer for the Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana and had served at Mobile 
early in the war. Von Sheliha outranked Lockett, so Gil­
mer got a promotion to full colonel for Lockett. Gilmer 
possibly did not intend for Lockett to supersede Von 
Sheliha completely because the former's orders called for 
him to continue his duties with the Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana. When Von Sheliha 
learned of Lockett"'s assignment, he submitted his resig­
nation but offered to remain in Mobile until the threat
to the city had ended. The War Department turned down
24his resignation request.
In numerous small ways the Confederate authorities 
at Mobile continued preparing for the defense of the 
city. Governor Watts closed all of the whiskey and alco­
hol distilleries in Mobile County and threatened to 
revoke the licenses of any persons who did not obey his 
instructions. Gardner formed a special company of cav­
alry scouts (some of whom were Negroes) to watch the
24Gilmer to Seddon, Aug. 17, 1864, in Compiled Ser­
vice Record of Lockett; Para III, Special Order No. 106, 
Headquarters Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East 
Louisiana, Aug. 20, 1864, quoted in ibid.; Von Sheliha to 
Gilmer, Aug. 20, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 206; Von Sheliha to Gindrat, 
Aug. 20, 1864, ibid.; Von Sheliha to Seddon, Aug. 20,
1864, ibid., 208-209.
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25enemy forces at Fort Powell and on Dauphin Island. He
also issued orders restricting personal movement around
the defenses. One of these orders prohibited persons
from passing outside the picket line toward the enemy
without passports issued by district headquarters.
Another regulation forbade persons from visiting the
2 6various batteries unless they did so on duty. Captain
Purves continued to seek horses and mules but still with
little success. A citizen living near the city wrote a
friend that, even though the government offered $1,000 to
$2,500 for mules and horses, the people in the vicinity
27could not supply their needs. Following a prior recom­
mendation by Von Sheliha, Gardner ordered the seizure of 
the blockade runners Mary, Virgin, and Red Gauntlet in 
late August. The Confederates mounted two 6-pounder guns
25Daily Tribune, Aug. 21, 1864; Garnder to Cooper, 
Aug. 19, 1864, Telegrams Received, Secretary of War; 
Mumford Diary, Aug. 18, 1864.
2 6General Order No. 104, Headquarters District of 
the Gulf, Aug. 19, 1864, quoted in Daily Tribune, Aug.
21, 1864; General Order No. 105, Headquarters District 
of the Gulf, Aug. 21, 1864, Records of the Department 
of the Gulf, LHA Collection.
27Purves to Paxton, Aug. 24, 1864, Letterbook,
Purves Papers; Spencer to Holcombe, Aug. 29, 1864, 
quoted in Pitcher (ed.), "Spencer-Holcombe Letters,"
47.
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on the Red Gauntlet and ordered her on picket duty near 
the eastern shore.^8
Maury's difficulties with the city's non-combatants 
did not abate. Despite Farragut's run into the bay and 
the fall of the lower bay line, the civilian population 
did not leave Mobile in significant numbers. Maury 
reported that the people seemed in good heart and not 
willing to leave. An aide to Governor Watts wrote Davis 
that he found the citizens confident in their generals 
and unafraid. In a letter to his son-in-law, a man liv­
ing near Mobile expressed some of the reasons why the 
non-combatants would not leave:
...The citizens do not appear to be alarmed..
..Some families are leaving for the up country 
but not in a panic. Most of the women and 
children even are determined to remaig^and 
risk the dangers of a bombardment....
Some of the people told Maury they would not leave
because they had no place to go. He wrote to editors of
inland newspapers and asked them to have neighboring
O Q
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 13, 1864, Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 173; 
Garner to Major Claud McGivern, Aug. 26, 1864, Letters 
Received, Secretary of War; McGivern to Brigadier Gen­
eral Alexander R. Lawton, Sept. 6 , 1864, ibid.; Roll for 
July and Aug. 18 64, Record of Events Cards, Company L,
1st Mississippi Light Artillery, Compiled Service Records.
29Daily Tribune, Aug. 21, 1864; Maury to Taylor,
Aug. 23, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 795; Edward Har­
rison to Davis, Aug. 26, 1864, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 726; 
Spencer to Holcombe, Aug. 26, 1864, quoted in Pitcher 
(ed.), "Spencer-Holcombe Letters," 46.
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planters inform the Mobile papers of available places of
refuge. The Mobile papers did not greatly aid Maury's
cause, however; they expressed confidence that the city
was safe and that the people should not "trouble them-
30selves with doubts and apprehensions."
As August ended and September began, Maury contin­
ued looking for troops to defend the city. Although 
Governor Watts urged him to leave Mobile "a heap of 
ashes" if he could not hold it, Maury remained confident 
that he could conduct a successful defense with enough 
troops. The War Department tried to aid Maury by 
requesting that Watts call out as many state militiamen 
as possible and send them to Mobile. State troops alone 
would not suffice for Maury's needs, however. One prob­
lem was that these units arrived very slowly from their 
scattered mustering places. More seriously, many of the 
men fell ill once they reached the city. Maury requested 
some veteran infantrymen from General John Bell Hood, 
commander of the Army of Tennessee. Hood responded with 
a brigade of four Alabama regiments (some 700 men) 
commanded by Brigadier General Alpheus Baker. When they 
arrived at Mobile on August 28, Gardner ordered these 
troops to Spanish Fort to defend that position and to
30Maury to R. G. Scott, Aug. 12, 1864, quoted m  
Daily Tribune, Aug. 23, 1864; Editorial in ibid., Aug.
25, 186T;
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picket the eastern shore. One of Baker's regiments took 
up its station at Pollard so that it could guard the 
railroad.^
At the same time that he asked Hood for men, Maury 
requested Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest to come 
south from northern Mississippi with some of his cavalry 
if his situation permitted it. Forrest ordered 2,000 men
to Mobile even though he undoubtedly did not favor such a
}
move. Before these troops could move southward, Davis 
telegraphed Maury that he could best use Forrest's men in 
a raid on Sherman's line of communications in Tennessee 
and that state reserves would do as well in the trenches 
as dismounted cavalrymen. Maury acceded to the presi­
dent's wishes and suspended the movement of Forrest's 
32men. Lieutenant General Richard Taylor, new commander
Watts to Maury, Aug. 16, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 780; Maury to Watts, Aug. 28, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 81; Seddon to Watts, Sept. 2, 1864, 
Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 
237; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 24, 1864, Telegrams Received, 
Secretary of War; Maury to General John B. Hood, Aug. 24, 
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 796; Hood to Maury, Aug. 24, 
1864, XbTd.; Gardner to Cooper, Aug. 29, 1864, ibid.,
803; History of Company B, 40th Alabama Regiment, Confed­
erate States Army, 1862 to 1865 (Anniston, Ala. (?T1 The 
Colonial Press, 1963), 82-83.
32Maury to Forrest, Aug. 24, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 
2, pp. 796-97; Forrest to Brigadier General James R. 
Chalmers, Sept. 4, 1864, ibid., 815; Davis to Maury,
Sept. 2, 1864, quoted in Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Jefferson 
Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and
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of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Lou­
isiana, reached Meridian and assumed command on Septem­
ber 6 . He decided to send Forrest's cavalry into Tennes­
see to operate against Sherman's supply lines: "...it is
better to risk the fall of Mobile than to leave any rea-
33sonable efforts and means untried to defeat Sherman."
To give Maury some support, Taylor agreed to send one of
Forrest's brigades to Mobile. Colonel Robert McCulloch
and his brigade, nearly 1,000 strong, moved southward
34from Meridian to the Gulf city.
Despite these additions, the troop strength in the 
District of the Gulf did not satisfy Maury. Sickness, 
still prevalent among the new troops at Mobile, had 
reduced the force by about 2,000 men. The governors of 
Alabama and Mississippi withdrew or disbanded militia 
units totaling nearly 2,000 more men. Toward the end of 
September, Maury received through Taylor a request by
Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.: Department of
Archives and History, 1923), VI, 330; Davis to Maury, 
Sept. 4, 1864, ibid., 331.
33 .Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: 
Personal Experiences of the Late War, ed~I by Richard B. 
Harwell (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 242;
General Order No. 114, Headquarters Department of Ala­
bama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Sept. 6 , 1864, 
O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 818; Taylor to Bragg, Sept. 6 , 
T864, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, pp. 731-32.
34Para III, Special Order No. 119, Headquarters 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Sept. 6 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 818.
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Hood for the return of Baker's brigade to the Army of 
Tennessee. Maury explained his situation to Taylor and 
stated that he did not feel justified in reducing his 
army by detaching Baker's men. He pointed out that the 
unit composed his sole veteran infantry force and held 
the important works on the eastern shore. Taylor sup­
ported Maury and passed on word that Baker's brigade 
could not be spared. Maury did agree to send one of his 
Alabama cavalry regiments to northern Mississippi to help 
guard that region in the absence of Forrest's cavalry.
By the end of September, the effective force in the Dis-
35trict of the Gulf numbered only 6,600 men.
By the end of September 1864, the engineers at 
Mobile had made good progress in preparing the various 
defensive works for active service. They did not have a 
great deal of construction to do along the city line 
because they had completed most of the redoubts and 
redans along it. Their primary concern here consisted of 
dressing up the forts, strengthening their magazines, and 
connecting the forts with trenches. Redoubt "N" received
35Maury to Captain W. F. Bullock, Sept. 26, 1864, 
in George W. Brent Collection (LSM 8932.1), Louisiana 
State Museum Archives and Manuscript Collections; Maury 
to Bullock, Sept. 27, 1864, ibid.; Hood to Bragg, Sept. 
23, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 746; Taylor to Bragg,
Sept. 29, 1864, ibid., 748; Abstract from return of the 
army of the District of the Gulf, Sept. 30, 1864, ibid., 
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 8 8 6 .
349
the attention of most of Von Sheliha's work force. This
position, also known as Fort Sidney Johnston, anchored
Von Sheliha's line to Garrow's Bend and, with Battery
Missouri, Mound Battery, and Battery Buchanan, covered
the water obstructions from the west. So important did
Von Sheliha feel the completion of this redoubt that he
employed a force of 500 slaves on it day and night. A
citizen who made a brief excursion along the Shell Road
gave this description of what he witnessed:
...It would be a novel sight to one unaccus­
tomed to the presence of the sable race, to 
witness the crowds of darkies employed in 
building the fortifications. They are in 
such numbers, that they look like ants on the 
side of an ant hill. Just as we passed, the 
signal to "knock off" work was given, & they 
obeyed the summons with alacrity, forming at 
once into companies, to marchfiinto the city, 
where they are quartered....
Battery Gladden and Battery McIntosh received minor 
repairs and several new guns. The engineers placed one 
7-inch Brooke rifle in the latter. They also prepared a 
platform in McIntosh for a 10-inch columbiad. This fort 
seemed susceptible to an attack by enemy launches, so the 
engineers used a pile driver to place obstructions in
3 6Weekly Report of Engineer Operations, Sept. 4, 
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 815; Weekly Report of 
Operations for the Defence of Mobile, Sept. 17, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 13, 
p. 61; Monthly Report of Operations for the Defense of 
Mobile, Oct. 6 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, p. 793; The 
Home Journal, Sept. 23, 1864.
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front of the work, while they strung a boom out along the
western face. An officer in the garrison at Battery
McIntosh wrote in his diary that they could not make much
of a defense at the battery unless they received strong
reinforcements. The men suffered from chills and fever:
"Thirty six men out of three companies are all we have
37for duty today." To further strengthen these two bat­
teries, the engineers moved two floating batteries to the 
vicinity. They transferred an ironclad battery up from 
the lower obstructions and placed it in the channel 
between the batteries. In the rear of McIntosh, the
engineers anchored a wooden battery (called Camel Bat-
38tery) that mounted two 42-pounder rifles.
Lockett placed Colonel Gindrat in charge of all 
engineer operations east of Tensas River, and Gindrat 
made good progress there. His men did little on Battery 
Tracy and Battery Huger except place more earth over 
their magazines and keep them clean. The engineers had 
almost completed the main work at Spanish Fort by the end 
of September and mounted two guns in it. They finished 
the largest of the four redoubts (No. 2) on the line in
37Monthly Report..., Oct. 6 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 
3, pp. 793-94; Mumford Diary, Sept. 5, 186T.
O O
Weekly Report..., Sept. 17, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 13, p. 62;
Monthly Report..., Oct. 6 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, 
p. 794; Mumford Diary, Sept. 5, 186T.
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rear of Spanish Fort but did not have it ready for guns. 
Practically all of Redoubt No. 3 and Redoubt No. 4 they 
had pushed toward completion by the end of the month.
The laborers dug more than 250 yards of rifle pits and 
cleared the timber for about 300 yards in front of the 
entire line. To aid in an evacuation of the works if it 
became necessary, Gindrat's men began construction of a 
road through Bay Minette swamp to a point across Apala­
chee River from Battery Tracy. At Von Sheliha's sugges­
tion, a portion of Gindrat's force erected a battery at 
Blakely and began clearing land for a supporting line 
similar to that at Spanish Fort. In the Blakely and Apa­
lachee rivers, the engineers placed additional piles and
39constructed rafts to block the streams. These opera­
tions in the eastern division completed the basic frame­
work of the Mobile defenses, and subsequent work would 
only complete or strengthen what the engineers had 
already begun.
39Weekly Report..., Sept. 4, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 
2, p. 815; Lockett to Gindrat, Sept. 6 , 1864, ibid.,
819; Gindrat to Von Sheliha, Sept. 16, 1864, ibid., 841- 
42; Monthly Report..., Oct. 6 , 1864, ibid., PtT T, p. 
794; Von Sheliha to Gindrat, Sept. 6 , 1864, Letters 
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 13, p. 29; 
Weekly Report..., Sept. 17, 1864, ibid., 62-63.
CHAPTER XIV 
"...STEADY AND ENERGETIC PREPARATIONS ..."
From October 1864 until the commencement of the 
final Federal campaign against Mobile in March 1865, the 
Confederate command in the city concentrated on strength­
ening their defenses and preparing them to meet an enemy 
attack. Maury remained concerned about obtaining a suf­
ficient military force to man his numerous works in the 
event of a siege. The small force at his disposal suf- 
ferred from various illnesses, primarily chills and 
fever, which reduced its effective strength. In early 
October, out of 900 men present, Colonel Patton could 
count only 100 men fit for duty in his brigade. Maury 
reported in mid-November that he had only about 700 men 
to defend the land lines around Mobile. By the latter 
part of that month, his entire effective force in the 
District of the Gulf numbered slightly less than 3,000 
men.'*' He asked the War Department for 4,000 or 5,000 
veteran troops, preferably men from states other than
■^Maury to Surget, Oct. 4, 1864 , in Richard Taylor 
Papers, Louisiana Adjutant General's Archives, Jackson 
Barracks, Chalmette, La.; Maury to Cooper, Nov. 10, 1864, 
O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, p. 910; Abstract from return of the 
army of the District of the Gulf, Nov. 20, 1864, ibid., 
XLV, Pt. 2, p. 632.
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Alabama: "A few Virginia regiments would be particularly
2
well suited for a tour of service here." Taylor echoed
Maury's request but recognized that few available units
existed. He stated that Mobile would fall if attacked
in its weakened condition. As Taylor anticipated, the
War Department could then find no troops to send to
Maury. Seddon wrote: "Re-enforcements cannot under more
pressing exigencies elsewhere be spared for the doubtful
3
contingency of an unreported attack."
The only source from which it seemed that Maury 
could draw reinforcements appeared to be Alabama State 
Troops. Practically all of these men then in service had 
already moved to Mobile. The Confederate command finally 
agreed to enroll free Negroes in the city for local 
defense, but no evidence exists of units forming at this 
time. Taylor urged Maury to allow portions of the mili­
tia and reserves to return home for short periods when 
he could spare them. These furloughs, Taylor felt, might 
encourage the men to turn out more readily when an attack
4
became imminent. Maury requested 4,000 more men from 
2
Maury to Cooper, Nov. 10, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, 
p. 910.
3
Ibid., with endorsements by Taylor, Nov. 14, 1864, 
and Seddon, Nov. 21, 1864, pp. 910-11.
4
Endorsement by Taylor, Nov. 14, 1864, on Maury to 
Cooper, Nov. 10, 18 64, ibid., 910; Evening News, Oct. 22, 
1864; Surget to Maury, Oct. 1, 1864, Letters Sent,
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Governor Watts and pointed out that necessities elsewhere
made it impossible for regular Confederate units to come
to Mobile. Taylor also addressed an appeal to Watts. He
asked the governor to urge the state legislature to pass
laws which would make possible the raising of an adequate
force for Mobile's defense. Taylor pointed out that the
Gulf coast presented the only threat of invasion of the
state. Sherman's "March to the Sea" had ended any
threat from the east, while Hood's invasion of Tennessee
had secured the state's northern border. Until Watts
and the Alabama legislature could act, Taylor searched
his department for men to send Maury. The only unit he
could find consisted of "galvanized Yankees"— foreigners
who had deserted the Union army— and this unit numbered
5
only 450 men of dubious reliability.
In the waning months of 1864, several general offi­
cer changes occurred at Mobile. Taylor had requested in 
September the assignment of Gardner to command of south­
western Mississippi and eastern Louisiana, where Taylor 
hoped he would succeed in correcting a chaotic situation.
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 109.
5
Maury to Watts, Nov. 23, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 197; Taylor to Watts, Dec. 12, 
1864, O.R., XLV, Pt. 2, pp. 683-84; Lieutenant Colonel 
William M. Levy to Maury, Dec. 22, 1864, ibid., 724.
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The War Department acceded to Taylor's request and in 
October ordered Gardner to Meridian and to report to
g
Taylor for orders. Maury also lost the services of 
Higgins in October but did so willingly. Higgins had 
left his command without orders in September when he 
thought the enemy would attack Mobile, and Maury removed 
him from duty. When Higgins applied to Taylor for rein­
statement, Maury informed the latter of Higgins' conduct
and asked that Taylor not allow him to return to Mobile.
7
Taylor supported Maury in his wishes. In late November 
General Gustave Toutant Beauregard, now in charge of all 
western armies, ordered Major General Martin L. Smith to 
report to Maury for temporary duty commanding the Mobile 
defenses. Maury wrote to Beauregard explaining that he 
would assign Smith as temporary commander of the District 
of the Gulf while he acted as departmental commander dur­
ing Taylor's absence in Georgia. When Smith arrived at 
Mobile, however, Maury decided to make him chief engineer
g
Taylor to Bragg, Sept. 24, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, 
p. 747; Para IX, Special Order No. 277, Headquarters 
District of the Gulf, Oct. 3, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 3, 
p. 786; General Order No. 126, Headquarters Department of 
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Oct. 4, 1864, 
General Orders, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana, RG 109, National Archives; Mumford Diary, 
Oct. 4, 1864.
7
Mumford Diary, Sept. 24, 1864; Surget to Higgins,
Oct. 23, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, p. 847.
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of the Mobile defenses and to turn the district over to 
Smith only when he (Maury) had to go outside its 
boundaries.^
Von Sheliha and his engineers did a considerable 
amount of work on the line of city defer es during the 
last months of 1864. For the most part, they made 
repairs and added earth to strengthen walls and magazines 
during October and November. The largest portion of the 
labor force of the city works concentrated their efforts 
in Redoubt "N" (Fort Sidney Johnston) to ready it for 
service against the enemy's gunboats. Heavy rains, cold 
weather, a shortage of workers, limited transportation, 
and a shortage of construction materials prevented Von 
Sheliha from making the progress he desired. To help 
alleviate the shortage of slave laborers, Taylor author­
ized Maury to employ his soldiers in completing the for-
I 9
tifxcations at Mobile. In early December Von Sheliha
O
Beauregard to Taylor, Nov. 16, 1864, O.R., XLV,
Pt. 1, p. 1213; Maury to Gardner, Nov. 22, 1864, ibid., 
1239; Beauregard to Brent, Nov. 26, 1864, ibid., 1248; 
Brent to Major General Martin L. Smith, Novi 27, 1864, 
ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 791; Maury to Brent, Nov. 28, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 198; Maury to 
Brent, Dec. 1, 1864, ibid., 206.
g
Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Oct. 15, 
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, pp. 839-40; Weekly Report of 
Operations for Week Ending Oct. 22, 1864, ibid., 850-51; 
Monthly Report of Operations for October 1864, ibid., 884; 
Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Novi 5"7 1864, 
ibid., 895; Report of Operations for Week Ending Nov. 12, 
1864, ibid., 916; Weekly Report of Operations for Week
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shifted most of his work force to the redans located 
between the redoubts on the city line. He wanted to put 
them in good condition so that they could give the neces­
sary support to the larger earthworks in the event of an 
attack. The engineers had placed all of the redans in 
fighting condition by the end of the month. General 
Smith ordered Von Sheliha to prepare chevaux-de-frise 
(sharpened stakes driven at right angles through logs) 
for placement in front of the lines to protect them 
against infantry assault. By the end of 1864, the city 
line seemed ready for active defense.
The bay batteries required less work than the city 
works. At Battery Gladden the engineers replaced an 8- 
inch gun with a 1 0-inch gun, made repairs necessitated by 
heavy rains, constructed a new wharf, and drove obstruc­
tions in the waters in front of the work to stop boat 
attacks. Von Sheliha's men constructed gun pits and
Ending Nov. 19, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, p. 1230; Weekly 
Report of Operations for Week Ending Nov. 26, 1864, ibid., 
1250; Von Sheliha to Captain W. D. Morris, Nov. 23, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 13, 
p. 208; Levy to Maury, Dec. 25, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 247.
■^Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Dec.
10, 1864, O.R., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 678; Weekly Report of 
Operations for Week Ending Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 707-708; 
Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Dec. 24,
1864, ibid., 734; Smith to Lockett, Dec. 29, 1864, Let­
ters Sent, Engineer Office at Mobile, Oct. 11, 1864-May 
8 , 1865, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 177.
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mounted two new 10-inch columbiads at Battery McIntosh. 
They also brought in additional earth to strengthen the 
walls and traverses of the fort. As was the case at 
Gladden, severe storms had eroded some of the sand and 
earth at McIntosh and made repairs necessary. To protect 
Gladden's left flank, Von Sheliha ordered an octagonal 
floating battery placed 500 yards northeast of the fort. 
This battery would mount two guns when completed. The 
engineers also employed two ironclad floating batteries 
and a battery constructed on camels (wooden caissons)—  
each mounting several heavy guns— in support of Gladden, 
McIntosh, and the bay obstructions. Because the bay 
batteries and eastern shore works had to share a steam­
boat for transporting supplies, Von Sheliha could not do 
as much strengthening and repair work as he had hoped, 
but by the end of December, he had all of the bay bat­
teries in fair fighting order."*''*'
1 Weekly Report... Oct. 15, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt.
3, p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22, 1864, ibid., 851; 
Monthly Report...Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report... 
Nov. 5, 1864, ibid., 895; Report...Nov. 12, 1864, ibid., 
916; Lockett to Major James H. Alexander, Nov. 20, 1864, 
ibid., 1229; Weekly Report...Nov. 19, 1864, ijbid., XLV, 
Pt. 1, p. 1231; Weekly Report.. .Nov. 26, 1864, i'bid. , 
1250; Weekly Report...Dec. 10, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 
678; Weekly Report...Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 708; Weekly 
Report... Dec. 24, 1864, ibid., 735; Lockett to Von 
Sheliha, Dec. 14, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, 
Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 128.
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Of the works on the eastern shore, Battery Huger and 
Battery Tracy received less attention than Blakely and 
Spanish Fort because the engineers had practically com­
pleted the two former forts. Tracy required only minor 
repairs and additional sodding. Von Sheliha began erec­
tion of a new, stronger magazine at Battery Huger. After 
the engineers covered it with about eight feet of earth, 
Von Sheliha mounted a gun atop it. Because Huger lay 
closer to the enemy's fleet, making it more vulnerable in 
case of an attack, Von Sheliha wanted to make its walls 
as strong as possible. He ordered his men to raise and
thicken the parapet, especially on the work's south face.
He also instructed his engineers to place additional sand 
on various parts of Huger's interior. Whenever possible, 
Von Sheliha had his labor force place sod on the walls to 
cut down on erosion. Likewise, he had them drive piles
in front of Huger to reduce damage by tidal action. Some
limited work remained to be done on Battery Tracy and
Battery Huger, but Von Sheliha and Lockett felt they
12could put up a satisfactory defense.
12Weekly Report...Oct. 15, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt.
3, p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22, 18(T4, ibid., 851; 
Monthly Report... Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report... 
Nov. 5, 1864, ibid., 895; Report...Nov. 12, 1864, ibid., 
916; Weekly Report...Nov. 19, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, 
p. 1231; Weekly Report...Nov. 26, 1864, ibid., 1250; 
Weekly Report... Dec. 10, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 678; 
Weekly Report... Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 708.
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For practically all of October and much of November 
1864, the Confederate engineers accomplished little con­
struction at Blakely. Maury had ordered them to cease 
work on the water battery there to make all supplies 
available for use at Spanish Fort. During October, the 
small labor force at Blakely divided its time between 
clearing land for the line of redoubts and trenches in 
the rear of the water battery and loading barges with 
earth and sod for use at Battery Huger and Battery Tracy. 
In mid-November, fifty laborers had to be diverted to 
make repairs on the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad. 
The engineers began more intensive work on the fortifi­
cations in December, although some of their men still had 
to provide some sod and earth for Huger and Tracy. By 
mid-month Lieutenant E. A. Ford, engineer in charge of 
the Eastern Division, could report that he had com­
pleted two redoubts on the land line. This progress did 
not please Lockett, however, because he expected Ford to 
have all of the redoubts in fighting order before any of 
them reached completion. Ford got two more redoubts 
ready for platforms by Christmas and fifty yards of 
infantry rifle pits dug. The engineers would have to do
361
considerable work in the new year to have Blakely ready
13for troops and all its guns.
Lieutenant John T. Elmore, in charge of engineer 
operations at Spanish Fort, had plenty of work to keep 
his men busy. The men mounted all of the guns Von She- 
liha planned for the main water battery (called No. 1 or 
Spanish Fort) and completed the work's main magazine.
They also strengthened the face of the fort on the land 
side and began erecting traverses around the guns.
Redoubt No. 2 (later called Fort McDermott) received 
almost as much attention as Spanish Fort since it was the 
largest fort on the land line. Elmore's laborers 
strengthened the fort's walls, placed a thick cover over 
its magazine and made the ditch deeper and wider. By 
mid-December, they had completed embrasures for six guns. 
Work slackened in late December because of a shortage of 
slave labor. Along the entire land line, the engineers 
be^an erecting a line of abatis (felled trees with 
sharpened branches facing the enemy) to protect the 
works against an infantry assault. Smith still saw a
13Weekly Report...Oct. 15, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt.
3, p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22 , 1864 , ibid., 851; 
Monthly Report...Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report... 
Nov. 5, 1864, ibid., 895; Report...Nov. 12, 1864, ibid., 
916; Weekly Report... Dec. 10, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 2, 
p. 678; Weekly Report... Dec. 17, 1864 , ibid., 708; Weekly 
Report... Dec. 24, 1864, ibid., 735; Lockett to Lieutenant 
E. A. Ford, Dec. 17, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, 
Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 139.
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need for a lot of work on the various fortifications as 
the year ended. He recommended light artillery positions 
at various points to cover the approaches to the main 
redoubts. He also recognized the need for safe communi­
cation routes between the redoubts and from the land line 
to a source of fresh water. As at the city works, Maury
authorized the engineers to use the soldiers stationed
14at Spanish Fort to do needed construction.
Maury faced no serious enemy attacks in his district 
in late 1864, although the Federals did conduct several 
raids or feint attacks. One of these raids occurred in 
mid-December and had Pollard as its objective. A force 
of about 800 Negro troops moved from Barrancas, Florida, 
with orders to break up the railroad at Pollard. They 
brushed aside the weak Confederate force under Brigadier 
General James H. Clanton and reached the village on 
December 16. After destroying part of the tracks and 
burning several government buildings, the Federals began 
returning to Barrancas. The Confederates gathered troops 
from various locations to oppose the raid. Liddell took
14Weekly Report...Oct. 15, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3, 
p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22, 1864, ibid., 851;
Monthly Report...Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report... 
Dec. 10, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 678; Weekly Report... 
Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 708; Weekly Report... Dec. 24, 1864 , 
ibid., 735; Smith to Lockett, Dec. 29, 1864, ibid., 746- 
47; Maury to Lockett, Nov. 27, 1864, Letters Sent, Engi­
neer Office, Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 70.
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a mixed force of infantry and cavalry from Baker's and 
Colonel Charles G. Armistead's brigades, respectively, 
from Blakely and caught the enemy about six miles below 
Pollard, where a running fight began. The pursuit con­
tinued for about thirty miles, ending only because the 
Confederates' horses became too exhausted to go farther. 
While the Federals admitted losing 81 men killed and 
wounded, one Confederate newspaper report placed the 
enemy casualties at 200. Liddell's men captured ten 
enemy wagons and much of their supplies. The Federals
had done little damage to the railroad, and by December
1524 repair crews had it in operation again.
Two other Federal forays occurred on the western 
side of Mobile Bay. On November 27, 1864, Brigadier Gen­
eral John W. Davidson rode out of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
with a force of about 4,000 cavalrymen, headed for south­
ern Mississippi. Davidson hoped to strike the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad northwest of Mobile and tear up as much of 
the track as possible. A brigade of Louisiana cavalry­
men pursued the Federal column but lacked strength enough
15Brigadier General Thomas J. McKean to Christensen, 
Dec. 19, 1864, O.R., XLIV, 449; Beauregard to Cooper,
Dec. 22, 1864, TbTd.; Brent to Taylor, Dec. 14, 1864, 
ibid., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 6 8 8 ; Brent to Cooper, Dec. 16,
1864, ibid., 695; Brent to Taylor, Dec. 16, 1864, ibid., 
697; Brent to Cooper, Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 699; Brent 
to Beauregard, Dec. 19, 1864, ibid., "109; The Army Argus 
and Crisis, Dec. 24, 1864.
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to risk an engagement. Maury ordered McCulloch to deploy
his brigade and the 15th Confederate Cavalry to oppose
the enemy, and he scraped together a small infantry force
at Meridian to serve under General Thomas. Rain turned
the roads into quagmires and all the streams and rivers
overflowed their banks. These circumstances impeded
Davidson's movements. Only a small detachment of the
Federal force actually threatened the rail line, but
McCulloch's men repulsed the detachment in a skirmish on
December 10. Unable to cross the Pascagoula River and
fearing the Confederate forces gathering against him,
Davidson decided to take his men to West Pascagoula where
they could get transports to East Pascagoula and be avail-
16able if further threats were made against the railroad.
General Gordon Granger, commanding Union forces 
around Mobile Bay, proposed a demonstration against Mobile 
from East Pascagoula to force the Confederates to keep 
their troops in the city instead of sending them against 
Davidson or the troops moving against Pollard. After 
landing at East Pascagoula on December 15, 1864, with
3,000 infantry, Granger began his march toward Mobile.
16Brigadier General John W. Davidson to Christensen, 
Nov. 26, 1864, O.R., XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 686-87; Davidson to 
Christensen, Dec. 13, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, pp. 787- 
89; Maury to Cooper, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid., 789;
Flowerree to McCulloch, Dec. 7, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 
661-62.
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He asked Canby to allow him to use Davidson's cavalry, 
which had just arrived at West Pascagoula, so that he 
could try to destroy part of the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad. Canby ordered only two regiments to Granger 
because he intended to use the rest of Davidson's men in
a raid from Memphis against Hood's communications in
17 .Tennessee. The Federal advance halted at Franklin
Creek, about 12 miles from East Pascagoula, without
encountering any opposition. At Franklin Creek, the
Federals threw up some light entrenchments and began
stripping sawmills in the area of all their lumber.
Granger gave up any plans for a strong push against the
railroad and contented himself with keeping the Confed-
T O
erates' attention on him.
To oppose the Federals at Franklin Creek, Maury 
ordered a small infantry force and three cavalry regi­
ments to the area. Taylor wanted Gardner to concentrate 
all available men from southern and central Mississippi
17Granger to Christensen, Dec. 3, 1864, ibid., XLI, 
Pt. 4, p. 752; Granger to Christensen, Dec. lT~, 1864 , 
ibid., 853; Granger to Christensen, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid., 
862; Christensen to Granger, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid., 863; 
Christensen to Davidson, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid.; Para VI, 
Special Order No. 14, Headquarters Cavalry Forces, Mili­
tary Division of West Mississippi, Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 
875.
18Granger to Christensen, Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 876; 
Granger to Christensen, Dec. 20, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 2, 
pp. 291-92.
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and eastern Louisiana and to station them between Merid­
ian and Mobile to cooperate with Maury. One of Taylor's 
dispatches expressed his evaluation of the city's status 
at this stage of the war. He regarded "the lines of com­
munication with Mobile and the safety of that city as of
vital importance, not only to this department, but to the
19maintenance of General Hood m  Tennessee...." Several 
skirmishes between the opposing forces at Franklin Creek 
convinced Maury that Granger would not advance any far­
ther and that he could not attack the Federals success­
fully behind their trenches. He then advised Taylor 
that he did not need to send any more men from Gardner's 
command toward Mobile. By Christmas, Maury no longer 
saw Granger's force as a real threat to the city. The 
retreat of the Federals on December 26 because of a lack 
of supplies confirmed Maury's opinion. Taylor requested 
Governor Watts and Governor Charles Clark of Mississippi 
to send available reserves to Maury in case another 
threat occurred.^
19Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian (New 
York: Scribners, 1894), 200; Taylor to Brent, Dec. 22,
1864, O.R., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 723; Levy to Maury, Dec. 22, 
1864, Ibid., 724-25.
20Major James E. Montgomery to Christensen, Dec. 19, 
1864, O.R., XLI, Pt. 4, p. 884; Granger to Christensen, 
Dec. 21, 1864, ibid., 925; Granger to Christensen, Dec. 
27, 1864, ibid.,941; Colonel Henry Bertram to Mont­
gomery, Dec. 22, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, p. 843; Levy to 
Maury, Dec. 27, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 743; Brent to
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The news reaching Taylor from Tennessee certainly
seemed to forebode a future threat to Mobile. Informing
Maury that he had become "satisfied that Genl. Hood has
suffered a severe reverse," Taylor made the following
prediction:
...for the first time, that Mobile will be 
seriously threatened— not immediately, but so 
soon as the enemy, having pressed his pursuit 
of our army as far south of the Tennessee as 
the condition of the roads will permit, shall 
be in a position to return the force— somg^
20,000 men— which he obtained from Canby.
Taylor urged Maury "to make steady and energetic prepara-
22tions for the anticipated movement." He stressed the 
importance of completing Mobile's defenses and having 
enough mills set up to supply the garrison with corn 
meal. Maury replied that Smith found the works defens­
ible and close to completion. He had six mills with a 
total capacity of 2,200 bushels of meal per day, but most 
of the corn in the city did not seem fit for issue.
Maury hoped Taylor would send proper supplies in time to 
meet the demands of a siege. Maury also stressed that 
the troops then in the city could not make a successful
Taylor, Dec. 30, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 748; Maury to 
Levy, Dec. 25, 1864, Brent Collection.
^Captain Andrew J. Watt to Maury, Dec. 25, 1864,
O.R., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 734.
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defense against an attack. Only men from field armies
23would constitute "a good and proper garrison."
In view of the possible threat to Mobile, Taylor 
began shifting troops from Hood's Army of Tennessee to 
the District of the Gulf in January 1865. Brigadier 
General James T. Holtzclaw received orders to take his 
Alabama brigade of Major General Henry D. Clayton's divi­
sion to Mobile to relieve Baker's brigade, which would 
replace Holtzclaw's in the division. Maury preferred to 
have a brigade of troops from another state because he 
felt they would be less likely to desert and would not be 
distracted by being so near their homes. Still, he did 
not adamantly oppose the assignment of Holtzclaw's men to 
his district. When the Alabamians reached the city, he
ordered them to the eastern shore to garrison Spanish
24Fort and Blakely. Another of Clayton's brigades—
2 ^^ Ibid.; Levy to Maury, Dec. 15, 1864, Letters Sent, 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 225; Endorsement of Major John J. 
Walker, Dec. 17, 18 64, on Levy to Maury, Dec. 15, 1864, 
Letters and Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana; Maury to Watt, Dec. 28, 
1864, Brent Collection.
24Para I, Special Field Order No. — , Headquarters 
Military Division of the West, Jan. 19, 1865, Special 
Field Orders, Military Division of the West, RG 109, 
National Archives; Bullock to Maury, Jan. 20, 1865, O.R. , 
XLV, Pt. 2, p. 801; Bullock to Maury, Jan. 27, 1865, 
ibid., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 938; Para V, Special Order No. 28, 
Headquarters District of the Gulf, Jan. 28, 1865, ibid., 
940; Maury to Taylor, Jan. 25, 1865, Brent Collection; 
Maury to Surget, Jan. 27, 1865, ibid.; Maury to Bullock,
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Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson's Louisianians— also
received orders for Mobile. Gibson's men arrived in
25early February and camped m  the city suburbs.
Initially Taylor had received permission to retain all of 
Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart's corps of Hood's 
army for use in his department, but he felt that the men 
should go to the Carolinas to fight Sherman. Taylor 
retained Major General Samuel G. French's division (now 
under Brigadier General Francis M. Cockrell) for duty at 
Mobile and ordered the rest of Stewart's corps eastward. 
Cockrell's three brigades occupied a camp on the Shell 
Road about five miles below the city. In all, some
3,000 veteran troops had augmented Maury's force at 
Mobile.
Feb. 16, 1865, ibid.; History of Company B, 40th Alabama 
Regiment, Confederate States Army, 1862 to 1865 (Anniston, 
Ala. (?): The Colonial Press, 1963), 8 6 .
25Surget to Maury, Jan. 21, 1865, Letters Sent, 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 285; Para IV, Special Order No. 19, 
Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Jan. 24, 1865, in Com­
piled Service Record of Randall L. Gibson; Rolls for 
Jan. and Feb. 1865, Record of Events Cards, 1st Louisi­
ana (Strawbridge's) Infantry, Compiled Service Records; 
Rolls for Jan. and Feb. 1865, Record of Events Cards,
4th Louisiana Infantry, ibid.
2 6Robert S. Bevier, History of the First and Second 
Missouri Confederate Brigades, 1861-1865 (St,. Louis:
Bryan, Brand & Co., 1879), 261-62; chambers, "My Journal," 
360; Taylor to Beauregard, Jan. 30, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 943; Taylor to Maury, Feb. 1, 1865, ibid., 951; 
Abstract from Return of the District of the Gulf, Mar.
10, 1865, ibid., 1045.
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In addition to these infantry units, Taylor ordered
approximately 1,500 artillerists to Mobile. These men
had manned light batteries in Hood's army but had lost
their guns during the disastrous Tennessee campaign.
Taylor intended Maury to use these men as infantry until
he could find guns for them. Maury, however, planned to
place the men in the works on the city line to man the
siege guns. Most of the men did receive infantry
weapons, however. All of the men had to undergo training
and drill in handling heavy artillery and mortars. The
captain of one battery wrote to his wife that his men
drilled four times a day and worked around the fort the
rest of the day. The men of Lumsden's Alabama Battery
practiced with their coehorn mortars by firing at targets
set out in the marsh in front of their redoubt. These
new duties did not satisfy all of the men involved. The
officers of the Fifth Company, Washington Artillery, for
example, wrote to Joe Johnston asking for a transfer to
his command. Even the batteries fortunate enough to get
field guns still faced shortages of animals to pull their
guns. Attempts to find necessary numbers of horses and 
27mules failed.
^Bullock to Maury, Jan. 31, 1865, O.R. , XLIX, Pt.
1, p. 947; Taylor to Maury, Feb. 1, 1865, ibid., 951; 
Maury to Taylor, Feb. 3, 1865, Brent Collection; George 
Little and James R. Maxwell, A History of Lumsden1s 
Battery, C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa: United Daughters of the
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The revival of war spirit which swept the South 
following the Hampton Roads peace conference found 
expression at Mobile in a mass meeting held at Temper­
ance Hall on February 13, 1865. Forty-six citizens 
issued the call for a gathering to "bring to the aid of
our cause and country all the available means at our 
2 8disposal." The editor of the Advertiser and Register
supported the call wholeheartedly:
...It is the proper and manly response to the 
slavish ultimatum of Lincoln. It is, we fondly 
hope, the beginning of a revival in the war 
spirit of the country, to end in a united and 
undying resolution to resist that ultimatum to 
the death and to consecrate anew all we have 
of manhood ^ d  means to the sacred cause of 
Freedom....
Although no attendance figures are available, newspaper 
accounts spoke of the meeting as the largest assemblage 
ever held in Mobile. Several persons made patriotic 
speeches, and then all the participants approved a series 
of resolutions in support of the civil and military author­
ities of the Confederacy. These resolutions included
Confederacy, 1905), 63; Captain Stouten H. Dent to Anna 
Beall Young Dent, Feb. 10, 1865, in Dent Confederate 
Collection, Auburn University Archives, Auburn University, 
Auburn, Ala.; William Miller Owen, In Camp and Battle with 
the Washington Artillery of New Orleans (Boston: Ticknor
and Co., 1885) , 420; Captain John B. Grayson to Major 
John A. A. West, Feb. 26, 1865, in Compiled Service 
Record of John B. Grayson.
28Advertiser and Register, Feb. 11, 1865.
29zyIbid.
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support for arming slaves for military service and for
the reinstatement of Joe Johnston to command of the Army
* m 30of Tennessee.
In anticipation of an enemy campaign against Mobile, 
Taylor and Maury concentrated their efforts on preparing 
the city and its defenses for a protracted siege. Taylor 
urged Maury to have a proper supply of foodstuffs on hand 
to feed 10,000 men for four months. In reply, Maury 
stated that the quartermasters had failed to accumulate 
a sufficient amount of corn and reminded him that he had 
no control over supply agents or means of transporting 
supplies. Taylor pointed out that Pemberton at Vicksburg 
had been deceived by his commissaries and quartermasters 
on the quantity of supplies in that beleaguered city. He 
ordered Maury to have one of his staff officers inspect 
his supplies daily and make a report to Taylor. He pro­
mised to aid Maury in removing any obstacle in the way 
of accumulating fuel, forage, and other supplies. Maury 
employed the former blockade runner Virgin to bring food­
stuffs down the Tombigbee River. Once subsistence sup­
plies reached Mobile, he had them stored in five
~^Ibid., Feb. 15, 1865; "Alabama," The American 
Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of the 
Year 1865, Vol. V (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1866),
9-10.
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different warehouses located in areas of the city least
31likely to be exposed to enemy fire.
Maury did not feel that he had an adequate supply of 
ordnance stores or small arms ammunition, but a report by 
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Waddy indicated that Maury had 
little cause for concern. Waddy found a small armory in 
the city employing six men. These workmen could repair 
between 75 and 100 small arms a week. Maury's chief of 
ordnance had accumulated enough caps, powder, paper, and 
other material needed to make 1,000,000 cartridges. He 
lacked only a sufficient supply of lead. To make up for 
the shortage of lead, Maury had made arrangements with 
the city government to take up the pipes of the city1s 
water works. Waddy stated that there was an average of 
115 cartridges per man on hand in Mobile. Some of the 
troops, however, did not receive ammunition until early 
March. A soldier of the 46th Mississippi Infantry wrote 
in his diary that although his brigade had gotten new 
Austrian rifles on its arrival in Mobile, the men did
31Surget to Maury, Jan. 11, 1865, Letters Sent, 
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 271; Taylor to Maury, Feb. 5, 1865, 
ibid., 312-13; Maury to Surget, Jan. 27, 1865, Brent Col­
lection; Maury to Taylor, Feb. 3, 1865, ibid.; Maury to 
Taylor, Feb. 7, 1865, ibid.; Maury to Taylor, Mar. 14, 
1865, ibid.
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32picket duty with empty weapons. Except for three types 
of guns, Waddy reported that most of the 209 heavy artil­
lery pieces in the District of the Gulf had an ample 
supply of ammunition. In fact, Waddy discovered that 
"in many instances the number of rounds per gun is too
great, or rather, greater than our present limited
33resources would authorize."
In early March 1865, as it became more evident that 
the enemy intended to move against Mobile soon, Maury 
issued orders and circulars outlining actions for sol­
diers and civilians to take when the attack came. He 
instructed the artillery commanders along the city line 
to destroy or remove any buildings, trees, or other 
obstacles to the effective fire of their guns. He 
advised those people living outside the works within 
range of these guns to move their belongings to a safe 
place. Because a siege would expose the city to heavy 
enemy fire and cause a shortage of provisions, Maury 
urged all non-combatants to leave if possible and asked 
them to as least send their slaves to the interior.
32Maury to Surget, Jan. 27, 1865, Brent Collection; 
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Waddy to Brent, Jan. 21, 1865, 
in George W. Brent Papers, Duke University Archives; 
Chambers, "My Journal," 364.
33Waddy to Brent, Jan. 21, 1865, Brent Papers; 
"Tabular Statement of the Artillery in the District of 
the Gulf, Mobile, Ala., Jan. 10th, 1865," Palmer Civil 
War Collection.
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In compliance with instructions from Taylor, Maury took 
steps to send out all government Negroes not necessary 
for siege operations. Also in accord with orders from 
Taylor, Maury made preparations to burn all state-owned
34cotton within the city limits as soon as a siege began.
He expressed confidence in being able to defend the 
city:
Our fortifications are strong— our stores 
are abundant and good— our troops are veter­
ans— and with the cordial support of the 
people in all measures required for the public 
safety, and, with the blessing-.of Almighty 
God, are confident of victory.
34Circular, Headquarters District of the Gulf, Mar.
3, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Mar. 4, 1865; 
General Order No. 8 , Headquarters District of the Gulf, 
Mar. 12, 1865, quoted in ibid., Mar. 14, 1865; Surget to 
Maury, Feb. 6 , 1865, Letters Sent, Department of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 
314; Surget to Maury, Mar. 14, 1865, ibid., 385; Lockett 
to Myers, Mar. 14, 1865, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, 
Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 394; Von Sheliha to Gar­
ner, Mar. 16, 1865, ibid., Vol. 13, p. 344; Maury to 
Surget, Feb. 10, 1865, Brent Collection; Maury to Taylor, 
Mar. 14, 1865, ibid.; Bullock to Maury, Mar. 12, 1865, 
Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 196, p. 115.
"^Butler to his sister, Mar. 13, 1865, Butler Family 
Papers; Para IV, General Order No. 8 , Headquarters Dis­
trict of the Gulf, Mar. 12, 1865, quoted in Advertiser 
and Register, Mar. 14, 1865.
CHAPTER XV
"WE HAD TO STAND AND TAKE IT"
The Union high command began making plans for a 
serious attack on Mobile in early 1865. Even then, how­
ever, neither Grant nor Halleck saw the city as the chief 
objective of a campaign by Canby's forces. Grant 
expected Canby to capture Mobile, if he could take it 
without an extensive siege, and then move against Selma 
or Montgomery in conjunction with a cavalry force riding 
southward from Tennessee. Mobile would serve only as a 
base for these subsequent marches. If Canby encountered 
much delay at the city, he could bypass it and go on to 
his real objective: the industrial area around Selma.^
Grant agreed to send 18,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry 
troops from Tennessee to reinforce Canby. The latter 
concentrated approximately 26,000 men of his command at 
Barrancas, Florida, and on Dauphin Island. Because the 
fortifications around Mobile itself seemed so strong, 
Canby decided to reduce the works on the eastern shore
^Grant to Halleck, Jan. 4, 1865, O.R. , XLV, Pt. 2, 
p. 506; Halleck to Canby, Jan. 19, 1865, ibid., XLVIII, 
Pt. 1, p. 580; Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, ibid.,
XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 91-92; Halleck to Canby, Jan. 26, 1865, 
ibid., 593; Christopher C. Andrews, History of the Cam­
paign of Mobile (New York: D. Van Nostrand,~T867), 2l,
11-32.
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and either move against the city by the Tensas and Ala­
bama rivers or cut it off from above. He ordered the 
force at Barrancas, under Major General Frederick Steele, 
to march first against Pollard to cut the railroad there 
and create the impression of a march toward Montgomery. 
Steele began his movement on March 20. The remainder of 
Canby's army began congregating near Fish River and com­
menced its march toward Spanish Fort and Blakely on 
March 25.^
Maury had only about 9,000 men in the District of
3the Gulf to defend Mobile in early March 1865. Despite 
the heavy disparity in numbers between his force and that 
of the enemy, he and Taylor determined to hold Mobile. 
General Robert E. Lee advised Taylor to evacuate the city 
if such a strong enemy army moved against it that he 
could not defeat the enemy in the field. Nevertheless, 
he told Taylor: "...the defence of your Department must
^Grant to Halleck, Jan. 26, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt.
1, p. 584; Halleck to Major General George H. Thomas,
Jan. 26, 1865, ibid.; Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, 
ibid., 91-93; Major General Frederick Steele to Christen­
sen, Apr. 12, 1865, ibid., 279; Andrews, Campaign of 
Mobile, 21-22, 25-26, 31.
2
Abstract from return of the District of the Gulf, 
Mar. 10, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 1045; Dabney H. 
Maury, "The Defence of Mobile in 1865," Southern Histori­
cal Society Papers, III (1877), 4; Maury to Davis, Dec.
25, 1871, quoted m  ibid., 6 .
d
be left entirely to your own judgment."* Davis agreed
with Taylor's ideas on the importance of holding Mobile
and wrote Lee that he thought the garrison there strong
enough to defend against any attack from the Gulf. When
Canby's campaign began to develop, Taylor reported to
Lee: "I am ready to receive any attack he may make at
5
Mobile." Taylor planned to use Forrest's cavalry to 
defeat enemy raids into northern Alabama and then send 
Forrest's men south to aid in the defense of Mobile. 
However, by the time the cavalrymen disengaged themselves 
in central Alabama, Canby had already invested the east­
ern shore defenses, so Taylor kept Forrest's forces near 
Meridian. Maury had to do the best he could against 
adverse odds.6
As I indicated earlier, Taylor and Maury made vari­
ous preparations to ready Mobile for a possible siege 
throughout the early months of 1865. Once they became 
aware that Canby's army had begun actual operations, the 
Confederate authorities issued additional orders to assist
4
General Robert E. Lee to Taylor, Mar. 15, 1865, 
Taylor Papers.
~*Davis to Lee, Mar. 22, 1865, O.R. , XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1139; Taylor to Lee, Mar. 27, 1865, ibid., 1161.
^Taylor to Lee, Mar. 27, 1865, ibid., 1161; Richard 
Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Exper­
iences of the Late War, ed. by Richard B. Harwell (New 
York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 267-69.
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in the defense of the city. The post commander, Colonel 
Thomas H. Taylor, issued circulars directing all able- 
bodied men to join local defense units or face expulsion 
from Mobile. Colonel Taylor also called for the organi­
zation of free Negroes into local defense companies.
Maury assigned a person to organize the free blacks who 
reported for duty and authorized these men to elect their 
company officers, as long as the men chosen were white.
By April 8 , one company, known as the Native Guards, had 
formed itself. Although the city's assistant chief of
police served as company commander, the other company
7
officers were all "Creoles." Maury forbade persons from 
going to or from the enemy's lines without special 
permission. Mayor Slough ordered a registration of all 
male slaves between 18 and 4 5 years old so they could be
g
located if required for work around the city.
Liddell, commanding on the eastern shore, informed 
Maury on March 20 of the enemy landing at Fish River.
7
Circular, Headquarters Military Post, Mobile, Mar. 
20, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Mar. 21, 
1865; Circular, Headquarters Military Post, Mar. 21,
1865, quoted in Army Argus and Crisis, Mar. 25, 1865;
Para II, Special Order No. 35, Headquarters District of 
the Gulf, Mar. 26, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Regis­
ter , Mar. 28, 1865; ibid., Apr. 8 , 1865.
g
General Order No. 11, Headquarters District of the 
Gulf, Mar. 21, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, 
Mar. 22, 1865; Order, Mayor's Office, Mar. 21, 1865, 
quoted in ibid., Mar. 23, 1865.
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He requested reinforcements to hold the works at Blakely 
and Spanish Fort. To contest the enemy's advance, Maury 
sent his entire infantry force across the bay to Liddell. 
The latter stationed his men south and east of Spanish 
Fort along D'Olive's Creek and planned to give battle on 
March 26. He thought that only a small portion of Can- 
by's army was in front of him, and he hoped to attack, and 
defeat this detachment before reinforcements could reach 
it. The Federals had a much stronger force than Liddell 
anticipated, however. In addition, instead of advancing 
directly toward Spanish Fort, Canby's men began outflank­
ing Liddell in the direction of Blakely. Liddell with­
drew most of his force toward Blakely and ordered General 
Gibson to assume command of Spanish Fort. To hold the 
lines at the latter place, Gibson had 500 men of his own 
Louisiana brigade, 950 men of Thomas' brigade of Alabama 
Reserves, and 360 artillerymen: a total force of approx­
imately 1,810 men. Gibson found six heavy guns, fourteen 
field pieces, and twelve coehorn mortars located in the
9
various redoubts at Spanish Fort.
9Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson to Flowerree, 
Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 313-14; Liddell 
to Garner, Mar. 20, 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1129; Liddell 
to Maury, Mar. 25, 1865, ibid., 1153; Liddell to Maury, 
Mar. 26, 1865, ibid., 1157; Chambers, "My Journal," 366; 
George Little and James R. Maxwell, A History of Lums- 
den's Battery, C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa: United Daughters of
the Confederacy, 1905), 65-66; Maury to Surget, Apr. 15, 
1865, Records of the Department of the Gulf, LHA
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Soon after the occupation of the works, Gibson con­
ducted an inspection of the lines. He reported later:
"It was apparent that an immense work with the spade, 
pick, and ax was before us ,..."10 Gibson ordered his 
men to dig rifle pits and strengthen existing works. The 
men constructed bombproofs behind the works to use as 
magazines, temporary hospitals, and living quarters:
...We cut down great trees, rolled the trunks 
over the mouth, then put a layer of brush and 
dirt; then came another layer of heavy logs 
crosswise, then a layer of brush and dirt, 
until the roof was six to eight feet thick.
To delay the enemy advance and give his men extra time to
dig in, Gibson ordered an attack on the enemy's pickets
on the morning of March 27. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
Lindsay led 550 men in the attack, which broke through
the enemy skirmish line for a short time. Lindsay's men
fell back after observing the main Federal force fall
into line of battle. The losses on both sides were
Collection; Maury to Beauregard, June 1, 1865, Dabney H. 
Maury Letter, Louisiana State University Department of 
Archives and Manuscripts. Coehorn mortars were small, 
bronze mortars used in trench warfare.
10Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX, 
Pt. 1, p. 314.
11Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 121.
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light, but Gibson's tactics succeeded in slowing the 
enemy's advance.^
The Federals did begin easing their lines forward on 
the afternoon of the twenty-seventh. Where Gibson's skir­
mishers had entrenching tools, they held their positions 
by digging in, but where the men did not have tools, they 
had to fall back within the main trench line. Despite 
the cautious advance, the Federals completed the invest­
ment of Spanish Fort by nightfall. Gibson reported his
13losses for the day at 5 killed and 44 wounded. Thomas'
Alabama Reserves, most of them young boys, performed well
in the fight. One veteran, however, felt they did not
protect themselves as well as they might have: "They
thought it was 'not soldierly,' and they stood up and
14were shot down like sheep." During the night, Gibson
12Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 49-50; Gibson to 
Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 314- 
15; Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 26 [27?], 1865, in Randall 
Lee Gibson Papers, Louisiana State University Department 
of Archives and Manuscripts; Randall L. Gibson to John 
McGrath, Sept. 26, 1884, in Randall Lee Gibson Letters, 
Special Collections, Tulane University Library; Army 
Argus and Crisis, Apr. 1, 1865.
13Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 27, 1865 (several items), 
O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, pp. 1162-64; Thad Holt (ed.), Miss 
Waring's Journal: 1863 and 1865 (Chicago: The Wyvern
Press, 1964), 9; Maury to Taylor, Mar. 27, 1865, Brent 
Collection; Advertiser and Register, Mar. 26, 1865; Army 
Argus and Crisis, Apr. 1, 1865.
^Gibson to Maury, Mar. 27, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1161; Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 122.
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sent off all his horses and wagons. He asked Maury and
the district ordnance officer for rifle and cannon
ammunition and for whiskey and tobacco for the men. To
Liddell he sent a request for more entrenching tools.
Gibson expressed a desire to keep the men of Thomas1
brigade, which Liddell wanted to move to Blakely, because
he did not know whether or not the enemy would assault
his lines the next morning. Liddell allowed Gibson to
15retain the men temporarily.
During March 28 and 29, the Federals contented them­
selves with erecting batteries and advancing their skir­
mish line. A Confederate officer wrote in his diary that 
the enemy siege lines were about 1 ,0 0 0-1,200 yards from 
the trenches, while the enemy skirmishers had worked 
their way to points from 250-300 yards of the Confederate 
lines. The Confederate artillery remained superior in 
its fire to that of the Federals during these two days.
To protect the gunners from enemy sharpshooters, the 
engineers constructed screens over each embrasure.
15Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 27, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt.
2, p. 1162; Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 27, lS"65, ibid., 1163; 
Circular, Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Mar. 27, 
1865, in Record Books of Brigadier General Daniel W.
Adams' and Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson's Brigade, 
Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 301, RG 109, National Archives, 
hereinafter cited as Adams-Gibson Record Books; Gibson 
to Liddell, Mar. 27, 1865 (two items), ibid., Vol. 302, 
p. 359; Gibson to Maury, Mar. 27, 1865 ,~"lbid. , 361;
Gibson to Myers, Mar. 27, 1865, ibid., 362.
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These screens consisted of steel plates two feet by three
feet square and about one-half-inch thick: "...they were
so secured to the inner faces of the embrasures that they
were quickly lowered and raised as the gun ran into bat-
16tery or recoiled." Maury visited Spanish Fort on the 
twenty-eighth and decided to begin strengthening the gar­
rison with troops from Blakely. Under orders from Maury, 
Liddell directed one regiment from Holtzclaw's brigade to 
move to Spanish Fort and relieve one of the Alabama
reserve regiments. Liddell also ordered a detachment of
17sharpshooters armed with Whitworth rifles to Gibson.
March 30 saw only dissultory firing by sharpshooters 
and a few artillery pieces. The Federals did succeed in 
pushing some of their pickets to points within 50 yards 
of the Confederate pickets. Much of the artillery fire 
on this day centered on Battery Huger and Battery Tracy. 
These two forts had added their firepower to that of the 
redoubts around Spanish Fort from the start of the siege.
^ Army Argus and Crisis, Apr. 1, 1865; Diary of a 
Confederate officer, Mar. 2F, 29, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 6 8 , n. 2, 77, n. 1; Maury 
"Defence of Mobile," 12.
"^Maury to Taylor, Mar. 28, 1865, 4 P.M., Brent Col­
lection; Lewis to Holtzclaw, Mar. 28, 1865, Letters Sent, 
Eastern Division, District of the Gulf, Chap. II, Vol.
99, p. 43, RG 109, National Archives; Lewis to Cockrell, 
Mar. 28, 1865, ibid.; Liddell to Gibson, Mar. 28, 1865, 
ibid., 1 0 0 .
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The Federals began erecting a heavy battery on the north 
shore of Bay Minette to bombard the two forts and suc­
ceeded in virtually ending steamship communication
18between Huger and Tracy and Mobile. Maury paid another 
visit to Spanish Fort on the thirtieth and again recog­
nized the need to reinforce Gibson. The garrison had 
lost approximately 320 men through March 30. Maury 
ordered Holtzclaw's and Colonel Julius A. Andrews' bri­
gades from Blakely to Spanish Fort to relieve the remain­
ing Alabama Reserves. Two steamers transferred the men 
during the night of the thirtieth. Gibson assigned
Holtzclaw to command of the two brigades, which then made
19up his left wing.
The Federal sharpshooters became particularly obnox­
ious on March 31. Their fire struck down several men, 
including Maury's chief of artillery. Colonel William E.
18Confederate diary, Mar. 30, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 80, n. 2; Army Argus and 
Crisis, Apr. 1, 18(T5.
19Confederate diary, Mar. 30, 1865, quoted m  
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 80, n. 2; Liddell to Gibson, 
Mar. 30, 1865, quoted m  ibid., 80, n. 1; Report of cas­
ualties to Mar. 28, 1865, dated Mar. 29, 1865, Gibson 
Papers; Casualty report, Mar. 29-Apr. 8 , 1865, Adams- 
Gibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol. 302, p. 397; Special 
Order No. 6 , Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Mar.
31, 1865, ibid., Vol. 304, p. 305; Lewis to [Holtzclaw], 
Mar. 30, 1865, Letters Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf,
Chap. II, Vol. 99, p. 46; Liddell to Maury, Mar. 31,
1865, Telegrams Sent, Eastern Division, District of the 
Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 77, RG 109, National 
Archives.
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Burnett, who was conducting a reconnaissance of the 
enemy's lines with Gibson. The latter requested 400 
"Beauregard screens" to protect his own sharpshooters. 
These "screens" were wooden embrasures covered by sand­
bags and had been invented by Beauregard at Charleston.
Maury reported that the "screens" provided "great security
20to the sharpshooters." Gibson decided active measures
would also be needed to protect his men. He ordered a
bombardment of the nearest enemy force, which lay about
150 yards outside the Confederate lines, and asked for
volunteers to conduct a sortie against this force that
night. Captain Clement Watson, Lieutenant A. E. Newton,
and fifteen volunteers from Gibson's brigade rushed the
Federal rifle pits just after dark. They succeeded in
capturing one captain and 21 men and drove back the rest
of the enemy force without any loss to their own party.
Maury formally congratulated the men for their "brilliant
21and successful sortie."
20Confederate diary, Mar. 31, 1865, quoted m  
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 87, n. 1; Gibson to Garner, 
Mar. 31, 1865 (two items), O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1179; 
Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 12; Maury, "Defence of 
Spanish Fort," Southern Historical Society Papers, XXXIX 
(1914), 135.
21Captain R. B. Stearns to Lieutenant George W. 
Shelton, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 225-26; 
Liddell to Garner, Mar. 31, 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1178; 
Army Argus and Crisis, Apr. 8 , 1865; Para IV, General 
Order No. 17, Headquarters District of the Gulf, Apr. 1, 
1865, Gibson Papers.
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Life for the men in the garrison at Spanish Fort
became more difficult as each day passed. One soldier
recalled: "Every day was full of incident, and it soon
2?got so that we had no rest day or night." ' The men
experienced great danger as well as discomfort:
Artillery duels became of daily occur­
rence, our 'head logs' were constantly knocked 
down upon us, bruising and crippling us; 
squads of sharpshooters devoted their especial 
attention to our port holes or embrasures and 
poured a steady stream of bulletS2through them 
from early morn till dewy eve;...
Another veteran remembered that during daylight men could
only move about by crawling through areas where no com-
24munication trenches had been dug. The people of Mobile
made liberal donations of many food items and did keep
the men well fed. Naturally, however, the morale of the
men began to sag, and Gibson urged his officers to cheer
and encourage their men. He also asked that they set
examples for the men to give them confidence: "It is
morale that defeats a charge— -it increases as the great
25Napoleon said— a resisting power tenfold." Gibson made 
22Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 122.
23Ibid., 122-23.
24Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23.
2^"H.A.J." to Editors, Apr. 1, 1865, in Advertiser 
and Register, Apr. 4, 1865; Circular, [Headquarters 
Spanish Fort], Apr. 6 , 1865, Gibson Papers; Circular, 
Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 5, 1865, Adams- 
Gibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 310.
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frequent visits to the trenches and thereby exposed him-
2 6self to enemy fire.
The strength of the garrison never did please Gibson, 
and he frequently asked for reinforcements. In one letter 
to Maury, he stated that his men had wider gaps between 
each soldier on the line than they had ever had under 
Johnston and Hood in the Atlanta campaign. Gibson issued 
orders and circulars designed to place his men in the 
safest positions possible while still maintaining vigi­
lance and the ability to respond quickly in case of an 
assault. One order established a force of sharpshooters 
for each artillery piece. Their responsibility was to
keep up a steady fire on the enemy skirmishers to prevent
27them from picking off the Confederate gunners. Gibson 
tried to get his men to conserve their ammunition as 
much as possible. On April 5, he pointed out that the 
men had expended nearly 54,000 rounds in two days and 
that at that rate the limited supply of ammunition would
^Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23; Maury, 
"Defence of Spanish Fort," 135.
^Gibson to Maury, Apr. 1, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
pp. 1184-85; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 5, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 142, n. 2; Gibson to Maury, 
Apr. 6, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol. 
302, p. 378; Special Order No. 7, Headquarters Forces at 
Spanish Fort, Apr. 3, 1865, ibid., Vol. 304, p. 307; 
Circular, Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 4, 
1865, ibid., 308; Circular, Headquarters Forces at 
Spanish Fort, Apr. 5, 1865, ibid., 311.
389
2 8soon run out. Gibson and Maury both encouraged the men
to collect "solid shot, shell, bullets, and missies of
every description" to send to the ordnance department in
29Mobile for recycling.
Throughout much of the siege, the Confederate troops
had to bear artillery bombardments by the enemy. One of
the most severe bombardments occurred on April 4. Even
in Mobile the people could feel the vibrations of the
shells striking the earth and could hear the reports of
the heavy guns: "This evening the firing is terrific,
not a moment elapsing between the booming of 'heavy 
30artillery.'" The cannonading lasted for about two 
hours, and Gibson and his artillery officers estimated 
the enemy used thirty to forty heavy guns and at least a 
dozen mortars. Redoubt No. 3, manned by veterans of the 
Fifth Company, Washington Artillery, of New Orleans, 
received the brunt of much of the Federal fire. Two 
shells disabled the redoubt's heaviest gun, an 8-inch
2 8
Gibson to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1192; Circular, [Headquarters Spanish Fort], Apr. 5, 
1865, Gibson Papers.
29Circular, Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort,
Apr. 2, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol. 
304, p. 306; Special Order No. 9, Headquarters [Spanish 
Fort], Apr. 4, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, pp. 1200-1201.
30Confederate diary, Apr. 4, 1865, quoted m  
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 137, n. 1; Holt (ed.), Miss 
Waring ' s Journal, 12".
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columbiad named "Lady Slocumb," and the bombardment prac­
tically levelled the parapets. When Maury offered to 
relieve the Louisianians with a fresh unit from the city, 
Captain Cuthbert H. Slocumb submitted the proposal to his 
men and reported back:
...'General, the company, grateful for your 
kind intention, desire to hold this position 
to the end. ^  respectfully decline to be 
relieved.'...
Gibson's left flank became the scene of increasing 
enemy activity during the last days of the siege. The 
marshy, densely wooded ground there made it almost impos­
sible for the men to erect any kind of earthworks for 
protection. Federal batteries established on high ground 
north of this flat dominated the area. The enemy also 
began moving launches to the area so that they could 
operate on Bay Minette and the Apalachee River. A battery 
from Liddell's command at Blakely and the gunboats Nash­
ville and Morgan provided some relief to Gibson's hard- 
pressed left but increasing numbers of enemy heavy guns 
in the area drove these supports back. Federal Parrott 
guns partially disabled the Nashville and kept the
"^Gibson to Maury, Apr./4, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1199; Confederate diary, /Apr. 4, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile', 137, n. 1; Waterman,
"Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23; J. A. Chalaron, "Battle 
Echoes of Shiloh," Southern Historical Society Papers,
XXI (1893), 220-21; Maury, "defence of Spanish Fort,"
132. /
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32gunboats from the area during daylight hours. Gibson 
developed a plan to attack the enemy troops opposite his 
left but cancelled the plan when he could not get an 
ironclad to enfilade the Federal flank. He did station 
additional men and two field pieces on his extreme left 
to guard against a surprise attack. Gibson finally got 
the assistance of several navy picket boats to help watch 
his flank.
By April 7, the enemy had dug almost up to the main 
Confederate works around Spanish Fort. The Federals had 
concentrated so much heavy artillery and so many mortars 
around the position that the Confederate gunners could 
reply but briefly to the bombardment. To give themselves 
added protection, the men of the garrison threw up more 
traverses and bombproofs. Gibson found that the Negroes 
at the fort's cooking yard did not have enough work to 
keep them busy all day, so he ordered them to the front
32 .Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 316; Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1865, ibid., 
319-20; Lewis to Colonel Isaac W. Patton, Apr. 1, 1865, 
ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1184; Gibson to Liddell, Apr. 1, 1865, 
ibid.; Confederate diary, Apr. 1, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 91n.
^Gibson to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1192; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 4, 1865, Ibid., 1200; 
Liddell to Bennett, Apr. 6, 1865, ibid., 1209; Liddell to 
Captain Joseph Fry, Apr. 6, 1865, ibid., 1210; Gibson to 
Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, Gibson Papers; Lewis to Fry, Apr. 4, 
1865, Letters Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II,
Vol. 99, p. 53; Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 4, 1865, ibid., 
Vol. 100, p. 98.
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lines to assist in erecting the new defenses and provide
relief for his exhausted soldiers. Gibson also renewed
his requests to Maury for hand grenades, engineer troops,
subterranean shells, and more Negro laborers. He warned:
"I must have the things I have asked for within the last
34three days, else disaster may happen." A shortage of 
ammunition forced Gibson to order the cessation of rifle 
fire from the main line except by sharpshooters. Only 
the skirmishers located in advanced rifle pits could con­
tinue to fire regularly. Gibson directed his officers to 
make sure these advanced pits had the "Beauregard
screens" and to see that the positions were safe from a
35sudden enemy rush.
Maury sent Gibson several howitzers, some hand gre­
nades , and an undetermined number of laborers on the 
night of April 7-8. Unusually heavy activity by the 
Federals early on the eighth prompted Gibson to order 
his skirmishers to keep up a steady small arms fire on 
the enemy work parties. He also urged his commanders to
34Confederate diary, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 147n; Circular, Headquarters 
Spanish Fort, Apr. 7, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record Books, 
Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 314; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 7,
1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1214; Gibson to Maury, Apr.
7, 186^,“ibid., 1215.
35Confederate diary, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 147n; Circular, Headquarters 
Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 7, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record 
Books, Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 314.
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exercise vigilance and monitor all movements on their 
fronts: "Every precaution must be taken to prevent a
r> £
surprise.. . . During the afternoon, Gibson ordered the 
men in Fort McDermott to open fire with their artillery 
on the Federal working party on their front. In reply, 
the enemy poured such a concentrated fire into the fort 
that the Confederates soon had to cease fire. The Fed­
eral shelling disabled one gun and destroyed an ammuni­
tion chest. Gibson decided to test the enemy's strength 
and determine his intentions. Accordingly, he ordered 
all of his batteries to be ready to open up at sunset.
His officers would watch the Federal lines closely for 
their reaction and prepare the defenses for anything 
which might occur. Gibson feared that "the moment had at
length arrived when I could no longer hold the position
37without imminent risk of losing the garrison."
Unknown to Gibson, Canby planned a bombardment of 
his own for sundown on the eighth. The Federals had 
fifty-three siege guns in position and Canby ordered his
■^Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8 , 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1217; Circular, Headquarters Spanish Fort, Apr. 8 , 
1865, ibid., 1219; Special Order No. 11, Headquarters 
Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 8 , 1865, ibid.; William Rix, 
Incidents of Life in a Southern City During the War 
(Mobile: Iberville HTstoncal Society Papers, 1865) ,
(19] .
37Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 316; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8, 1865, ibid., Pt.
2, p. 1218.
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infantry commanders to be ready to exploit any favorable 
3 8situation. Gibson's gunners opened first, about 5:30, 
but got off only a few rounds before the Federal bombard­
ment silenced them. The enemy fire became so heavy that 
the men of the garrison found no safety in their bomb- 
proofs and had to find shelter wherever they could behind 
their works. Shells from the Federal fifteen-inch mor­
tars caused particular destruction, being able to 
penetrate six feet of solid earth, or the strongest 
bombproof, before exploding. One member of the garrison
remembered that the men could see these big shells drop-
39ping into the works, but "we had to stand and take it." 
Few men could recall such a severe hail of shot and 
shell. The enemy musket fire and the dense smoke gener­
ated by firing cannons and exploding shells added to the 
confusion:
... it was though the mouth of the pit had 
yawned and the uproar of the damned was about 
us. And it was not taking away from this 
infernal picture to see men, as I did, hop­
ping about, 'raving, distracted mad,' the 
blood bursting from eyes and ears and mouth, 
driven stark^grazy by concussion or some 
other cause.
O O
Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, ibid., Pt. 1,
p. 96.
39Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, ibid., 316; 
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 123-25.
^Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 124.
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During the bombardment and as darkness fell, the 8th
Iowa Infantry advanced against the works on Gibson's left.
There they struck Andrews' Texans and drove them from
their positions. A small force under Captain James A.
Howze of the 14th Texas Dismounted Cavalry charged the
Iowans to try to stop their advance. When the color
bearer fell, however, the Texans retired with the rest of
the brigade: "...they were retreating in great confu-
41sion, every man pretty much his own commander." The 
Federals captured several hundred men and overran 300 
yards of trenches. Lieutenant Alfred G. Clark led the 
garrison's 1 0 0-man provost guard to the scene of action 
and delivered a counterattack. Although Clark fell 
mortally wounded, his assault stopped the enemy advance. 
The Federals threw up light trenches and awaited further 
developments. Holtzclaw repprted to Gibson that his 
force was not strong enough to push the enemy back, and 
Gibson decided, in accordance with standing orders from 
Maury, to abandon his works rather than risk the capture 
of his men. He ordered his brigade withdrawn from the
41Colonel James L. Geddes to Captain Fluford Wilson, 
Apr. 9, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 275-76, Lieutenant 
Colonel William B. Bell to Captain Wilbur F. Henry,
Apr. 9, 1865, ibid., 277-78; Gibson to Flowerree, Apr.
16, 1865, ibid., 316; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8 , 1865, 
ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1218; W. Bailey, "The Star Company of 
Ector's Texas Brigade," Confederate Veteran, XXII (1914), 
405.
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right, posted part of the men to watch the left, and 
stationed the remainder of the brigade in position to 
cover the retreat.^2
The men in the various redoubts spiked their guns, 
and the entire garrison, including the sick and wounded 
and Negro laborers, assembled on the beach. Maury and 
his engineers had made preparations for an evacuation by 
erecting a wooden treadway from the rear of Spanish Fort 
across the marsh to a point on the Apalachee River oppo­
site Battery Huger. Gibson ordered the men to remove 
their shoes and boots and to carry their weapons on their 
side away from the enemy. Filing silently down the 
treadway under the cover of darkness, the troops reached 
the end of the planks without alerting the enemy to their 
movement. Steamers conveyed the garrison from Battery 
Huger to Blakely. A few men had to travel across the 
marsh directly to Liddell's lines. After a short rest 
there, the soldiers travelled on the steamers to Mobile. 
There the people first became aware of what had happened. 
Many of the citizens expressed disbelief at first: "Still
I had to believe the evidence of my own eyes, for our
42Geddes to Wilson, Apr. 9, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 275; Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 186F, ibid., 316-17; 
Gibson to McGrath, Sept. 26, 1884, Gibson Letters; 
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 125-26; Andrews, 
Campaign of Mobile, 155-58.
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soldiers were passing by in squads, from an early hour,
43dirty, wet and completely worn out,..."
Gibson reported his casualties during the siege of
Spanish Fort as 73 killed, 350 wounded, and 6 missing.
In the final bombardment and assault, he lost 20 killed,
45 wounded, and 250 missing. The number of men captured
44on April 8 may have numbered as many as 325. The Fed­
eral losses at Spanish Fort were 52 killed, 575 wounded,
45and 30 missing. In his memoirs, Taylor praised the
stand made at Spanish Fort: "Gibson's stubborn defense
and skillful retreat make this one of the best achieve-
4 6ments of the war." Maury echoed this assessment:
...It is not too much to say that no position 
was ever held by Confederate troops with 
greater hardihood and tenacity, nor evacuated
43 .Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 317; Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 8 , lS’65’, ibid. ,
Pt. 2, p. 1219; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8 , 1865, ibid.; 
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 126-28; Maury, 
"Defence of Spanish Fort," 131; Maury to Taylor, Apr.
8 , 1865, Taylor Papers; Maury to Taylor, Apr. 9, 1865, 
Brent Collection; Holt (ed.), Miss Waring's Journal,
13.
44Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 318; Casualty list, Adams-Gibson Record Books, 
Chap. II, Vol. 302, p. 397.
45Comparative statement of killed, wounded, captured, 
and missing during the campaign from March 17 to April 12, 
1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 102.
46Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 270.
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more skilfully after hope of further defense 
was gone.
Gibson praised all of his officers and men for their
"steady valor and cheerful endurance" and disavowed any
personal recognition: "...if any credit shall attach to
the defense of Spanish Fort, it belongs to the heroes
whose sleep shall no more be disturbed by the cannon's 
48roar." The defense of this position for two weeks by 
less than 3,000 men against eight times as many Federals 
certainly should stand as one of the most heroic episodes 
of the war.
47Maury, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 130.
A O
Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, pp. 317, 318.
CHAPTER XVI
"...MOBILE WAS LEFT WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE..."
When Canby's army laid siege to Spanish Fort, Liddell 
occupied his forces in preparing the lines at Blakely for 
an attack. He also kept scouts out on the approaches 
from Plllard to watch for Steele's forces, which he 
expected might move against Blakely. Initially, Liddell 
had under his command a small artillery force, Holtz- 
claw's brigade, and three brigades of Cockrell's division. 
The latter units had arrived from Mobile late on March 
24, 1865. As the siege of Spanish Fort progressed, Lid­
dell detached Holtzclaw's brigade and Ector's brigade 
(under Colonel Andrews) of Cockrell's division and sent 
them to Gibson. He received in exchange Thomas' brigade 
of Alabama Reserves. On April 1, the 1st Mississippi 
Light Artillery Regiment, its men armed with rifles, 
reported to Liddell. He thus had approximately 2,700 
effectives to defend his works.^ The position at Blakely
^Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury, 
"Defence of Mobile," 8 ; Maury to Beauregard, June 1, 1865, 
Maury Letter; James Bradley, The Confederate Mail Carrier 
(Mexico, Mo., 1894), 224; Chambers, "My Journal," 367; 
Edward W. Tarrant, "Siege and Capture of Fort Blakely," 
Confederate Veteran, XXIII (1915), 457; Liddell to Gar­
ner, Apr. 1, 1865, Telegrams Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf, 
Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 84.
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consisted of nine lunettes connected by rifle pits, the 
whole line covering some 3,000 yards. Advanced rifle 
pits, abatis, and land mines helped protect the ground in 
front of the works. Liddell assigned Sears' Mississippi 
brigade (Colonel Thomas N. Adaire) to the left, Cock­
rell's brigade (Colonel James McCown) to the center, and 
Thomas' Alabamians to the right. He did not have enough
men to adequately fill the works, so at some points on
2
the line ten paces separated each soldier.
Steele's Federals did not reach the vicinity of 
Blakely until April 1. Early on that morning, Steele's 
cavalry encountered one of Liddell's outposts near Wil­
kins' plantation on the Stockton Road, about four miles 
north of Blakely. This outpost consisted of 100 men of 
the 46th Mississippi Infantry under Captain J. B. Hart. 
The Mississippians watched one regiment dismount and 
advance on foot, while another regiment followed closely 
behind with drawn sabers and on horseback. Taking advan­
tage of fences and other obstructions, Hart's men fell 
back slowly for about one mile. At that point, the 
mounted enemy troops charged and routed the Confederates. 
Three officers, 71 men, and the regimental colors all
2Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury, 
"Defence of Mobile," 8 ; Chambers, "My Journal," 367; 
Tarrant, "Siege and Capture of Fort Blakely," 457.
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fell captive to the Federals. The Federal pursuit con­
tinued almost up to the Confederate trenches at Blakely. 
Colonel McCown's Missourians had also been on outpost, 
and he stationed one of his regiments in a ravine across 
the road to stop the enemy advance. The fire of this 
unit, supported by artillery in the works, broke the 
Federal pursuit and forced them to fall back. A Missouri 
officer wrote: "'...it must have been a downfall to
their pride to know that they had been whipped and routed
4
by less than an hundred ragged Missouri infantry.'"
Liddell anticipated that Steele would attempt to 
storm his lines during the day. He telegraphed Maury and 
asked for 150 rifles for distribution to the artillerymen 
who had none. He ordered Cockrell to put men from his 
Missouri brigade in all of the advanced skirmish pits on 
his front:
3Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Spurling to Captain 
John F. Lacy, Apr. 2, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 311; 
Chambers, "My Journal," 367; Confederate diary, Apr. 1, 
1865, quoted in Christopher C. Andrews, History of the 
Campaign of Mobile (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867),
Flru
^Spurling to Lacy, Apr. 2, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, 
p. 311; Bradley, The Confederate Mail Carrier, 224-25; 
Account of Lieutenant G. W. Warren, quoted m  Robert S. 
Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri Confed­
erate Brigades, 1861-1865 Tst. Louis: Bryan, Brand &
Co., 1879), 262.
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...they are the only ones here that can be 
relied upon thoroughly,...and therefore it is^ 
necessary to have the best men in those pits.
Thomas received similar instructions, including direc­
tions to station six men in each pit. Liddell informed 
Thomas that most of Steele's men were Negro troops who 
would not "spare any of our men should they gain posses­
sion of our works" and urged him:
...impress upon their [Thomas' men] minds the 
importance of holding their position to the 
last, and with the determination never to 
surrender....
Steele's men did not attack on April 1, but Liddell
attempted to have Ector's brigade returned from Spanish
Fort that night. Maury, however, decided the Texans
7
should remain with Gibson.
The Confederate skirmishers on the Stockton Road 
tried to drive in the Federal cavalry pickets on the 
morning of April 2. Brigadier General John P. Hawkins, 
commander of the First Division, U. S. Colored Troops, 
quickly threw his men into line of battle. With a heavy
5
Liddell to Maury, Apr. 1, 1865, Telegrams Sent, 
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 87; Lewis 
to Cockrell, Apr. 1, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1188.
^Lewis to Thomas, Apr. 1, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1188.
^Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 1, 1865, ibid., 1185; Gib­
son to Maury, Apr. 1, 1865, ibid.; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 
1, 1865, ibid., 1187; Lewis to Cockrell, Apr. 1, 1865, 
ibid., 1188.
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force of skirmishers in front, the Negro troops advanced 
toward the sound of battle. Confronted by such overwhelm­
ing numbers, the Confederates began falling back slowly 
toward their main line. The Federals followed until the 
Confederates reached their advanced rifle pits and the 
protection of their artillery. At that point, about a 
half mile from the Confederate works, the enemy halted 
and began diggins rifle pits of their own. Several hours
later, Steele's division of white troops took position on
8the left of Hawkins' men and began entrenching. Liddell
again feared an attack on Blakely and asked Maury to send
him any light artillery which he could spare and some
coehorn mortars to use on his flanks. Liddell also
requested the services of the gunboat Morgan to bombard
the Federals' right flank. The ironclad Huntsville was
in the vicinity, but her guns could not be elevated
enough to fire over the bluff. The attack Liddell feared 
q
did not occur.
O
Major General Frederick Steele to Christensen, Apr. 
12, 1865, ibid., Pt. 1, p. 282; Brigadier General John P. 
Hawkins to Lacy, Apr. 16, 1865, ibid., 287; Liddell to 
Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1190; Bradley, The 
Confederate Mail Carrier, 225.
q .
Liddell to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, Telegrams Sent, 
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 90; Lid­
dell to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865 (three items), O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 2, p. 1190; Liddell to Farrand, Apr. 2, 1IF65, ibid.
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Two divisions from the force in front of Spanish 
Fort joined Steele on the third, and the Federals com­
pleted the investment of Blakely. From the third to the 
eighth, they occupied themselves advancing their siege 
approaches and erecting batteries. Liddell's men kept up 
a steady fire from their skirmish pits and batteries to 
try to slow the Federal work parties. The ironclads 
Nashville and Huntsville and the gunboat Morgan all added 
their firepower in defense of the land lines. Steele 
reported that the bombardment of these vessels "was very 
harassing and destructive, especially to Hawkins' divi­
sion" on the Federal right.^ Liddell's artillery suf­
fered little inconvenience from the Federals because it 
had protection by wooden screens and because the enemy at 
first had only a few light guns. To illuminate the area 
in front of their works at night, the Confederate gunners 
employed fireballs sent up by coehorn mortars. These 
fireballs enabled the men to keep up an accurate rifle 
and artillery fire even after sundown. Toward the end 
of the siege, Liddell received three heavy guns from
"^Steele to Christensen, Apr. 17, 1865, O.R., XLIX, 
Pt. 1, p. 283; Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1863", ibid. ,
320-21; Bradley, The Confederate Mail Carrier, 225.
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Mobile but barely got them mounted in time for use
11against the enemy.
Activities in the siege of Blakely did not have the 
intensity of those at Spanish Fort. Both sides conducted 
occasional operations against each other's advanced rifle 
pits. Usually these skirmishes resulted in few casual­
ties and no lasting tactical success. On the morning of 
April 7, for example, Federal troops attacked the pits 
held by the Alabama Reserves, but the boy soldiers suc­
ceeded in driving the enemy back. Liddell decided to 
retaliate and ordered a sortie for the next morning 
before daylight. About midnight, the Confederate artil­
lery opened fire on the Federal lines. After a bombard­
ment of nearly an hour, Lieutenant Colonel Junius A.
Law's 2nd Alabama Reserves charged the enemy pickets.
They got to within 40 yards of the Federal pits before 
they received any enemy fire. At that point, however,
the enemy poured heavy musketry at them and threw them
12back with a loss of 15 killed and 22 wounded. When not
"^Liddell to Maury, Apr. 3, 1865, Telegrams Sent, 
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 91; Lid­
dell to Garner, Apr. 3, 1865, ibid., 93; Liddell to 
Myers, Apr. 5, 1865, ibid., 100; Liddell to Maury, Apr.
3, 1865, quoted in Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 171, n.
1; Liddell to Maury, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in Ibid., 183, 
n. 1 .
12Maury to Taylor, Apr. 7, 1865, Taylor Papers; 
Colonel Charles L. Harris to Major James B. Sample, Apr. 
10, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 261; Lieutenant Colonel
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on the skirmish line, Liddell's men had to use spades and
picks to strengthen their works. Naturally, all of these
activities sapped the men's energies, and Liddell
requested that Maury send him 100 Negro laborers to
13relieve his soldiers from the engineer work.
Conditions for the Confederate soldiers at Blakely 
were similar to those at Spanish Fort, but some differ­
ences did exist. The men apparently had no extensive 
system of bombproofs to use as quarters at Blakely. In 
fact, one officer wrote his mother that the soldiers 
lived in caves and holes and were generally exposed both 
to enemy fire and the elements. This same officer asked 
his mother to have a servant gather up rags to send to
Blakely: "We fire constantly & the men have literally
14nothing to wipe out their rifles with...." As if the 
regular rifle and artillery fire by the Federals were not 
dangerous enough, Blakely's garrison suffered from the 
fire of sharpshooters as well. Liddell reported that
Zalmon S. Main to Captain Riel E. Jackson, Apr. 10,
1865, ibid., 264; Brigadier General Christopher C.
Andrews to Lacey, Apr. 8 , 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 282; 
Brigadier General Kenner Garrard to Lacey, Apr. 8 , 1865, 
ibid., 284.
13Liddell to Maury, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in Andrews, 
Campaign of Mobile, 183, n. 1.
■^Captain J. L. Bradford to mother, Apr. 8 , 1865, 
typed copy in Confederate Pension Application file of 
Mrs. Sallie Slatten, Louisiana State Archives and Records 
Service.
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these sharpshooters could hit men at the wharf from 
behind the Federal lines. Captain J. L. Bradford of the 
1st Mississippi Light Artillery related that a sharp­
shooter's bullet struck one of his men in the head and 
killed him instantly. Bradford himself had barely 
escaped death when a bullet hit him near the heart but 
was stopped by two letters folded in his pocket. In 
spite of all the dangers and privations, the men main­
tained high morale:
...If we only had plenty of ammunition we 
could hold the dogs at bay forever, but we are 
stinted, & they will gain on us little by lit­
tle I fear.
The Federal artillery began a heavy fire on Blakely 
on the morning of April 8 in conjunction with the bom­
bardment of Spanish Fort. Liddell had planned an artil­
lery barrage of his own to start at 8 P.M. The enemy 
replied briskly to his fire, and he found that his guns 
could not silence those of the enemy. A masked battery 
of heavy Parrott guns opened on the Confederate naval 
squadron during the afternoon. The Morgan received sev­
eral hits, one near the waterline, and had to withdraw 
when her ammunition ran out. The Nashville also ran out
15Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 5, 1865, Telegrams Sent, 
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 100; Brad­
ford to mother, Apr. 8 , 1865, Slatten Pension Application.
408
of shells and fell back even though she had not been 
X 6struck. Liddell ordered his gunners and skirmishers
to fire, with the aid of fireballs, on the enemy on the
night of the eighth to help cover the evacuation of
Spanish Fort and to discover the intentions of the enemy
on his front. On the morning of April 9, the Federals
renewed their bombardment in preparation for an assault.
This bombardment did little damage except to dismount
two guns. Liddell issued orders for his men to prepare 
17for an attack.
Following the evacuation and fall of Spanish Fort, 
Canby began shifting his forces there toward Blakely and 
ordered Steele to be prepared to assault Liddell's lines. 
The attack opened at 5:30 P.M., and the four Federal divi­
sions which had been in the trenches since April 3 all 
advanced simultaneously. With a shout the Federals 
rushed forward and drove Liddell's skirmishers back to 
their main line. A short time only had expired before
■^Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 321; Liddell to Maury, Apr. 8 , lSeB", ibid., Pt. 
2, p. 1217; Lewis to Cockrell and Thomas, Apr. T~, 1865, 
Letters Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 99, 
p. 60; Jeanie M. Walker, Life of Capt. Joseph Fry, the 
Cuban Martyr (Hartford, Conn.: The J. B. Burr Publish­
ing C o ~  1875), 180-84.
■^Liddell to Maury, Apr. 9, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, 
p. 1222; Lewis to Cockrell, Apr. 9, 1865, ibid., 1222-23; 
Lewis to Cockrell and Thomas, Apr. 8 , 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 188, n. 2.
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the enemy force carried the entire line of works. Many
Confederates surrendered at that point, while others fell
back to the wharf before being captured. Some 3,700 men
fell into enemy hands, but between 150 and 200 managed to
escape to the naval squadron by swimming or floating on
pieces of wood. All three Confederate brigadiers— Lid-
18dell, Cockrell, and Thomas— surrendered. The Federals
lost fairly heavily in the assault— 105 killed and 466 
wounded. Total Federal casualties during the siege of
19Blakely numbered 116 killed, 655 wounded, and 4 missing. 
Maury had planned to evacuate the Blakely garrison on the 
night of the ninth, but he did not pull the men out on 
the night of the eighth with the Spanish Fort garrison
because he felt Liddell could hold out throughout the
^  20 next day.
1 RCanby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, 
pp. 97-98; Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1865, ibid.,
321-22; Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury, 
"Defence of Mobile," 8 ; Bradley, The Confederate Mail 
Carrier, 225; Tarrant, "Siege and Capture of Fort 
Blakely," 457-58; Ephraim McD. Anderson, Memoirs: His­
torical and Personal; Including the Campaigns of the First 
Missouri Brigade (St. Louis: Times Printing Co., 1868) ,
399-400; Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri 
Confederate Brigades, 21T5-67.
19Consolidated report of casualties from March 25 to 
April 10, 1865, Army and Division of West Mississippi,
O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 101; Consolidated statement of 
killed, wounded, captured, and missing during the cam­
paign from March 17 to April 12, 1865, ibid., 102.
20 .Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: 
Personal Experiences of the Late War, ed. by Richard B. 
Harwell (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 270-71.
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The fall of Blakely left only the small garrisons 
at Battery Huger and Battery Tracy to prevent the Fed­
erals from moving through the rivers toward Mobile. Two 
hundred men of Companies B and K f 22nd Louisiana Infantry, 
and Company C, 1st Mississippi Light Artillery, held Bat­
tery Huger. Major Washington Marks, commander of Huger, 
had eleven guns in his work. At Tracy, 120 men of Com­
panies G, H, and I, 22nd Louisiana, manned the five guns 
of that fort, and Captain Ambrose A. Plattsmier had 
charge of Tracy. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Brown com­
manded both Huger and Tracy until April 3, when he
reported to Maury as inspector of artillery. Major Marks
21then assumed direction of the two forts. Both garri­
sons fired their guns in support of Spanish Fort in the 
first few days of the siege of that place, but a short­
age of ammunition in the works led Maury to order the 
men not to fire throughout the remainder of the siege.
From March 31 to April 8 , the two forts endured daily 
bombardments from an enemy Parrot gun battery on Bay 
Minette and occasional fire from the Federal fleet in 
Mobile Bay. The enemy shells did little damage to the
^Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23, 55; Lid­
dell to Patton, Apr. 3, 1865, Telegrams Sent, Eastern 
Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 93.
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earthern walls, and the men filled shell holes and
strengthened the parapets with sandbags floated down to
22the forts on flatboats at night.
Colonel Patton of the 22nd Louisiana took his four
companies from the Spanish Fort garrison and assumed
command of Huger and Tracy on April 9. The men in the
forts had to hold those positions at first to prevent the
Federal fleet from cutting off retreat from Blakely and
later to prevent the enemy from interfering with the ,
evacuation of Mobile. Maury gave Patton permission to
use his guns: "'Open all your guns upon the enemy, keep
up an active fire, and hold your position until you
23receive orders to retire.'" The Louisianians faced the 
fire not only of the guns in the Bay. Minette battery and
the fleet but some of the guns abandoned at Spanish Fort
and Fort McDermott. The men kept up a heavy, accurate 
fire against the Federal land batteries from April 9-11. 
The men endeavored to expend every round they had before
22Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury, 
"Defence of Mobile," 9-10; "Ebenezer R. F. S." to Editor, 
Mar. 31, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Apr. 4, 
1865; Confederate diary, Apr. 2-7, 1865, quoted in 
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 135, n. 1, 136n, 137, n. 1, 
143, n. 2, 145, n. 1.
23Liddell to Patton, Apr. 8 , 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt.
2, p. 1219; Mumford Diary, Apr. 9, 1865; wTlliam Rix, 
Incidents of Life in a Southern City During the War 
(Mobile: Iberville Historical Society Papers, 1865),
[20]; Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury, 
"Defence of Mobile," 10.
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they had to abandon their works. On the night of the 
eleventh, Maury sent a staff officer to Patton with
orders to retire. The first steamer sent to pick up the -
men ran aground at Conway Bayou, but a second vessel suc­
ceeded in bringing the men off. They spiked all the guns
before leaving. Maury wrote later: "These garrisons
fired the last cannon in the last great battle of the war
24 .for the freedom of the Southern states." A Unionist
living in Mobile expressed his admiration for the defense
of Huger and Tracy: "Never was a devoted garrison more
bravely defended, and never was [there] a finer display
25of scientific gunnery...."
In Mobile, Maury had begun preparations for a siege 
about the time the Federals invested Spanish Fort. On 
March 30, he declared the city to be in a state of siege, 
which enabled the military to arrest and hold suspicious 
persons. Taylor issued orders forbidding non-combatants 
from visiting the city without permission from his head­
quarters but removed this restriction after five days. 
Maury notified slave owners that they had to remove all 
their slaves-from the city. Those persons not complying 
with these instructions faced the seizure and enrollment
24Mumford Diary, Apr. 9-11, 1865; Waterman, "Afloat—  
Afield— Afloat," 55; Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted 
in Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 10.
25 *Rix, Incidents of Life, [20].
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of their slaves in government service. The state of
siege enabled the post commandant to close all saloons
and drinking establishments in Mobile. Finally, the
military began gathering up all cotton in the city for
burning. Major William H. Ketchum impressed every dray
he could find and hauled the bales out to a plain north
of Mobile. A citizen reported:
...Going home, one day, I was surprised to see 
bales of cotton tumbling from the attic win­
dows of some of the best mansions in the city 
....Almost everybody had secreted a little of 
that commodity in their homes to serve their 
wants when t^g Confederate money should 
collapse....
The losses suffered at Spanish Fort and Blakely 
caused Maury to begin planning for the evacuation of 
Mobile. Not only had the casualties in the two garrisons 
cost Maury half of his effective force, but a consider­
able amount of artillery and small arms ammunition had 
been expended. Forrest's defeat in central Alabama 
removed any real hope of relief. In a telegram to
2 6Para II, General Order No. 15, Headquarters Dis­
trict of the Gulf, Mar. 30, 1865, Gibson Papers; Major 
Joseph D. Sayers to Colonel Thomas Taylor, Mar. 31, 1865, 
Letters Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 423; Surget to T. 
Taylor, Apr. 5, 1865, Telegrams Sent, Department of Ala­
bama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 11, 
p. 63; General Order No. 16, Headquarters District of the 
Gulf, Mar. 31, 1865, quoted in A m y  Argus and Crisis,
Apr. 8 , 1865; Circular, Headquarters Military Post, 
Mobile, Apr. 1, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, 
Apr. 2, 1865; Major William H. Ketchum to T. Taylor, Apr. 
20, 1865, Brent Collection; Rix, Incidents of Life, [20].
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Taylor, Maury stated that he would be unable to hold
27Mobile for even a day if the enemy attacked it. With
so many men tied down defending Spanish Fort and Blakely,
the city had long had only a few artillerymen and home
guards manning the works. An officer at Battery Gladden
recognized the susceptibility of the defenses to assault:
...The Federal Comr. has displayed a great 
want of knowledge by not landing on this side 
of the bay some time since. The entrance to 
the city has always been open....
Maury stated in later years that he would have been
unable to hold the city for long if Canby had moved
directly against it rather than operating on the eastern
shore. Canby might even have bagged most of Maury's
army:
...The city was level and exposed throughout 
the whole extent to fire from any direction.
There were near 40,000 non-combatants within 
its lines of defence, whose sufferings under 
a siege would soon have paralyzed the defence 
by a garrison so small as ours was; and the 
early evacuation would have been inevitable, 
while it would have been exceedingly diffi­
cult of accomplishment....
The ringing of alarm bells broke the stillness of 
the city on the morning of April 10. The bells pealed
27Maury to Surget, Apr. 15, 1865, Department of the 
Gulf Records, LHA Collection; Maury to Beauregard, June 
1, 1865, Maury Letter; Maury to Taylor, Apr. 9, 1865, 
Taylor Papers; Bullock to Maury, Apr. 10, 1865, ibid.; 
Maury to Taylor, Apr. 10, 1865, ibid.
op
Mumford Diary, Apr. 10, 1865.
29
Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 1-2.
to call out the local defense troops so they could par­
ticipate in preparations for the evacuation. Maury had 
about 18 steamers at the city, and the home guards and 
regulars began loading them with ordnance and commissary 
stores. The soldiers appropriated the drays which had 
carried cotton out of the city and used them to move the 
stores to the landing. The men put some supplies on the 
few railroad cars remaining in the city. Many of the 
troops departed that day, while Maury kept a small infan­
try and cavalry force in the city as a rear guard. A 
number of sick and wounded soldiers could not be evac­
uated, so the authorities arranged to place these men in 
the City Hospital and Marine Hospital under the care of 
the Sisters of Charity. Maury hoped the men would not be
molested by the enemy while under the care of this
30religious order. The cloudy, dismal weather conditions
reflected the feelings of many of the city's residents:
...Never have I experienced such feelings as 
now take possession of me— perfectly miser­
able, as may be imagined. Every body is
3 0
Thad Holt (ed.), Miss Waring's Journal: 1863 and
1865 (Chicago: The Wyvern Press, 1964), 13; Mumford
Diary, Apr. 10, 1865; Ketchum to T. Taylor, Apr. 20,
1865, Brent Collection; Account of Sister Gabriella, 
quoted in Oscar H. Lipscomb, "The Administration of John 
Quinlan, Second Bishop of Mobile, 1859-1883" (unpublished 
master's thesis, Catholic University of America, 1959), 
92.
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excited and running around, gathering what 
information they can....
Fortunately, the depression did not spread to the sol­
diers: "Amidst all the reverses, the men seem to be in
32good spirits."
On April 11, the removal of men and supplies con­
tinued, and the few remaining officers and men prepared 
to disable the artillery and ammunition which they could 
not get out. Confusion marred the orderly conduct of 
these operations. The local defense troops did not sur­
render their weapons and seemed ill disposed to obey any 
orders by regular officers. Lieutenant Daniel Geary took 
it upon himself to put out of order the forts on the city 
lines. He requisitioned spikes and had them distributed 
to the various batteries for spiking the guns. He 
instructed the battery commanders to dump their ammunition
into the moats, burn the gun carriages, and set the bomb- 
33proofs afire. The garrisons of the bay batteries 
evacuated their works last. At Battery Gladden, the men 
emptied their powder into the bay, threw shells into the 
water, and broke all tools. Rather than spiking their
^Mumford Diary, Apr. 10, 1865; Holt (ed.), Miss 
Waring1s Journal, 13.
32Mumford Diary, Apr. 10, 1865.
33Maury to Taylor, Apr. 11, 1865 (several items), 
Taylor Papers; Holt (ed.), Miss Waring's Journal, 14; 
Diary, Apr. 11, 1865, Geary Papers.
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guns, the soldiers threw the elevating screws and wheels 
into the bay, which prevented the enemy from using the 
guns. Some delay occurred in evacuating the men because 
the engineers and Negro firemen on several steamers 
deserted. The soldiers had to collect wood and navigate 
the steamers as best they could. Finally, the last of 
the garrisons steamed away from the wharf: "Mobile was
left with great reluctance by both officers and men. The
. . 34men, though low-spirited, behaved well...."
Maury left Mobile early on the morning of April 12 
with the rear guard of 300 Louisianians commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay. Maury left Gibson behind 
with Lieutenant Colonel Philip B. Spence's 12th Missis­
sippi Cavalry Regiment and a section of an artillery 
battery. This rear guard left Mobile about 11 A.M. and 
set fire to the cotton bales piled up north of the city.
A citizen reported that when the cavalry had departed 
from the scene of the confligration, the home guards or 
municipal officials rang the alarm bells so that the 
people could rush out and try to save some of the cotton.
They reportedly saved nearly 1,500 of the 3,500 bales
35which the military had stacked up. Maury's commissary
34Rix, Incidents of Life, [21]; Mumford Diary, Apr. 
11, 1865.
35Maury to Taylor, Apr. 12, 1865, Taylor Papers; 
Maury to Surget, Apr. 15, 1865, Department of the Gulf
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officer had turned over to Mayor Slough some supplies for 
distribution to the poor of the city. A young lady 
described the scene which occurred after Spence's caval­
rymen left the city:
...each one of that class [the poor], help­
ing herself freely, and endeavoring to carry 
off as much as possible— each one tries to 
be first, and consequently much scuffling 
and rioting ensues— ...
Eventually some home guards and armed citizens restored
order.
Canby ordered two divisions under Granger to cross 
Mobile Bay and occupy Mobile. Granger's men landed at 
Catfish Point, about five miles below the city, at 
10:30 A.M., and Granger sent a dispatch to Slough demand­
ing the unconditional surrender of Mobile. At noon, 
Slough and several citizens rode down the Shell Road in 
a carriage to near the Magnolia Racetrack. With a large 
sheet as a flag of truce, Slough informed Granger that 
the Confederate troops had left the city, and he formally
Records, LHA Collection; Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 8; 
Maury to Beauregard, June 1, 1865, Maury Letter; Ketchum 
to T. Taylor, Apr. 20, 1865, with endorsements by Taylor, 
Apr. 20, 1865, Brent Collection; Maury to Taylor, Apr.
13, 1865, ibid.; Rix, Incidents of Life, [21].
^6Maury to Taylor, Apr. 12, 1865, Taylor Papers;
Rix, Incidents of Life, [22] ; Holt (ed.) , Miss Waring's 
Journal, 15.
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37surrendered to the Federals. A regiment from Granger's 
force occupied the town during the afternoon and raised 
the United States flag over the customhouse. About sun­
down, a small number of Confederate cavalry scouts made 
a quick raid on the city and captured several Federal 
soldiers. Granger then ordered an entire brigade into 
Mobile to occupy the former Confederate works. One 
citizen described the entry of these soldiers:
...The city was resonant with every patriotic 
refrain, from the Star Spangled Banner to John 
Brown's Soul is Marching On. Every one real­
ized for the first time, as he listened to the 
'tramp, tramp' of the orderly files, that 'the 
boys' had come.
Indeed, it was only the strains of tunes like 
"Yankee Doodle" and the cheers of the Federal soldiers 
that made many citizens realize that Mobile had finally 
fallen to the enemy: "...I began to realize what had
and was taking place, as before that, I had been so much
Granger to Christensen, Apr. 24, 1865, O.R., XLIX, 
Pt. 1, p. 143; Granger and Thatcher to Slough, Apr. 12, 
1865, ibid., 144; Slough to Granger and Thatcher, Apr. 12, 
1865, ibid., 144, 146; Maury to Taylor, Apr. 13, 1865, 
Brent Collection; Holt (ed.), Miss Waring's Journal, 15; 
Peter Joseph Hamilton, A Little Boy in Confederate 
Mobile (Mobile: Colonial Mobile Book Shop, 1947), 26;
Cox, ^Mobile in the War Between the States," 210.
3 8Brigadier General Elias S. Dennis to Captain 
Robert G. Curtis, Apr. 22, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p.
175; Cox, "Mobile in the War Between the States," 210-11; 
Rix, Incidents of Life, [24].
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39excited that I hardly had time for thought...." Three 
days after Lee's surrender at Appamattox Courthouse, the 
war ended for the Gulf city. Many days, however, would 
elapse before life in Mobile returned to a semblance of 
normality and even longer before she recovered something 
akin to her former status. Twelve days after the surren­
der of Mobile, a northern newspaper correspondent penned 
the following description of what the war had brought 
the city:
The city is a sad picture to contemplate.
The stores look a thousand years old. They 
wear something of the appearance of the old 
castles to be seen in some of the countries 
of Europe. They are empty and forsaken, 
except here and there an old man seated like 
some faithful sentinel at his post. Shelves 
are forsaken of their silks, and occupied 
only with the flies and the dust. The people 
look sad and sorry. The best people of the 
city are poor, and poorly clad. There is no 
money save the scrip of the confederacy. The 
people are distressed. No money except coin 
and greenbacks will pass. They have little 
of the former— none of the latter. We have 
witnessed such sorrow over this order of 
things as we do not desire again to behold.
3 9Holt (ed.), Miss Waring1s Journal, 15.
40Cincinnati Daily Commercial, May 10, 1865.
EPILOGUE
The defense of Mobile was an integral part of the 
southern war effort. Jefferson Davis certainly recog­
nized Mobile's strategic position in the Confederacy and 
strove to keep competent, trustworthy men over the terri­
torial command which included the city. He needed gen­
erals at Mobile who would not only push the construction 
of strong defenses but who would also be selfless when 
called upon to send men or supplies to other points. So 
long as Mobile's commander recognized the city's place in 
the Confederacy's overall war strategy and acted accord­
ingly, it made little difference whether he directed an 
independent department or a subordinate district. The 
president and the War Department would see that he 
received needed supplies and that he would have enough 
men to defend the city if those men were not required 
elsewhere. The command at Mobile could not have been an 
easy one to hold, however. It required patience both 
because of the demands frequently made upon it for men 
and supplies that might be needed to defend the city and 
because the position offered no opportunities for active 
service which might lead to promotion. All of the men 
who commanded at Mobile deserve credit for accepting 
their role and performing their job capably.
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For four years, the best engineering minds in the 
Confederacy— Leadbetter, Von Sheliha, Lockett, and Gilmer—  
planned, designed and supervised the construction of defen­
sive works around Mobile. Thousands of slaves toiled, 
sweated, and suffered to erect the earthworks. Engineer 
troops and Negro laborers struggled to place cannons in 
the forts, obstruct the rivers around the city with pil­
ings, and float deadly torpedoes in those rivers and Mobile 
Bay. Weeks and months of work went into arming and 
strengthening the two masonry sentinels guarding the 
entrance to the bay. With the resources available to 
them, the Confederates did everything possible to con­
struct proper defenses for the area. Despite all these 
preparations, however, the Mobile defenses fell fairly 
easily to the enemy— Fort Powell in one day, Fort Gaines 
in two days, Fort Morgan in fifteen days, Spanish Fort and 
Blakely in fifteen days, Battery Huger and Battery Tracy 
in three days, and the bay batteries and city lines with­
out a fight. Yet the Mobile defenses served a useful pur­
pose through most of the war because they undoubtedly 
helped deter an enemy attack. Thus, the tons of earth 
and masonry and hundreds of heavy guns kept the port open 
for vital blockade running activities and kept functioning 
the strategic railroad lines through the city. The fall 
of Mobile early in the war might well have been a 
crippling blow the Confederate war effort.
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APPENDIX
Mobile Confederate Military Commands
The following chart traces the chronological evolu­
tion of the military territorial commands that had the 
responsibility for the defense of Mobile and includes the 
names of commanding officers.
Confederate forces at Fort Morgan
Expanded to include Fort Gaines, Grant's Pass, 
and approaches to Mobile in April 1861. Placed 
in District of Alabama September 12, 1861. 
Colonel William J,. Hardee, March 28 , 1861.
Colonel Henry Maury, June 18, 1861.
District of Alabama
Created September 12, 1861. Placed in Depart­
ment of Alabama and West Florida October 14,
1861. Designated Army of Mobile January 27,
1862.
Brigadier General Jones M. Withers, September 12, 
1861.
Department of Alabama and West Florida
Established October 14, 1861. Discontinued 
June 27, 1862, and included in Department No.
2 (Western Department).
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Major General Braxton Bragg, October 14, 1861.
Brigadier General Samuel Jones, March 3, 1862.
Brigadier General Thomas J. Butler (temporary),
March 29, 1862.
Brigadier General Samuel Jones, April 2, 1862.
Brigadier General John H. Forney, April 28, 1862.
District of the Gulf
Established July 2, 1862, as part of Department 
No. 2 (Western Department). Transferred to 
Department of the West, November 24, 1862.
Known as Department of the Gulf June 8 , 1863- 
January 28, 1864. Merged into Department of 
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana 
January 28, 1864.
Brigadier (later Major) General John H. Forney,
July 2, 1862.
Brigadier General William W. Mackall (temporary), 
December 14, 1862.
Major General Simon B. Buckner, December 23, 1862.
Brigadier General James E. Slaughter (temporary),
May 8 , 1863.
Major General Dabney H. Maury, May 19, 1863.
Major General Franklin Gardner (temporary), August 
17, 1864.
Major General Dabney H. Maury, September 6, 1864.
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